Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003241
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/57007/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

ESTER TITA AJALA
(No ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Emmanuel Ajala, legal representative at Legal Matters Firm Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at the Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 7 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. I am remaking the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 11 September 2024 refusing her application for leave to remain pursuant to Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules.

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria. She states that because she is the adult child of Mr Charles Reuben (a German national resident in the UK) and dependent upon him then her application to the Secretary of State ought to have succeeded.

Appeal at the First-tier Tribunal and Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

3. The Appellant’s appeal had been considered by First-tier Tribunal Judge Rea on 30 May 2025. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the Judge by way of a decision dated 5 June 2025.

4. The Appellant had appealed against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. That appeal had then been considered by a panel of the Upper Tribunal comprising Upper Tribunal Judge Rimmington and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge O’Ryan dated. In a decision allowing the appeal dated 28 January 2926, the panel had observed that the legal avenue that the Appellant was required to satisfy was as follows:

“The specific route relied upon was that under paragraph EU14, condition 1, where the applicant is a ‘family member’ of the relevant EEA citizen, with reference to the definition of ‘family member of an EEA citizen’ within Appendix 1, which includes at (c) ‘child’; and ‘child’ being separately defined as persons including at (b)(i) ‘a direct descendant aged 21 years or over of a relevant EEA citizen and…dependent on the relevant EEA citizen at the date of application’. The term ‘dependent’ is separately defined as: ‘having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot… meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (etc)’.”

The Hearing Before Me

5. The panel had retained the matter at the Upper Tribunal and pursuant to a transfer order, the matter came before me. At the hearing before me, I dealt with preliminary matters, including that there was a 113 paged bundle and an original bundle of 116 pages. Mr Ajala said he was also seeking to rely on a further late supplementary bundle. I provided an ex tempore judgment rejecting the application for the admission of the very late bundle which was not provided in compliance with the directions previously ordered. I concluded it was not in the interest of justice to admit the late evidence and in any event, it would not further the overriding objective. Procedural rigour meant that the Appellant’s legal representatives had to have a good reason for filing evidence so late. The reason provided that the Appellant herself provided the evidence late did not persuade me to admit the late evidence.

6. I heard oral evidence from the Appellant and from Mr Reuben. The Appellant adopted her witness statement dated 12 March 2025. There was some confusion from the Appellant in respect of her name. She was interposing her middle and surname. It seems clear to me that the Appellant uses her first, middle and surnames interchangeably.

7. In examination in chief the Appellant referred to page 56 of the 113 paged bundle and said that her friend purchased the item referred to there because it was her birthday. She said that no one else had purchased items for her.

8. In cross examination the Appellant said that he had moved into her father’s home in Barking in July 2023. She said that she had been staying with her father and she was looking for a job. She was asked why she had not provided a CV or job applications. She said that she had registered with various agencies and that she had submitted them with various job applications. She did not know why the CV was not included as part of her bundle.

9. The Appellant said that she had provided copies of her Monzo bank account. She said that no one else uses that account. The Appellant was asked about saying at the previous hearing that she had been working since January 2025 and has been living in Liverpool. She said she had not said that she had started work in January 2025. She said she had started a part time job in April 2025.

10. The Appellant was asked where her wages for that part time job are paid into. She said that the wages were paid into her Monzo account but that she had not been asked to provide details of that bank account.

11. The Appellant said that when she was previously working as a carer up to the middle of 2023, her salary for that work was paid into the same Monzo bank account.

12. The Appellant said that the Monzo account was the only bank account that she has had. The Appellant said that she was not working at present and had stopped work in January 2026.

13. The Appellant was asked why her salary for her work did not appear in the disclosed Monzo bank account statements. The Appellant said she did not know. Pressed on this, the Appellant said she did not know why that was so.

14. The Appellant was asked about an item that she had been purchased for her as a birthday present. She was referred to pages 56 to 58 of the bundle. She was asked why the person who allegedly paid for the item lived on the same street (redacted “W” Street). The Appellant said that despite it saying the billing address for her friend was the same as her street, the friend used her address as the delivery address. She said this was so she could get the items directly. She was asked why there was a separate “shipping address”. The Appellant insisted that it was possible to put the delivery address as the shipping address even if the billing address for the payer was different from the delivery address.

15. The Appellant was asked why she was shopping in Dartford which was some 20 miles away from her father’s address in Barking. She said she met friends there and went shopping there.

16. In re-examination the Appellant said that she did not go to particular shops in Dartford. She went that area because she liked that area.

17. In response to my questions for clarification and which were followed up with questions from the advocates, the Appellant said that in respect of page 58 the payment card used had worked even with a billing address which was different to her friend’s address.

18. Mr Charles Reuben then provided evidence. He adopted his witness statement dated 11 March 2025 as his examination in chief. In cross examination he said that the Appellant had moved to Barking in January 2023. He said that she had moved to Manchester and that he had promised to take care of the Appellant. He said the Appellant had moved out of his home in January 2025. He said he did know know how many bank accounts the Appellant had but he thought she had one bank account. He said he did not know into which bank account her wages were paid into. He said she was an adult and over 18 years of age.

19. Mr Reuben said that when the Appellant was living in Barking, she would go with friends to Dartford. He said he would occasionally drop her off there too. He said she liked shopping there. He gave his own example of buying shoes from certain shops in central London as he prefers going there.

20. Mr Reuben said he was unable to assist with copies of the Appellant’s bank statements and why there were no transactions in her bank statements of purchases in Barking. He said he did not know anything about it. There was no re-examination.

21. I then heard closing submissions, first from Mr Tan on behalf of the Respondent. He relied on the skeleton argument which had been previously provided. Mr Tan highlighted that a significant number of expenses were missing from the schedule. He said the failure to provide evidence of the job searching profile was not provided but was relevant for the history of where the Appellant had actually been living. Mr Tan said that the Appellant had only provided a limited selection of her Monzo bank statements for the period from July 2023 to 2024. The Appellant had been employed in 2023 and then in 2025. She had moved to Liverpool in the early months of 2025. Mr Tan pointed out that there were earlier Monzo bank statement and then later ones at page 105 onwards in the bundle but none showed the actual wages. The full picture was not being provided by the Appellant. Mr Tan submitted that there were also the ‘murky issues’ in respect of the Temu purchase by the ‘friend’. He said it was not credible that the friend purchased the item with the shipping address being the same as the payment card address. Mr Tan also referred to the Monzo bank statements showing shopping in Kent some 20 miles from the Appellant’s father’s home. He highlighted that nowhere was it possible to see transport costs. He said that there was no credible account of the living arrangements and this was not a genuine case of dependence. He said the Appellant had failed to provide another source of income. Mr Tan said that not even the Temu purchase was in the Monzo bank account statements. Mr Tan said that the purchases within the disclosed Monzo bank statements were not in the geographical area that the Appellant said she lives in. There were payments at Tesco and KFC and were are all over the London area and in locations around 20 miles away regularly and so the Appellant was not living in Barking area. Mr Tan said that because there was likely to be another bank account then it showed that the Appellant was not actually dependant on the sponsor.

22. In his closing submissions Mr Ajala said that he relied on his skeleton argument. He said that the previous directions had asked the parties to address the ‘relevant date’ and he said that the relevant date was 10 April 2024. That was the date of the application. He said that the Appellant’s evidence was that she became dependent on her father when she lost her job as the Appellant’s previous employer had lost its licence. The termination letter was at page 43 of the bundle and was dated 14 July 2023. Mr Ajala said that the schedule of outgoings on page 54 showed that between July 2023 and April 2024 the Appellant’s evidence was that she was not working and was not receiving salary and so there was no salary within those bank statements. Mr Ajala said that it was not relevant that the Appellant eventually started working in January 2025 to April 2025, Mr Ajala said that between July 2023 and April 2024 it was the Appellant’s evidence that she was not working, but she was actively looking for work.

23. In view of the issues highlighted by Mr Tan, I thought it appropriate to invite Mr Ajala to seek bank statements from the Appellant of her online Monzo bank account. I therefore adjourned the matter to enable that to be done.

24. When the matter resumed at 12.30pm, Mr Ajala said that he had asked the Appellant for the Monzo bank statements “…but she does not have access to those bank statements right now.” Mr Ajala made clear that he was only representing the Appellant and was acting in her best interests but he was not and would not suppress evidence. Mr Ajala said the Appellant could not access the evidence today. He said the Appellant had told him that her online account was an App on her mobile telephone but that her mobile telephone was at home. She said that was in Liverpool and the hearing was taking place in Manchester. I therefore adjourned the matter until later in the day to enable the Appellant to be able to access her mobile telephone and the Appellant could forward her Monzo bank statements to her legal representative once she arrived in Liverpool.

25. I resumed the hearing at around 2.10pm but Mr Ajala was not immediately available. I therefore put the case back until 3pm. Mr Ajala informed me that the Sponsor had remained at the hearing centre and that he had been in touch with the Appellant by mobile telephone. The Appellant had informed the Sponsor that she had not yet reached Liverpool. I asked how it was that the communication was taking place and I was informed that the Sponsor had called the Appellant on her mobile telephone. I enquired how that was possible if the Appellant said she had left her mobile telephone at home in Liverpool, yet she had not yet reached home to retrieve it. Mr Ajala said that the mobile telephone in Liverpool was a different mobile telephone.

26. I invited Mr Ajala to telephone the Appellant. He informed me had done so twice previously but on both occasions the call went to voicemail. Because the Sponsor had been successful in getting through to the Appellant using his telephone. I invited Mr Ajala to telephone the Appellant using the Sponsor’s telephone. The Sponsor agreed and so I put the matter back for that purpose. I also invited Mr Ajala to ask the Appellant to send her Monzo bank statements via WhatsApp to Mr Ajala/the Sponsor so that the Respondent and I could see them.

27. Upon return Mr Ajala said that he had not been able to get through to the Appellant. Mr Ajala said that the Sponsor had spoken with the Appellant at 2.19pm. She had sent a text at 2.19pm to him too. I therefore invited them to text the Appellant. On return I was informed that the Appellant was sent a text message from the Sponsor’s telephone but there had been no reply from the Appellant.

28. Mr Ajala said that he was not sure why the Appellant was not responding to the numerous calls and text messages. Mr Ajala said he acknowledged that it was his client’s case to provide. He said that I had been more than fair in permitting the Appellant this much time. He was inviting me to conclude the hearing and to make a decision on the evidence available.

29. Mr Tan said that I had been more than generous to give the Appellant most of the day to address that issue but nothing had been forthcoming.

30. To be even fairer I thought it appropriate to give the Appellant an opportunity to provide the missing Monzo bank statements. Additionally, she was to provide evidence of the payment of the Temu item in respect of the Visa payment. This was to be done by 4pm on 8 April 2026. Certified copies were to be provided. Mr Ajala stressed I was being extremely fair in allowing this opportunity, but I thought it is necessary to do so. Especially since it was possible that there was a mishap with travel or the like.

31. I was provided on 8 April 2026 with an e-mail from Mr Ajala. He had merely forwarded the Appellant’s e mail. The Appellant makes clear in that e-mail that she is not pleased that she is continually being asked for documents and she feels it is not possible for her to provide them in the timescales asked of her. She does not appear to explain why she could not simply have forwarded the documents that she claimed to have on her mobile telephone. That was ‘all’ she had do on the day of the hearing and it was the reason she went to her home to retrieve her other mobile telephone.

32. Despite waiting in case any further documents were to be provided, nothing further has been provided by the Appellant thereafter. I therefore provide this, my reserved judgment in this matter.

Consideration and Analysis
33. I decide the case on the balance of probabilities with the information before me.

34. The issue is one of dependency. Whilst the date of application is indeed the relevant date, the Appellant must show that she was genuinely dependent, even in part. The difficulty which arises is that it is abundantly clear that the Appellant has failed to show where her salary or wages were actually being paid. As Mr Tan has highlighted, it is clear that there is almost certainly another bank account that the Appellant has failed to disclose. At the very least the Appellant has income and savings higher than she has disclosed within her carefully selected and filleted dates of her Monzo bank statements.

35. It is clear to me that the Appellant has known full well what is required of her and she has deliberately failed to provide the necessary evidence. The burden of proof is on her. Just as Mr Ajala said. I had taken the precaution of giving the Appellant an opportunity to provide the bank statements throughout the day of the hearing. It remains strange why she was failing to respond to telephone calls and text messages on the day.

36. Even if there was a good reason for the Appellant failing to respond, the failure thereafter to provide the Monzo bank statements makes it clear to me that the Appellant cannot be believed in terms of her claim of dependency, even if partial dependency. I do not accept her oral evidence, supported only by partial disclosure of her Monzo bank statements. The true and complete picture both before and after the relevant date was necessary because it would have provided that true and complete picture. The suppression by the Appellant of easy to produce online bank statements at the hearing was curious. It is odd that she had a mobile telephone all along but said she had to go home to get it. Even if there really was a different mobile telephone that she had forgotten and left at home, the Appellant had ample time to provide those online Monzo bank statements.

37. I simply cannot ignore that it is very easy to forward online bank statements from a bank account via WhatsApp or e-mail. I appreciate that some people find it difficult to do so because they may not have access to mobile telephones or computers, but there is no such issues with this Appellant. Indeed, as the Appellant confirmed during her evidence to me, Monzo is an online bank account in any event and requires the holder of the account to be able to access their account online.

38. Indeed, the Respondent had further put the Appellant on notice of what was required. I refer to paragraph 21 above.

39. Even making every allowance for the Appellant and even when trying to provide her with opportunities on the day of the hearing and thereafter to provide the necessary documents, she has failed to do so. The Appellant has known for several months that the burden of proof is on her. In my judgment it is abundantly clear that the Appellant clearly has many more transactions on her Monzo bank account which she has failed to disclose. In my judgment she has failed to do so because those transactions will show that she is not dependant on Mr Reuben, not even partially. In my judgment, it is also clear to the required standard of proof that the Appellant also has a different bank account and she has deliberately failed to disclose that too. She has calculated that she would not provide details of those accounts to the respondent and to me because it will show that she is not, even partially, dependant on Mr Reuben.

40. Therefore, in my judgment, the Appellant’s case must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.

I remake the decision.

The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

22 May 2026