Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003329

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55259/2024 LP/00782/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

GK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 20 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear serious harm on return to Georgia. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. This appeal came before me to be remade following the decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) involved a material error of law. A significant portion of the FTT fact-finding assessment was preserved. With the appellant’s credibility largely resolved in the FTT, the issues which remain to be decided on remaking are threefold: whether the appellant is at risk of suffering serious harm on return to Georgia; if so, whether the appellant can turn to the Georgian state authorities for sufficient protection; if at risk, can the appellant reasonably internally relocate in Georgia to obviate the risk he faces.

3. The factual foundation of the appellant’s protection claim is that he unlawfully installed surveillance equipment in a Georgian prison over an extended period of time, ending in 2017. He did this on behalf of the prison authorities with the connivance of senior political figures who approved this unlawful activity. He claims that his work in supporting spying on prisoners has become widely known among those who were spied upon in the prison estate and that he is in grave danger from the criminal fraternity.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

4. A range of factual findings were preserved in the error of law decision. It is important to set out these findings of fact in some detail because they will form the factual bedrock of the issues which I must go on to decide. The appeal proceeds solely on humanitarian protection principles because it was found by the FTT (at [8]) that no Refugee Convention reason underpinned the appellant’s fears. In essence, he primarily fears criminal actors.

5. The following findings from the FTT decision stand for the purposes of the remaking decision:

[16] The Appellant’s credibility is damaged under s8 Asylum and Immigration Treatment of Claimants Etc. Act 2004. The Appellant travelled through European countries deemed as safe including France where he stayed for two months. The Appellant was asked in oral evidence his reason for not claiming in a safe country on his journey to the UK to which he stated that he heard it was harder to deport from the UK than from other countries. This is not a relevant reason for not claiming asylum in the first safe country, in my finding. I find that the Appellant’s credibility is damaged as a result of failing to claim asylum in the first safe country that he reached.

[17] Notwithstanding the damage to credibility, I find that the Appellant’s claim is credible to some extent. I find that the Appellant did install cables, bugging devices and cameras in prison as claimed. I find this as the Appellant gave very detailed evidence in his substantive interview as to the devices that were installed at the prison and when they were installed which was between December 2016 and May 2017. The Respondent’s reasons for refusal states that this is inconsistent with external evidence that the state were tackling the problems of installation of devices at that time, but I don’t find the evidence referred to by the Respondent in the Reason for Refusal to be incompatible with the Appellant’s evidence on the installations occurring in 2017.

[18] The Appellant stated that there were ongoing investigations into the bugging and camera installation in Georgian prisons. I find the Appellant has been sufficiently detailed and consistent for this aspect of his claim, that is that he installed the devices in the prison to be found to be credible in regard to this aspect.

[19] In respect of the stabbing of the Appellant in 2019, there is no obvious link between the Appellant’s activities installing cameras and bugging devices and the Appellant’s stated stabbing. The Appellant’s evidence is that he was not sure who the assailant was although stated that that the assailant knew of the Appellant’s activities installing devices within the prison. The Respondent stated that insufficient detail was provided in respect of the stabbing. I accept that the Appellant was unrepresented. The Appellant states he hasn’t received medical treatment in the UK so it is difficult to see how he could provide any evidence of his wound in the circumstances. It would however have assisted in substantiating the Appellant’s case, if medical evidence of this was supplied. Notwithstanding this, taking into account the damage to the Appellant’s credibility caused by s8 as detailed above, the Appellant has provided insufficient detail of the stabbing event and the motive for it. I do not find the Appellant has given a credible account of this event.

[20] In respect of the threats from ZC there are inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account. The Appellant’s oral evidence was that he was able to reside in Georgia for around 18 months following the threat to leaving the UK, although the Appellant’s asylum interview Q 46 indicates that the threat was received in 2021 and that he left in October 2021. That must be a period of a maximum of 10 months. The inconsistency was put to the Appellant who stated that he thought the period was 18 months.

[21] The subjective evidence before me of the threats is scant and there are inconsistencies in the account as detailed above which go to the core of the claim as they relate to the threat. The Appellant, by his own account, did not feel that he was fearful of the threat which now forms the basis of his claiming asylum until he left Georgia which would have been around 18 months after he was last threatened, or less if his account in his asylum interview record is correct.

[…]

[23] In respect of the Appellant’s credibility, I find it credible that the Appellant was involved in the installation of cameras in prison. I also accept the Appellant’s evidence that this was unlawful and unconstitutional and that on balance, it is likely that persons at ministerial level and prisoner governor level sanctioned the installations. It is difficult to see how it could not have been sanctioned at least prison governor level given that the Appellant worked for a private company carrying out the installation.

[24] In respect of the stabbing and the threat from ZC, I do not accept the Appellant’s account, it lacks detail. I do not find the Appellant credible in this regard.

[…]

[25] The Appellant’s actions do not demonstrate that the Appellant felt he was at risk. The Appellant left Georgia at one point to travel to Poland to buy a car to travel to the UK and returned to Georgia before commencing his journey. The Appellant states that he remained safe by only leaving his house to travel to work and the shop, but that does not demonstrate a significant risk to the Appellant, the fact remains he was able to live safely in his home for a significant period, he stated in oral evidence this was 18 months, without facing threats or assaults.

[26] Even if the Appellant were to establish that he was stabbed in 2019 and that the stabbing was related to his activities installing cameras and bugging devices, he would struggle to establish related risk since he did not receive further issues from this person, yet made no attempt to hide or gain protection.

6. In the error of law decision, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi limited the matters to be determined in the remaking hearing at [32] and [34] of her decision:

[32] As to the scope of the re-making, of course sufficiency of protection is to be considered. To the extent that there was even a formal challenge to the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim to have been stabbed in 2019 and threatened in 2021, I have not found the judge to have been in error. However, the judge has made findings that the appellant was engaged in unlawful conduct in 2016-17 within a prison, sanctioned at high level. To the extent that there is a risk in 2025 arising from this activity is a matter which will be considered at the re-making of the decision together with whether or not there would be sufficient protection for the appellant in Georgia and a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative.

[34] […] The Upper Tribunal will be considering risk at the date of the next hearing. That means that any evidence on which the appellant relies to show that he may be at risk in Georgia arising from the situation set out at [32] above if he has to go back; or to show that he would not be able to ask the police to protect him; or to show that it is either unsafe or unreasonable for him to live somewhere else in Georgia has to be sent to the respondent and to the Upper Tribunal in accordance with the directions below. […]

7. The appellant was unrepresented at the remaking hearing. Mr Lawson drew my attention to version 3 of the Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’) on Georgia dated September 2024. This document was made available to the appellant at the hearing, and I have had regard to it in the context of deciding the issues which arise for determination. At the remaking hearing, I heard oral evidence from the appellant with the assistance of an interpreter. I then heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any evidence and submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Legal Framework

8. To succeed in an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds, the appellant must not be a refugee, and they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof is on the appellant.

Discussion

9. As alluded to above, the scope of the issues which fall to be redecided in this appeal are limited. Parts of the appellant’s narrative account stand as accepted and credible while others stand as rejected because they were not found to be credible. In broad terms, the FTT judge was satisfied that the appellant had installed surveillance equipment at a prison at the behest of senior Georgian public officials. He was not, however, believed in respect to his claims to have been stabbed in 2019, or threatened with serious violence in 2021, by criminal actors. Equally, he was disbelieved about his claim to have been fearful of reprisals about his work in 2016-207. The appellant relied on further evidence in the shape of further narrative evidence, online reports of high-level corruption in Georgian political life and international sanctions imposed by Western countries which reflect those political abuses of power. He further relied on a photograph of the palm of his hand which showed a visible scar. He claimed that this showed he had been injured with a knife in 2019 as he had always claimed. Confined as I am to the issues of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, it is not open to me to reopen the credibility findings which were preserved in the error of law decision which demonstrably included adverse findings that the knife attack was not truthful. While directions were given in the error of law decision to enable the parties to rely on further evidence, any new evidence was restricted to that which went to the three issues which remain to be decided, not those which are deemed to be settled and preserved, namely, credibility.

10. In assessing whether the appellant is at risk on return to Georgia from state actors as a result of the work he undertook in installing surveillance equipment, I am bound to observe that according to the preserved findings of fact, he has not been targeted for reprisals by criminals or state actors since he completed this unlawful state-sponsored activity in 2017. I also take account of the preserved finding that the appellant left the country to travel to Poland and voluntarily returned to Georgia before ultimately departing on his journey which led him to the UK. As the FTT judge remarked, these factors do not sit comfortably with the notion that the appellant considered himself to be at risk much less that he was actually and objectively at a real risk of suffering serious harm.

11. The only conceivable basis on which the appellant might attract the attention of state actors on account of his surveillance work in 2016-2017 would be if he were to seek the protection of the police to guard against threats of violence. This is because he would then be required to disclose the reasons why he believed he had been targeted. Not only would this run the risk that he would face investigation and prosecution for the part he played in this unlawful activity – which is not, in my view, a principled reason why he should not seek protection from the Georgian police – but it would also run the risk of attracting the unwanted and dangerous attention of those who would be naturally implicated as having authorised this work. Were he to make such an approach to the authorities, the CPIN is tolerably clear, at paragraph 4.1.1 that he could not expect to receive sufficient protection because he would then have a well-founded fear of the state. The foundation for the Home Office assessment at paragraph 4.1.1 is to be found throughout the CPIN but, in particular, section 12.3. This section sets out the objective third party country information which reveals a concerning picture of high-level political corruption which, while subject to growing efforts to curb these improper influences, continues to infect official bodies charged with enforcing the law. Paragraph 12.3.8 gives a sense of the corruption which persists:

The USSD HR Report further noted:

‘The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally did not implement the law effectively. There were reports of high-level government corruption…

‘NGOs continued to cite weak checks and balances and a lack of independence of law enforcement agencies among the factors contributing to allegations of high-level corruption. On November 3, Transparency International/Georgia listed uninvestigated cases of alleged corruption involving high-ranking public officials or persons associated with the ruling party. As of September [2023], 99 public servants were charged with corruption.

‘NGOs assessed there were no effective mechanisms for preventing corruption in state-owned enterprises and independent regulatory bodies. NGOs continued to call for an independent anti-corruption agency outside the authority of the SSSG, alleging its officials were abusing its functions.

‘In February, the new Anti-Corruption Bureau became operational to facilitate the fight against corruption. According to Transparency International/Georgia, the law did not grant the bureau investigative powers, which remained with the Anti-Corruption Agency under the SSSG and the Prosecutor’s Office. The law established that the bureau was accountable to both parliament and the Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Council. Leading civil society organizations raised concerns that the new bureau would neither have sufficient independence nor authority to be effective.’

12. The difficulty for the appellant is that, according to the preserved findings of fact, he simply has no need to seek protection from the Georgian police. He has not been found to have been credible about the violence and the threats of violence he claimed to suffer. There is nothing to indicate that state actors are (or have been in the past) actively interested in him for the work he performed in 2016-2017. In short, he might only be exposed to a risk of serious harm if he were to make a complaint about dangers from criminal actors which have already been found to be lacking in credibility.

13. In view of the scope of the remaking hearing and the foundations of the preserved findings of fact, I am bound to conclude that the appellant is not at risk of serious harm from criminal or state actors for the work he performed in 2016-2017. It follows that the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not properly arise for consideration because these matters could only assume relevance if the appellant were at risk on return.

Notice of Decision

The appeal brought on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 February 2026