Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003274
UI-2025-003919

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/54187/2024
LP/12279/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

FM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms M Garman, counsel instructed by My UK Visas Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal following a hearing which took place on 3 June 2025.
Anonymity
2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. I have considered the public interest in open justice, but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of Albania now aged 30. He left Albania in 2014 with assistance of a gang, spending one and a half years in Belgium and two years in France where he undertook various forms of work arranged by those who brought him to Europe. In 2018 he was brought to the United Kingdom clandestinely from France in order to undertake work in a cannabis house, against his will. In the conclusive Grounds decision dated 31 March 2023, the Single Competent Authority accepted that the appellant was a victim of modern slavery for the purpose of forced criminality, in France and the United Kingdom from 2018 until 23 January 2019.
4. The basis of his protection claim was set out in a Preliminary Information Questionnaire (PIQ), which was completed by his current representatives on his behalf; the interview records and the witness statement dated 17 May 2024, prepared for his appeal. In essence, the appellant stated that he feared for his life if returned to Albania because the people who brought him to the United Kingdom were after the money he owed them and he did not have the money to pay them.
5. That claim was refused in a decision dated 5 February 2024. While the appellant’s identity and nationality were accepted, along with him being a victim of trafficking, the respondent considered that the credibility of the appellant’s account was undermined owing to his failure to claim asylum in France and Belgium, that it was not reasonable that he was allowed to walk around in Belgium by those who had brought him there and that it was difficult to understand how he did not make the authorities in those countries aware of what was going on. Furthermore, the respondent did not accept that the appellant having been a victim of modern slavery would result in persecution in Albania owing to the evidence in the CPIN. It was also considered that the appellant’s education and work history reduced the risk ‘significantly.’ It was further considered that he could seek sufficient protection in Albania or relocate to another region of the country. As for the Article 8 claim, the respondent concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Albania, it being noted that he was not receiving medical treatment for his mental health symptoms.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. At the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the following were the agreed issues in dispute.
a) whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm on return to Albania;
b) would there be sufficiency of State protection available to him;
c) is there a reasonable and safe option of internal relocation on return;
d) does section 8(4) of the 2004 Act apply (and presumably, if so, to what effect); and
e) does the Respondent’s decision give rise to a breach of the duty owed to the Appellant under either Article 3 or Article 8 of the European Convention on medical grounds.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows: -
Ground 1: Failure to Recognise Male Victims of Trafficking as a Particular Social Group (PSG).
Ground 2: Speculative and Irrational Findings on Risk from Traffickers.
Ground 3: Failure to Apply the Correct Lower Standard of Proof (Karanakaran).
Ground 4: Improper Reliance on Delay and Screening Interview, Contrary to Trafficking Guidance.
Ground 5: Procedural Unfairness in Rejection of Expert Medical Evidence (Dr Akinola’s Report).
Ground 6: Misapplication of Country Guidance and CPIN – Risk and Mental Health Factors.
8. Permission to appeal was granted on the first ground alone by the First-tier Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal subsequently granted permission on all remaining grounds.
9. The respondent filed two Rule 24 responses dated 25 July 2025 and 7 November 2025 in which the appeal was robustly opposed.
The error of law hearing
10. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted on behalf of the appellant on the day of the hearing containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. An appellant’s skeleton argument dated 29 December 2025 was also uploaded on the day of the hearing.
11. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
12. Ms Garman raised a preliminary issue which she had not had time to raise earlier owing to the very late instructions she had received in this matter. She explained that she had been instructed that the appellant had been trafficked from Albania to France and not just from France to the United Kingdom. As the National Referral Mechanism decision was silent on the earlier journey, she requested time to obtain the underlying documents to find out if that had been considered. Ms Garman explained that this material was relevant to the judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not trafficked from Albania. The matter was put back in the list to allow Ms Garman and Mr Nappey to make enquiries as to the availability of any minutes and to locate the Reasonable Grounds decision. Neither of these items could be obtained in the short-term and Ms Garman stated that she had been instructed to proceed and to rely on the skeleton argument drafted by Arta Heath of MyUKVisas.
13. At the end of Ms Garman’s submissions, Mr Nappey stated that he had received the Positive Reasonable Grounds minutes and decision minute, redacted in places, and circulated them by email after seeking permission to disclose them. Ms Garman was given time to consider them and make submissions.
14. Ms Garman submitted that the documents demonstrated that it was only the appellant’s journey from France to the UK which was analysed and that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in concluding that SCA had found against the appellant’s account of being trafficked from Albania.
15. In response to my comment that there was some inconsistency in the account provided by the appellant as to the circumstances in which he left Albania, Ms Garman drew my attention to the clarification provided by the appellant to the SCA which was recorded in the minutes.
16. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
17. I will address the grounds in the order in which they were presented by the parties. Grounds 2 and 4 were combined. Ms Garman argued that the judge made unsustainable findings that the appellant was not at future risk in Albania.
18. The judge’s notes at [17] of the decision and reasons that there was no finding by the SCA that the appellant was trafficked other than from France to the United Kingdom.
In doing so I note, however, that the trafficking the Authority found was from France to the UK and not any other part of his history from Albania onwards
19. The judge concluded, at [18] that the appellant was not at risk of persecution and ill-treatment in Albania on the basis of being trafficked which are replicated here for completeness.
It is the Appellant’s account, in so far as I understand it, that he was trafficked by Romanians acting behalf of one or more Albanians. This uncertainty is compounded that the Appellant stated in his substantive asylum interview that he did not know who the traffickers were. It was his belief that they were seeking him in the UK but he did not know this. He had had no contact with anyone since he was detected by the police in this country working in a cannabis farm. The Appellant says that his fear from the people who trafficked him is heightened because they must know that he gave evidence to the police in this country. This is somewhat undermined by the fact that he agrees that he cannot name them or otherwise identify them. I find as a fact that he is not being sought by persons who trafficked him previously.
20. The findings at [18] were open to the judge, as far as they went. In that it was not irrelevant for the judge to consider that the appellant’s inability to identify his traffickers might reduce the information that he could provide to the UK police. Yet the judge has not engaged with the appellant’s claim that he was trafficked from Albania to begin with. Indeed at [22] the judge repeats that the appellant was not trafficked from Albania and has materially erred in failing to assess this claim and, if accepted, failing to take it into consideration in assessing risk.
21. The judge correctly considered, at [20], that the appellant said in his screening interview, when asked why had not claimed asylum in Belgium or France, that he had ‘come to the United Kingdom for a better life originally and not to claim asylum,’ and noting that he had three brothers in the United Kingdom.
22. The decision minutes served by Mr Nappey highlight that initially there were discrepant descriptions of the date of, and circumstances of departure provided by the appellant to the SCA in the context of his trafficking claim which may go some way to explaining why no conclusion was reached as to whether the appellant had been trafficked from Albania.
23. In his SEF which took place in January 2024, the appellant mentioned being exploited in Tirana, Albania where he went to look for work and being ‘put to work’ in Europe, in construction, car washes or in the fast-food industry. He also goes into some detail regarding his documents being confiscated after he was trafficked out of Albania, being threatened and ill-treated by the people who put him to work.
24. Apart from the error in neglecting to take account of the appellant’s claim that he was trafficked out of Albania in considering risk, these factors were not considered in relation to the criticism of the appellant for the delay in or failure to seek asylum. At [19], the judge says that ‘I cannot accept that during the period of 3 ½ years, whilst living in either Belgium or France, the Appellant had no opportunity to place himself in the hands of the authorities in one or other or both of those countries.’ Given that there was evidence before judge as to the appellant having been trafficked from Albania, that evidence should have assessed on the lower standard. I accept Ms Garman’s submission that the failure of the judge to look at that aspect of the claim infected the credibility assessment. The appellant’s failure seek asylum ought to have been considered in the context of the circumstances he stated that he was in. Alternatively, consideration should have been given to the claims of trafficking from Albania, and if rejected, adequate reasons provided.
25. Turning to the fifth ground, there is some merit in Ms Garman’s submission that the judge made the classic Mibanga error of concluding the assessment of credibility before turning his attention to the medical evidence. That evidence amounted to a psychiatric report which diagnosed the appellant with PTSD, adjustment disorder and risk of suicide.
26. The judge at [27] accepted that the psychiatrist was an expert in mental health issues and further accepted the specific diagnoses made. Nonetheless, the conclusions of the doctor as to the likelihood of the appellant accessing help or having an increased risk of suicide in Albania were rejected because the report was based on an hour-long remote consultation.
27. It is plainly contradictory for the judge to accept the majority of the report notwithstanding any shortcomings with the manner in which the consultation took place but to use that reason to reject the doctor’s expert opinion. Furthermore, the medical evidence was considered separately from the judge’s findings on credibility and as such there was a lack of context to the answers given by the appellant, particularly during his screening interview. It was also not helpful for the judge to substitute his opinion for that of the doctor at [32] where the judge concluded that the appellant’s mental health issues were ‘most likely to be because of his immigration problems.’
28. While there are further three grounds, which are not lacking merit, which could be discussed, I find that the material errors set out above suffice to render the decision of the First-tier Tribunal unsafe. I conclude that without these errors another judge could have arrived at a different conclusion as to the credibility of the appellant’s account and the medical evidence.
29. I canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking and both were of the view that the matter ought to be remitted if there were no preserved findings of fact. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements.
30. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the appellant was deprived of an adequate consideration of his protection appeal. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by another judge.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 January 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email.