Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025‑003264
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04037/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 26th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ATHWAL

Between

DL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Philips of Counsel, Wilson Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission to appeal from the Upper Tribunal, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. On 6 May 2025 the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) refused the Appellant’s appeal against the decision refusing his asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant is a national of Brazil. He entered the United Kingdom on 31 January 2023 with leave to enter as a visitor. During 2023 he made two applications under the EU Settlement Scheme, both of which were refused. On 22 August 2024 he was arrested as an overstayer, and on 27 August 2024 he claimed asylum. That claim was refused on 27 September 2024.
3. The Appellant states that he fears the Primeiro Comando da Capital (“PCC”). He attributes this to a brief relationship with a woman, (“C”), whose former husband (“S”) is said to have been a PCC member. He further asserts a risk of harm from a non‑state agent, a moneylender (“CE”), to whom he owes an outstanding debt.
4. The Appellant relies on medical evidence indicating diagnoses of anxiety, depression, and post‑traumatic stress disorder. He contends that his mental health condition would amount to a very significant obstacle to his reintegration were he to return to Brazil.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The Judge heard the appeal on 6 May 2025 and made the following findings;
i) She accepted the expert evidence indicating that, in the Appellant’s home area and in those areas where the PCC exert significant dominance, the threshold for persecution on political opinion or particular social group grounds was met.

ii) She found the Appellant’s account to be implausible and inconsistent in several respects, including:

a) It was unlikely that C, if aware that her former partner was associated with PCC, either as a member or leader, would have exposed the Appellant and herself to risk by openly bringing him to a large family gathering. The Appellant’s account was at odds with the expert evidence concerning PCC reprisals for perceived dishonour [13]-[20],[28]

b) The Appellant gave an inconsistent explanation regarding how he knew S was involved with PCC. He failed to disclose in his asylum interview that his brother had made enquiries about S’s alleged involvement with PCC. [31]-[33]

c) The Appellant’s assertion that PCC were unable to locate him when he was in hiding was undermined by the expert evidence concerning the organisation’s influence and extensive reach. [42],[44]

d) Delay in claiming asylum constituted behaviour falling within section 8, which weighed against his credibility.[39]

iii) The Respondent’s decision to remove the Appellant was proportionate. The Appellant did not meet the requirements of Appendix Private Life. The Appellant had not established the existence of very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Brazil: he had spent most of his life there; spoke the language; and had family support available. Any private life established in the United Kingdom was afforded little weight owing to his precarious immigration status. [53]-[54]
Issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. Permission to appeal was granted on application to the Upper Tribunal on the following basis;
“2. The first ground challenges the FTT’s credibility assessment, for six different reasons. Four relate to a plausibility finding made at [18]-[20] and [28] (this is the second set of paragraphs with these numbers, as the paragraphing resets itself on page 18 of the decision). This finding is that it was not plausible that the appellant’s partner C would have risked disclosing their relationship by inviting him to a barbecue if her ex-husband was a leader of the PCC gang. The four errors in this regard are a mistake of fact about whether the ex-husband was a member or a leader of the PCC gang; the assessment of plausibility without taking into account the country context; irrationally placing weight on the appellant’s failure to explain C’s behaviour; and finding an inconsistency with the expert evidence without pointing to what aspect of the evidence was relied on and when in fact nothing in the expert evidence was relevant to the point.
3. Most of what is said under this ground is not arguable. When the decision is read as a whole, it is clear that the FTT has expressly done what the grounds say it did not: namely, place the plausibility assessment within the country context. The finding that C would not have invited the appellant to a barbecue if her ex-husband was in the PCC follows directly after extensive quotations from the expert report to the effect that the identity of PCC members is known in their community and that the partners of PCC members who are perceived as having abandoned them while they are in prison face real risks of inhuman and degrading treatment and even murder. Nor does the FTT place undue weight on the appellant’s inability to explain C’s conduct; the FTT gave the appellant an opportunity to explain what appeared to it – in light of the country evidence – to be implausible but was not persuaded by the explanation. The details of that exchange are set out at [8]-[11]. It is clear that it was the expert evidence that was driving the implausibility finding throughout.
4. As to the issue of whether the C’s ex-partner was a leader or a member of the PCC, this cannot have been material, as the FTT considers the issue in the alternative basis that he was a member of the PCC at [28] and [45].
5. However, it is just arguable that the FTT erred in placing as much weight as it did on the single plausibility finding about C having invited the appellant to a barbecue. This finding is returned to repeatedly throughout the decision, and there are few other adverse credibility points (other than section 8). The only internal inconsistency the FTT noted in the appellant’s evidence was about the enquiries he had made about C’s ex-husband at [33] and this was, arguably, erroneous for the reasons detailed at ground two.
6. The second ground is that the FTT made a material error of fact in finding the appellant’s account to have been inconsistent. This appears to be arguable, in that the FTT may have relied here on the RFRL’s excerpts from the appellant’s answers at his interview, rather than on the appellant’s actual answers. That the FTT fell into such an error is made more likely by the structure of the decision, which proceeds repeatedly by reference to block quotes from the RFRL.
7. The third ground is that the FTT’s finding about the reach of the PCC gang was irrational. This is less persuasive, as it would appear to rest on a disagreement with the FTT’s assessment of the expert country evidence, but I do not limit the grounds.
8. The fourth ground challenges the article 8 assessment for several reasons: failure to make a finding as to the proportionality of removal, mistake of fact about the medical evidence, and failure to take into relevant account medical evidence. It is not arguable that the FTT failed to carry out a proportionality assessment. It did, at [54]. However, it is arguable that the FTT failed to take into account the medical evidence in that assessment, and that it was required to do so, given that it was a central element of his private life claim (as noted at [12]).”
The Hearing
7. I heard submissions from Ms Philips and Mr Lindsay. Ms Philip relied on the grounds of permission application, restricted to the grounds upon which the Appellant had been granted permission to appeal. Mr Lindsay relied on the Respondent’s response to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24. I reserved my decision.
Findings
8. The parties agreed that grounds 1, 2 and 3 were linked to the credibility assessment conducted by the Judge and the issue was whether cumulatively these errors established a material error of law.
9. The issue of whether the Judge erred in attaching significant weight to the Appellant’s account of attending the barbeque is connected to whether the Judge considered that account in the round with all other evidence provided. It is therefore appropriate to firstly consider the second and third ground.
Ground 2
10. Ms Philips submitted that the Respondent had selectively quoted from the Appellant’s answer to question 130 of the asylum interview. The interview records;
130. Question (required)
How did you know the ex-husband was associated with the PCC, what evidence did you have of this?

130. Response (required)
I don't have any evidence, but the cousin said he was part of the PCC. When my brother talked to some people about it, they confirmed he was a member of the PCC but I have no evidence.”
11. The refusal letter recorded only that C’s family had informed the Appellant that S was associated with PCC and that the Appellant confirmed he had no evidence to support this. It failed to record that the Appellant’s brother had also made enquiries.
12. The Judge extracted the aforementioned passage from the refusal letter and quoted it at [31] of her decision. At [32] the Judge stated, “I note the Appellant didn’t say, in answer to the above, that his brother made enquiries, when this would have been the most obvious answer. His mental health does not explain why he would not have explained the same. I give this negative weight.” Ms Philips submitted that the Judge failed to identify the error in the refusal letter and treated the error of fact as part of the credibility assessment.
13. Mr Lindsay argued that the Judge did not make an error of fact. At [29] of the decision, the Judge demonstrated that she was aware of the correct answer by reference to question 130 of the interview and to the brother’s enquiries regarding S’s connection to the PCC. Mr Lindsay submitted that, when the decision was read from [28] to [33], it was clear that the Judge set out the evidence at [29] and then continued to address the Respondent’s claim concerning the alleged inconsistency at [32].
14.  I reject Mr Lindsay’s submission. It does not address the fact that, when considering the issue of inconsistency, the Judge found the Appellant’s accounts to be inconsistent when they were not. The Judge stated that the Appellant’s failure to mention his brother’s enquiries led her to attach negative weight to his account. This was incorrect because the Appellant did provide that answer in response to question 130. I therefore find that the Judge made a factual error when she concluded that the Appellant had given inconsistent evidence regarding how he discovered S’s links to PCC.
15. I am also satisfied that the Judge made inconsistent findings. At [29] of her decision, the Judge found that the Appellant’s answer at question 130 was consistent with the expert evidence. Her subsequent finding at [32] contradicts her findings at [29], and no explanation is offered in the decision for that change in position.
16. I turn to consider whether this error is material and I am satisfied that it is. The Appellant’s account of how he discovered S’s links to PCC are a material part of his claim because his asserted fear arises from S’s membership of this gang. The factual error at [32] together with the inconsistent findings, led the Judge to place weight on a matter that was wrongly treated as materially undermining the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
Ground 3
17. Ms Philips argued that, when assessing the credibility of the Appellant’s account, the Judge took into consideration his explanation as to how he was able to hide from PCC for four weeks. She submitted that the Judge’s findings regarding the reach of PCC were irrational, as the Judge failed to take into account that the Appellant was moving between locations and taking extreme measures to avoid detection.
18. I do not accept Ms Philips submissions that the Judge’s findings are irrational for the following reasons. The Judge relied on the expert and country evidence which suggested that the power and reach of PCC was such that a person who is of adverse interest would be unable to escape their reach. The expert confirmed that he had considered all the accounts pertaining to the Appellant’s historical claim. At [v.(1.32)] the expert states, “PCC operates throughout Brazil and is the most powerful criminal organisation on a regional scale, it is certain that they would be able to track down an individual they were targeting, whether in Bahia, São Paulo, Maranhão, or any other location within national territory.” Ms Philips did not refer me to the expert or country evidence that suggested that this assessment would not apply to someone attempting to hide from the PCC. The Judge was entitled to take this assessment into consideration when assessing the credibility of the Appellant’s account. Ms Philips has therefore failed to establish that the Judge’s findings are irrational.
Ground 1
19. I return to the first ground of appeal and the issue of whether the Judge erred in according significant weight to the single plausibility finding concerning C’s decision to invite the Appellant to a barbeque despite the likelihood that S would become aware of their relationship.
20. When assessing the credibility of the Appellant’s claim, the Judge relied upon a number of factors: her conclusion regarding the plausibility of C’s invitation; her finding that the Appellant had given an inconsistent account of how he learned that S was a member of PCC; the Appellant’s description of avoiding PCC for four weeks; and the adverse inference under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.
21. In reaching her conclusion, the Judge placed weight on a material factual error, namely her finding that the Appellant had given inconsistent accounts of how he knew that S was associated with PCC. That finding was itself inconsistent with her earlier conclusion that the Appellant’s account was consistent with the expert evidence. The Judge erred by firstly treating this aspect of the evidence as inconsistent; and secondly in making inconsistent findings about this evidence.
22. In consequence, the Judge did not correctly evaluate the actual evidence in the round. There is a real risk that the factual error increased the weight attached to the plausibility finding concerning the barbeque. Taken together, these matters led to a failure properly to consider all the evidence cumulatively. I therefore find that the Judge made a material error of law.
Ground 4- Article 8
23. The Appellant’s Article 8 private life claim and protection claim arise from the same factual matrix. It follows that it is unnecessary to consider ground 4 as Article 8 will need to be considered afresh.
Conclusion
24. I am therefore satisfied that these errors of law materially impacted the Judge’s decision and that this should be set aside. It follows that the Appellant has established that the Judge’s decision is infected by an error on a point of law.
Disposal
25. The parties urged me to remit the matter to the FTT. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:   
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:    
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or    
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.   
26. It appears to me to be fair and just to remit this matter to the FTT because the Appellant has been deprived of a fair hearing before the FTT. The appropriate venue is the FTT on remittal.
Notice of Decision
The Judge’s decision involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety and preserve no findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to hear the appeal de novo.

H.Athwal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 March 2026