Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003283

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/69487/2024
LP/02901/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

SJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Khan, Counsel instructed by Morden Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who came to the UK in 2022 on a visit visa. She is Christian. She claims that it would unsafe for her to return to Pakistan because (a) she has been threatened by a travel agent who owes her money; and (b) the travel agent falsely accused her of blasphemy and filed a police complaint against her.
2. The appellant applied for asylum. Her application was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 16 August 2024 (“the SSHD decision”). She appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where her appeal came before JFTT Malik (“the judge”). In a decision dated 27 May 2025 (“the FtT decision”) the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against the FtT decision.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
3. The judge, in paragraph 12 of the FtT decision, summarised the issue in dispute as follows:
“The issue is of credibility as whilst the respondent accepts the appellant is of adverse interest to the travel agents, it is not accepted there is a blasphemy allegation/charge against her. The appellant’s representative argued the appellant wants to practice her faith freely in Pakistan, this places her at risk and the respondent failed to consider it. This was disputed by the respondent’s representative given what is recorded in the asylum interview. Nonetheless, I can deal with it as part of this appeal.”
4. The judge found that the appellant had not been truthful about there being a blasphemy allegation against her. He described this aspect of her claim as being “fabricated” and a “false asylum claim”. In paragraph 16 the judge states:
“The respondent accepts the appellant is a MPSG as a lone woman and is of adverse attention to the travel agents in Pakistan – but it is not accepted she is at risk on return as the individuals she claims to fear are non-state actors and there would be sufficient protection available from the authorities. It is the appellant's claim that she is at risk from the authorities as blasphemy charges/allegations have been made against her. Having considered the evidence, I find the appellant has fabricated her claim to form what I find the be a false asylum, claim for the reasons set out below.”
Grounds of Appeal
5. There are five grounds of appeal. Grounds 1 – 3 and 5 concern the judge not accepting the appellant’s claim that a blasphemy charge has been made against her. The appellant contends that the respondent conceded this point and that it was not open to the judge to go behind the concession without the concession being withdrawn.
6. As I am persuaded by the arguments in grounds 1-3 and 5, it has not been necessary to consider the other ground of appeal.
Analysis
7. The judge identified as an issue in dispute whether a blasphemy allegation/charge was made against the appellant. This is difficult to reconcile with the respondent’s position, as set out in the SSHD decision and the respondent’s statement dated 11 February 2025 made pursuant to rule 24A(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 (“the Review”), which indicate that no aspect of the appellant’s account of what occurred in Pakistan was disputed.
8. In the SSHD decision, under the heading “Material facts I accept”, the respondent states:
“6. Nationality.
7. You are a member of a particular social group that being you are a single female.
8. You are of adverse interest to two travel agents in Pakistan because you gave them money for travel tickets the UK and didn’t receive the tickets and you state they have threatened you if you return to Pakistan.”
9. Under the heading ‘Material facts I do not accept’ the following is stated:
“9. None.”
10. In the Review a “Schedule of Issues” is provided. These list the following three issues:
“(i) Did the A provide inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation?
(ii) Would the A be in danger if she were to return to Pakistan?
(iii) The appellant wants to practice her faith freely. Did the SSHD fail to consider this part and overlook the evidence provided?”
11. The Review then states that the first issue (provision of inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation) has been adequately addressed and is no longer in dispute.
12. In the Review, the respondent does not dispute the appellant’s claim that a blasphemy charge has been brought against her. In fact, there is no reference to the blasphemy charge in respect of the first issue in the schedule of issues, which is the only issue that relates to the credibility of the appellant’s account.
13. The blasphemy charge is mentioned (or alluded to) in the second and third issues in the Schedule of Issues. In respect of the second issue (whether the appellant will face a risk on return), it is said (in para. 12 of the Review) that “it is not clear that the police in Pakistan would take any action based on the information provided”. The wording used indicates that it is accepted the charge was made but not that a risk will arise because of it.
14. The blasphemy charge is also referred to in respect of the third issue (the appellant being able to practice her faith freely). The Review states that it has not been established that the police are actively pursuing the blasphemy charge (para. 28 of the Review) and that it has not been established that the appellant would face persecution due to a blasphemy allegation (para. 29 of the Review). The wording in these paragraphs indicates that it is the effect of the blasphemy charge, not its existence, that is in dispute.
15. The issue, in respect of the claimed blasphemy charge, that the Review indicates was in dispute was whether the appellant faced a risk as a consequence of the blasphemy charge. This issue does not impugn the credibility of the appellant’s account and is entirely different to the question of whether the appellant has been truthful about facing a blasphemy charge. Based on the SSHD decision and Review, the appellant (and her representatives) would have had no reason to anticipate prior to the hearing (or at the hearing unless it was explicitly raised) that the appellant’s account of a blasphemy charge being brought against her was disputed by the respondent.
16. In these circumstances it was procedurally unfair to make adverse credibility findings on the issue without first (a) making clear that there had been a change in the respondent’s case such that the credibility of an aspect of the appellant’s account that had not previously been disputed was now in dispute; and (b) giving the appellant an opportunity to address this issue in the knowledge that it was now disputed. Accordingly, I find that the judge erred by expanding the scope of the issues in dispute beyond that which the parties had agreed prior to the hearing without taking steps to ensure that this was not procedurally unfair to the appellant who was faced with needing to address at the hearing an issue (the truthfulness of her account) that she could not have anticipated would be in dispute. This has, in my view, had the consequence of effectively denying the appellant a fair hearing.
17. The general principle is that cases will be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. However, there are exceptions to this, as set out in paragraphs 7.2.(a) and (b) of the Practice Statement. One of the exceptions is that a party was deprived of a fair hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. This case falls within this exception and accordingly I have decided to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be made afresh.
Notice of Decision
18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
19. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be made afresh by different judge

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26.9.2025