UI-2025-003335

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 11 Dec 2025
• Promulgation date: 9 Feb 2026
• Publication date: 24 Feb 2026
• Last updated on: 24 Feb 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003335

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63235/2023
LH/00436/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th February 2026

Before

THE HON. MR JUSTICE LAVENDER, PRESIDENT
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

SORAYA DAWRANI
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Osmani, Times PBS
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

(1) Introduction

1. The appellant, Ms Dawrani, currently resides in Iran and claims to fear being forcibly repatriated to the country of her nationality, Afghanistan. She appealed, on Article 8 human rights grounds, against the respondent’s refusal to grant her entry clearance to join her husband, who has lived in the UK for many years. She now appeals against the dismissal of that appeal, principally because she argues that her appeal was unfairly and unjustly handled by the First-tier Tribunal judge, who refused to admit bundles of evidence and material provided shortly before the substantive hearing.




(2) The Refusal Decision and the Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

(2)(a) The Refusal Decision

2. The appellant’s application for entry clearance, under the family reunion part of the Immigration Rules, was refused in a decision dated 9 October 2023. It was decided that she was not eligible to succeed under this scheme because her husband did not have protected status under the Refugee Convention or humanitarian protection principles. The sponsor’s asylum claim was refused in 2003, but he was granted leave to remain on 19 December 2020 following a series of previous grants. The decision summarised the documents which were submitted and considered, including evidence touching on the couple’s relationship and the appellant’s circumstances in Iran. Once it was concluded that the claim could not succeed under the Immigration Rules, consideration turned to whether the claim could succeed outside of the Rules. It was noted that the appellant claimed to fear persecution and breaches of various human rights in Afghanistan. It was determined that there were no exceptional circumstances. The following observation was made:

The UK has a proud record of providing protection for people who need it, for as long as it is needed, in accordance with our international obligations under the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. However, there is no provision within our Immigration Rules for someone to be allowed to travel to the UK to seek asylum or temporary refuge. Whilst we sympathise with people in difficult situations, we are not bound to consider asylum claims from the very large numbers of people overseas who might like to come here. Those who need international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach - that is the fastest route to safety.

I would also like to kindly draw your attention to the alternative visa application routes for family members which you may wish to consider — further details can be found on the following link: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immiqration-rules/immiqration-rules-part-8-family-members

3. The respondent concluded that the refusal of entry clearance would not amount to a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. A right of appeal was granted.

(2)(b) Chronology of the FTT Appeal Proceedings

9 November 2023: An in-time appeal against the refusal decision was lodged, relying on a single ground of appeal, namely that the decision was unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

23 November 2023: The appeal was struck out due to non-payment of the required fee.

12 April 2024: The appellant applied for the appeal to be reinstated.

29 August 2024: The appeal was reinstated upon payment of the required fee. The respondent was directed to provide her bundle by 12 September 2024.

2 September 2024: The respondent served her bundle in compliance with the direction.

8 November 2024: The appellant was directed to provide her bundle of evidence and skeleton argument by 6 December 2024.

9 December 2024: Upon failing to comply with the above direction, the appellant was again directed to serve her bundle and skeleton argument by 16 December 2024. In this direction, the appellant was warned that a further failure to comply with directions might result in the appeal being heard and decided without this material.

18 December 2024: Following a further failure by the appellant to comply with directions, the respondent was directed to review the case by 1 January 2025.

23 December 2024: The respondent complied with the direction and served a review.

29 December 2024: The appellant was directed to provide, by 3 January 2025, her requirements for the substantive hearing, which was to be listed in due course.

6 January 2025: Upon failing to comply with the direction to provide her hearing requirements, the appellant was again directed to do so, this time by 13 January 2025.

16 January 2025: It was directed that the substantive hearing should be listed without the appellant’s hearing requirements.

21 January 2025: The substantive hearing was listed to be heard on 12 May 2025.

2 May 2025: The tribunal created a ‘stitched bundle’ for the hearing, consisting of all the served evidence, documentary material and submissions. It included: the grounds of appeal, the refusal decision, the respondent’s bundle and the respondent’s review.

Friday 9 May 2025 at 5:49pm: The appellant provided a 507-page bundle of objective country information. It was not accompanied by an application for an extension of time.

Saturday 10 May 2025 at 12:06pm The appellant provided a 586-page bundle of evidence, including witness statements from the appellant and her sponsor, documents relating to the birth of their son almost 2 years before, on 25 June 2023, evidence of the sponsor’s international travel, call logs, photographs of the family and money transfer receipts. It was not accompanied by an application for an extension of time.

Saturday 10 May 2025 at 12:53pm: The appellant’s representatives provided a 12-page skeleton argument. It was not accompanied by an application for an extension of time.

Monday 12 May 2025: The substantive appeal was heard. Mr Osmani appeared, as he did before us, on behalf of the appellant. The sponsor provided the only oral evidence.

Tuesday 13 May 2025: The judge’s decision, in which the appeal was dismissed, was promulgated.


(2)(c) The Judge’s Decision

4. In the introductory parts of his decision, the judge noted that there was no dispute between the parties that the appellant and sponsor were married and that the sponsor had leave to remain in the UK, albeit not as a refugee. It was further noted that the couple had been married since 2019, that the family reunion provisions of the Immigration Rules did not apply and that the appeal could only succeed on an Article 8 analysis outside of the Rules. The factual essence of the appeal was set out at [8]:

The Appellant’s case is that she is at risk in Afghanistan, due to her marriage to the Appellant, now that the Taliban have taken over. She asserts that she has travelled to Iran, and remains there illegally at risk of deportation. The Appellant asserts that she has a child with the sponsor. The Appellant asserts that the failure to grant entry clearance would result in an unjustifiably harsh consequence, as she will be deported to Afghanistan and suffer ill treatment and harm as a consequence.

5. After the judge’s introductory remarks, he considered preliminary matters and noted that he had been asked to deal with the appeal hearing at 11:30am as a ‘float’, namely, an appeal which had not previously been allocated to a judge. He then considered the procedural background and decided not to admit the 586-page appellant’s bundle for the following reasons:

[11] On the 9th of May 2025 (the working day prior to the hearing) those representing the Appellant uploaded a skeleton argument and a bundle of 586 pages containing two new witness statements. Those documents and the upload failed to comply with the practice direction.

[12] At 2pm when I heard from the parties, Ms Tasnim indicated that with a bundle of that size, she could not prepare for the hearing (having only just been allocated), and if the evidence was admitted, she sought the matter to be adjourned. I had not considered the 586 page bundle, as it had no permission to be relied upon and there was no compliance with the practice direction. I did however, review the index.

[13] I indicated that in light of the non compliance, it was for the Appellant to persuade me as to why the evidence should be admitted and the reason for the lack of application.

[14] Having heard from Mr Osmani, he failed to explain the lack of application (other than his own litigation failings), or what within the new papers was required to assist the Tribunal. He explained some delays in obtaining the tax returns of the sponsor, but these were immaterial to my determination. He simply said, in the interest of justice it should be allowed.

[15] I concluded that there was an inadequate explanation. Nothing within the submissions adequately explained the non-compliance. No adequate explanation was provided as to what it was in the 586 page bundle that was required, or why? There was simply an expectation that it would be allowed. I refused permission to adduce the Appellant’s bundle accordingly, as the burden had not been discharged. Even bearing in mind that much of the evidence in the stitched bundle is historic, it was not explained, what it was in the new material which would assist with my determination about the present circumstances of the Appellant. Having reviewed the index there was little if anything related to documents regarding Iran.

[16] I explained to Mr Osmani that adherence to the practice direction was not optional. I reiterated that it was designed to improve the practice and litigation standards across the sector. The litigation here is precisely the type of behaviour which the practice direction is designed to prevent. Hearings must be fair to both sides. Practice standards must improve. Those who fail to comply, cannot routinely expect evidence to be admitted, without rigour being applied to ascertain why there has been a failure, why the material is necessary, and why admission at a late stage outweighs the Respondent’s right to adequate notice. None of those matters were discharged in this case.

[17] The rigorous application of the practice direction, brings into sharp focus the need for litigators to fully and comprehensively discharge their duty of care to their clients and provide them with a service which complies with the rules of the Tribunal.

[18] Where there has been non compliance due to no fault of the litigator, a detailed chronological explanation of the attempts at compliance that they have undertaken, needs to become commonplace.

[19] Having refused permission, I proceeded to hear the case and the evidence based upon the stitched bundle. I did consider the Skeleton argument, as this is a legal document and not evidence.

6. The judge revisited the disputed issues and recorded that the parties agreed that the Immigration Rules were not met. The respondent conceded that Article 8 was engaged on the facts and that the only meaningful issue to be resolved was whether the refusal decision amounted to a disproportionate interference or caused unjustifiably harsh consequences. It was also noted that Mr Osmani conceded that the birth of the couple’s child was a ‘new matter’ which could not feature in the hearing.

7. The judge referred to the similarity between the sponsor’s and the appellant’s witness statements. He noted that the appellant’s core case was her fear of the risks which would flow if she were removed from Iran to Afghanistan, but he observed that this was not a protection appeal. He noted Mr Osmani’s reliance on Al Hassan (Article 8, entry clearance, KF (Syria)) [2024] UKUT 00234 (IAC).

8. The judge summarised the family background and then made the following remarks about the appellant’s circumstances in Iran, at [32]-[34]:

[32] The statement of the sponsor at 5.1 states that the Appellant is in Iran. The circumstances of her exit are not adequately explained. However, I can accept that were she to return to Afghanistan alone, with a child, then her circumstances are likely to pass an article 3 threshold of risk, absent support from a male family member. This was not challenged by the Respondent.

[33] The Appellant argues that the Appellant is at risk of deportation from Iran. He argued that she entered on a tourist visa which has now expired. Rendering her liable to enforced and sudden deportation.

[34] The statements provided cover almost exclusively the risks in Afghanistan. The details around the Appellant’s time in Iran are not provided.

9. Discrepancies were noted in the money transfer receipts, but the benefit of the doubt was afforded to the appellant that these transfers of funds were intended for her. Gaps in the evidence were noted in relation to the sponsor’s visits to Iran and the appellant’s claimed continued residence there. At [38], the judge discussed the evidence which touched on the appellant’s pregnancy before considering the evidence in the round as follows:

[38] She has produced scans dated 2023 for the baby. There is no evidence in the bundle of the child being carried to term. I cannot apply any weight to the existence of a child as I simply don’t have the evidence to support this. Even if there is a child this would be a new matter and I cannot attach weight to this. In and of itself it does not shift the balancing that I need to undertake.

[39] Taking the evidence I have into the round then I can attach little weight to the present circumstances of the Appellant, as I have insufficient details about it. She may be at risk of deportation. However, I have little to verify that she is still in Iran, or without valid leave. The Appellant has visited her there previously, on two occasions and has maintained a relationship at a distance since 2019. I note that it was not until 2022 that an application was made for the Appellant to come to the UK. The reason for this delay is not clear.

[40] I attach limited weight to the oral evidence, as I lack any document to substantiate the
current circumstances in Iran.

10. Having reached his findings of fact, the judge proceeded to balance the competing public interest and personal factors, before resolving the balance against the appellant, as follows:

[41] […] Although Article 8 (1) is engaged, the Immigration Rules are not met for the reasons given above. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance sheet approach:

(a) I weigh the following further public interest factors against the Appellant:
a. The relationship was formed at a time when it was clear that the Appellant may not be able to secure entry clearance to the UK, as she does not meet the English language requirements of the rules.
b. The application was not made until 2022, a delay of almost 3 years after the marriage. The reason for this is not explained.
c. The sponsor was able to return to Afghanistan and Iran to maintain the relationship. The relationship has continued at a distance for 6 years at this point in time.
d. There is no evidence submitted of the Appellant’s residence status in Iran. The burden to show that she is at risk, and that this is relevant to the proportionality exercise, has not been discharged.
e. There is no evidence that she is still in Iran or at risk of deportation. She has remained there since 2022 seemingly without issue.
f. Whilst difficult to visit Iran, the sponsor has been able to do so, well after the tourist visa of the Appellant is said to have expired.

(b) I weigh the following family and private life factors in the Appellant’s favour:
a. The Appellant has been financially maintained by the sponsor to some extent.
b. The situation in Afghanistan is such that as a lone female, the sponsor would face risks and difficulties returning to Afghanistan, without a male relative or husband due to Taliban restrictions.
c. The Sponsor has leave to remain in the UK. On balance it is unlikely that the relationship could be maintained if the Appellant was living in Afghanistan, now that the Taliban back in control.
d. The relationship has been maintained remotely including direct contact on four occasions.
e. The Appellant has settled in the UK and has a form of employment in the UK to support the Appellant.

[42] I find that the factors raised by the Appellant do not outweigh the public interest because:
(a) There is insufficient evidence regarding risk and the Appellant has not discharged her burden in this regard, in relation to her present situation. I therefore attach little weight to the arguments put forward.
(b) There is insufficient evidence regarding the current circumstances of the Appellant and where she is living (and how). The Appellant has not discharged her burden to show that this cannot continue.
(c) There is insufficient evidence to suggest why the relationship cannot be maintained remotely or at a distance as has happened to date.

[43] Taking all of the matters into account the Appellant has failed to discharge her burden of proof, to show that there are unjustifiably harsh consequences of the refusal decision. It may be that there exists evidence to rebut the findings I have made above. However, the Appellant has failed to provide this and there have been numerous litigation failures in this case. The situation is dynamic regarding risk to the Appellant, and may need to be considered in any future application as that situation evolves. However, at present, the burden has not been discharged.

(3) The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

i. The judge unfairly and unjustly refused to admit the appellant’s bundle.

ii. The judge misdirected himself in law as to the application of Article 8 of the ECHR.

iii. The judge provided unlawfully inadequate reasons for his decision.

iv. The judge failed to consider all relevant factors going to the proportionality balancing exercise.

12. Permission was granted by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 21 July 2025.

13. The grounds have been developed over the course of a response to the respondent’s rule 24 notice, a skeleton argument and further written submissions directed to be provided following the Court of Appeal judgment in IA & Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516. For the respondent’s part, a rule 24 notice, skeleton argument and written submissions on the effect of IA & Others were provided.

14. At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both parties. We address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.


(4) The Law and Procedural Guidance

(4)(a) Article 8 ECHR

15. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:

(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

16. Authoritative guidance on how these rights apply in cases where a family member is outside the jurisdiction and seeks to enter the UK was recently given by the Court of Appeal in IA & Others. Much of the court’s analysis was devoted to Article 8(1) in the context of family members outside the core family unit of partners and minor children. As it has always been accepted by the respondent, and expressly conceded in the appeal proceedings, that family life is engaged on the facts of the present case, we need not go beyond the high-level principles which the Court of Appeal clarified in IA & Others. At [10] and [100] of their joint judgment, Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Dingemans LJ, SPT, and Elisabeth Laing LJ held:

[10] First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”” (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. […]

[100] It seems to us that all these cases point in the same direction. Whilst persons seeking to enter an ECHR state from outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR will not have their own rights under article 8, if they have pre-existing family life with a person within the territory of the ECtHR, article 8 may impose a positive obligation on a state to admit those people, if they have family life with a person within the territory. That is what is meant by family life being unitary (see [141] under ground 2 below). The concept of unitary family life does not, however, mean that the state is under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the UK.

17. Notwithstanding the conclusion that family life was not engaged on the facts of the appeals before it, the court proceeded to provide considered and authoritative guidance on the existence of exceptional circumstances and how a fair balance should be struck when assessing proportionality. At [97], the court described as “valuable”, the obiter reliance placed by Burnett LJ (in his judgment in Abbas v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1393, [2018] 1 WLR 533) on [27] of the ECtHR judgment in Khan v United Kingdom (2014) 58 EHRR SE15:

[27] There is support in the [ECtHR’s] case law for the proposition that the contracting state’s obligation under article 8 may, in certain circumstances, require family members to be reunited with their relatives living in the contracting state. However, that positive obligation rests, in large part, on the fact that one of the family members/applicants is already in that contracting state and is being prevented from enjoying his or her family life with their relative because that relative has been denied entry to the contracting state . . . The transposition of that limited article 8 obligation to article 3 would, in effect, create an unlimited obligation on contracting states to allow entry to an individual who might be at real risk of ill-treatment contrary to article 3, regardless of where in the world that individual might find himself. …

18. This is reflected in the court’s wider conclusions:

[142] […] The main focus of that [proportionality] exercise would have been the family life of the person within the jurisdiction of article 1 (here, the sponsor), but that family life had to be considered as being a unitary family life with his brother or the family outside the UK. The unitary family life of the brother with his own family outside the UK is also not the focus of the proportionality exercise.

19. The court considered the weight to be afforded to the public interest in striking a fair balance in the following paragraphs:

[109] At [46], Lord Reed [in R (Agyarko) v. SSHD [2017] UKSC 11; [2017] 1 WLR 823] explained that the Rules are “statements of the practice to be followed, which are approved by Parliament, and are based on the Secretary of State’s policy as to how individual rights under article 8 should be balanced against the competing public interests”. He went on to say that “[i]mmigration control is an intensely political issue, on which differing views are held within the contracting states, and as between those states”. The authorities responsible for determining policy in relation to immigration, within the limits of the national margin of appreciation, are the Secretary of State and Parliament.

[110] At [47] in Agyarko, Lord Reed reminded us that the courts “have to bear in mind the Secretary of State’s constitutional responsibility for policy in this area, and the endorsement of the Rules by Parliament”, and that, in considering how the balance is struck in individual cases, “they have to take the Secretary of State’s policy into account and to attach considerable weight to it at a general level, as well as considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case” [as explained in Ali v. SSHD [2016] 1 WLR 4799 at [44–46], [50] and [53]]”.

[159] The SSHD’s point is that it is not her policy (as represented by the Rules) to admit all persons who share family life with a person lawfully settled in the UK. That is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK’s laws and democratic process, and for what the Government determines is necessary in that society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. The courts must always, as Lord Reed said, attach considerable weight to the SSHD’s immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.

[160] […] The personal circumstances of [the appellants] applying outside the Rules to come to the UK for the first time had to be balanced against the SSHD’s policies, reflected in the Rules, which did not allow them to do so on the grounds of the risks they faced in a warzone. That is the relevance of the absence of a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. Had there been one, the policies of the SSHD might have favoured the family and allowed the balance to be struck differently.

[166] […] As we have said, article 8(2) does not prohibit interference by a public authority with the exercise of the right to family life, if that interference is “in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of … the economic well-being of the country … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Immigration control is to be assumed in this respect, and in the view of the SSHD, to be in the public interest and protective of the economic well-being of the country. […]

[167] The SSHD’s policy is a matter for her and for the UK Government. It is, as we have also already said, not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK’s laws and democratic process. The decision as to what is necessary in UK society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK is the business of the SSHD and the Government. The courts must, as Lord Reed said in Agyarko, and we would respectfully endorse, attach considerable weight to the SSHD’s immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.

[168] Again, under this heading, the UT fell into error. It may, understandably, have been driven by its quite natural human reaction to the evidence of what the family were enduring in Gaza. But that reaction should not, in our judgment, have prevented the UT from giving effect to the Government’s immigration policies (which are not, as Lord Reed also said in Agyarko, in general, inconsistent with the ECHR). The UT could only, in effect, override those policies in very exceptional or compelling circumstances, which we do not believe existed here as we shall now explain. Those policies, as we have also said, did not include a resettlement policy concerning Gaza. Had they done so, as we have also said, the balance might have been struck differently.

[169] […] It is the responsibility of the SSHD and the Government to make policy decisions as to what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. The courts and tribunals must respect those policy decisions and not seek to get around them save in very exceptional or compelling circumstances.

(4)(b) Late Evidence

20. In the recent reported decision of Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal (Dove J, President, UTJ Ockleton, Vice President, and UTJ Blum) considered the judicial approach to be taken to late applications to admit evidence. At [29], the panel stressed the importance of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 (“the FTT Procedure Rules”) in reaching such decisions. The overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly, as well as the factors which inform how the overriding objective should be applied, were set out. At [35], rule 6(2)(a)-(c), which describes the procedural steps the tribunal “may” take where “just”, was discussed. “Just” was interpreted as embracing “fairness”, which, it was said, will “depend on the particular circumstances of a case”. The panel next turned to Practice Statement No 1 of 2022, which contains (in annexes A to C) model directions, and said:

[36] […] Each of the annexes contains a section dealing with ‘late material’. Although the word ‘material’ is not defined we take it to be synonymous with ‘evidence’. These sections state that any material provided to the First-tier Tribunal outside the relevant time limits may not be relied upon without permission from the First-tier Tribunal. Where any material is provided after 5 working days prior to the hearing, including on the day of the hearing, the judge must deal with the admissibility of that material at the hearing as a preliminary matter.

[37] The effect of the PS is that where the model directions are applied, even in the absence of a specific direction that includes a sanction leading to the potential exclusion of evidence, if the evidence is provided outside of the time limits it may not be relied on without obtaining the permission of the Tribunal.

21. Broader principles of procedural rigour in the field of public law were then considered. Between [39] and [41], R (AB) Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [2019] EWHC 3461 (Admin) and R (Talpada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841 were cited in support of the proposition that public law matters are subject to principles of procedural rigour and that the public interest is an important factor in such decision-making. The headnote in Shabir Ahmed and others (sanctions for non–compliance) [2016] UKUT 00562 (IAC) was referred to: “Persistent and egregious non-compliance with Upper Tribunal orders, directions and rules will attract appropriate sanctions”.

22. The panel in Maleci followed the approach established in SSHD v SS (Congo) and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 387; [2015] Imm AR 1036 which in turn drew upon a line of authorities in this area. Paragraphs [93]-[95] of SS (Congo) provide the following three-stage analytical process:

[93] […] [A] judge should address an application for relief from sanction in three stages, as follows:

i) The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with the rules. The focus should be on whether the breach has been serious or significant. If a judge concludes that a breach is not serious or significant, then relief will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages; but if the judge decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance.

ii) The second stage is to consider why the failure occurred, that is to say whether there is a good reason for it. It was stated in Mitchell (at para. [41]) that if there is a good reason for the default, the court will be likely to decide that relief should be granted. The important point made in Denton was that if there is a serious or significant breach and no good reason for the breach, this does not mean that the application for relief will automatically fail. It is necessary in every case to move to the third stage.

iii) The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application. The two factors specifically mentioned in CPR rule 3.9 are of particular importance and should be given particular weight. They are (a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and (b) the need to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and court orders. As stated in para. [35] of the judgment in Denton:

"Thus, the court must, in considering all the circumstances of the case so as to enable it to deal with the application justly, give particular weight to these two important factors. In doing so, it will take account of the seriousness and significance of the breach (which has been assessed at the first stage) and any explanation (which has been considered at the second stage). The more serious or significant the breach the less likely it is that relief will be granted unless there is good reason for it …."

[94] The court in Hysaj added some points of particular relevance to the present context. At para. [41] of his judgment, Moore-Bick LJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) said that it would be quite wrong to construct a special regime for applications for extensions of time in public law cases, but he accepted that "the importance of the issues to the public at large is a factor that the court can properly take into account when it comes at stage three of the decision-making process to evaluate all the circumstances of the case". At para. [42] he rejected the contention that the court could construct a special rule for public authorities, which "have a responsibility to adhere to the rules just as much as any other litigants". He added that the nature of the proceedings and the identification of the responsibility for delay are factors which it may be appropriate to take into account at the third stage.

[95] Another point concerned the merits of the substantive appeal, as to which Moore-Bick LJ said this at para. [46]:

"If applications for extensions of time are allowed to develop into disputes about the merits of the substantive appeal, they will occupy a great deal of time and lead to the parties' incurring substantial costs. In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process. In most cases the court should decline to embark on an investigation of the merits and firmly discourage argument directed to them ….."

23. Having summarised the applicable legal principles, the panel in Maleci arrived at the following overall conclusion about how judges in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber should approach applications to admit evidence provided in breach of directions:

[47] Having regard to the Procedure Rules, and in particular rules 2, 4, 5 and 6, and to the authorities cited above in respect of procedural rigour and relief from sanctions, we are satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal is empowered to issue directions regulating the filing and service of evidence in proceedings which provide sanctions in the event of non-compliance that lead to the exclusion of evidence if the Tribunal considers this to be ‘just’. This is necessary to ensure that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the overriding objective. Non-compliance with directions imposing specified time limits may impact on judicial and administrative resources, on the ability of the other party to participate fully in the proceedings, and could delay the administration of justice. It is also disrespectful of the judicial process and the rule of law. Parties must appreciate that if they fail to comply with directions they run the risk that the Tribunal will refuse to consider evidence that is not provided in accordance with those directions. What is ‘just’ will depend on the particular circumstances of each case but will be informed by the principles set out in SS (Congo).

24. In applying those principles to the facts of the appeal before them, the panel had regard to the fact that the judge who refused to admit the belatedly served evidence “was aware of and took into account … the importance of the documents to the appellant’s case” and that “[t]he judge weighed the relevance of the documents against the seriousness of the breach and the consequences for the appellant” (see [50]).

25. Since Maleci, and before the present appeal was heard, further procedural guidance has been introduced in the shape of the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (“the SPT’s Practice Direction”), the first paragraph of which reinforces the overriding objective of the FTT Procedure Rules before emphasising the importance of the observance of procedural rigour:

[1.2] The parties must ensure they conduct proceedings with procedural rigour. The Tribunal will not overlook breaches of the requirements of the Procedure Rules, Practice Directions, Practice Statements and failures to comply with directions issued by the Tribunal.

26. Of importance for present purposes is what is set out at paragraphs [5.1]-[5.4] and [7.14]:

[5.1] The general principles set out in Part 1 above shall apply to case management and the decisions made by the Tribunal. The parties will approach the steps required by case management with procedural rigour. This will ensure that appeals may be listed for substantive decision without delay. Failure, without good reason, to comply with case management directions is a serious matter, which undermines the good administration of justice and is inconsistent with the Overriding Objective. These principles apply whether case management is conducted by judges or by Legal Officers.

[5.2] In relation to directions issued (6.1(d) below), in the event of non-compliance, the Tribunal will make use of its power under rule 6(2) of the Procedure Rules, which will in turn include requiring failure to be remedied and the imposition of sanctions as appropriate.

[5.3] Sanctions for failing to comply with case management directions may include the exclusion of evidence in the event of non-compliance in appropriate cases and subject to the Tribunal considering such action “just”, in accordance with rule 6(2). The assessment of what is just will take into account all relevant principles, including the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with rules or directions, any explanation offered for the failure or good reason for it and, as a third stage, an evaluation of all the circumstances of the case, to enable the Tribunal to deal justly with the application.

[5.4] In assessing whether to grant relief from a sanction imposed by way of earlier directions, the judge dealing with the application for relief will consider the matter afresh, applying all relevant principles and considerations.

[7.14] Where any evidence is provided later than 5 working days prior to the hearing, including on the day of the hearing, the judge must decide as a preliminary matter whether to admit that evidence at the hearing. If an application is made to admit evidence which is ruled inadmissible, the judge must give specific reasons for the exclusion of that evidence in any written decision. If it is decided to admit the evidence, but the judge considers that it would be unfair to proceed to hear the appeal on that day, the Tribunal should consider the issue of unreasonably incurred or wasted costs for the adjourned hearing. If appropriate, directions should be given in accordance with the Presidential Guidance Notes on costs of 2015 and 2018.

(5) Discussion

(5)(a) Ground 1

27. As we indicated at the outset of this decision, the appellant’s primary complaint against the judge’s handling of her appeal concerned his decision to refuse to admit the evidence and material provided by her representatives at a very late stage of the proceedings. Not only is this the gravamen of the first ground of appeal, but it also infuses the remaining grounds of appeal.

28. In assessing whether the judge erred in law in how he approached the procedural issue of whether to admit the belatedly served bundles of evidence, we must be guided by the statements of principle settled in the authorities discussed above. We recognise that the judge did not expressly structure his analysis of this issue by assessing each of the three stages in sequence as suggested by SS (Congo), Maleci and numerous additional authorities which restate those principles. Notwithstanding the omission of this formal structure, we are bound to ask ourselves whether these critical factors were nonetheless considered in substance.

(5)(a)(i) Ground 1: Stage 1

29. The first stage is to consider the seriousness and significance of the procedural failure. The judge unarguably assessed the procedural background and the flouting of previous directions to provide what was ultimately served at 5:49pm on the Friday, and at 12:06pm on the Saturday, before the substantive hearing was due to be heard on the following Monday. He noted, at [11], that the late submission of evidence did not meet the requirements of the Practice Direction. This appears to have been a reference to the objective country information bundle, which amounted to some 507 pages. It was demonstrably not reduced to the country schedule of no more than 12 pages, with embedded hyperlinks, required by paragraph [10.6] of the SPT’s Practice Direction. The large volume of material contained within the 507-page objective bundle and the 586-page subjective evidence bundle was not accompanied by a written application to extend time for service some 6 months after the appellant was first directed to provide the bundles she sought to rely upon. The judge noted, at [12], that the respondent had indicated that she would not be able fairly to proceed if the bundles were admitted and would seek an adjournment. The judge’s observations at [16] can only be sensibly understood as his conclusions on just how serious and significant he found the appellant’s representatives’ conduct to be.

30. At the error of law hearing, in answer to our questions, Mr Osmani accepted that the breaches of the procedural rules and guidance were both serious and significant. In truth, it is impossible to conceive of any other answer to the first stage of the required analytical exercise. The proceedings were bedevilled by persistent and egregious (to borrow the language used in Shabir Ahmed) failures to comply with the most basic preparatory steps needed to ensure that this appeal was effectively decided after a substantive hearing on the appointed date. One only needs to return to the chronology above to see that the proceedings were conducted without any regard to procedural rigour. Directions were repeatedly ignored and it was only when the substantive hearing came into view that any meaningful steps appeared to be taken to gather and serve the evidence which was sought to be relied upon. Such poor practice places an intolerable burden on the limited resources of a tribunal which is facing a very great backlog of work. The breaches of procedure which tainted the effectiveness of these proceedings were self-evidently serious and significant. Even if the judge did not use these express terms, there can be no sensible doubt that this is the substance of what he found to be before him.

(5)(a)(ii) Ground 1: Stage 2

31. The second stage is to consider the reasons for any breach. In compliance with directions made in the context of the error of law proceedings, Mr Osmani has explained what went wrong. The judge in the FTT had no such assistance. The explanation for the procedural failings might have emerged if the appellant’s representatives had seen fit to apply for an extension of time or relief from sanctions. Instead, the judge appears to have been left with little more than nebulous apologies for “litigation failings” advanced orally at the hearing. In his statement before us, Mr Osmani referred to various matters to explain why the bundles were served so late. He indicated that the appellant and her sponsor ran out of funds to continue paying for their services and that this led to their decision to act on a pro bono basis. He also described how the sponsor began to suffer with mental health issues which stalled the evidence gathering process. Finally, he frankly admitted that he had misjudged the way in which the appellant’s documentary case should be served. He recognised that it was unwise and procedurally inept to wait until all of the evidence they sought to rely on was in place before serving any of it.

32. It is to the legal representatives’ credit that they were prepared to act pro bono once the appellant could no longer afford to pay their fees, but this does not mean that those who choose to act on behalf of a client in adversarial proceedings are entitled to conduct those proceedings any less professionally. Equally, the difficulties experienced in gathering the full package of evidence on which the appellant sought to rely might have been the subject of an application for an extension of time or some other form of accommodation. No such application was ever made. At [13] of his witness statement before us, Mr Osmani said this about the steps he had subsequently taken to ensure that there is not a repeat of what went wrong in this case:

I have reflected on the timing of the bundle carefully. I understand why concerns were raised and I have already implemented procedural safeguards to ensure that future cases are protected from similar difficulty. These include automated internal deadline control, mandatory early ASA filing practice, and escalation protocols where evidence gathering is delayed due to vulnerability, welfare or funding breakdown.

33. At the risk of stating the obvious, it should not have taken these events to drive forward the practical changes which have now been made. The reality is that these steps simply reflect good and standard practice and should be the norm for competent representatives in this field who are aware, as they should be, of their responsibility to observe the principles of procedural rigour. When read fairly, it is clear to us that the judge was not remotely persuaded that there was a good reason to justify the procedural shortcomings which tainted and frustrated these proceedings from start to finish. We have seen nothing in the explanations which have been provided since, in response to our directions, which could possibly amount to a good reason for the procedural problems which led to such difficulties.

(5)(a)(iii) Ground 1: Stage 3

34. At the third stage, the judge must turn his mind to the overall circumstances of the case. Properly understood, in the context of the SS (Congo) three-stage analysis, this was the primary focus of the appellant’s arguments against the judge’s exercise of discretion. In essence, the principal point made on the appellant’s behalf was that the judge excluded a large volume of evidence and material, with little understanding of precisely what it was that he was leaving out of account. This argument is founded upon the judge’s comment that he considered the index to the subjective bundle when considering whether to admit the underlying evidence and supporting documents. On a superficial reading of the decision, there might be thought to be some substance to this complaint. However, closer analysis reveals that the judge went beyond the index. At [19], he referred to his consideration of the skeleton argument. This summary of the appellant’s factual and legal case was plainly prepared on the strength of the bundles which were provided shortly before the 12 May 2025 hearing. It is a detailed, 12-page distillation of the evidence and arguments. It contains detailed references to both bundles and summarises the claimed effect of that evidence and material. This is not to say that the skeleton argument functioned as a replacement for the documents it was describing and relying on, but it cannot be said that the judge was unaware of what was in the bundles he decided, in his discretion, not to admit.

35. We agree with Mr Osmani that the evidence and material in the belatedly served bundles was relevant to the issues which fell to be decided on the appeal, but we also agree with his submission, made at the error of law hearing, that these bundles supplemented the essential factual and legal case which had been advanced from the outset of the claim. The exception to this is the evidence which tended to establish the birth of the couple’s young child, which we address below. In considering the overall circumstances, it must not be thought that the mere presence of available and relevant evidence will invariably result in its admission, irrespective of whether it has been provided in compliance with case management directions. To adopt this blunt and unprincipled approach would only serve to encourage the kind of poor preparation seen in these proceedings. The expectation of procedural indulgence when a judge is presented with relevant evidence, no matter how late, is inimical to the interests of justice and its effective administration. We are satisfied that the judge had regard to the nature of the bundles he refused to admit.

36. It is clear from the face of the decision that the judge never lost sight of the fundamental factual and legal issues which fell to be determined. He grappled with the centrepiece of the appellant’s case that she feared being summarily deported from Iran to Afghanistan. The appellant’s and her husband’s witness statements in the excluded bundle devote much of their content to the strength of their continuing family life. However, it is important to bear in mind that the existence and nature of their family life was never in dispute. Further evidence in the excluded bundle related to the birth of the couple’s young son. The appellant was pregnant when the application was initially made. Echoing the position adopted at the FTT hearing, the parties agreed at the error of law hearing that the birth of the couple’s child was a ‘new matter’, for which consent had not been granted.

37. A further discrete question which arises in the context of the overall circumstances of the case is whether the judge might have sanctioned the defaulting party in a different way, such as by adjourning the hearing and going on to consider wasted or unreasonably incurred costs, or by only allowing the truly essential parts of the bundles to be admitted. The SPT’s Practice Direction countenances such alternative measures. However, just because other judges might have adopted a different course in the exercise of their discretion, that does not mean that the discretionary decision taken by this judge on these particular facts was wrong in law. The judge was plainly aware of the procedural option of admitting the evidence and adjourning to allow the respondent properly to digest it, because the Home Office Presenting Officer argued that the only fair outcome, on admitting the bundles, would have been to adjourn the substantive hearing. It cannot have been lost on the judge that the FTT is currently grappling with a substantial backlog of appeals. This may tend to explain why it was decided that an adjournment should not be the first port of call in a situation such as this. To do otherwise would have cut across the judge’s observation, at [16], that: “Those who fail to comply, cannot routinely expect evidence to be admitted, without rigour being applied to ascertain why there has been a failure, why the material is necessary, and why admission at a late stage outweighs the Respondent’s right to adequate notice”.

38. We reject the submission, made at [9] of the appellant’s skeleton argument, that the judge adopted an unlawful mindset in taking an ‘all or nothing’ approach to whether the bundles should be admitted. The decision as to whether the bundles fell to be excluded in their entirety, or whether some alternative measure might have been appropriate in the circumstances, is pre-eminently a matter of judgment. The judge manifestly had in mind the option of admitting the bundles and adjourning the hearing, but it was not wrong in principle for him to decide that the overall circumstances of this case, given the troubled procedural backdrop, called for a different sanction.

39. The appellant advanced other reasons for challenging the judge’s exercise of discretion. It was contended in the grounds that the judge did not expressly refer to the overriding objective of the FTT Procedure Rules before deciding not to admit the bundles. We find this argument to be lacking in substance. It is not an error of law to omit express and mechanical reference to the FTT Procedural Rules. The reality is that the judge had regard to all of the material factors which informed the fair and just handling of this issue. Explicitly referring to the overriding objective might have improved the form of the decision, but it would have added nothing of substance.

40. We were equally unimpressed by the suggestion made in the appellant’s written and oral submissions that IA & Others emphasised that procedural discipline must give way to merits-based assessments in human rights proceedings. When we asked for assistance as to which part of IA & Others was relied on for this purpose, we were directed to [8] of the Court of Appeal’s judgment:

The words that are particularly important for this case are that: “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his … family life”, and “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of [the right to family life] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of … the economic well-being of the country … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. We emphasise the words of article 8 at the outset because it is apparent that, in some of the cases, the terms of the rights protected by article 8 are not given sufficient prominence.

These uncontroversial words do not come close to bearing the weight placed upon them and do not mean that judges are required to overlook procedural failings in human rights matters.

41. Standing back, and drawing the above observations together, we are left in no doubt that the judge was entitled in law to reach the discretionary judgment which he did when he decided not to admit the bundles. They were provided at the very last opportunity before the substantive hearing and in circumstances where those who needed to digest and understand this large volume of evidence and material simply had no realistic prospect of doing so on the day of the hearing itself. This egregious conduct came against a backdrop of persistent failures to comply with directions, for which there was no good reason. The judge considered the overall circumstances of the case and the interests of justice. The decision not to admit the bundles was a lawful exercise of discretionary judgment.

42. It was argued on the appellant’s behalf that the appellant should not be deprived of relevant evidence and forensically disadvantaged because of the failings of her representatives. However, it would be wrong to approach such questions one-dimensionally. The wider interests of justice fall to be considered in situations such as this. In adversarial proceedings, the other side has a reasonable expectation that they will have a fair opportunity to consider evidence and material deployed against them. Equally, the tribunal is the guardian of precious and limited judicial time and resources in circumstances where there are many others awaiting decisions in their proceedings. We trust that this decision will further reinforce the key message in the SPT’s Practice Direction and previous authorities that the tribunal will not blindly tolerate flagrant procedural failings of the kind seen in these proceedings. Those who appear in this jurisdiction must come to understand that procedural requirements and case management directions are to be taken seriously and that serious consequences may flow from breaches.

(5)(b) Ground 2

43. The centrepiece of the second ground of appeal was that the judge sidelined the risks of serious harm, or Article 3 conditions, to the appellant outside the UK. The appellant relied heavily on Al Hassan & Ors (Article 8; entry clearance; KF (Syria)) [2024] UKUT 00234 (IAC) to argue that these risks were weighty factors in the proportionality balance and in the consideration of unjustifiably harsh consequences. It is worth recalling what the Court of Appeal recently said about this decision in IA & Others, at [144]:

[144] […] The UT relied unhelpfully on a series of UT authorities (e.g. KF (Syria) and Al Hassan) rather than on MN v. Belgium, Beoku-Betts and Abbas. Its erroneous reliance on the article 8 rights of the entire family was relevant to its determination in respect of the best interests of the children, as we shall mention under ground 3.

44. In view of those recent and authoritative observations, it is difficult to regard Al Hassan as weighing in favour of a different outcome on the facts of this case. The judge’s approach here appears to have been entirely consistent with the Court of Appeal’s clarification of the law in this field at [97] and [142] of its judgment.

(5)(c) Ground 3

45. The third ground of appeal challenged the adequacy of the judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal. This argument is tightly tethered to the first ground, because it hinges on the evidence which was not admitted. There is a circular quality to the argument that the reasoning which underpinned the decision to dismiss the appeal was in some way deficient because there was a failure to take account of the excluded evidence and that this therefore rendered the decision to exclude that evidence unlawful. Once it has been concluded that there was no error in the decision to exclude this evidence, the reasons challenge, built on that very evidence, collapses.

46. It was further suggested under this head of challenge that the judge was wrong not to accept the appellant’s evidence unless he first gave reasons to find her to be lacking in credibility. This struck us an overly binary characterisation of the judge’s fact-finding duty. He was not required to accept all that the appellant said in her untested written evidence just because he did not emphatically reject her credibility as a witness. The judge was entitled to consider gaps in the evidence which was admitted in the proceedings and to place the appellant’s written evidence into its proper place within the overall evidential picture.

47. The judge’s reasoning was further questioned on the basis that he did not consider the best interests of the child born to the appellant and her husband. It would have been unprincipled and jurisdictionally problematic for the judge to proceed on the agreed basis that the birth of the couple’s son was a ‘new matter’ for the purposes of the 2002 Act and yet go on to consider that very same matter in the context of the proportionality exercise. He properly and lawfully left a ‘new matter’ out of account, in accordance with the statutory scheme. It would have been inappropriate for him to reintroduce the very same matter in a different guise. Subject to the need to assess proportionality at the time of the judicial assessment, we agree with the broad thrust of the respondent’s reliance, in her skeleton argument, on [58] of SS (Congo), where the following observations were made:

In this context, there is a relevant feature of the legal framework governing these immigration appeals which should be referred to. By virtue of section 85(4) and (5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, read with section 85A(2) (which were the applicable provisions in these cases: the statute has since been amended), an appeal against a decision refusing LTE is to be heard by the FTT by reference to the evidence and circumstances which applied when the matter was considered by the Entry Clearance Officer. Section 85A(2) provides that "the Tribunal may consider only the circumstances appertaining at the time of the decision [i.e. the immigration decision taken by the Officer]". Changes in circumstances are not to be brought into account on the appeal: if there is a significant change of circumstances, a new application can be made to the Entry Clearance Officer, and that will be the proper course for an applicant to take who wishes to rely on such change of circumstances, even though a new application fee will be payable. When the Upper Tribunal or this court reviews the lawfulness of a decision of the FTT, it obviously will likewise do so having regard to the evidence and circumstances to which the FTT was obliged to have regard, without bringing into account later materials. Accordingly, it will be irrelevant on an appeal to the FTT and on any further appeal that what was as yet an unrealised possible future compliance with the Rules at the time the application for LTE was first considered by an Entry Clearance Officer and rejected may have matured as the applicant hoped so that, by the time of the appeal, the requirements of the Rules are satisfied. An applicant is not entitled to apply for LTE at a time when the requirements of the Rules are not satisfied, in the hope that by the time the appellate process has been exhausted those requirements will be satisfied and LTE will be granted by the appellate tribunal or court. This would be an illegitimate way of trying to jump the queue for consideration of the applicant's case and would represent an improper attempt to subvert the operation of the Rules. Sections 85 and 85A(2) prevent consideration of an application for LTE in this way.

48. At paragraph [20] of the grounds of appeal, the appellant advanced the following submission:

Taking all of the above in the round, it is submitted that had the FTJ considered the updated evidence, he would have confirmed the existence of the Appellant’s child and the Appellant’s presence in Iran; taking into account the relevant authorities he would found that the existence of a child is matter he could consider and that s.55 BCIA is engaged to an extent and that under such the welfare of the Appellant’s child would be best furthered by their presence in the UK with their settled father (not fearing deportation from Iran (where they hold little to no rights) to Afghanistan where (as accepted) their Article 3 ECHR rights would be engaged) and that this is a primary consideration that he is entitled to undertake within his proportionality assessment. On this, it is ardently and respectfully arguably submitted that the failure to do so impacted the FTJ’s proportionality exercise to shift the balance demonstrably in favour of the Respondent’s position, therefore materially affecting the outcome of the appeal and leading to its dismissal.

49. This formulation of the appellant’s case is difficult to reconcile with the passages cited above from IA & Others. The above approach would be in considerable tension with the sponsor-focussed proportionality analysis and the need to guard against importing Article 3 concerns for those outside the reach of the UK’s jurisdictional limits under the ECHR.

(5)(d) Ground 4

50. As this ground of appeal was effectively bound together the previous grounds for challenging the proportionality assessment, we can address it briefly. For the reasons we have given above, we are not persuaded that the decision of the judge involved any error of law of the kind alleged in grounds 1-3. We could discern no legal flaws in how the judge struck a fair proportionality balance. All of the relevant factors, drawn from the evidence properly before the judge, were adequately and lawfully assessed and weighed in the balance.

(6) Notice of Decision

The decision of the FTT did not involve an error of law. The appeal against the decision is, accordingly, dismissed.


The Hon. Mr Justice Lavender, President

Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato

Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

5 February 2026