Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003306

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52214/2024
LP/00352/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2025
Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st October 2025
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE H NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE T BIBI

Between

FQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge A Rao (“the judge”) dated 15 May 2025, refusing her asylum appeal.

Background
2. The Appellant is an Albanian national born in 1992. She entered the UK in February 2019. She asserts that she would be at risk of return due to her status as a member of particular social group, namely a victim of trafficking, as she was forced into prostitution/modern slavery. Her appeal against that decision came before the judge at a hearing on 29 April 2025.
3. The parties agreed that the issues before the judge were (i) whether the Appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee Convention and/or whether there are substantial grounds for believing that Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR would be engaged if she is removed to Albania, (ii) whether there was a sufficiency of protection and (iii) whether the Appellant could safely internally relocate. The Appellant did not rely on Article 8 of the ECHR.
4. The judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds that firstly, the judge had erred in her approach to risk. The grounds accept that the judge had made references to TD and AD v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Trafficked woman: Albania) CG [2016] UKUT 92. However, it is the Appellant’s position that the judge failed to conduct a complete assessment in compliance with TD and AD when determining whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Secondly, the judge failed to give adequate reasons and/or reached perverse conclusions in relation to sufficiency of protection. Thirdly, the judge made irrational and/or inadequate findings in relation to internal relocation.
5. Permission was granted on all grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge RA Pickering on 19 July 2025.
6. The Respondent filed a Rule 24 response. In summary, it opposes all the Grounds raised by the Appellant.
Submissions
7. Mr Badar’s submissions on behalf of the Appellant were closely based on the grounds of appeal on which he relied on. In relation to Ground one, he submitted that the judge at §51 to §57 of the decision failed to conduct a complete assessment in compliance with TD and AD, when considering whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution not simply from SL, but other potential traffickers. He further submitted that paragraph (h) of the judicial headnote and paragraph 119 (h) in TD and AD both provide a non-exhaustive and well known list of potential factors that may be relevant in determining whether a woman will be at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group. The Judge did not adopt this approach and confined her findings to risk from SL which in turn impacts the wider findings of Grounds two and three.
8. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Hulme submitted that in relation to Ground one, the panel should not infer that a relevant point has not been taken into account simply because it was not expressly mentioned by the judge, with reference to §52 and §57. He submitted that if the Tribunal does not accept Ground one, it would be the Respondent’s position that Grounds two and three are of no consequence towards material error of law. Namely, in the absence of risk, there would be no need for the panel to consider sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Mr Hulme argued that the judge did not make an error of law.
9. After hearing submissions, we reserved our decision.

Decision on the appeal
10. We find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law for the following reasons.
11. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. We remind ourselves of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and also bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, 1 WLR 3784 at §72.
12. Turning to aspect one of Ground one, the Appellant’s case is that the judge failed to conduct a TD and AD compliant assessment when determining whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of future risk of persecution.
13. The judge did refer to TD and AD expressly throughout her determination. At §54 she refers to some of the potential factors that may be relevant in determining whether a woman will be at risk of persecution as a member of particular social group. The judge states she is not satisfied that the Appellant is at risk of future persecution and quotes “… Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking or being forced into other exploitative situations.”
14. Mr Badar referred us to paragraph (h) of the judicial headnote and paragraph 119(h) in TD and AD. Both provide a non-exhaustive and well-known list of potential factors that may be relevant in determining whether a woman will be at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group:-
Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.
15. Mr Badar submitted that the judge’s findings at §51 to §57 of the decision failed to conduct a complete assessment in compliance with TD and AD. The judge at §56 has considered what family support is available and this was not challenged by Mr Badar. The Respondent accepts that the judge did not expressly mention the presence of an illegitimate child, the Appellant’s mental health issues and her limited education within §55 to §57. However, we accept the Respondent’s submission and have considered the entirety of the decision, and it is apparent that the judge undeniably referred to TD and AD and applied this throughout the decision. The judge carried out the assessment in 119 (h) TD and AD at §59 of the decision and gave careful and detailed consideration to the Appellant’s family, social status, education, health issues, the Appellant’s illegitimate child, her age and the support network that is available. Whilst it may have been preferable for the judge to have had separate headings for “a well-founded fear of future risk of persecution from SL” and then from other traffickers, that is in truth a matter of form over substance. We are concerned with the latter.
16. Turning to the second aspect to Ground one, Mr Badar argued that the judge has considered the risk of re-trafficking from SL and not appropriately applied paragraph 119(g) in TD and AD. Mr Badar referred us to the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument §10 which states “Paragraph 119(a) of TD and AD confirms that trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds. There is often a misconception that the assessment of risk and relocation is confined to the original trafficker(s). This is not the case; please see paragraph 119(e). We note at §31 of the decision the judge states that “ Mr Gajjar submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the factors in TD and AD show she is at risk of re-trafficking and cannot access sufficient protection or relocate internally.” Mr Badar accepted that Mr Gajjar had argued the wider issue as well as the narrow issue in relation to risk of other traffickers, as well as SL.
17. The Appellant’s Skeleton Argument as rehearsed above emphasised that the risk was not limited to SL. Mr Badar argued that when considering re-trafficking the judge had focused her mind on SL and not the wider aspects of re-trafficking by others. He referred us to §52 of the decision where he submitted that the judge found that the Appellant’s fear is confined to SL and his friend, and the risk of re-trafficking. Mr Badar further submitted that although the judge was looking at re-trafficking, it was from the perspective of trafficking from SL and this narrow themed prism continued at §55 where the judge finds “weighing everything I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that SL will seek to re-traffic FQ”. He argued that the narrow approach continued at §56 to §57 of the decision. He submitted that the correct approach was for the judge to assess the wider aspects of trafficking rather than just focusing on SL. Therefore, it was his submission that this had led to a material error of law.
18. It is trite that the First-tier Tribunal must apply country guidance cases appropriately and the judge has referred to TD and AD throughout her decision. Given that determining whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of future persecution of being re-trafficked was a central issue in the appeal, we consider the judge has applied TD and AD to her decision and it is apparent that the judge carried out the appropriate assessment. We accept the Respondent’s argument that the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that a relevant point has not been considered simply because it is not expressly mentioned by a judge (see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC §49 at §45). Importantly, given the repeated references to TD and AD, and given the express reference to the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant at the hearing (which Mr Badar is accepted were based in part on a wider risk of re-trafficking), we are not prepared to conclude that the judge simply overlooked the wider issue when conducting her risk assessment. This leads us to conclude that there is no material error of law.
19. Turning to Ground two, and with reference to §58 to §66, Mr Badar was asked to highlight what particular risk factors the judge had allegedly failed to address. He was unable to respond and reiterated that if the Tribunal were with him on Ground one then it would impact the wider findings which were the subject of Grounds two and three. If the Tribunal were not with him on Ground one, then Grounds two and three would stand alone.
20. We reject the Appellant’s argument that the judge’s findings are perverse. The Appellant relies on §53 of TD and AD appears to suggest that the attitudes towards women were much wider referring to most of the population remaining under the influence of traditional culture. This is also echoed by the evidence the Panel heard at [85]. At paragraph [106], when considering life outside of shelters, the Panel said:
“106. All of the evidence before us indicates that in this period women face numerous obstacles, that include, but are not limited to: financial hardship, difficulty in finding secure employment and housing, poverty, discrimination and stigma (pertaining to the VOT as well as any children she might have), isolation and no, or severely restricted, access to mental health services. As will be seen below it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the cumulative effect of such factors renders internal flight as unreasonable for many VOTs; it is further argued that the vulnerability of a VOT at this point places her at an unacceptably high risk of re-trafficking or other harm.”
21. Mr Badar argued that the findings at §59 are inadequate. We reject this argument and accept the Respondent’s submission that the Upper Tribunal emphasised the importance of family, and a distinction was drawn between women living on their own and those who a part of a family unit. The judge found that the Appellant would have family support §59 (a) and §62. Further, §85 of TD and AD concerns a returnee’s pathways to reintegration, and the Respondent argues that in respect of the socio-economic pathway, emphasis was again placed on those with financial and emotional support from families, which “can be the right, and safe, choice for them”, and “for those who have this option available to them, it can result in a “satisfactory outcome”.
22. With regards to shelter and support §62 we reject the Appellant’s argument that the Judge does not engage with the guidance in TD and AD regarding this being potentially being unsuitable for those with mental health difficulties. The judge went onto conclude at §62 “in this case I find that the Appellant and her child will have the support of her sisters and financial support of her brother. She is unlikely to need all the facilities that are available to a VOT, but they will be available to her.” We do not find this to be a material error of law.
23. Turning to Ground three which has three aspects. Dealing with aspect one of Ground three, the Appellant argues when considering internal relocation, the judge’s findings are infected by the judge’s focus on risk from SL as opposed the wider risk. Given that we have found that there is no arguable error of law in ground one for the same reasons there is no material error of law.
24. In relation to aspect two of Ground three, the judge has considered the availability of shelters, the grounds argue that the judge has failed to properly asse this in accordance with TD and AD. We again reject this argument given the finding made by the judge at §62 of the decision.
25. Turning to aspect three of Ground three it is argued that the judge failed to carefully consider the reasonableness of relocation for her daughter with regards to her age and the fact that she was born in the UK. We accept the Respondent’s submission that the judge considered the illegitimate child §69 to §70. The judge found at §70 of the decision “the Appellant will still have financial support from her family and be able to communicate with them for some non-financial support. She will be able to utilise state and NGO resources including shelters and facilities for a VOT. In a larger city the stigma associated with having an illegitimate child will be reduced. The guidance in TD and AD is that it is possible for a woman to live alone or with a child especially in larger cities.” We find that there was no material error in the judge’s findings in this respect.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, and we decline to set it aside. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

T Bibi
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 September 2025