Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003300

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62384/2024
LP/13439/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Clewly, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms Joshi, Legal Representative

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), dated 23 June 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 24 April 2024, refusing his asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellant’s case was that he owed someone money in Egypt and that person had made threats against him. The police had come to his home on 16 September 2021, and having consulted a lawyer in Egypt, he decided to flee the country. By the date of the appellant’s asylum interview, he said there was a court judgment against him, sentencing him to twelve years imprisonment for various offences, which he says was a false political case against him. When refusing the protection and human rights claims, the respondent had found the claim not to be credible and said there was no risk to the appellant on return, that there was sufficiency of protection and an internal relocation option. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed on the same basis by the judge, who gave reasons in the decision [at 19 to 27].
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the grant of permission to appeal
3. The appellant appeals against the decision, with permission from the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) granted on 18 July 2025 on grounds 1 to 5, which are briefly summarised below:
Ground 1
4. The judge made irrational findings to the extent that the appellant’s credibility was damaged by his failure to approach the police for protection. This was because the judge relied on what the judge considered to be a reasonable expectation that the appellant would be able to provide documentary evidence of the business transaction in question. The appellant’s evidence was that no such evidence existed and so the judge made this finding in error.
Ground 2
5. The judge relied on a purported inconsistency between the appellant’s screening interview and later account, which was a failure to mention the police visit to his home in the screening interview. However, it was the appellant’s case that he did not know there was a case against him until early 2024, after the screening interview, when he received the court documents from Egypt. It was therefore reasonable for him not to have mentioned this at the screening interview, as he did not know about it, and as the screening interview was conducted after a long journey. This was an irrational finding, where the judge failed to take into account the chronology of events and the appellant should have been given the benefit of the doubt. The judge also failed to take into account material matters.
Ground 3
6. The judge failed to give adequate reasons and made an irrational finding to the extent that the timing of the court documents being obtained in March 2024, close to the asylum interview in April 2024, was capable of damaging the appellant’s credibility. The appellant could have had no advance knowledge of when his interview would be scheduled and it was baseless conjecture to rely on the timing of the documents being obtained as ‘convenient’ and therefore capable of undermining the appellant’s credibility.
Ground 4
7. The judge made an irrational finding that the appellant’s ability to leave Egypt despite there being an outstanding warrant for his arrest was capable of undermining the credibility of his claim. The appellant had not been given a copy of the arrest warrant when the police visited his home and only learned of it when making enquiries in 2024. Given the manner in which he left Egypt this was not capable of undermining his credibility. The appellant also argues that the judge failed to take relevant matters into consideration, namely that only a travel ban can prohibit a person from exiting Egypt and no such travel ban had been issued at the time of the appellant’s exit.
Ground 5
8. The appellant relied on official documents from the Egyptian courts at the FtT hearing which he said were not challenged by the respondent. The appellant also argued that the transcript of the hearing would support this. The judge’s decision to reject this evidence was therefore irrational and procedurally unfair. In the alternative, the only reason given by the judge for refusing to attach any weight to official court documentation, was that they were obtained close to the substantive interview. The appellant told the respondent at that interview that he had documentation to produce, but was given no timeline to produce them. He was also unrepresented at that time. The respondent then refused the claim two weeks later and relied on the appellant’s failure to produce the evidence. The judge failed to take into account that chronology and there was no rational assessment of the appellant’s credibility based on the evidence, procedure and law.
Permission to Appeal
9. Permission to appeal was granted with the following reasons and observations:
“4. Ground 1 argues that there is a misunderstanding from the judge between arranging a sale over the internet and having written evidence of a transaction. There is no record that appellant stated it was an oral transaction over social media and so I cannot discern a meritorious ground of appeal. There still would be some potential “written evidence “ even if conducted over the internet. The grounds that the appellant would have reported the matter to the police if he had evidence does not appear to be supported in evidence. It is not clear where this assertion has come from within the evidence provided.
5. In respect of ground 2 the appellant did not refer to the visit of police at the screening interview. In the appellant’s statement [11] he stated he did not tell the respondent as he thought it would not go further. The judge assesses the appellant’s evidence at [20]. I can discern no arguable material error of law by the judge taking this failure into account, to state this brief fact at the screening interview. The ground appears to amount to no more than a disagreement with the finding made.
6. In respect of ground 3, the judge considered the appellant’s explanation as to why he asked his brother to consult a lawyer in early 2024 [21] and [22]. The judge rejected that the appellant would wait more than 2 years to find out why the police had visited his home in 2021. I can discern no arguable meritorious ground in this respect.
7. Ground 4 assert that the judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s account by taking into account that the appellant left Egypt despite there being an arrest warrant. The warrant was issued on 10 October 2021. The appellant left Egypt after this. I can discern no meritorious error of law in the judge taking into account that the appellant was able to leave Egypt despite a warrant for his arrest being issued.
8. In respect of ground 5, the judge directed themselves in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed, in respect of the documents submitted, late. The appellant did not comply with directions and the respondent’s review was conducted without the appellant’s bundle. A bundle was submitted by the appellant’s representative on 7 April 2025. However the judge rejected the evidence on the basis of the timing as to when the appellant sought to obtain the evidence and the timing as to when they were provided. It is arguable that although stating the principles of Tanveer Ahmed, these have not been applied. I grant permission to appeal on this ground.
9. I have made comments above about all the grounds of appeal but I do not limit the grant of permission. All grounds may be argued.”
10. We had before us a bundle running to 177 digital pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal before us, including a transcript of the FtT hearing, and the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
11. Following submissions from Ms Joshi and Ms Clewly, we indicated that we would reserve our decision and we provide this below with reasons.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Ground 1
12. We have considered the evidence that was before the judge, which included the interviews, statement and oral evidence at hearing, of the events which gave rise to the reasons why the appellant claims to have left Egypt. We did find the account to be confused, and difficult to make sense of, both at interview and in cross examination. It appears to be the appellant’s case, as best as we can make sense of his evidence, that he contracted a loan from a third party, and this is the person he says has made threats against him and potentially instigated a false court case against him. He says he hoped to repay the loan through selling motorbike or ‘tuk-tuk’ parts to another person, who took the parts but did not make payment. The judge relied [at 19] on the appellant’s explanation for why he did not report what had happened to the police being ‘difficult to understand’. This was because the appellant said he was ‘scared to do so’. The judge also considered that the appellant had said that the transaction was arranged over the internet, and so he would have information in writing to give to the police. The judge found he had also not provided that information in the appeal, or made any efforts to obtain it.
13. It is argued that this is a mischaracterisation of the appellant’s evidence, because he had never said he had information in writing to produce and said in oral evidence that there was no such evidence. This was therefore, in the appellant’s submission, an erroneous finding.
14. We note that the transcript shows that the appellant did say in oral evidence that there was some sort of written cheque or ‘IOU’ between him and the lender or buyer, which he described as ‘like a contract which is written what, that he sold this goods to this party’ (transcript, p.35 at A). Somewhat confusingly, he then said he did not sell any goods to a party as a result of this agreement, which was instead a loan. In relation to the person who was supposed to buy goods from him, at hearing he said ‘the deal was through the internet’ (transcript, p.47 at D). He later said he had no proof or evidence to show that he gave the goods he bought with the loan money to this other person, but did not address whether there would be documentary or written evidence of the deal that was arranged with either person. In submissions, it was put to the judge by the respondent that for a deal arranged over the internet, there would be some sort of a paper trail.
15. We find it was open to the judge to find that it would be reasonable to expect the appellant to have, or be able to obtain, documentary evidence of the claimed business contacts and agreement, either in the form of the original contract with the lender, if that is what the appellant was asserting he signed, or of any arrangements to contract with the other person over the internet. It remains the case that the appellant had not adequately addressed why such evidence could not be shown to the police, nor established that he had tried to obtain it for his hearing, and if not, the reasons why not. Furthermore, we found the judge was not relying only on an absence of documentary evidence, but rather on credibility issues arising from the appellant’s explanation of why he would not have gone to the police, given he claimed to have been the victim of fraud, and to be receiving death threats. At hearing, he argued that there was a political dimension to the court case against him in Egypt, but his case was that he did not know that in September 2021, and so this does not address why he would not have approached the police at that time. We find it was open to the judge on the evidence before him to have regard to the appellant’s explanations on this point and to find that these were not reasonable when assessing credibility.
Ground 2
16. It is argued that the judge relied in error on a purported inconsistency between the screening and substantive interviews, which the appellant maintains is not an inconsistency at all and in relation to which explanations have been provided by the appellant that the judge has not adequately considered.
17. At the screening interview, the appellant was asked to ‘summarise ALL of the reasons’ for his asylum claim, and replied [at 4.1]:
“My life is in danger in Egypt. I had a business deal which went wrong and the person threatened to kill me.”
18. The record includes no mention of the appellant saying that he received a visit from police, who came to his home looking for him with a ‘notice to attend’ the court [asylum interview question 46], and about which he also now says he went to see a solicitor in Egypt.
19. The screening interview record shows a series of questions were also put to the appellant in the screening interview [at 5.3] which included asking him whether he had ever been accused of an offence, and whether there was a warrant for his arrest, to all of which he answered ‘no’.
20. The judge found the failure to mention a key feature of his claim at the earliest opportunity, and when asked specific questions, was relevant to the credibility assessment. We find that this is a potential inconsistency within the account and it was open to the judge to have regard to it. The judge also considered the appellant’s explanation for not mentioning this aspect of his case at the screening interview but found it to lack credibility. He said in oral evidence before the judge that he did not know at the time that the police had come to the house in connection with a political case, rather than the loan dispute. We note that he gave a different explanation at interview, which was that he was hoping the case would not go any further and that the man he owed money to would forget him. The judge found these explanations were not credible and did not adequately address why he would not have mentioned such an important aspect of his case at the screening interview. We find that too was open to the judge on the evidence before him.
Ground 3
21. It is also argued before us that the judge’s reliance on the timing of when the appellant obtained the documentation from Egypt as being ‘convenient’ is irrational, because the appellant would not have known that his interview would take place imminently. He had also mentioned the documents at interview, although he was given no time scale to submit them. We note in relation to the latter, that the appellant was offered five days to submit his documents and accompanying translations, but asked for seven days to do so. The documents were not submitted within that time-frame and were only submitted post refusal, a year later.
22. It is clear from the judge’s findings that the judge considered that the appellant’s account as a whole lacked credibility. In particular, the judge reasonably questioned why the appellant would leave Egypt if at the time of his leaving, the appellant did not know why the police had come to his home and had not appreciated that there was a case against him in court. The judge also considered that this raised the question of why, if the appellant knew the police had come to his home and he had approached a solicitor for advice, he would not have made any effort to find out the reasons for this. He instead came to the United Kingdom and claimed asylum, and says in his witness statement he took no steps to find out why he was wanted by police, and instead waited until early 2024 before contacting his brother to find out, through the lawyer, why the police were looking for him.
23. By the date of the asylum interview the account had also evolved from fear of a non-state actor in relation to an unpaid loan, to include a political dimension and the existence of arrest warrants for terrorist offences. We consider these matters, both the fundamental shift in the nature of the claim and who the appellant fears and whether the state would offer protection, as well as the appellant’s explanations surrounding the documentation, are all relevant to the credibility assessment the judge was required to make. Thus, these findings too were open to him, on the evidence before him.
Ground 4
24. It is also argued that it was not open to the judge to find that if the appellant was wanted by authorities, he would have not been able to leave the country. We consider the judge’s finding to have been somewhat wider, in that he found that the whole account was not plausible, as addressed already above. The judge had regard, on the evidence before him, to the chronology, and to the appellant’s decision and ability to leave the country, without this alerting the authorities despite there being at the time an outstanding arrest warrant.
25. It was additionally submitted at the hearing before us that the warrant would not have prevented the appellant’s travel in any event, because he had left without a visa and by ‘another way’ out of Egypt. We asked Ms Joshi to direct us to any evidence in the bundle that addressed how the appellant left Egypt, whether he had a visa or not, and whether he left clandestinely, as appeared to be the case put to us. Ms Joshi was unable to do so. We note that at interview, the appellant told the respondent he left by air, with a flight ticket. He did not say that he had left clandestinely or using false documentation. There does not appear therefore to be evidence to support the submission that the appellant left the country illegally, and so would not trigger any adverse interest on leaving the country, quite the opposite. Nor was the judge taken to any background evidence or country guidance to support the submission that a court order is required to prevent a person from travelling out of Egypt. There is no reference to this effect in the transcript.
26. We therefore find the judge’s finding that this aspect of the account was not plausible, was a finding that was open to him on the evidence.
Ground 5
27. In relation to the judge’s assessment of the documentary evidence from Egypt which emerged after the interview, we note that he appropriately directed himself [at 15] to consider such evidence in accordance with the guidance given in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKAIT 00439, reminding himself that ‘it is for the claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied upon’ and that the decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance can be placed ‘after looking at all the evidence in the round’.
28. It is argued in the grounds that the transcript will show that the documents were ‘unchallenged’ by the respondent and that the judge failed to have regard to that important fact or concession by the respondent at hearing. In fact, the transcript shows that the appellant was cross-examined about the documents, in particular who signed them and their seniority and how he could have been able to leave the country despite the prosecutor signing an arrest warrant in advance of his travel. He was asked about the provenance of the documents, the timing of them being obtained and the dates of the warrants. It was also put to the appellant at the end of cross-examination that his claim was made entirely for economic reasons, because the appellant was not making enough money in Egypt and had just got married, and so he had come to the UK for a better life. Then in submissions, the presenting officer submitted the documents should be assessed in line with Tanveer Ahmed and afforded ‘little weight’, because the entire claim was a fabrication. It is clear from the transcript that the reliability of the appellant’s account, its credibility and the documents on which he relied, were in fact challenged both in cross-examination and in submissions by the respondent. There is therefore no support for the appellant’s contention under this ground.
29. It was also submitted to us that because the presenting officer did not cross-examine on specific inconsistencies, or could not identify specific inconsistencies within the documents from Egypt, the judge’s finding that they were not reliable was irrational and unreasonable. A judge is not required to assess documentary evidence at face value and treat purported court documents as ‘official court documents’. The judge appropriately directed himself to the guidance of the Upper Tribunal in relation to the proper approach to be taken when assessing the weight to attach to documentary evidence, and assessed the documents in the round with the remaining evidence and credibility findings.
30. We therefore find that on the evidence before the judge, the findings the judge made about the appellant’s credibility and the weight to attach to his documentary and other evidence, were adequately reasoned findings that were open to the judge to make.
Notice of Decision
31. The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of errors of law. Accordingly, it stands and the appeal is dismissed.

H Graves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 October 2025