Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003325

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/50234/2024
LE/00945/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

Maksimiljan Vataj
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No attendance
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hallen (“the judge”) dated 5 May 2025.
Background
2. The appellant, a national of Albania, was born on 17 March 1997. He entered the UK illegally on 21 February 2019. He made an asylum claim which he subsequently withdrew and has remained in the UK without leave to remain since.
3. The appellant is married to Ms Klisian Oshafi who was born on 7 February 1999, who is also a national of Albania. Ms Oshafi is in the UK on a skilled worker visa working as a community care worker. Her visa runs until 30 September 2027. The couple were married in the UK on 14 October 2023. On 10 December 2023 the appellant applied for leave to remain in the UK as a partner. The couple’s daughter was born on 23 December 2023.
4. In a decision dated 22 March 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s application and his human rights claim.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 29 April 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr A Malik of Counsel and the respondent was represented by Mr K Fearon, a Home Office Presenting Officer.
6. Under the heading “Issues in Dispute” the judge stated at paragraph 6:
“6. It was accepted by the appellant that he did not meet the eligibility requirements under the immigration rules (‘the rules’). The parties agreed that the sole issue to be decided by me is whether the refusal (and requiring the appellant to relocate to Albania) is disproportionate on the basis it gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. There is therefore no need to consider the other points which have been made in the appellant’s skeleton argument though of course whether the appellant and his wife and daughter would face insurmountable obstacles is relevant to the proportionality assessment. The appellant’s representative confirmed that he was not making any claim on behalf of the appellant in respect of private life.”
7. The appellant and his wife both gave oral evidence. The appellant used an Albanian interpreter and his wife gave evidence in English.
8. The judge concluded that the return of the appellant to Albania would not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. The judged noted that the appellant was not able to point to any particularly compelling features which would render his removal disproportionate and therefore found that the removal of the appellant was not disproportionate and would not amount to unlawful interference in his family life contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant applied for permission to appeal relying on the following grounds:
“GROUND 1: Procedural Unfairness – Mischaracterisation of the Appellant’s Case Regarding Private Life
GROUND 2: Misapplication of the ‘Unjustifiably Harsh Consequences’ Test
GROUND 3: Error of Law in Dismissing the Significance of Removal on a Lawfully Resident, Skilled-Worker Sponsor
GROUND 4: Failure to Lawfully Assess the Best Interests of the Child under Section 55 of the 2009 Act
GROUND 5: Improper Speculation and Adverse Inference on Asylum Claim
GROUND 6: Inadequate Consideration of ‘Very Significant Obstacles’ to Reintegration
GROUND 7: Material Error in Factual Finding – English Language and Financial Self-Sufficiency”
10. In a decision dated 19 June 2025 the First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on 1 September 2025. The Upper Tribunal considered that only grounds 3, 5, 6 and 7 were arguable, but did not limit the grant of permission.
11. The respondent did not file and serve a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
12. On 24 October 2025 the appellant emailed the Upper Tribunal to state that he would not attend the hearing and invited the Upper Tribunal to determine the appeal on the papers. The appellant did not provide any reasons why he would not attend the hearing or why he was not instructing a representative to attend on his behalf.
13. The appellant sought to rely on an additional letter from his wife and evidence that she was currently expecting their second child. As the evidence was not relevant to my consideration of whether the judge made a material error of law, I did not admit the letter and supporting evidence under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
14. At the hearing I heard submissions from Ms Kerr for the respondent who opposed the appellant’s appeal. As indicated in the correspondence the appellant was not represented and did not appear. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
15. Reading the First-tier Tribunal decision fairly and not hypercritically I am not persuaded that the judge materially erred in law.
Ground 1
16. As outlined above, under the heading, “Issues in Dispute”, the judge recorded that the parties agree that the sole issue to be decided is whether the refusal and requiring the appellant to relocate to Albania is disproportionate on the basis it gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences and that the appellant’s representative confirmed that he was not making any claim on behalf of the appellant in respect of his private life.
17. In the grounds the appellant submits that this is incorrect and describes it as a mischaracterisation of the appellant’s claim because the appellant’s skeleton argument and witness evidence addressed the appellant’s private life, particularly the duration of his residence since 2019, integration in the UK and his relationship predating formal marriage.
18. The appellant does not claim that his representative at the hearing did not inform the judge that the appellant was not making a claim on the basis of his private life.
19. The Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal states:
“It is the requirement that the parties identify, articulate, agree and then focus upon the principle controversial issues or the disputed issues, thereby adopting an issues based approach to the appeal”.
20. The appellant’s representative confirmed that the appellant’s private life was not an issue that the judge was required to determine. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the judge did not materially err by failing to consider it.
21. In any event, the public interest factors listed in Section 117B would have required the judge to give little weight to the appellant’s private life as it was established at a time when his immigration status is precarious. Accordingly, I am satisfied that any consideration of a private life claim could not have made a material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
Ground 2
22. I am satisfied that the judge did not import as strict a threshold to his proportionality assessment as claimed in the grounds.
23. Under the heading “Article 8 Balancing Exercise”, the judge records that the respondent accepted that there was family life between the appellant, his wife and his child and as a result he was required to “move onto the question of striking a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved.” The judge found that “the factors raised by the appellant do not in this case outweigh the public interest in maintaining immigration control”.
24. It is clear from the judge’s language that he is aware of and applied the correct test. I am satisfied that the judge considered all the relevant factors and conducted a legally appropriate balancing exercise.
Ground 3
25. The judge was clearly aware that the appellant’s wife is in the UK on a skilled worker visa working as a community care worker. He referred to this fact at paragraphs 3, 11 and 20 of the decision.
26. I accept that the judge does not specifically refer to the public interest in retaining skilled care workers in the UK as expressed in their conclusion on the shortage occupation list and the grant of entry clearance to the appellant’s wife. However, I am satisfied that the judge was clearly aware of the basis upon which the appellant’s wife was in the UK and factored it into his consideration. The judge was not obliged to express every step of his reasoning. I also note that it is not one of the public interest factors the judge was required to consider under Section 117 of the 2002 Act.
Ground 4
27. The judge did not fail to lawfully assess the appellant’s child’s best interests. The judge considered them in appropriate detail at paragraph 17 of the decision concluding that he was not presented with any persuasive evidence as to why it was not in the child’s best interests to stay with her parents in Albania.
28. I note that the appellant has not identified any evidence before the judge that could have persuaded him that this is not where the child’s best interests lay.
Ground 5
29. The judge was entitled to consider the fact that the appellant had withdrawn his asylum claim and had chosen not to pursue his claim for international protection. The judge considered the evidence from the appellant’s father referencing a danger to the appellant in Albania and the appellant’s own evidence that he feared return to Albania.
30. I am satisfied that it was open to the judge to find that had the appellant’s claim been genuine, the appellant would not have withdrawn it. I note that the appellant has not provided an alternative explanation for withdrawing his asylum claim.
Ground 6
31. As outlined above, the judge was not required to consider whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration as it was not an issue in dispute before him. I refer back to my early consideration of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, which states that the parties must adopt an issue based approach to the appeal.
32. In any event, it is clear from the factual findings made by the judge i.e. that there was no danger to the appellant in Albania, he could access family support and employment in Albania, that that if he had considered whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration, he would have found that there weren’t any.
Ground 7
33. The appellant has not pointed to any evidence before the judge that demonstrates that he could speak English or that he was economically self-sufficient. The judge was clearly aware that the appellant’s wife was in employment and records her earnings in the decision as being £24,752 per annum. The judge records that he considers the appellant’s inability to speak English and the fact that he is not financially self-sufficient to be neutral factors in the balancing exercise. Accordingly, even if the judge did err in making those conclusions, it is clear that neither were material to his overall balancing exercise and assessment.
Conclusion
34. I am satisfied that the judge applied the correct legal tests and made findings that were open to him on the evidence before him and gave clear and adequate reasons for his conclusions. I find that the grounds disclose no material error of law.
35. There is no error of law in the First tier Tribunal’s decision and it shall stand.
Notice of Decision
36. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

G. Loughran
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 November 2025