Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003340

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56058/2023
LP/05571/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

QT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hawkins, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have made an order to anonymise the Appellant. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, it is my view that there is a need to protect the identity of the Appellant. This in the light of the fact that this is an asylum claim.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Vietnam, born in 1984.
3. The issue to decide is whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge (‘the Judge’) Mulholland erred in law, in a decision dated 4 April 2025, when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent, dated 29 August 2023, to refuse his claim on protection and human rights grounds.
Background
4. The Appellant entered the UK on 1 May 2019. He claimed asylum on 26 May 2019.
5. His asylum claim is based on a fear of being of interest to the Vietnamese authorities owing to (i) a land dispute, (ii) supplying photographs to newspapers of waste that had been dumped which implicated the authorities, (iii) borrowing money from his friends which he did not return and was threatened to repay, and (iv) his membership and involvement in the Brotherhood for Democracy.
6. His hearing before the FtT took place on 9 October 2024 and 3 March 2025. At the latter hearing, he had tried to produce further evidence relating to his political activity. The Judge only admitted into evidence documents relating to the Appellant’s role as a moderator, as he had been cross examined on this as the first hearing. He was asked further questions about this evidence. No other evidence was admitted.
7. His appeal was dismissed on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds, in a decision dated 4 April 2025, by FtT Judge Mulholland.
Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
8. The Appellant appealed the decision of the FtT in grounds dated 21 April 2025. I summarise the grounds of appeal advanced as follows:
i. Ground 1: The Judge erred in failing to take into account material country evidence in respect of Vietnam when assessing the claim. The Judge’s findings are made without reference to the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Opposition to the State, Vietnam August 2023 at 3.2.5, 3.2.7, 10.2.2 and 11.1.
ii. Ground 2: The Judge erred in considering A’s political activities, by referring to Iranian country guidance when determining risk to the Appellant for his political activities. The CPIN Opposition to the State, Vietnam August 2023 showed he was at risk as a member of an illegal party and the approach of the Vietnamese state towards political opposition was severe, with extensive monitoring of activists abroad.
iii. Ground 3: The Judge erred by making a mistake of fact when looking at the Facebook material at para. 63 in finding that the material suffered from the deficiencies referred to in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC).
iv. Ground 4: The Judge erred in considering whether or not the Appellant’s political beliefs were genuinely held at paras. 66 and 69 given the extent of his political activities and the supporting evidence. There is inadequate reasoning or a failure to analyse the evidence before the FtT in looking at this issue and how the Appellant would behave on return. This leaves the Appellant unable to understand why he has lost on this point.
9. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal by FtT Judge Parkes in a decision dated 23 July 2025. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
2. The grounds argue that the Judge erred in failing to take into account relevant background evidence relating to Vietnam. It is also argued that the Judge placed inappropriate reliance of Iranian country guidance given the more severe stance of the Vietnamese authorities. The Appellant had provided his full Facebook profile and in respect of the Appellant's political beliefs.
3. The reference to Iranian country guidance is arguably erroneous and may undermine the credibility findings that follow. In the circumstances all the grounds may be argued.
4. The grounds disclose arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted.
Submissions
10. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 6 November 2025. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives.
11. I had before me a composite bundle which was prepared for the Upper Tribunal and ran to 522 pages, and a rule 24 reply dated 4 August 2025. It became apparent to me that there were documents before the FtT which were not included in that bundle. I raised this with the parties at the start of the hearing. As such, I was taken to and had access to the FtT hearing/stitched bundle which ran to 1384 pages.
Findings and Reasons
12. I consider the grounds advanced below in turn.
Ground 1
13. It is submitted by the Appellant that the Judge erred in failing to take into account material country evidence in respect of Vietnam when assessing the claim. The Judge’s findings are made without reference to the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN): Opposition to the State, Vietnam August 2023 at 3.2.5, 3.2.7, 10.2.2 and 11.1.
14. At paras. 15-27 the Judge finds that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the Vietnamese authorities are interested in him and would persecute him for providing photographs to newspapers on environmental issues. As part of the reasons given for this conclusion the Judge says as follows:
• Para. 17 - the Appellant’s name is not credited to the photos. He has not provided evidence that newspapers and journals have been shut down or harassed or that any of their journalists have been persecuted by the authorities.
• Para. 18 – the photos show a large amount of industrial waste, which everyone living or passing through the area would see. It is difficult to see why this would cause the authorities to be interested in the Appellant.
• Para. 19 – the articles say the matter has been raised with the authorities at a community level for years which means the issues is known. It is difficult to see why reporting on a local story known to all concerned would cause the authorities to pursue the Appellant for taking photographs.
• Paras. 20 and 21 – He has failed to explain why the government would target the photographer as opposed to the person writing the article. He claims only to have supplied photos to a newspaper twice and this lacks further credibility.
• Para. 22 – The fact several articles were published after he left detailing environmental problems in Vietnam suggests the authorities are not interested in articles of this nature, as they would not let further articles be published.
15. The country evidence I was referred to by the parties at 3.25, 3.2.7, 10.2.2 and 11.1 of the CPIN does show that activism or protests in respects of environmental issues was deemed to be a sensitive issue by the government (though less sensitive than, for example, relations with China or cases of corruption which were subject to censorship) and that those involved in activism on this issue could attract the attention of the authorities.
16. I also note that 10.5.2 of the CPIN states that sensitivity on environmental issues can change or depend on government priorities and was difficult for activists to predict. Further, 13.1.4 states that the courts had convicted individuals for campaigning on environmental causes and sentenced them to long prison sentences.
17. The findings made by the Judge (as set out at para. 13 above) do not appear to have had in mind relevant background evidence. I find that this is a material error of law.
Ground 2
18. The Appellant argues that the Judge erred in considering the extent of A’s political activities and risk. The Judge referred to Iranian country guidance when determining risk to the Appellant for his political activities. The CPIN Opposition to the State, Vietnam August 2023 showed he was at risk as a member of an illegal party and the approach of the Vietnamese state towards political opposition was severe, with extensive monitoring of activists abroad.
19. I note that the Judge makes the following findings:
• The Appellant produced Facebook pictures of the Brotherhood for Democracy page which he accessed from his own personal account. He states he posts political content on the group’s page. There is a photograph of him at a conference event in 2021, photos of him as a December conference showing him wearing a Brotherhood for Democracy top and captured working as a photographer. Some weight is placed on these images (paras. 43-44).
• The Appellant produced photographs of him holding a loudspeaker amongst a group but there are no details on when the photo was taken, how long the demonstration was for, what he was saying, if the loud speaker was on, and what role he had. The photos could be staged (para. 48).
• He has produced a letter which shows he was a signatory to a letter from the Brotherhood of Democracy sent to the Vietnamese President complaining about human rights abuses. There is a record of posting from the Royal Mail but it does not indicate what was inside the letter. No ID documents was sent to the President of the signatories. If it was delivered and the Appellant was identifiable, there is little information or evidence to show the authorities followed this up with a visit to his home or family (para. 50).
• The Tribunal must consider the theme of the demonstrations, his role and political profile, the extent of participation, whether the demonstrations attracted media attention, identification risks, surveillance of demonstrators, the authorities’ capacity to identify individuals, factors triggering enquiries or action on return, his immigration history and method of leaving the country, the consequences of identification and risk, whether the authorities are likely to be interested in him and their response to his activities as per BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) (para. 54).
• The CPIN is referred to 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 and it is concluded that photography is unlikely to be considered serious enough by the authorities to attract adverse interest from them. In the photographs, he attends demonstrations and does not appear to be participating in an organisational or leading capacity. He would not receive adverse attention for his minimal role in demonstrations, amongst many other attendees (paras.55-58).
• XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) requires consideration of the likelihood of Facebook material being available to the Vietnamese authorities which is affected by whether the personal is or has been at any material time a person of significant interest, because if so, that are, in general, reasonably likely to have been the subject of targeted Facebook surveillance (para. 59).
• The Appellant claims he received threats on Facebook from government officials but has not been able to show the connection between trolls and the Vietnamese authorities. He has failed to show this always happens (para. 61).
• The Appellant’s demonstration and social media activates, even taken cumulatively, do not create a real risk on return. There is an overwhelming volume of internet and social media activity. I do not accept the authorities in Vietnam would have any real interest in monitoring the Facebook posts of all their fellow nationals who are currently seeking asylum in the UK, even if the account is taken at its highest (para. 67).
20. I have considered the CPIN and set out some passages from the same here:
• 3.1.1 A person who is a member of an illegal opposition political party and can show that his/her political opposition has come to the attention of the authorities is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm. Each case, however, must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that are likely to be at risk.
• 3.1.4 Members of illegal political parties are subject to arrest and detention and can be charged under security provisions such as "abusing democratic freedom" and "carrying out activities to overthrow the government". Those who are members or who have participated in activities organised by groups proscribed as terrorist organisations in Vietnam may be charged with terrorism offences
• 8.3.4 Vietnam Human Rights Networks annual report for 2021-2022 noted that: 'To protect the Party's political security, the government maintained its intolerance of outside dissent or criticism…. 'Thus, organizations promoting democracy and human rights, such as Bloc 8406, the People's Action Party, the Democratic Party of Vietnam, the Vietnam Progress Party, the Populist Party, the High Tide of Humanism Movement, the Committee for Human Rights, the United Workers-Farmers Association, Viet Labor Movement, the Vietnamese Political and Religious Prisoners Friendship Association, the Patriotic Youth, the Vietnam Path Movement, Vietnam Blogger Network, the Brotherhood For Democracy, the Constitution Group, Vietnamese Women for Human Rights, and the Independent Journalists Association continued to be banned and persecuted. Many members of these organizations were isolated or imprisoned.'
• 10.5.8 The 2022 USSD report noted that: 'In prior years police and plainclothes authorities routinely mistreated, harassed, and assaulted activists and those demonstrating against the government. No major demonstrations against the government were permitted during the year…
• 11.4.1 Several sources reported that cyber group OceanLotus or APT32 targeted overseas human rights defenders and journalists through the use of malware. The group are suspected of having links to the Vietnamese government
• 12.3.3 The 88 Project's Human Rights Report 2021 (published 8 May 2022) noted: 'In April 2020, Facebook agreed to ramp up censorship on behalf of the government after state-owned telecommunications services restricted access to the site's servers for seven weeks, slowing traffic and often rendering the platform unusable….
• 12.3.4 Global Voices Advox reported in March 2023 that: 'Vietnam has deployed an army of online trolls and cyber troops who are spreading not just disinformation but also conducting vicious hate campaigns against human rights activists and suspected critics of the state.
• 12.3.5 The 2022 USSD report noted that: 'An administrative regulation compels owners of all websites and social networking sites to cooperate with the Ministry of Information and Communications to prevent the spread of "bad, toxic news."
• 12.4.2 The 2022 DFAT report noted: 'Authorities closely monitor online activism. Human rights advocates claim there are thousands of agents monitoring online discussion and blogs and claim there is trolling online by a Government organisation known as 'Force 47'. The activities of Force 47 are not well understood but sources told DFAT that suspicious posts, which are sometimes anonymous, can be attributed to Force 47, and that Force 47 allegedly trolls online users and hacks accounts. Force 47 is allegedly active on topics such as religion, women's and LGBTI rights, and human rights generally.'
• 12.4.5 Vietnam Human Rights Networks annual report for 2021-2022 noted that: 'Additionally, in 2020-2021, several media platforms, especially Facebook, have complied with the Vietnamese government's escalating demand to censor dissidents.
• 12.5.2 The 2022 DFAT report noted that: …'…Low-level users of little profile are sometimes subject to fines, arrest and prison sentences, but sources told DFAT this is inconsistent and may depend on local authorities. Low-level discussion with friends from time to time might be tolerated or go unnoticed, but in other cases related to sensitive issues (such as elections) social media users might be accused of producing 'fake news,' required to provide 'evidence' for their views and fined. Frequent posting online increases the risk of attention from authorities. Those in large cities are less likely to come to the attention of authorities than those in rural areas, according to sources. Several sources told DFAT that being low-profile may actually present a higher risk of arrest because high-profile people are watched and noticed when they are arrested, both domestically and internationally.'
• 12.5.6 Freedom House noted in their 'Freedom on the Net 2022' report that: ‘Activists, dissidents, and online commentators, including those living outside of Vietnam, have increasingly had their Facebook accounts suspended for violating the platform's community standards…. '… Bloggers and online activists are subject to frequent physical attacks, job loss, severed internet access, travel restrictions, and other rights violations….
• 13.1.1 The BTI 2022 report on Vietnam noted that: 'Local human rights activists have reported that a total of 72 people, including social media users, dissidents and human rights defenders, have been arrested, detained and given prison sentences.'
• 14.4.4 In a report by the International Federation for Human Rights, they noted that: 'Individuals involved in protests have often been subjected to torture and ill- treatment in custody, including through beatings, the use of shackles, and solitary confinement… 'Persons detained for questioning during demonstrations have been frequently beaten by police….
21. Having considered the CPIN, I am of the view that the Judge has erred materially in considering the risk to the Appellant as a result of his political activities.
22. The Judge does refer to and apply Iranian country guidance at paras. 54 and 59 of her decision. I remind myself of what the Court of Appeal held in KS (Burma) & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 67 (emphasis added):
33. In BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), the UT promulgated country guidance in relation to similar difficulties with Iranian demonstrators. It referred to a number of factors and "a spectrum of risk". The non-exhaustive list of factors is grouped under a number of headings: nature of sur place activity; identification risk; factors triggering inquiry/action on return; consequences of identification; and identification risk on return. Each heading is then illustrated and amplified. Of course, all countries are different and it would be presumptuous for this Court to prescribe the format of country guidance in a particular case but, in my judgment, the guidance in relation to Burma might usefully benefit from such a structural approach.
23. I have come to the conclusion that there was a failure to adequately consider the approach of the Vietnamese authorities against the country evidence. In particular, it is clear from the findings of the Judge that the FtT has (i) failed to consider, adequately or at all, the risk to the Appellant as a result of being a member of an illegal or banned opposition party against the country evidence, (ii) failed to note that the country evidence shows mistreatment of demonstrators, (iii) failed to note that the country evidence demonstrated that those of low profile still faced arrest and sentence and some evidence suggested that they may in fact be at higher risk of arrest than those of high profile, (iv) failed to have regard to evidence which showed that there was close monitoring of online activism which included individuals outside of the UK, and that there was evidence of Facebook cooperating with the Vietnamese authorities and, (v) failed to consider that the Appellant’s claim to have received threats from the government on Facebook and that his claim that there was a link between online trolls and the authorities was indeed supported by the country evidence.
24. The Judge’s references to the CPIN are very limited. The findings made in respect of the Appellant’s political activism and risk on return are at odds with a large amount of the evidence in the CPIN. As per R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9 (iii) (‘R (Iran) & Ors’), this grounds makes out a material error.
Ground 3
25. The Judge erred by making a mistake of fact when looking at the Facebook material at para. 63 in finding that the material suffered from the deficiencies referred to in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC).
26. I note that the Judge makes the following findings:
• XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) is Iranian country guidance but it states that those who wish to rely on a Facebook account should produce the whole of their account to determine it has not been manipulated or altered (para. 62).
• The Facebook evidence suffers from the sort of deficiencies referred to in XX and is not much more than a partial and selective set of ‘snapshot prints’ Given what XX says about how easily manipulated Facebook evidence is, the nature of the evidence in this appeal has a low value/weight as support for his claims that he faces a risk of persecutory treatment (para. 63).
• Considering XX at paras. 121-122, based on the limited evidence A provided of his Facebook activity, it was not accepted he was a prolific or substantial poster on Facebook. His claim that his account had come or was likely to come to come to the attention of the authorities is difficult to accept (para. 64).
27. I have already found, in respect of Ground 3, that the Judge erred materially in failing to consider the Appellant’s claim and evidence against the relevant CPIN. I find that the conclusion arrived at by the Judge at para. 64 is flawed for the same reasons. Indeed the references made to paras. 121-122 of the XX here, further magnify the error made in this regard.
28. Moreover, I have considered the stitch bundle. I note that this shows A provided a download of his Facebook posts from 6 May 2021 to 5 June 2024 (pages 642 to 804) and then provided an updated download of his posts, check-ins, photos and videos from 10 June 2024 to 27 September 2024 (pages 853 to 1091). These show there are several posts made by the Appellant which are critical of the regime, that there are photographs on his page of protests in London in 2023 and 2024, there are photos of meetings in London for Brotherhood for Democracy and posts in support of Brotherhood for Democracy, as well as photos of garbage being dumped in Hanoi, for example.
29. Given the dates on the Facebook posts and the extent of the posts in the bundle, the Judge was wrong to describe these as partial and a selective set of ‘snapshot prints’ at para. 63. It does not appear, the Appellant downloaded his likes and comments or shares on his Facebook account. This is a unfortunate omission. However, the evidence produced was not simply a printout or an excerpt of an internet page as referred to in XX at headnotes 7-8 . The comments made by the Judge about manipulation/altering of evidence and the findings on the low weight to be attached to this evidence at para.63 cause me concern as they appear not to consider what has been produced by the Appellant. It appears that the Judge has failed to note that the Appellant had downloaded his Facebook account but just his posts, check-ins, photos and videos (see page 970). The dates on his posts and the extent of the same do not to have been considered adequately by the Judge.
30. I find that this ground also makes out a material error, as per 9 (iii) (vii) of R (Iran) & Ors.
Ground 4
31. The Appellant argues that the Judge erred in considering whether or not the Appellant’s political beliefs were genuinely held at paras. 66 and 69 of the decision, given the extent of his political activities and the supporting evidence. There is inadequate reasoning or a failure to analyse the evidence before the FtT in looking at this issue and how the Appellant would behave on return. This leaves the Appellant unable to understand why he has lost on this point.
32. At para. 66 the Judge finds that the Appellant has engaged in critical social media activities opportunistically and in bad faith and not on account of any genuinely held beliefs. As such, she finds he can reasonably be expected to close his account, which is very unlikely to have been subjected to monitoring in good time for his return. At para. 69 she further states his activities, which include attendance at demonstrations, are not reasonably likely to give rise to a real risk of persecution.
33. For the reasons I have set out above, in considering Grounds 2 and 3, the Judge has erred in considering the social media evidence before the Tribunal (including the nature and extent of that evidence) and in her assessment of risk on return to the Appellant in light of the country evidence. Given this, it follows that the conclusions arrived at by the Judge at paras. 66 and 69 also disclose material errors of law.
Notice of Decision
34. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in this decision. The decision is set aside.
35. Considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and the nature of the errors identified, I remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard before any Judge aside from Judge Mulholland.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 January 2026