Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003316

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/53485/2024
LP/12311/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BIBI

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Saifolahi, Counsel, instructed by BHD Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity who appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge G D Davison (“the judge”). By that decision, the judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims.
The judge’s decision
2. The Appellant’s claim was, as described by the judge, relatively straightforward. She asserted that she lived in a rural community and that her own family and those of friends in that community made a living by herding flocks of sheep in the nearby mountains. She also asserted that a friend of hers, N, had been in a relationship with a member of the Peshmerga and that she herself had, to an extent, also become involved with them. She asserted that on a particular occasion, her friend N had had her house raided by the Iranian authorities. N was detained by the authorities.

3. The Appellant’s uncle, who had been up in the mountains looking after the sheep, had returned from what one might describe as shift of fifteen days and had discovered the raid had taken place. The raid on N’s house and N’s arrest had led to problems for the Appellant. She, with the assistance of her uncle, left Iran and made her way to Turkey and eventually on to this country. She asserted that the authorities knew of her involvement with the Peshmerga and that she would be at risk on return.

4. The judge recorded that credibility was the central aspect of the Appellant’s case. It is implicit in that if she had been deemed credible her appeal would have succeeded. However, the judge found that the claim was “lacking in both credibility and plausibility” and that it did not have the “ring of truth” about it. The reasons for that ultimate conclusion are set out from [19] onwards. For the purposes of this appeal and the three grounds of appeal put forward and on which permission was granted, there are three aspects of the judge’s decision which fall to be considered. First, his conclusion that evidence given by the Appellant at the hearing was said to add to her claim and had not been put forward in advance of the hearing to the extent that it constituted an inconsistency or discrepancy which undermined her overall credibility. That evidence went to the issue of the manner in which the flock of sheep had been looked after in the mountains and how the Appellant’s uncle had come to find out about the raid on N’s house. The second aspect of the judge’s findings relate to the Appellant’s claim that her friend N had been monitored by the Iranian authorities. The judge found it to be “implausible” that N would have been monitored simply by virtue of being associated to the member of the Peshmerga, as opposed to direct surveillance of member of the Peshmerga themselves. Finally, the judge regarded it to be “illogical” that the Appellant’s uncle would have told her to remain with the agent rather than return to Iran if, as was the case, the Appellant was already with that agent and making her journey through Turkey and on to Europe.
Conclusions
5. We are grateful to both representatives for their assistance at the hearing.

6. Having canvassed all relevant issues, we conclude for the following reasons that the judge did materially err in law, at least in respect of grounds 1 and 2.

7. In respect of ground 1 and the provision of further evidence by the Appellant at the hearing, we conclude that the judge failed to identify or adequately reason why the additional evidence provided by the Appellant at the hearing constituted an inconsistency as regards any previous or subsequent evidence on the particular issue. As a general proposition, an individual may provide additional details to a protection claim during the process of assessment, investigation and decision-making. In one sense that is in the nature of initial negative assessments by the Respondent being followed by appeals. The addition of further details is not in and of itself a discrepancy. A relevant discrepancy needs to be identified and supported by reasons.

8. In the present case, we acknowledge that the further information provided by the Appellant, namely that there were young men who looked after the flock of sheep whilst the change over between the Appellant’s uncle and her friend’s father was made on a fifteen day cycle, had not been stated previously. However, we are satisfied that the judge failed to explain why this constituted an inconsistency such as to damage the Appellant’s overall credibility. Having looked at the asylum interview (in particular Q80) and read the judge’s decision as a whole, he did not identify what, if any, previous evidence had been provided in which the Appellant had had an opportunity to provide that evidence but had failed to do so or had provided evidence which was in direct contradiction to what she said at the hearing.

9. We conclude it was not necessary for us to listen to an audio recording of the hearing because what the judge recorded in his decision at [22] and [23] was sufficient for us to reach a firm conclusion on this particular point.

10. In addition to the absence of a reasoned explanation as to why the Appellant’s evidence was inconsistent, we agree with ground 1 to the extent that he did not assess whether the additional information provided at the hearing was of itself plausible, or whether indeed it fitted in to the general narrative which the Appellant had initially provided. On the face of the additional information provided no such inconsistency or significant implausibility arose.

11. We conclude that the judge erred in law.

12. To the extent that it was material, we acknowledge Mr Hulme’s submission that the judge had made it clear that he was only providing examples of evidential problems. However, it is right to say, as pointed out by Ms Saifolahi, that the judge had taken a cumulative view to credibility. If, as we have found, one of the examples provided is materially flawed, that must, it seems to us, have a knock-on effect on the sustainability of the overall credibility assessment.

13. On that basis alone, we would conclude that the judge’s decision should be set aside.

14. However, we are also satisfied that ground 2 is made out. Judges are required to exercise real caution before making an adverse finding on plausibility grounds. That is for good reason, as has been explained in the authorities over the course of many years. In the present case, the judge regarded the monitoring of the Appellant’s friend as being “implausible”. He did not refer to any country information on the issue of the Iranian authority’s attitudes towards political opponents, the Kurdish community, members of the Peshmerga, or anyone else. The grounds of appeal make reference to several passages within the relevant CPIN (which we are satisfied was before the judge) indicating that in fact the Iranian authorities do undertake surveillance of people deemed to be associated with parties, groups or indeed ethnicities opposed to the regime. That is not to say that the judge was bound to have accepted the Appellant’s evidence. However, in our view, the judge erred by failing to have regard to the country evidence on the particular point or alternatively failing to have provide reasons as to why that contextual evidence did not apply or was not relevant to the Appellant’s case.

15. Given that the implausibility finding was said to damage the Appellant’s overall credibility, we deem the error to be material and combined with what we have said about ground 2, this further undermines the overall credibility assessment.

16. Given our conclusions on grounds 1 and 2, we need not express a firm conclusion on ground 3. For what is it worth, there is some uncertainty as to what was meant by the written evidence in question and it may be that the judge could have been entitled to interpret it in a way other that that put forward in the grounds. It makes no difference in this particular case.
Disposal
17. Having canvassed the views of the parties, we agree that this is a case which has to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete reassessment of the evidence. There are no findings which can be preserved and the fact-finding exercise will be extensive and critical to the outcome of the Appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and that decision is set aside.

The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (Hatton Cross hearing centre) to be heard without any preserved findings and by a judge other than Judge G D Davison.

H Norton-Taylor

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 23 September 2025