Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003314

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52131/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

TA
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 21 November 2025

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Schwenk of Counsel instructed by Latitude Law
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. The Appellant, a national of Pakistan, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant (“the Judge”) dated 20 May 2025 whereby the learned Judge had dismissed her appeal based on human rights grounds.
3. Permission to appeal had been refused by the First-tier Tribunal. Following a renewed application permission to appeal had been granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien by way of a decision dated 22 August 2025.
The Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission to Appeal
4. The Appellant relies on 2 grounds of appeal. The central theme being that there was an error by the Judge when considering the medical evidence.
5. Ground 1 contends that there was a failure to consider evidence relating to the diagnosis of the Appellant’s Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) in particular with reference to paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision. Ground 2 contends that there was a failure to consider evidence related to the Appellant’s mental health.
6. When granting permission Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien had said in relation to ground 1:
“It is unclear whether the judge rejected the appellant’s diagnosis of PTSD as entirely feigned, considered it to be exaggerated in severity or reluctantly accepted it. In describing at [22] the appellant’s mental health symptoms as ‘self-reported’, there is no mention of the medical evidence from 19 October 2015 of scarring on her body. Whilst it will be for the appellant to establish that this letter was brought to the judge’s attention, it is consistent with evidence given at the 2012 FtT hearing, to which the judge had express regard. It is arguable that the judge overlooked evidence relevant to whether the appellant had feigned or exaggerated her symptoms and so reached unreasonable conclusions regarding her PTSD diagnosis”.
7. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge said in respect of Ground 2:
“It is arguable that these matters were relevant to the judge’s overall conclusions on whether the appellant’s medical conditions amounted to insurmountable obstacles for the purposes of Appendix FM and/or very significant obstacles for the purposes of Appendix PL”.
The Hearing Before Me
8. In his submissions today, Mr Schwenk on behalf of the Appellant referred me to documents within the Appellant’s 298 paged bundle. He also relied on and amplified parts of the skeleton argument drafted by his instructing solicitors.
9. I was referred to the Judge’s decision, in particular to paragraph 22. That states:
“The Appellant also claims she has mental health concerns and suffers from anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts. She says she attempted suicide in June 2016. I take into account the letters from Dr Sarah Kiely, a specialist general practitioner (GP) from the Asylum Seeker Mental Health Service in Greater Manchester. She states that the Appellant has a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from 2012 and suffers from anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts. Whilst it is not in dispute there is a diagnosis of PTSD, I note there is no detailed medico-legal report before me to explain how the Appellant came to be diagnosed or what trauma is said to have given rise to such. It is wholly unclear whether relevant mental health diagnostic criteria were properly applied or whether the medical practitioner considered the possibility that the Appellant was feigning symptoms at that time. This is of some relevance given previous judicial findings that the Appellant had fabricated her asylum claim and bearing in mind her mental health symptoms are self-reported”.
10. Mr Tan resisted the appeal and said that although paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision did not ‘outright’ say that Dr Kiely’s evidence was rejected or that the Appellant was feigning her symptoms, nonetheless, there was adequate reasoning.
Consideration and Analysis
11. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
12. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
13. In my judgment and as Mr Schwenk very clearly pointed out, paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision was not him merely making observations. Mr Schwenk asks rhetorically what was the Judge doing at paragraph 22 if not making findings.
14. It is therefore necessary to refer to the evidence which was available to the Judge. I start in reverse chronological order. Page 83 of the 289 paged bundle refers to a medical letter from over 10 years ago dated 19 October 2015 in which Dr R Farrington stated in respect of the Appellant:
“From what I can see it does not appear that she has ever had an independent medicolegal report regarding the extensive scars on her body which she attributes to maltreatment by her husband’s family in Pakistan. Today she showed me those scars on her face, ear, left hand, back of her neck, right thigh and right knee. She didn’t show me but described scarring under one breast”.
15. I accept that this arguably shows a basis for the underlying trauma of which the Appellant refers to suffering with.
16. I then refer to page 222 of the bundle. It is a more recent report and is dated 21 June 2022. It is medical letter from Dr Sarah Kiely. She is a specialist General Practitioner from the Asylum Seeker Mental Health Service which is part of the Greater Manchester Mental Health Service. She explains that the Appellant has been a patient of the Service for some 5 years. Her letter states that this is a further update following a letter originally submitted in October 2019. Dr Kiely states in part as follows:
“The situation and [A’s] conditions remain the same. Should this be needed as per her last letter - I can confirm that A’s mental health diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (ICD-10 F43.1) diagnosed in 2012. This is in addition to anxiety and depression. The A has persistent and chronic symptoms which include recurring night mares, poor sleep, anxiety, depression, forgetfulness and panic episodes. There is a past history of a suicide attempt of an overdose of medication in June 2016”.
17. That letter is much more detailed and I have merely referred to a brief part of it.

18. Thereafter there is a letter at page 71 of the bundle, which is dated 27 November 2024, again by Dr Sarah Kiely. In short, she summarises as follows:
“I can confirm that the A’s mental health diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (ICD-10 F43.1) diagnosed in 2012 remains present with features of depression, anxiety and suicidal thoughts. The A has persistent and chronic symptoms which include recurring nightmares, poor sleep, anxiety, depression, forgetfulness and panic episodes”.
19. Then most recent are the letters from May 2025 at page 176 of the bundle state. One letter states:
“The situation and the A’s conditions have further deteriorated since my last letter. The strain and stress of the lack of status, the resultant impact this has on her mental health are evident in her symptoms. The years of lack of access to support, stability and independence cause significant stress to both the A but to also her family whom she is reliant on to provide for her.
The A’s memory has deteriorated due to the chronic stress and as a result of her mental health – requiring now the one to one support of her children, in particular her daughter H and her son A. They prompt her with her medications, they support her with all her activities of daily living examples of this include reminding her to get changed, washed, take her to her appointments when she is able to manage this”.
20. There was further confirmation of the diagnosis of PTSD in that letter and reference to the suicidal ideation as well.
21. Against that background I then return to the Judge’s decision at paragraph 22 to assess whether there is a material error of law. Firstly, where the Judge said there was no evidence of what trauma is said to have given rise to matters, the Judge plainly did have that evidence. He had the evidence from 2015 from Dr Farrington and the letters from Dr Kiely referring to the scarring.
22. Secondly, the Judge said at paragraph 22 of his decision: “It is wholly unclear whether relevant mental health diagnostic criteria were properly applied”. In my judgment the doctor clearly did apply the relevant correct diagnostic criteria. That is because she set the criteria in her reports in a specific way. I have referred to those when I read out Dr Kiely’s letters.
23. Thirdly the Judge queried “whether the medical practitioner considered the possibility that the Appellant was feigning symptoms at that time”.
24. In my judgment this is an unusual case in which there has been extensive continuity with medical treatment for some years which the Appellant has been receiving at least from Dr Kiely (and other). In my judgment had any of the symptoms been in issue, whether feigning or otherwise, requiring further clarification and/or had to be dealt with then the Judge ought to have specifically raised such matters at the hearing.
25. Instead, the Judge merely referred to previous judicial findings which related to the Appellant’s asylum claim not having been successful, and because the mental health symptoms were self-reported. Although the Judge did not use these words, he appears to have considered that the evidence was thereby diluted and he remained unattracted by the evidence.
26. Whilst I take on board the clear and helpful submissions of Mr Tan, in my judgment although this was a detailed decision by the Judge, the difficulty which arises is that it is clear in my judgment that the Judge allowed himself to be unduly seduced by the asylum determination from many priors years and he did not consider the medical evidence appropriately. Perhaps that is understandable in a jurisdiction where Appellants sometimes do rely on ‘last minute’ medical reports which merely make assertions without proper consideration of an Appellant’s history.
27. In this particular case however, the medical evidence was of a wholly different character and was consistently updated by medical practitioners over a period of a decade or so.
28. In my judgment the evidence of Dr Kiely in particular was of great significance and required much more examination instead of the limited way that it was dealt with at paragraph 22 of the Judge’s decision. I accept of course that it was for the Judge to make the final decision and not for experts or medical practitioners to do so. However, the Judge’s role was to consider the whole of the evidence and come to his decision. In this case the Judge did not consider the whole of the evidence and did not set out why Dr Kiely’s first hand witnessing of the Appellant’s symptoms over many years was evidence which could be rejected. Nor did the Judge adequately reason why that evidence was insufficient.
29. It is not necessary to consider the Appellant’s second ground of appeal because Ground 1 is fundamental and cuts across the whole of the Judge’s decision.
30. As I have said already, the Judge’s decision is a lengthy one which correctly cites Rules and statute in some detail, but ultimately however the way in which paragraph 22 is framed means that I conclude that the decision contains a material error of law. Therefore, the decision of the Judge has to be set aside.
31. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for further consideration here at the Upper Tribunal or be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. I apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that I remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.
Conclusion
32. In the circumstances of this case because the whole of the decision is set aside, it is appropriate that the matter be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for hearing afresh on all issues with no preserved findings,
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law. The decision is set aside.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings for a hearing on all matters.
An anonymity direction has previously been made and that shall continue.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 November 2025