Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003339

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/52909/2024
LP/09524/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

EM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Iqbal of Counsel, instructed by Hoffmans Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lester (‘the Judge’). By a decision promulgated on 12th March 2025, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Egypt. He entered the United Kingdom on 14 November 2022. On the same day he made a protection claim to the respondent asserting that he was entitled to humanitarian protection on account of his fear of the Shawahra tribe because of a dispute over land that he rented. It was asserted that the Shawahra tribe attempted to extort money from the appellant by claiming the land belonged to their ancestors, and demanding payment for it. The appellant claimed this dispute led to a man being killed, and his brother being arrested. Following these events, the appellant relocated to Alexandria, however this was futile and the tribe continued looking for him there, which precipitated the appellant’s exit from Egypt.
3. The respondent refused the claim on 22 January 2024. Whilst accepting the appellant’s identity and his Egyptian nationality, she did not accept the credibility of the claim for a number of reasons as outlined in the refusal decision. She considered the appellant’s credibility was damaged because of his failure to claim asylum in Italy and France. Even if the claim were credible it was asserted by the respondent that the appellant could avail himself of the protection of the authorities or relocate internally to Cairo or Qena. It was not accepted the appellant satisfied the Immigration Rules in respect of his private life, nor was it accepted his removal would be in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and the appeal came before the Judge sitting at the Newport Hearing Centre on 17 February 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Coerman of Counsel and the respondent by a Presenting Officer. The judge heard evidence from the appellant through an Arabic interpreter and heard submissions from both representatives.
5. In his reserved decision the Judge recorded the background and the evidence provided by the parties. The Judge recorded his decision to admit late evidence following an application by the appellant [7], and his decision to refuse an adjournment application made by Ms Coerman at the end of the oral evidence, with the appellant having brought medical evidence with him to the hearing, which dated from 2023. Whilst he refused the application, the Judge permitted Ms Coerman to recall the appellant following time to take instructions.
6. The Judge did not accept the credibility of the Appellant’s claim for a number of reasons as outlined in his decision. The Judge
7. The appellant thereafter sought permission to appeal. That was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mills on 15 July 2025 but granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien on 22 August 2025. The grant of permission was not restricted. It is on this basis then that the appeal comes before me sitting at Field House.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal
8. At the start of the hearing, I raised with Mr Iqbal the appellant’s failure to comply with the guidance note on CE file and electronic bundles. The bundle was provided with handwritten pagination, did not contain a digital indexed hyperlink to the pages he referred to, nor were any documents or sections of the bundle bookmarked. The bundle was not text based and was simply a scan of a hard copy bundle. These deficiencies made it difficult to navigate the bundle. Mr Iqbal took instructions and advised that the failure to comply was the result of a caseworker’s unfamiliarity with the guidance. An apology was extended and accepted and I was assured that the guidance would be complied with going forward.
9. I was then taken through the appellant’s grounds of appeal. Although they are not clearly delineated in the grounds they can be summarised as four distinct grounds. The first of those was a failure on the part of the judge to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. Secondly, that the judge treated the appellant’s failure to claim asylum as determinative without considering whether the appellant had proffered a reasonable explanation. Third, the judge’s credibility findings were inadequately reasoned, and fourth, that the judge had failed to give the expert report proper weight. I was helpfully taken through the submissions on the grounds by Mr Iqbal and Ms Isherwood replied and having heard the submissions of both advocates in respect of the grounds I find the following.
Ground One
10. Ground One concerns the judge’s failure to consider the vulnerability of the appellant when assessing credibility. Mr Iqbal submitted that the judge observed a number of medical problems, anxiety being one of them. It was also not disputed that the appellant was on medication, and the cumulative effect was that the appellant should have been treated as a vulnerable witness. Ms Isherwood observed that there were no problems at the hearing as a result of the appellant’s putative vulnerability. The judge permitted the appellant time with his representative to discuss his medical issues. The judge also directed himself to the appellant’s vulnerability [40], and to the medical evidence [42].
11. In my view, it is clear the judge outlines the appellant’s medical conditions at [41]. Those medical conditions are a pin in his lower leg that he is being treated for and that he previously received medication for. The appellant was also said to be diabetic, have weak vision, multiple leg breaks and nails in his leg. The appellant had trauma in his head which caused weakness of vision, permanent headaches and a broken hand and took tablet medication for diabetes along with medication for his nervous system because of the diabetes. There was medical evidence before the judge spanning 31 pages appearing in the bundle. There was nothing in that evidence which appeared to pertain to the appellant’s poor mental health. The only reference at all to the appellant’s mental health was a reference [71] of the decision where the judge says (presumably in oral evidence) that mental health was raised but that the appellant accepted he had not been to a doctor about it.
12. There was also no application made by Counsel for the appellant at the hearing for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness. As the guidance which is quoted in the Rule 24 notice observes the judge should have expected assistance from the parties in that respect. Notwithstanding the absence of an application the judge in my view clearly took into account the appellant’s putative vulnerability. [40] of the decision is headed ‘Medical/Vulnerable’. The judge also directed himself clearly to the reality of anxiety whilst the appellant gave evidence and confirms that he bore that in mind when assessing the evidence of the appellant in the round. Therefore, I do not find any material error of law is disclosed in ground one.
Ground Two
13. Mr Iqbal submitted that the appellant had provided a number of reasons as to why he did not claim asylum. The appellant had mentioned [79] comments made by the Italian Prime Minister about deporting all of the refugees and also being street homeless in France. It was said the judge erred in considering that because the appellant was not ‘physically prevented’ from making an asylum claim, his credibility was damaged. Ms Isherwood submitted that the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s failure to claim was immaterial, as the judge had already concluded at [73] that the appellant’s account was not credible.
14. I find that the judge’s treatment of the Section 8 point does also not disclose any material error of law. The appellant passed through Italy and then France on his way to the United Kingdom and did not claim asylum in either of those countries. That is not in dispute. The appellant gave a number of reasons recorded by the judge at [76] of the decision as to why he did not make an asylum claim in those countries. In the witness statement he says he did not claim asylum in any other country because he saw with his own eyes how asylum seekers were treated, they were living on the street having nothing to eat, and he was told that he would be treated with kindness in the United Kingdom.
15. In my view the judge was entitled to find that the appellant had opted not to claim asylum in these countries. This was not a case, as the judge observed, where the appellant was prevented by doing so by reasons outside of his control, for example, that he was under the control of an agent. It was open to the judge to find that the appellant did not claim asylum in these countries because he did not want to. In these circumstances that was a finding which I find was open to the judge on the evidence before him.
16. In any event, it is clear that the Section 8 consideration was secondary to the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility. [73] makes clear that the judge considered the appellant’s evidence, reminded himself of the applicable standard of proof and did not find that the appellant was credible even to the lower standard. It is only after that finding is made and those threads are pulled together that the judge then goes on to consider the applicability of Section 8. Whilst in my view Section 8 is clearly a factor to be considered in the round and not as a secondary assessment after credibility has been determined, it is clear as Ms Isherwood says that the appellant’s claim had been rejected and therefore even had the judge erred in his application of Section 8 that error would not be material.
Ground Three
17. The grounds put this as a challenge to the reasons given by the judge. That submission evolved slightly in the course of the hearing. I was taken by Mr Iqbal to specific points where the judge is said to have erred in considering credibility. [60] for example, was highlighted to me. This is the issue of the appellant providing evidence in oral evidence that he had not hitherto provided. It was put to the appellant at the hearing that he had not raised this before. That is not a factor that is disputed by the representatives before me. Mr Iqbal in fact accepted that he had been able to see this fact raised by the appellant elsewhere. The judge then continued to treat this as an inconsistency because the appellant had only mentioned for the first time threats to his children. I agree with what Mr Iqbal says that this is not an inconsistency but rather should have been called an omission.
18. However it was characterised by the judge, the fact is that disclosing the evidence that was material to the claim in circumstances where a person was legally represented was a factor that the judge was entitled to take into account as damaging to the appellant’s claim. [65] in my view is a disagreement simply with the findings made by the judge. The judge considered the appellant’s evidence as it had been given in the asylum interview. The judge was entitled therefore to find that the appellant had been inconsistent in his description of the influence and the reach of those whom he feared. It is clear in my view that the judge took a proper approach to credibility, it cannot be ignored that the judge actually spends eight paragraphs directing himself to the appropriate manner in which credibility is to be considered. That self-direction is arguably more detailed than is often seen in decisions of the First-tier Tribunal. Nothing in the grounds advanced by the appellant indicates that the judge failed to comply with his own self-direction. It is trite law that the duty of First-tier Tribunal Judges is to disclose to the appellant precisely why he has lost his appeal and, in my view, a fair reading of the decision would explain exactly to the appellant why he has lost.
Ground Four
19. The final point relied on in the grounds but sensibly not advanced before me by Mr Iqbal is a criticism of the judge’s treatment of the expert report. Very simply the grounds assert that the judge failed to give the expert report proper weight. That is a misconception of what is said in the judge’s decision. What the judge states at [62] of the decision is that the expert report in essence found that there was a lack of information regarding the extent to which the tribe the appellant fears is connected to the Egyptian government, authorities, police, law enforcement or security forces. The judge then goes on to consider that the expert deemed that the tribe lived on the fringes of Egyptian society, are perceived as lawless and are also referred to at another source as being regarded as an enemy created by Egypt itself. The judge then concludes those observations in saying “Even taking this at its highest I find that on the appellant’s own expert report it does not provide objective evidence even to the lower standard of the tribe being well connected to the Egyptian state apparatus”. It is clear then that the appellant’s own expert report undermined his claim, that is a factor that the judge took into account and I therefore do not find that there is any material error of law disclosed by ground 4.
Notice of Decision
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed, and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal on all grounds shall stand.

CJ Williams

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th November 2025