Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003301

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53986/2024
IA/00061/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON
AND
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

DS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Price, Solicitor instructed by Latta & Co, Solicitors

Heard in Edinburgh on 26 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The respondent is a national of Iraq. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 18 July 2025 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 7 April 2025 to grant the respondent’s appeal against the refusal of her protection claim.
2. The basis of the respondent’s claim for protection was that she had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Kirkuk, Iraq as a consequence of imputed political opinion. Her case was that she worked for a colonel who was the head of the KDP in Kirkuk. Her role was as a cleaner and she also made the tea for attendees at office meetings. She alleged that following one such meeting she had been accused by the authorities in Kirkuk of disclosing sensitive information that she had overheard at the meeting. Her house had been burnt down and she had fled the country along with her husband and eldest son. The respondent also sought humanitarian protection on the same grounds as her asylum claim and in addition on the grounds that she no longer had her CSID identity card. She further claimed that to return her to Iraq would be a breach of her rights under Article 3 and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
3. The appellant accepted that the respondent is an Iraq national but rejected the respondent’s application for international protection on the basis that the respondent had failed to establish that she was at risk on return to Iraq. In relation to the documentation the appellant rejected her claim on the basis that she would be able to obtain the necessary documents from her family in Iraq.
4. The FtT did not allow the appeal by the respondent on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds on the basis that the respondent had not established that she was at risk on return. In particular, they had not found the appellant credible on a number of key points. However the FtT did allow the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds/Article 3 ECHR on the basis that the FtT accepted the respondents evidence that she no longer had in her possession her CSID card and that applying the country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG 2022 UKUT 00110 (IAC) (“SMO2”) the respondent would be at real risk of serious harm at security checkpoints when attempting to travel internally by land within Iraq sufficient to breach her Article 3 ECHR rights. Further she would also face significant difficulties in accessing public services, employment and housing contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
5. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 26 November 2025. At the hearing we heard submissions from the parties and reserved our decision. For the reasons set out below, we find that there was no error of law and we dismiss the appeal.
6. The FtT made an anonymity order in this appeal, and we have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, we are satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the respondent has made an application for international protection and we consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.
Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
7. There were two grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in this case. The first ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in law in that having found the respondent to be an unreliable witness in respect of her asylum claim and specifically on the issue of risk on return it was “bordering on the perverse” to then find that the appellant was truthful in relation to whether she still possessed her identity documentation. The determination was materially flawed as the FtT reached a finding that was at odds with all other conclusions related to credibility.
8. The second ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in rejecting the possibility that the respondent may be able to obtain sufficient documentation from family members remaining in Iraq in order to facilitate her return. It was for the respondent to show why she was unable to do so and given the finding by the FtT that she remains in contact with her family in Iraq (at paragraph 43) it was unclear why the evidence provided by the Iraqi consulate which was before the FtT was dismissed as unreliable. The appellant also referenced MA (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 289 (02 April 2009) as authority for the proposition that there was an onus on the appellant to take steps to secure the necessary documents to facilitate her return. She had not done this.
9. We heard submissions from both Mr Mullen for the appellant and Mr Price for the respondent.
10. In deciding whether the FtT’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the guidance set out by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.
The First Ground of Appeal
11. Although the appellant made a reference to perversity in the first ground of appeal we agree with the submission of Mr Price that in reality the issue here is whether or not the FtT gave a sufficiently reasoned decision in arriving at the conclusion that the respondents account of what happened to her CSID should be believed, in circumstances where on other matters she was not believed. It is clearly established law that a determination should disclose clearly the reason for a tribunal’s decision (MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC)).
12. In arriving at the decision to find the respondent’s account credible the FtT clearly sets out at paragraph 40 of the determination the reasons for making that finding. There is a clear reference to the consistency of the evidence regarding the account from the respondent. Both consistency in relation to the respondents own account – with reference to what the respondent said both in oral evidence and in her witness statement and consistency with the evidence provided by her husband, HK. There is also a reference to the fact that the account given by the respondent is consistent with the knowledge the FtT has that identity documents are taken by agents after people have exited their country of origin. It is on the basis of this consistency that the FtT find it reasonably likely that the respondent, her husband and eldest son do not have access to their CSID’s because they were taken from them when they left Iraq.
13. We would also agree with Mr Price that when one considers the determination as a whole this was not a case where the respondent was found to be lacking in credibility on all matters. It is a much more nuanced picture than that. The respondent was found to be credible in relation to the issue of who had authority at the meetings (paragraph 20) and that she had not been told what information she was leaking (paragraph 21). We also bear in mind that it is not unusual to find that in a case such as this there will be certain elements where a witness may be found to be credible and other elements where their evidence will not be accepted. That is a position that has been recognised by the courts – TF & AM -v- SSHD 2018 CSIH 58 see the comments from Lady Paton at paragraphs 38 and 48.
14. For the reasons set out above we do not consider that the first ground of appeal sets out any error of law in the determination of the FtT.
Second Ground of Appeal
15. The appellant argues that there is an onus on the respondent to show that she is unable to obtain documentation to facilitate her return in circumstances where there is a finding that she remains in contact with her family in Iraq and further that it is unclear why the evidence provided by the Iraqi consulate was dismissed as unreliable.
16. The FtT did find that the respondent was no longer in possession of her CSID (paragraph 40); that the Iraqi government does not have the respondent’s biometrics (paragraph 41) and that the FtT do not accept that the respondent has not been in contact with her family in Iraq (paragraph 43). Further the FtT had already established (paragraph 5) that the respondent could not be returned direct to Kirkuk but would require to be returned through Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.
17. We consider that the starting point for considering the second ground of appeal is the country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG 2022 UKUT 00110 (IAC) (“SMO2”). At paragraph 47 of the determination the FtT state “Applying SMO2 it remains the case that an individual is expected to attend their local CSA office in order to obtain an INID, and that persons not in possession of either a CSID or INID on return, or shortly after return, are at a real risk of serious harm at security checkpoints when attempting to travel internally by land within Iraq sufficient to breach their Article 3 EHCR rights.” In arriving at its determination, it is clear that the FtT were applying the guidance contained in SMO2. They are required to do this unless there are cogent reasons for not doing so – SG Iraq 2012 EWCA Civ 940. They were also following the guidance set out in the CPIN; Iraq, Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns October 2023 (”the October 2023 CPIN”) being the relevant CPIN in force at the time of the FtT determination on 7 April 2025.
18. In putting forward the submission that there is an onus upon the respondent to show that she is unable to obtain documentation to facilitate her return the appellant makes reference to MA (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 289 (02 April 2009). We do not consider that that case is relevant to the position regarding documentation in Iraq. That case dealt with the issue of statelessness. The position regarding lack of documentation in respect of a return to Iraq is governed by SMO2 – which the FtT are obliged to follow unless there are cogent reasons not to do so. It is for the party maintaining that SMO2 should not be followed who is required to produce the cogent reasons. In this instance that is the appellant.
19. The appellant sought to rely upon two documents before the FtT to support its position that the respondent could be redocumented within a reasonable time frame with the assistance of family members in Iraq. At paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 the FtT deal with the Inspection Report on Country of Origin Information that suggests that family members can attend at the airport and vouch for the undocumented individual who will then be given a seven day residency permit pending proof of identity. At paragraph 45 the FtT clearly set out the reasons why they are not persuaded by this document. In particular the FtT consider that it is 5 years old and critically the report has nothing to say on whether this permit would enable the respondent to safely pass through checkpoints after leaving the airport in the IKR and during their onward journey to their home area in Kirkuk. The FtT also point out that there is no evidence that this has actually been successfully pursed by any Iraqi citizens. The FtT were not persuaded that this was cogent evidence to depart from SMO2.
20. The other document put forward by the appellant was a report dealing with the issue of INID’s by the Iraqi Embassy in the UK. This is covered at paragraph 46 of the determination. Beyond the document itself the FtT noted that there was no further evidence to support the claim that INID’s are now available in the UK and are being successfully used by Iraqi citizens on return to Iraq to avoid treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR when travelling to their home area or internally elsewhere. Again, the FtT did not find that this document amounts to cogent evidence.
21. During submissions we asked Mr Mullen if there was anything further in SMO2 or the October 2023 CPIN that addressed this issue of internal travel in Iraq for undocumented citizens – and he conceded that he was not aware of anything.
22. We consider that there was no error in law in the FtT applying the country guidance case of SMO2 and rejecting the arguments put forward by the appellant as not being cogent reasons to depart from SMO2.
23. We note that the October 2023 CPIN has been replaced by an October 2025 version and in addition there is a new country guidance case on this issue that has been heard but in respect of which the decision has not yet been promulgated. These developments, whilst of interest in this area, have no direct bearing on whether there was an error of law made in a determination dated 7 April 2025.
Conclusion
24. For the reasons set out above we find that there is no error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
10.12.25