Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No.: UI-2025-003331

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59576/2023
LP/12489/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

GA (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Eaton, Counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals from the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Isaacs promulgated on 22 May 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Isaacs dismissed the appellant’s appeal on asylum and Article 3 ECHR grounds.
Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq, whose date of birth is 18 January 1992. The appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity, and he was born and brought up in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. On 15 September 2021 the appellant left Iraq and flew to Dubai. He made his way through several countries before arriving in the UK by boat clandestinely on 10 November 2021. He claimed asylum the next day, and on 16 October 2023 the respondent refused his claim.
The Hearing Before, and the Decision of, the First-Tier Tribunal
3. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Isaacs sitting at Hatton Cross on 20 May 2025. Both parties were legally represented.
4. As set out in para [5] of the Decision, the appellant claimed that he faced a reasonable likelihood of persecution should he return to Iraq, for several reasons. Firstly, he said that he had had a sexual relationship with a girl referred to as RA and, as a result of this, RA’s family had threatened him on three occasions by telephone and his own family had disowned him. Secondly, he said that a Security Officer in Iraq, referred to as Major M, had taken a dislike to him and had threatened to accuse him of spying for the PMF. Finally, he said that he had taken part in political activities in the UK which placed him at risk from the authorities should he return to Iraq.
5. At para [7] of the Decision, the Judge said that it was agreed at the hearing between the parties that the issues were as follows:
• Has the appellant established on a balance of probabilities that he had the sexual relationship with RA in Iraq as he has claimed? As a result, has he come to the attention of her family and been threatened?
• Has he been targeted by Major M as claimed?
• What are the implications for the appellant of his political activities in the United Kingdom?
• Will the appellant have to return to Erbil as an undocumented person?
• This case is pre-NABA and therefore the standard of proof is reasonable likelihood.
• There were no discrete ECHR Article 8 claims other than facing very significant obstacles, which stands or falls with the protection claim.
6. The Judge’s findings of fact began at para [19]. At para [20] she said that she did not find that the appellant was generally a credible witness. This was because of a lack of internally consistency. He had not been consistent about where he was living in Iraq; about what he knew about his girlfriend’s family’s connection to the PMF; about who he feared and why he feared them upon his return to Iraq; about where he had been accused of spying whilst in Iraq; and about his possession of biometric ID.
7. At para [21] the Judge found that the inconsistencies in his evidence significantly undermined his credibility, which the third-party evidence did not mitigate.
8. At paras [22] to [23], the Judge set out the claimed factual background and at paras [24] to [31] she elaborated upon the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account.
9. At paras [32] and [33], the Judge set out her conclusions on the appellant’s account of events in Iraq. She accepted that it was reasonably likely that the court documents were genuine. They showed that the appellant and RA were arrested and charged with immoral activities in his car. It was the appellant’s defence at the time that he was merely helping her, and this was substantiated by witnesses who gave statements to support him. It was also the finding of the court that they were not guilty of any immoral activities and the charges were dismissed.
10. It was the appellant’s case that their defence was entirely fabricated, and that in truth he was in a sexual relationship with RA. However, this was not the finding of the court, or the case put forward by his witnesses.
11. The fact that there may have been a real case brought against him and RA did not corroborate his claims that they had had a sexual relationship, or that the charges were trumped up by Major M, or that he had received threats from her family, or that he had been disowned by his own family.
12. The Judge concluded that the appellant’s account of the problems he had encountered with Major M, RA’s family and his own family were not reasonably likely to be true, and that he had concocted them off the back of a genuine charge of being found in a car with a girl.
The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
13. The grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal were settled by Ms Lynes of Counsel who had appeared on behalf of the appellant at the hearing.
14. Ground 1 was that the Judge had misdirected herself as to the standard of proof to be applied to the appellant’s account of past events in Iraq. In the first bullet point at para [7] of the Decision the Judge had mistakenly stated that the issues agreed by the parties were: “Has the appellant established on the balance of probabilities that he had a sexual relationship with RA in Iraq as he has claimed? As a result, has he come to the attention of her family and been threatened?”
15. Ground 2 was that the Judge had made findings of inconsistency on matters that were not raised by the respondent and that were not put to the appellant as matters that were of concern to the Judge. For example, at para [24] of the Decision, the Judge found that the appellant’s account of where he was living in Iraq was inconsistent with the information set out in the documents relating to the court case brought against him in Iraq. The alleged inconsistency between the appellant’s witness statement and the information “supposedly” contained in the court documents was not put to the appellant at any point in the proceedings, either prior to or at the hearing itself.
16. This caused obvious unfairness to the appellant. Had the alleged inconsistency been raised during the hearing, the appellant would have been able to clarify that the reference to an individual staying in a hotel in Ankawa (Erbil) as recently as July 2019 was not a reference to him, but instead was a reference to his girlfriend, RA.
17. Permission to appeal on both grounds was granted by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 21 July 2025.
The Rule 24 Response and the respondent’s response to the Rule 25 Reply
18. In a Rule 24 Response dated 1 August 2025 that was settled by Ms Simbi of the Specialist Appeals Team, the respondent gave reasons for opposing the appeal.
19. As to Ground 1, when the determination was read as a whole, it was clear that the Judge was aware of and applied the correct standard of proof.
20. As to Ground 2, the grounds only identified one alleged credibility issue, while failing to engage with the multiple other credibility concerns identified by the Judge at paras [25]-[32] of the determination. The Judge’s conclusions were reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence, and the credibility assessment was thorough and properly reasoned. Accordingly, Ground 2 amounted to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings and did not disclose any material error of law.
21. In an email sent on 3 September 2025, Ms Simbi said that the factual premise of Ground 2 was not disputed. Having checked the HOPO’s note of proceedings, it was accepted that the asserted inconsistency in para [24] was not put to the appellant.
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
22. At the hearing before me at Field House to determine whether an error of law was made out, the representatives attended remotely, appearing by Video Link.
23. Mr Eaton developed the case put forward in the grounds of appeal. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Everett took the same line as the Rule 24 Response. As to Ground 2, Ms Everett conceded that the Judge had drawn a wrong inference from the court documents, but she submitted that her error was not material as she had made many other unchallenged findings.
24. In reply, Mr Eaton submitted that Ms Everett’s concession meant that the Judge’s error was material, as it infected the entire credibility assessment.
Discussion and Conclusions
25. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
26. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:
“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
27. As to Ground 1, the Judge clearly misdirected herself as to the beginning of para [7] of the Decision. The parties did not agree at the outset of the hearing that the first issue was whether the appellant had established on the balance of probabilities that he had the sexual relationship with RA in Iraq as he claimed, and as a result he had come to the attention of her family and had been threatened.
29. However, having regard to Lord Brown’s observations cited above, the Judge’s reasoning thereafter does not give rise to substantial doubt as to whether the Judge erred in law by applying the wrong standard of proof to the resolution of the issues identified in the first bullet point, rather than applying the correct standard of proof, which is the lower standard of reasonable likelihood.
30. In the same paragraph, the Judge correctly directs herself that the case is pre-NABA, and therefore the standard of proof is reasonable likelihood.
31. It is also clear from para [33] that the Judge applied the reasonable likelihood test to all aspects of the appellant’s account of his claimed problems in Iraq, and there is nothing in her reasoning leading up to para [33] which indicates that the Judge applied the higher standard of proof to the issues identified in the first bullet point in para [7].
32. As to Ground 2, in support of his claim, the appellant provided a suite of case documents with accompanying translations relating to an investigation carried out against him and RA by Bakhtiari Police Station in Erbil.
33. According to the translation of the Preliminary Police Report dated 11 September 2019 (Core Bundle part 1, p73), the appellant had been found that night in a car with RA, and this was the third time that they had committed immorality in public places. The initial investigation had revealed that the woman had no place to stay, and according to her, she stayed in the appellant’s car every night. The report continued:
“He fled Baghdad and was previously staying in a hotel called [Add] in Ankawa two months ago.
He then fled the hotel as he had no money, and left his documents behind.
After contacting the owner of the hotel … the information was confirmed …”
34. It is apparent from the other case documents, in particular the statement that was taken from RA on 11 September 2019, that the Preliminary Police Report wrongly attributes to the appellant the account that was provided by RA.
35. Thus, while the Judge was not wrong to find that the account of the appellant’s movements given in the Preliminary Police Report was inconsistent with the account which the appellant had given elsewhere, the Judge was wrong to infer that the appellant was the source of the discrepancy.
36. However, on the particular facts of this case, I do not consider that the Judge’s error is material. I reach this conclusion for three reasons:
37. Firstly, the adverse credibility finding in para [24] is independent of the adverse credibility findings which follow. The finding in para [24] does not feed into them, and they are not contaminated by the finding at para [24].
38. Secondly, the finding at para [24] was peripheral in that the Judge went on to accept that the appellant was at all material times living in Erbil, and that it was true that he was encountered by the police with RA in his car in Erbil on the night of 11 September 2019.
39. Thirdly, the true position, as set out in the grounds of appeal, still discloses a stark inconsistency. In short, while the appellant was not inconsistent about his own movements, the grounds of appeal highlight that his account of RA’s movements was contradicted both by RA and the police.
40. As stated at the beginning of para [24], in his witness statement the appellant said that he left home in 2017 and rented a flat in Erbil. RA regularly stayed with him at the flat from about spring 2018, and he said in oral evidence that by the end of the relationship when they were arrested in September 2019, they had lived together for 5-6 months.
41. However, as stated in the grounds of appeal, in her statement dated 11 September 2019, RA said that she came to Erbil from Baghdad 3-4 months ago to work, but she could not find a job and she had no money. She first slept in a hotel in Ankawa called Beauty Fan. She had no money to pay the hotel, so the owner took her Iraqi citizenship document. She went to another hotel, called Add, in Ankawa. She did not have money to pay, so the hotel took her passport instead of money, and she then slept in GA’s car.
42. Not only did RA’s account of her movements contradict the account given by the appellant to the Tribunal that she was regularly staying with him at his flat in Erbil from the spring of 2018, and that as of September 2019 they had been living together for the past five to six months, but according to the Preliminary Police Report the police checked RA’s account and found that it stood up with regard to her staying in a hotel in Erbil as recently as July 2019, and the hotel taking her passport as she had no money to pay.
43. Thus, no material unfairness flows from the fact that the Judge did not raise the contents of the Preliminary Police Report during the hearing. For if she had done so, her attention would have been drawn to the stark inconsistency which I have outlined above.
Conclusion
44. For the reasons given above, I find that no material error of law is made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Anonymity
The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in favour of the appellant, and I consider that it is appropriate that the appellant continues to be protected by anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings in the Upper Tribunal.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
27 November 2025