UI-2025-003293

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 18 May 2026
• Promulgation date: 10 Sep 2026
• Publication date: 29 Sep 2026
• Last updated on: 29 Sep 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003293
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56603/2024
LP/02243/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

I C
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter, Counsel instructed by Dynamic Solicitors Limited.
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 18 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Row (‘the FtT’/’the Judge’) dated 8th June 2025, in which the Judge dismissed his protection and human rights appeal.

2. Due to the nature of the proceedings involving a protection claim against the authorities in Turkey, I consider that the Appellant’s human rights in terms of safety from harm outweigh the requirement for open justice in this appeal such that an anonymity direction is made.

Factual and procedural background

3. The Appellant is a national of Turkey, who entered the UK in 2017 and claimed asylum. That claim was refused and a subsequent appeal was dismissed by the FtT. On 17th October 2023, the Appellant submitted further submissions to the Respondent raising further protection and human rights grounds. Those submissions were refused but were recognised by the Respondent as amounting to a fresh claim, providing the Appellant with a fresh statutory right of appeal. It was that decision that led to the appeal decision in the FtT, which is the subject of this challenge.

4. The Appellant’s protection claim is grounded in his support for Kurdish movements in Turkey.

5. The Appellant was legally represented right up to, but not including, the day of the hearing. On the morning of the hearing, the Appellant’s solicitors wrote to the FtT to inform that they were no longer instructed as the Appellant had not placed them in funds. The Appellant therefore attended on his own on the day of his hearing in the FtT. This is briefly recorded at [13] of the Judge’s decision, where the Judge also recorded that the Appellant “was aware of the position”, “did not seek an adjournment” and “said that he intended to represent himself”.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

6. In so far as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge recorded the following and reached the following findings and conclusions:

(a) Two of the Appellant’s witnesses’ identities “had not become apparent until they came in to give evidence in the course of the hearing. They had not made statements which were in the bundle.” – [15];

(b) The Judge did not admit the evidence of these two witnesses, considering that the Practice Direction requirements regarding witness statements was clear, the Appellant had had time to prepare and submit these in the usual manner and he had been professionally represented until the day of the hearing, with his solicitors having prepared a bundle and a skeleton argument – [16]. Further, it would have been unfair to the Respondent to admit oral evidence from witnesses who had not provided witness statements ([17]) and “(t)here was no unfairness to the appellant. It was up to him and his representatives to ensure that appropriate witness statements were prepared and uploaded” – [18];

(c) The Judge recorded a summary of the Appellant’s case at [19]-[25] and that of the Respondent at [26]-[31];

(d) The Judge recorded a summary of the previous Judge’s findings as part of the Appellant’s first asylum appeal at [32]-[35] and the nature of the new evidence relied upon by the Appellant at [36]-[47] and [57]. These sections of the Judge’s decision also appear to contain some observations, or findings from the Judge, and/or a summary of the Respondent’s position on this evidence – it is not clear which;

(e) The Judge recorded at [48]-[51] a summary of the oral evidence given by the two witnesses, who were permitted to give oral evidence, together with a summary of the Respondent’s position on this evidence at [52]-[53];

(f) The Judge’s conclusion on the Appellant’s asylum appeal are at [58]-[66], where the Judge finds that the Appellant had not demonstrated that the arrest warrant was the document it purports to be ([59]-[60]). Further, that inter alia little weight can be placed on the evidence of the Appellant’s two witnesses and on the Appellant’s KDPA membership with brief reasons given at [61] at [63]-[64];

(g) Lastly, the Judge found that the Appellant was not a reliable witness as to fact – there was nothing in the evidence which had been put before the Judge to persuade him to depart from the adverse findings reached in the first asylum appeal – [65].

7. The Judge went on to consider the Appellant’s human rights appeal but I do not summarise those findings since the Appellant does not seek to challenge those in these proceedings.

8. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal

9. The Appellant pursues two grounds of appeal, both of which raise procedural unfairness. In the first ground (‘Ground 1’), the Appellant argues that the Judge ought to have considered whether to adjourn the proceedings to enable the Appellant to secure alternative legal representation in light of his solicitors coming off the record the day of the hearing in the FtT.

10. The second ground (‘Ground 2’) raises a challenge to the Judge’s decision not to admit the evidence of the Appellant’s two other witnesses (referred to at para 6(a) above). In the alternative, it is pleaded under this ground that the Judge ought to have considered whether to adjourn the proceedings so as to enable witness statements to be taken/submitted for these two witnesses, in fairness to both the Appellant and the Respondent.

11. The Appellant was given permission to appeal on both grounds by a different judge of the FtT. In support of his appeal to this Tribunal, the Appellant has also settled a witness statement providing, from his point of view, further information and context to the appeal hearing in the FtT.

12. There was no dispute that the Appellant’s above-referred to witness statement, which post-dates the hearing at first instance, is to be admitted as this forms part of the Appellant’s case on the procedural unfairness that he alleges in this Tribunal.

13. The Respondent filed and served a Rule 24 response, in which the Respondent defends the Judge’s decision.

14. Following the observations made by the FtT Judge who granted permission to appeal to the Appellant, the audio recording of the FtT hearing was made available to the parties. Both parties’ representatives arranged for a listening appointment and duly listened to the recording. Each party prepared their own respective note with written submissions on what they each heard. There is a measure of disagreement, between the two notes, on some of the issues raised by the Appellant. I raised at the hearing whether the parties’ positions had resolved and/or narrowed. Both parties confirmed that the disagreements remained and, for this reason, they each invited me at the hearing to listen to the recording, or relevant parts of it, for myself. Neither party thought it necessary that I listen to the recording before starting the hearing and so I agreed to do so after hearing the parties’ respective oral submissions and after reserving my decision at the end of the hearing.

15. I confirm that I have listened to the sections of the recording that were necessary for me to resolve the contentious issues between the parties and to determine the Appellant’s appeal. There was some delay in me being able to do so as a result of technical difficulties being experienced and my being on leave. I have addressed the relevant aspects of the recording, as well as the parties’ respective evidence and submissions, in my ‘analysis and conclusions’ section below.

Analysis and conclusions

Ground 1 – procedural fairness and whether the Judge should have considered adjourning the appeal hearing

The parties’ respective positions – a summary

16. As I have summarised above, the Judge recorded at [13] that the Appellant’s solicitors withdrew their representation on the morning of the hearing and that the reason given was that the Appellant had not placed them in funds. The Judge also recorded that the Appellant was aware of the position, that he did not seek an adjournment, and that he said that he intended to represent himself. That is all that is recorded by the Judge about this in the decision.

17. In the Appellant’s witness statement of 25th June 2025, the Appellant addresses the Judge’s summary at [13]. The Appellant explains the circumstances, in which he found himself, the day before the hearing and on the morning of the hearing. These include that the Appellant was asked by his solicitors on 3rd June 2025 at 16:39 (the evening before the hearing), to send through a payment of £1,300 to cover the barrister's fees for the hearing. The Appellant sets out at para 2 of his statement that this was in addition to a significant sum that had already been provided to the solicitors and the Appellant explains that he told the solicitors that he would not be able to provide that sum straight away. He says that he asked for flexibility and that he confirmed being able to provide the funds on the morning of the day after the hearing.

18. The next paragraph in the Appellant’s statement confirms that the Appellant attended the hearing centre on the day of the hearing, expecting to be represented, and discovered that no barrister was present for his appeal. He states that he was shocked and that he did not know what to do. He also states that he was worried that if he asked for an adjournment, that this “may prejudice (his) case”. He alleges that the Judge’s record of him not seeking an adjournment does not “reflect the position that (he) was in” because he “only agreed to go ahead without representation because (he) felt that is what (he) was required to do and (he) was very worried that (he) would upset the Judge”.

19. The Respondent’s position in response is that there was no procedural unfairness since the Appellant did not seek an adjournment, as recorded by the Judge at [13]. Thus, the Respondent maintains that the Appellant was not deprived of a fair hearing.

20. From the information set out in the Appellant’s witness statement, it is accepted that he did not raise the difficulties or the concerns that he was experiencing at the outset of the hearing. Mr Slatter did not seek to argue otherwise.

The recording of the FtT hearing – a summary

21. I have listened to the recording of the hearing and the summary set out below is what I consider to be of note to the issues raised in this appeal. The recording starts, as one would expect, with the Judge introducing himself, the proceedings, and the other persons in the room including the interpreter. Shortly thereafter, the Judge confirms that a message had been received from the Appellant’s former solicitors informing the Tribunal that they would not be attending the hearing as a result of not being placed in funds. The Appellant replied that that was correct. The Judge then said the following to the Appellant:

“So you’re going to represent yourself today, is that right ?”

22. To this question, the Appellant answered ‘yes’ and added some other words in Turkish (four or five words), which were not interpreted. The Judge did not check on the further information provided by the Appellant, which was not interpreted. The Judge then asked about the persons who had come to the hearing centre with the Appellant and whether they were going to give evidence as witnesses in support of the Appellant’s appeal. At this stage, it is not identified by either party or the Judge that some of these witnesses had not prepared witness statements. However, at the Judge’s request, the Appellant confirmed the number and identity of the witnesses he intended to call.

23. Following from this, the Judge sets out the details of the appeal bundle, referring to this consisting of 540 pages and checking with each party whether they had the same. The Presenting Officer confirmed that he had the same bundle. When the Judge asked the Appellant if he “had seen these papers”, the Appellant responded as follows:

“I have seen some of the documents but I am not sure if I saw in complete”.

To this, the Judge suggested that he summarise for the Appellant “what the Secretary of State says”. The Judge then proceeded to give a summary of the refusal decision, which was duly translated by the interpreter. The Judge did not explore further whether the Appellant had in fact seen a complete version of the bundle or, indeed, if he had a copy available to him to enable his participation in the hearing, as an unrepresented party.

24. The Judge then went through his understanding of the new evidence, which the Appellant was seeking to rely on. This consisted of, and was referred to by the Judge as, an arrest warrant and the additional witnesses, who were able to confirm what the Appellant had claimed in connection with his case. Again, there was no identification or discussion at this stage of any missing witness statements and the Judge relayed the Respondent’s position on the arrest warrant relied upon.

25. After these exchanges, the Judge said that “we are going to hear from you all” but since it was approaching the lunch-hour, the Tribunal would break for lunch. The Judge then explained that the witnesses should wait outside the hearing room once the case resumes after lunch until it is each of their turn to give evidence.

26. After the lunch adjournment, the case resumed with the Appellant giving his oral evidence and being cross-examined. It was only after the Appellant gave his evidence that it was identified that there was no witness statement for the next intended witness. This happened again for the second intended witness.

Ground 1 – my conclusions

27. If a judge needs assistance with how to conduct a hearing involving an unrepresented party, the Equal Treatment Bench Book sets out comprehensive guidance and information in Chapter 1. At para 18 of Chapter 1, the Book sets out the following (emphasis original):

“Ways to help
18. The aim is to ensure that LIPs understand what is going on and what is expected of them at all stages of the proceedings. This means ensuring that:
• The process is (or has been) explained to them in a manner that they can understand.
• They have access to appropriate information (eg the rules, Practice Directions and guidelines – whether from publications or websites).
• They are informed about what is expected of them in ample time for them to prepare and comply.
• Wherever possible, they are given sufficient time for their needs.

(…)

Difficulties at the hearing and how to help
59. Basic conventions and rules need to be stated at the start of a hearing by the judge:
• Introduce those present. Explain their roles, and how the judge should be addressed.
• Explain the procedure and timing of the day.
• Ensure mobile phones are switched off.
• Inform the LIP that they should ask for clarification if anything is unclear and request breaks if they require them.
• Clearly state the purpose of the hearing and issue(s) to be decided.
• Explain that a party may take notes, but the law forbids the making of audio or video recordings (without the express consent of the judge).
• Only one person may speak at a time. Each side will have a full opportunity to present its case.

60. The judge may need to assist the LIP in ways that would not be appropriate if a party was represented. This may include:
• Ascertaining the LIP’s level of understanding at the outset.
• Not engaging in a legalistic discussion with a legal representative which might feel unfair and make the LIP feel excluded. When discussing matters with a legally represented party and an LIP is present, then plain English should be used to ensure that both parties feel engaged and understand what is being discussed. This will avoid any feelings of exclusion and unfairness by the LIP.
• Making clear the concept of a just trial on the evidence, ie that the case will be decided on the basis of the factual evidence presented and the truthfulness and accuracy of the witnesses called.
• Exercising considerable patience when LIPs demonstrate their scant knowledge of law and procedure.
• Not interrupting, engaging in dialogue, indicating a preliminary view or cutting short an argument in the same way that might be done with a qualified lawyer.
• When hearing submissions at any stage, allowing the LIP to conclude their prepared submission rather than asking questions as they naturally arise. It helps to save relevant questions until the end of the prepared submission.”

28. Having very carefully considered each party’s submissions on the Appellant’s first ground and listened to the audio recording of the hearing, I am satisfied that there has been procedural unfairness in this particular case. The Judge asked a leading question of an unrepresented appellant, imparting in that same question that the Appellant would be representing himself. There was no other discussion as to the Appellant’s wishes or intentions, which I find surprising considering that asylum applicants can secure publicly-funded legal representation, subject to a means and merits test. Moreover, the Applicant would not have had the opportunity to secure, or to attempt to secure, alternative representation considering the short notice of the difficulty that arose between him and his solicitors.

29. The manner in which the Judge approached this issue, namely by asking a single leading question of the Appellant, is likely therefore to have caused the Appellant to believe that he had no other option. I do not consider that this amounts to the Judge ascertaining the Appellant’s level of understanding of what options may have been available to him and whether he wished to apply for an adjournment to enable him to try and secure alternative legal representation.

30. In protection appeals, the principle of anxious scrutiny applies. Unrepresented parties, who are in the main and in this jurisdiction unfamiliar with legal proceedings, are not ordinarily aware of the relevant procedure rules and principles that govern the conduct of such cases. This may be even more so when a party becomes unrepresented at short notice and with little time to prepare their own representation.

31. Whether or not the appeal would have been adjourned had the Appellant made such an application, is not the question. In the particular circumstances of this case, it was incumbent for the Judge to ascertain, with an open-mind, what the Appellant’s position actually was in response to him attending unrepresented on the day of the appeal. This is particularly so when he had been represented all the way through prior to that. This should not have been done by way of a single leading question, which comprised an expectation that the Appellant would be representing himself.

32. Mr Pugh submitted that the Appellant’s complaint was really that the Judge did not himself suggest that the Appellant make an application to adjourn, which would have amounted to the Judge effectively running the Appellant’s case for him. Referring to the Senior President’s guidance and the Equal Treatment Bench Book, Mr Pugh submitted that the Tribunal’s obligations towards an unrepresented party did not extend to conducting that party’s case on their behalf.

33. It is entirely correct that the guidance referred to in this decision and by Mr Pugh does not advocate for a tribunal to conduct an unrepresented party’s case on their behalf. However, I do not accept that the Appellant’s challenge and his submissions on procedural fairness amount to requiring the Judge to have done that. As the Equal Treatment Bench Book illustrates, there is often a need to explain at the outset of a hearing, or in response to an issue arising, the applicable procedures and processes. I am satisfied that it was incumbent upon the Judge to properly ascertain the Appellant’s position in response to his representatives’ withdrawal and that this would not have amounted to running the Appellant’s case for him. The Appellant may simply have been unaware that it would have been permissible for him to apply for an adjournment. For these reasons, there was procedural unfairness with the Judge failing to ascertain whether or not the Appellant wished to apply for an adjournment and if so, to facilitate that opportunity. This would have then enabled the Judge to consider both parties’ positions on the issue.

34. It was also clear in the exchanges between the Judge and the Appellant that the Appellant was not equipped with a copy of the appeal bundle, yet the Judge did not address this at all. It was not the Tribunal’s fault that the Appellant attended without a copy of the bundle. However, considering the timescales involved surrounding the Appellant’s loss of representation, it was unfair of the Judge to proceed with the hearing without seeking to address, or attempt to address this.

35. There are other complaints raised by the Appellant under Ground 1 relating to connectivity problems with the interpreter attending and assisting remotely. The Appellant argues that the technical difficulties experienced were to such an extent that this affected his evidence and his ability to understand and be understood. The Appellant has also raised concerns that the interpreter’s mobile telephone was making noises and that this was distracting and interfered with the hearing. The Appellant also alleges that he heard the call to prayer from the interpreter’s location, causing him to fear that the interpreter was based in Turkey.

36. Both parties addressed this in detail in their respective written representations after listening to the recording of the hearing, for which I am grateful. These matters are disputed by the Respondent, who maintains that the audio and visual quality of the remote hearing link and of the interpretation did not lead to any unfairness. The Appellant, through his written representations on the recording, maintains otherwise.

37. In light of my conclusions above at paras 28-34, it is not necessary for me to resolve these issues. I note only that it is unlikely that the court interpreter would have attended from Turkey since the interpreter would be working in accordance with their employer’s standards and expectations, as well as those of HMCTS. This of course does not negate the possibility that the Appellant may have experienced a subjective fear and anxiety that this was the case. Further, this may have been heightened, or exacerbated, by the fact that the Appellant was not legally represented during the hearing and may have little knowledge or experience of how protection appeals are ordinarily conducted and experienced, including hybrid hearings.

38. Lastly and for the sake of completeness, under Ground 1, the Appellant has expressed several concerns with the conduct of his previous solicitors, that led to him being unrepresented at the hearing at first instance and to several documents, including witness statements, not being lodged in his appeal bundle.

39. The FtT judge granting permission to appeal to this Tribunal to the Appellant stated as follows about this:

“(…) although I bear in mind the short window for filing an application for permission to appeal, there is no indication that the serious allegations made against (the solicitors) have been put to them for comment: MM and others (Out of time appeals) Burundi* [2004] UKIAT 00182 (at [36]); BT (Former solicitors’ alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004] UKIAT 00311 (at [5]); and SV (Alleging misconduct and suppressing evidence) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00160 (at [18]). That will need to be remedied in good time for the Upper Tribunal proceedings.”

40. The Respondent pursued this point before me, both in oral submissions and in her Rule 24 response, where she raised this as follows:

“The respondent relies on the principles arising from BT (Former solicitors' alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004] UKIAT 00311 at [5] and submits that there is no evidence that those allegations have been put to the former representatives. Neither has a response, nor correspondence indicating that there has been no response, been provided.”

41. It is correct that this has not been addressed by the Appellant before me or in advance of the error of law hearing. I do not consider however that any such failure to address undermines the Appellant’s case as to procedural unfairness. The information before the Judge at first instance was that the Appellant’s representatives had withdrawn as a result of not being placed in funds. As per my conclusions above, the procedural unfairness has arisen as a result of the Judge not taking the time to explore matters properly with the Appellant as to whether he was actually able, and willing, to proceed with the hearing as an unrepresented party. To this extent, I do not consider that it is necessary for me to determine whether the Appellant’s complaints are well-founded. It remains the case however that if the Appellant continues to raise concerns in tribunal proceedings about his prior legal representation and assistance, and to rely on such concerns, it is not sufficient for him to do so by way of assertions only.

Ground 2 – procedural fairness and the Appellant’s witnesses

42. In light of my conclusions under Ground 1, it is not necessary for me to address this second ground in much detail. I make the brief observations below in the alternative to my findings under Ground 1.

43. I note that it was not until each of the two witnesses in question entered the hearing room in turn, after the Appellant had given his oral evidence, that the Judge learnt of their lack of witness statements. In particular, the lack of witness statement was only realised after each of the two intended witness had given, in turn, their name and other official information for the Tribunal record.

44. This ought to have been avoided through case-management checks at the outset of the hearing, which were not done – as confirmed by the audio recording and as I have summarised at paras 22-26 above. This is all the more so considering that the Appellant was now legally unrepresented.

45. Mr Pugh submitted that listening to the recording would weaken rather than strengthen the Appellant's case. This was because, in his submission, the prospective witnesses appeared to emerge only part-way through the hearing. In those circumstances, it was not surprising, in my Pugh’s submission, that the Judge may not have appreciated from the outset that those individuals were intended to give evidence.

46. Having listened to the recording, that is not correct. The Judge took the time with the Appellant to check at the very beginning of the hearing, the number of witnesses (four) the Appellant wished to call. What was not done at the same time was to check whether witness statements had been filed and served for each of those witnesses. This was only done after the hearing was well under way and after the Appellant’s own oral evidence had concluded, as I have addressed above. The Judge had also confirmed before the lunch adjournment that he would hear from “you all” after lunch. It was not until the first intended witness statement had been called into the hearing room, had given his name and date of birth that the Presenting Officer raised that there was no witness statement for them.

47. Moreover, the Appellant informed the Judge in each instance that a witness statement and identity evidence had been furnished to the Appellant’s solicitors in good time. The Appellant asked that the Judge double-check as the statements had been provided. When it was confirmed that there was no witness statement for the first witness, the Appellant apologised and referred to his solicitors. The Judge then confirmed that he would not hear what this first witness would say. The Judge did not ask prior to this what the Appellant wished to do about the lack of witness statement.

48. The same sequences as outlined immediately above happened with the second witness called by the Appellant. There was no witness statement from that witness either and this was only identified after the witness had been called forward and had given his name. The witness himself confirmed to the Judge, unprompted, that he had given a statement and evidence of his identity and “relevant information requested” to the Appellant’s solicitor. The Judge asked the witness when this had been done. The first witness mentioned that this had been done in – he thought – February or March 2024.

49. The Judge addressed the Appellant to confirm that there was no witness statement again and the Judge referred to the procedure rules that required witness statements to be provided in advance, to stand as a witness’ evidence and to provide an opportunity to the Home Office to set out what they are going to say. The Appellant in response repeated his apology and also stated that he keeps referring to his former “solicitors’ deficiencies”. He expressed that he could have checked this himself but he does not speak English. The Judge then checked with the Presenting Officer as to what his views were. The Presenting Officer submitted that it was not possible for a witness to give evidence without a witness statement, to which the Judge confirmed again that he would not hear from this second witness. Again, the possibility of adjourning, as addressed above, was not explored and neither party’s views about such an option were canvassed.

50. In light of the above, I am of the firm view that it was incumbent on the Judge to consider whether or not it was in the interests of justice and in pursuance of the overriding objective to continue with the hearing once the issues with the lack of witness statements had been identified.

51. Whether or not the former solicitors had been deficient in the conduct of the Appellant’s matter was not an issue that the Judge would have been able to resolve on the day of the appeal hearing but considering the appeal concerned a protection claim, with a legally unrepresented appellant, and considering these difficulties only came to light on the day of the hearing, and in the case of the missing witness statements part-way through the hearing, procedural fairness required at the very least for the Judge to consider whether an adjournment was in the interests of justice.

52. There were various options available to the Judge, including adjourning part-heard and if need be, consideration could have also been given to directions being issued in order to provide an opportunity for the Appellant to raise the concerns he held with his former solicitors, and in turn with the relevant professional regulating body, in the proper manner. None of this was explored and in the particular circumstances of this case, this gave rise to procedural unfairness, in the alternative to that found under Ground 1.

53. Considering the above, I set aside the Judge’s decision in its entirety. For the same reasons and in keeping with para 7.2 of Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, it is appropriate to remit the appeal back to the FtT for re-making, before a different judge.

Notice of Decision

54. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 8th June 2025 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and the decision is set aside.

55. The Appellant’s appeal to this Tribunal shall be allowed and the appeal shall be remitted to the FtT for re-making, before a different judge.



Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


03.09.2026