Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003235

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00765/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

Kofi Osei-Bonsu
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Fazli, instructed by Wisemart Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant’s partner, minor son and minor step-daughter are granted anonymity and shall be referred to in these proceedings by the initials G, N and R respectively.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information likely to lead members of the public to identify G, N or R, including but not limited to their names or addresses. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 13 May 2025 dismissing his appeal on human rights grounds.
2. For the reasons set out below, we have decided that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error of law and we decline to set the decision aside.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Ghanaian national. He entered the UK on 1 November 2004 and overstayed. He formed a relationship with a British woman (‘G’) with whom he had a son (‘N’) born in 2011. The Appellant was granted leave to remain on the basis of his parental relationship, which expired on 27 November 2021. On 16 June 2023 the Appellant was convicted of sexual activity with a child (his 14-year-old stepdaughter ‘R’) and sentenced to 26 months’ imprisonment.
4. On 8 March 2023 the Respondent made a decision to deport the Appellant. The Appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 13 May 2025. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant did not have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with N and that the Appellant’s removal would not have unduly harsh consequences on N or G.
5. The Appellant’s application for permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 13 June 2025.
The Appellant’s grounds of appeal
6. The grounds of appeal on which permission was granted asserted that the First-tier Tribunal judge had erred in the following respects:
a. Ground 1: In finding that the Appellant was not credible, the judge impermissibly gave undue weight to the sentencing remarks made following the Appellant’s criminal trial;
b. Ground 2: The judge used the adverse credibility findings as the basis for undermining the Appellant’s evidence in respect of his relationship with his son N;
c. Ground 3: The judge proceeded on an erroneous factual basis when assessing the Appellant’s evidence of his relationship with N, and erred in finding that his evidence about his involvement in his son’s care was inconsistent;
d. Ground 4: The judge failed to put concerns about the Appellant’s inconsistency to the Appellant during the hearing;
e. Ground 5: The judge erred in going behind the Respondent’s concession in the deportation decision letter that the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with N;
f. Ground 6: The judge erred in giving less weight to the evidence of the Appellant’s partner G on the basis that she did not accept his guilt of the criminal offence;
g. Ground 7: The judge’s conclusion that N was not supported practically or emotionally by the Appellant was perverse in light of the evidence in the social worker’s report;
h. Ground 8: The judge’s finding at paragraph 104 that the Appellant’s removal would not have unduly harsh consequences on N was inadequately reasoned;
i. Ground 9: The judge’s assessment and rejection of the social worker’s report was inadequately reasoned.
Discussion and decision
7. Judicial caution is appropriate when considering whether to set aside the decision of a specialist tribunal of fact. A first instance determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to detailed textual analysis, and the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that the First Tier Tribunal judge has misdirected herself or failed to take a point into account: cf HA (Iraq) v SSHD[2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at §72.
8. The Appellant’s overarching submission was that the errors identified in the grounds of appeal cumulatively demonstrated that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was not fair or reasonable. For the reasons set out below, we reject that submission. We consider the grounds in turn.
Grounds 1 and 2
9. Grounds 1 and 2 assert that the First-tier Tribunal judge erred at paragraphs 91 and 92 of the decision by treating the judge’s sentencing remarks in the Appellant’s criminal trial as determinative of his credibility in his immigration appeal.
10. The sentencing remarks, an excerpt from which was quoted at paragraph 91 of the decision, were in robust terms and referred to the Appellant’s “dissembling and lies” and his “wholly unrealistic denial” of his offending in the face of compelling evidence. At paragraphs 92-93 the First-tier Tribunal judge continued:
“92. Therefore, the Appellant is someone whose evidence I approach with caution and circumspect [sic] in the light of his behaviour in criminal proceedings. He is clearly willing to lie for his own gain and in the face of such clear evidence.
93. The Appellant is vague as to how he contributes to his son’s upbringing and welfare and does not particularise what guidance or support he gives to him. Combining these features, I find his evidence weak. He gave inconsistent evidence about his involvement in taking his son to school as set out above and again this does not support his reliability or credibility.”
11. As Mr Fazli acknowledged in his submissions, the First-tier Tribunal was entitled both to take the sentencing remarks into account and to approach the Appellant’s evidence with caution in light of them. That being so, the weight to be given to the sentencing remarks (and the conduct reflected in them) was a matter for the judge.
12. It is apparent from the decision that the First-tier Tribunal judge did not treat the sentencing remarks as determinative of the Appellant’s credibility, but simply as a relevant factor in her assessment. Having heard the Appellant give oral evidence, the judge was plainly entitled to find that his evidence on a central issue in the appeal (his involvement in parenting his son) was vague, unparticularised and inconsistent. There was no error in her approach.
Grounds 3 and 4
13. Ground 3 criticised the judge’s reference at paragraph 93 to the Appellant having given “inconsistent evidence” about his involvement in his son’s care as a material error of fact.
14. The judge recorded at paragraph 90 that the Appellant’s evidence at the hearing was that he had supervised face to face contact with N at weekends and regular telephone contact. Further contact was not permitted by the terms of his licence and sex offender notification requirements. The inconsistency referred to by the judge related to whether the Appellant was, at the time of the hearing, also taking N to school or school events. Paragraph 17 of the Appellant’s witness statement stated “Prior to my imprisonment, I support [G] with school rounds and other welfare needs, [she] will lack all these if I am to leave the UK…”. Although the beginning of that paragraph referred to the Appellant’s activity prior to his imprisonment, the second part of the paragraph was in the present tense. It was perhaps understandable that the judge concluded that the Appellant’s written evidence indicated that he had present involvement in school runs and other events.
15. In reality, however, the judge’s finding that there had been an inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence was not material to her findings as to the nature and extent of the Appellant’s care for his son. The Appellant’s evidence, as Mr Fazli accepted, was that his involvement with his son at the time of the hearing was limited to weekend face to face contact and telephone contact. That was reflected in what the judge found at paragraph 90 of the decision. There was no material error in her approach.
16. The Appellant’s Ground 4 asserted that the judge should have put the alleged inconsistency to the Appellant during the hearing and allowed him to respond. However, given that the judge’s findings in fact reflected the Appellant’s evidence, and that her finding of inconsistency was not material to her decision, there was no unfairness or error in not putting the inconsistency to the Appellant during the hearing.
Ground 5
17. In the deportation decision letter, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with his son N. However, at paragraph 12(a) of the decision, the agreed list of issues included “whether the Appellant has established a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner or qualifying child…” In submissions at the end of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, the Presenting Officer initially resiled from the concession made in the decision letter but later confirmed that the Respondent did not seek to resile from it. That was recorded by the First-tier Tribunal judge at paragraph 47 of the decision.
18. The judge proceeded on the basis that she was required to determine the issue. She gave detailed consideration to the evidence of the relationship, before concluding at paragraph 101 that the Appellant did not have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with N. However, at paragraphs 103-104 the judge then went on to consider, in the alternative, whether the Appellant’s removal would have unduly harsh consequences on N and concluded that it would not.
19. Mr Fazli’s submission was that although the judge had considered the alternative position, her conclusions were infected by her failure to recognise the Respondent’s concession. He submitted that if the judge had proceeded on the correct basis (that the relationship with N was accepted), she would inevitably have concluded that the Appellant’s removal would have unduly harsh effects. The judge’s error in going behind the Respondent’s concession was therefore material to the outcome of the appeal.
20. We do not consider that is a sustainable submission on the evidence which was before the judge, and which she summarised in detail in the decision. The judge was required to consider the position as it was at the time of the hearing, with the Appellant’s contact with N limited by the conditions of his licence. On the evidence, it was entirely open to the judge to conclude, as she did at paragraphs 103-104, that N’s best interests lay in remaining in the UK in the care of his mother and with the involvement of social services, and that whilst N would suffer some pain from the cessation of his limited contact with the Appellant that did not reach the ‘unduly harsh’ threshold.
21. Although it was an error for the judge to go behind the Respondent’s concession as to whether there was a genuine and subsisting parental relationship without raising the issue with the parties, that error was not material in light of the judge’s consideration of the alternative position and her conclusion that the Appellant’s removal would in any event not have unduly harsh consequences for N.
Ground 6
22. The Appellant asserted that the First-tier Tribunal erred at paragraphs 94 and 99 of the decision by undermining the weight given to the evidence of the Appellant’s partner G on the basis that she did not accept the Appellant’s conviction. Mr Fazli’s submission was that as G had not herself been convicted of a crime, and the sole issue was whether the Appellant’s removal would have unduly harsh consequences on G, it was an error for the First-tier Tribunal judge to treat her lack of insight into the Appellant’s offending as an important factor.
23. At paragraph 94, the judge noted that G maintained that the Appellant was innocent of the offences of which he was convicted and that her daughter (the victim of the Appellant’s offending) had lied, and noted that there was no reference in G’s statement to the Appellant’s offending behaviour or its impact on either R or N. At paragraph 99, the judge referred to G as an unreliable witness.
24. As is apparent from paragraphs 95-98 of the decision, the judge treated G’s lack of insight as relevant to the weight which could be attached to the independent social worker’s report. That was because it was apparent from the report that it was largely based on what the writer had been told by the Appellant and G. Mr Fazli acknowledged in his submissions that G’s lack of insight into the Appellant’s offending was a relevant factor for the judge to consider. Again, the weight to be given to that factor was a matter for the judge. It was entirely open to the judge to find that G was an unreliable witness as to the Appellant’s role in the family, or the impact of the Appellant’s removal on N, given her refusal to acknowledge his offending and its impact on both children. There was no error in the judge’s approach.
Grounds 7 and 8
25. Ground 7 criticised the judge’s finding at paragraph 99 that the Appellant did not support N practically or emotionally, because the social worker’s report had noted that N was “effectively positive” about contact with his father and because contact between fathers and sons is in general important. Ground 8 asserted that the judge’s finding at paragraph 104 that removal would not have unduly harsh consequences on N was inadequately reasoned, because it failed to consider the fact that the Appellant was not permitted to have greater contact with N because of his conviction.
26. Neither ground has any merit. There were significant flaws with the report of the independent social worker (addressed under Ground 9 below) and it was plainly open to the judge to give the report limited weight for the reasons given in her decision. The judge was required to consider the substance of the Appellant’s relationship with N as it was at the time of the hearing, which included the obvious fact that the Appellant was only permitted limited and supervised contact with N as a direct consequence of his offending. The judge’s conclusions at paragraphs 99 and 104 were entirely open to her on the evidence and came nowhere near the perversity threshold.
Ground 9
27. Ground 9 asserted that the First-tier Tribunal’s consideration of the independent social worker’s report, and the rejection of its conclusions, were inadequately reasoned.
28. It is trite that the First-tier Tribunal must give reasons which are sufficient to enable the parties and any appellate court to understand why it reached the decision that it did. In this case, the First-tier Tribunal gave detailed consideration to the independent social worker’s report at paragraphs 95-98 of the decision. The judge set out her reasons for rejecting the views expressed in the report clearly and at length: they included the lack of documentary information provided to the writer of the report, including any medical or educational documentation; the paucity of detail regarding the Appellant’s offending or its impact on the children; the lack of particulars as to the Appellant’s involvement in N’s life; reference to N’s “suspected autism” without further details or supporting evidence; the lack of safeguards in relation to N’s telephone conversation with the social worker; the lack of exploration of N’s reluctance to speak to the social worker; and the lack of individual details relating to N’s particular circumstances.
29. The judge’s consideration of the report, and the reasons given for rejecting the views of the report writer, were more than adequate to explain her conclusions, which were entirely open to her. There was no error in her approach.
Conclusion
30. Even taking the Appellant’s grounds cumulatively, there was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s approach or its conclusions.
31. We therefore decline to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 November 2025