Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003321

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/59195/2023
LP/12107/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 31st December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

SK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sowerby (Counsel), Pasha Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gray of the decision of 15 May 2025 and heard on 28 April 2025 in which the Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal.

2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan. The Respondent refused his protection claim on 26 October 2021.

3. The Appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection claim. The Judge sets out a summary of the facts at [4]:

“4. The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return due to his political opinion or alternatively that he is entitled to humanitarian protection. In summary, his case is that he is a member of the Awami National Party and he and his wife will be targeted by the Taliban if he is returned to Pakistan. He also advances an Article 8 claim on the basis of what he says are insurmountable obstacles to family life with his wife continuing outside the United Kingdom.”

4. At [7] the Judge states:

“7. The Respondent accepts that a Convention reason is engaged on the facts asserted by the Appellant, taken at their highest. Ms Grosicka accepted that, if the Appellant is found to be credible, then his fears of persecution are well founded.”

5. The Judge also sets out the issues in dispute at [8].

Grounds of Appeal

6. The Grounds of appeal run to 16 paragraphs and are not listed in separate grounds but amount to a series of complaints about the Judgement and set out that there are a number of errors that could amount to an error of law.

7. Permission was granted by the First-tier on 21 July 2025 in relation to the grounds as a whole.

8. It is therefore difficult to discern specific grounds of appeal rather it is said that there are a series of errors that taken either individually or collectively amount to an error of law.

Discussion

9. The Judge in essence concluded that the Appellant was credible in relation to some aspects of his claim and not others. In particular the Appellant had been previously found to have sat the ETS test in a fraudulent manner.

10. Before me it was argued that there were in essence three significant errors. Firstly, that the Judge was wrong on the facts to conclude that there was sufficiency of protection. Secondly, that the previous finding on the ETS test was not properly dealt with and finally, that there was no proper consideration of Article 8 ECHR.

11. The Judge heard the Appellant and his wife give evidence. The Judge found the Appellant to be credible at [20]:

“20. Having considered the evidence in the round, I do not consider that the Respondent has identified any significant credibility issues with the Appellant’s account. I consider that his account was consistent with the objective evidence to which I was referred. I have highlighted above elements of the Appellant’s account that I consider to be reasonably detailed. The Appellant’s account was not implausible for the reasons set out above. In my judgment, the Appellant’s account is reasonably likely to be true. I find that the Appellant is a member of the Awami National Party and that he has, through his father, received threats from the Taliban that he and his wife will be kidnapped or killed if they return.”

12. The Judge then went on to consider sufficiency of protection. The Judge gave short shrift to the submission that there is not sufficiency of protection at [22]-[25]. Before me is was submitted that the Judge had cherry picked aspects of the Country Guidance dating from 2024 in particular failing to consider paragraphs: 4.2.9; 4.3.4, the reference to the US state Department 2022 and 4.2.10. It is also submitted that the Judge should not have dismissed the 2021 BBC article [at 23] for being out of date.

13. Examining the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Actors of Protection 2024 I do not agree that the Judge has cherry picked. The paragraphs cited state the following:

4.2.9 The January 2022 DFAT report noted that ‘Police capacity and effectiveness in Pakistan is limited by a lack of resources, poor training, insufficient and outmoded equipment, and competing pressures from superiors, political actors, security forces and the judiciary.’[footnote 41] The same report noted that:

‘Some groups are denied adequate state protection on discriminatory grounds… Despite measures introduced to curb violence across the country under the NAP [National Action Plan] – including strengthened powers for military and paramilitary security forces and the establishment of military courts – successful prosecution for politically motivated [ethnic, religious[footnote 42]] or sectarian violence is rare. This is due to ineffective police investigations, a lack of forensic capabilities and prosecution and judicial legal understanding, and threats against Judges, lawyers, witnesses and their families.’[footnote 43]

4.2.10 The OSAC commented on the police forces that operated across the country, excluding Balochistan:
‘While Islamabad has a large police force, resource constraints affect the efficacy of police operations. Low salaries and a lack of equipment are pervasive issues throughout the country…
‘The efficacy of police services in Karachi is diminished by a lack of training and resources; police also receive relatively low salaries. As a result, political influence and bribery may impact the conduct of investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. Nonetheless, the Sindh force of the Pakistan Rangers has significantly diminished the capabilities of militant groups in the province…
‘The Punjab Police clearly lack funds, resources, and training along with the rest of the Pakistani Police Services… though the government is working to improve the situation with computerization and modernization. As of 2020, approximately 10,000 surveillance cameras monitor Lahore under the Punjab “Safe City” Project, part of a nationwide project. The system features a 24-hour command center where police officials monitor various areas of the city, looking for criminal or terrorist activities. These cameras also monitor traffic, with violators receiving mailed violations based on license plate numbers.
‘The security agencies in northwest Pakistan comprise civilian and military forces. Security forces are largely professional, but lack equipment, communications technology, and training. In general, police response to criminal incidents is inconsistent. Police and government forces are common targets of terrorist attacks. The local threat environment requires authorities to prioritize counterterrorism, force protection, and infrastructure security.’[footnote 44]
4.3.4 The USSD HR Report 2022 stated that ‘The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government generally did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices at all levels. Corruption was pervasive in politics and government, and various politicians and public office holders faced allegations of corruption, including bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement.’[footnote 51] The USSD repeated this information in its HR Report 2023[footnote 52].

14. The Judge fairly summarises the CPIN. Reviews the additional 2021 article and concludes that there is sufficient state protection. It is further submitted that the Judge ignores the FCDO guidance from Mach 2024 in the bundle. On reading this guidance is shows that there is a risk of terrorist attack in Pakistan to tourists. However, this was not required to be referred to by the Judge given the comprehensive analysis in the CPIN. I accept that the FCDO shows that there is a risk but it does not undermine the CPIN as that risk has to be real and in relation to the appellant. It is not enough to show that there is some risk of terrorism for a protection claim to succeed.

15. Finally it is submitted that the Appellant’s wife is a British National and as a result that puts her at higher risk. This it is submitted is particularly so because she has been previously threatened by the Taliban. Rule 339K was mentioned in passing in submissions but ultimately the submission is that the Appellant’s wife being a British National puts him into a higher risk category and as a result there is not sufficient protection. The Judge deals with this at [21] finding the narrative credible. However this does not change the evidence or assessment of the sufficiency of protection or the ability to relocate.

16. In my judgment on the facts presented to the Judge and submission today there is no error of law in relation to asylum and humanitarian protection. There is sufficiency of protection in relation to this Appellant.

17. The issue in relation to internal relocation is not challenged by the appellant.

18. Therefore, in relation to the asylum and humanitarian protection claims there is no error of law.

Suitability

19. The second issue raised is that is submitted that the Judge was wrong to treat the 2013 application for a Tier 1 visa in which the appellant was found to have committed fraud as determinative of dishonesty in relation to Article 8 ECHR.

20. It is worth noting again that the judge found the appellant credible in spite of the previous immigration fraud.

21. The appellant now has a British Child born a few weeks before this appeal was heard.

22. The original judgement in relation to the Tier 1 application made in 2013 was herd in 2017. At [45] of that judgment it was stated that:

“Having given careful consideration to all the evidence in the round. I find that the Appellant has failed to dispel the prima facie case of deception established against him. Overall I am satisfied that I should treat the “invalid” assessment as reliable. It follows that there is no further transfer of proof to the Secretary of State”

23. The Judge in 2025 dealt with this matter in an exemplary manner. The Judge took the 2017 decision as the starting point and although the judge did not cite the case of Devaseelan it was clear that the principle was applied.

24. The judge then heard evidence about the test from a witness who was said to have taken the appellant to and from the test centre. The Judge having considered the evidence found that “nothing in the evidence of [the witness] causes me to depart from the findings of Judge Courtney”[39]

25. The submissions before me where that the judge should not have treated the appellant as credible in relation to the protection claim but not in relation to the Article 8 and ETS issues. There is no merit in this argument. The Judge was entitled to examine the evidence in the round – it is perfectly possible for an appellant to be found credible about some and not other aspects of his claim. However, in this case the issue is one of suitability and the appellant having already been found to not meet the requirements for suitability on the basis of a judgment there was no reason on the evidence to interfere with that judgment. There is accordingly no error of law.

Article 8

26. The Appellant effectively submits that the birth of his child a few weeks before this appeal is a significant change of circumstances and that judge weighed the fact that that his wife was due to give birth improperly. In that the Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the imminent birth.

27. In my judgment the Judge conducted an exemplary Article 8 analysis. The judge did consider the birth of the child and said the following [56]:

“56. The Tribunal was told that the Appellant and his wife are expecting a baby in September this year. It was not suggested that the Appellant’s wife would be unable to obtain adequate healthcare in relation to her pregnancy in Pakistan. I have taken into account that one or other of the parents may need to take time off work to care for the baby in the early months following the birth, however as set out above, one parent will still be able to work and the Appellant owns a property that could be sold to realise some money when the other parent is not working. It is an ordinary feature of raising a child that family income will be reduced in the short term if one parent is not working outside of the home.”

28. It is also worth noting at [50] the Judge states:

“50. The Appellant confirmed in the course of his oral evidence that he and his wife have discussed what will happen if he is required to return to Pakistan, and that they have agreed that she will go with him. The Appellant’s wife confirmed that she has known for some time that there was a prospect that she would have to move to Pakistan with the Appellant.”

29. The balancing exercise was in my judgment undertaken with skill and care and in accordance with the law.

30. For all the reasons above I find there is no error of law.

Notice of Decision

1. There is no error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 September 2025