Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003355

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66029/2023
LP/01298/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

TM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Slatter
For the Respondent: Mr Hume

Heard at Field House on 3 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant made a claim for asylum on 31 January 2022 which was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 13 December 2023. The appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier Tribunal who rejected her appeal in a decision dated 27 May 2025. The appellant’s application for permission to appeal was rejected by the First-tier Tribunal. Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted the appellant’s application for permission to appeal in a decision dated 1 September 2025. This granted permission to appeal on all grounds and included the following:

a. ground one - whilst it was recognised that the judge “gave multiple reasons for rejecting the appellant’s credibility including a failure to answer direct questions in cross examination, the lack of internal coherence in her account, the lack of corroborating evidence that should have been available to the appellant (the explanation for its non availability having been considered and rejected) and a significant inconsistency on the material issue about whether the appellant had approached the police. However, there is repeated reliance on finding the account implausible when it is not clear what the basis of that finding is. The paragraph on Bangladeshi “cultural norms” at [27] is particularly concerning as a basis for the FTT’s knowledge of this is unclear”;
b. ground 2 - the judge should have acknowledged country evidence in the appellant’s supplementary bundle and given reasons for preferring the CPIN’s earlier assessment about risk to BNP supporters in Bangladesh;
c. ground 3 – is less arguable as “FTT judges should be assumed to know and be applying the law, and do not need to recite it.”
d. Ground 4 – “it is arguable that the FTT has erred at [39] in finding that the appellant’s partner did not have a “strong connection” to the UK because he was born abroad and is a naturalised British citizen”;
e. ground five - appears to be merely a disagreement.

2. The respondent submitted a rule 24 response. Both parties made oral submissions at the hearing.

Ground 1

3. Mr Slatter challenged the judge’s findings about credibility on the basis that the judge had made unsupportable findings of implausibility about the appellant’s claim. He submitted that following HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 an appellant’s account must be considered against the whole of the country evidence and the judge erred by not making a self-direction on plausibility and did not make reference to the objective evidence in light of considering plausibility. He referred to section 10 of the fact-finding mission and the section on women but that this did not provide any indication of what Bangladeshi cultural norms were.

4. He also referred to paragraph 28 in which the judge set out that there was no medical evidence however page 115 of the appellant’s bundle contains a medical record. I asked if that medical note was referred to in the skeleton or submissions at the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Slatter stated that he did not act in those proceedings and he could not see a reference to it in the skeleton argument. He did refer to the index to the appellant’s bundle which included the identifier “medical report of the appellant being victim of domestic violence”.

5. As is set out in the grant of permission and repeated in Mr Hume’s submission the Judge gave detailed and numerous reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account these included the following:

a. [25] the appellant’s account was vague and generalised;

b. [25] her credibility was damaged by her failure to seek asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom;

c. [26] the appellant did not give clear answers to the questions put to her in cross examination “that undermined the lack of any substance to her case”;

d. [26] “the appellant’s first witness statement failed to provide a chronological or coherent account of her alleged political activism on behalf of the BNP in Bangladesh. That reflected her incoherent account provided at her asylum interview(s).”

e. [27] “the appellant’s claim that she was married to a man who was a keen supporter of the Awami league is implausible and contrary to well established Bangladeshi cultural norms.”

f. [28[ the appellant’s claim that she was subject to domestic violence is implausible. “The appellant gave conflicting evidence about seeking help from the police, as cross examination demonstrated” “the photographs which were said to illustrate the domestic violence claim could not be positively identified as being of the appellant… Connection with more recent events was unclear. There were no medical notes”.

g. [28] the appellant’s claim that the police were controlled by the Awami league and her husband was an Awami league supporter but she repeatedly sought police help was implausible.

h. [28] there was no credible evidence of the appellant’s involvement in BNP activities in Bangladesh

i. [30] the photographs of sur place activities “showed little more than her presence at some well attended and anti-Hussina demonstrations”

j. [31] the appellant claims that her ex-husband had threatened her and her family were implausible given they were divorced and the consequent difficulties he would have in having access to the family home

k. [31] the recent claim that people were asking about her in Bangladesh was “vague and unsubstantiated as the rest of her evidence, and was a transparent attempt to avoid the favourable consequences of the change of government”

l. [33] the appellant’s failure to continue her studies in the United Kingdom was not credibly explained.

6. As can be seen from the above the judge gave a very extensive list of detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account. Not only were the findings against the appellant’s credibility extensive, they went to the very core of her credibility, namely that her account was vague, unsubstantiated, general and her poor response to questions put in cross examination underlined the lack of substance to her claim. The grounds of appeal and submissions concern two of these twelve reasons and relate to the plausibility of her marriage to somebody with opposing political views and the evidence of domestic violence.

7. I have considered HK V SSHD.

8. In addition in SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 160, Green LJ said (para 46)

“In cases (such as the present) where the credibility of the appellant is in issue courts adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. The court will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given to investigators at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on the facts found or agreed which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as a risk if returned, and, if so, as to the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable Country Guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (v), the overall plausibility of an appellant's account.”

9. In Awala [2005] CSOH 73 (para 24) Lord Brodie said that a tribunal of fact making an adverse finding on credibility must only do so on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation. Inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence must have a basis in that evidence. An appellant’s evidence should not be lightly or readily dismissed and when it is reasons must be given. Nevertheless, the tribunal of fact need not necessarily accept an applicant's account simply because it is not contradicted at the relevant hearing. The tribunal is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent "with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole."

10. I consider that the Judge’s finding about the plausibility of the marriage was only one part of extensive findings and that the credibility assessment was carried out in the round and considered plausibility in light of the appellant’s own claims that her husband was an Awami League Supporter, the police were controlled by the Awami League and still she said she went to the police for help. as it should have been. I find that it was open to the Judge to make a plausibility finding in this regard and that it falls within the category identified in Awala.

11. In relation to the domestic violence, the Judge does not mention the medical notes. However, there is no evidence nor was a submission made that this was identified to the Judge. The appellant relied on a bundle and a supplementary bundle running to over 800 pages in the First-tier Tribunal, it is incumbent on representatives to draw relevant evidence to the attention of the Judge.

12. I do not find that not referring to or taking into account the medical notes is a material error of law because even if the Judge had accepted that the appellant had suffered domestic violence, it does little to advance her claim. The note refers to 2019 some 6 years ago and the appellant has since divorced her husband. This is the same for the plausibility of the marriage point – even if it was an error of law it was not material. Her claim was not argued on the basis that she was a member of a PSG namely victims of domestic violence or otherwise linked to the abusive marriage to her ex-husband. The skeleton argument clearly sets out that the claim was based on the Refugee Convention reason of political opinion. She feared return because she feared those controlled by the Awami League. Given my findings relating to the lack of influence and threat from the Awami League, no such errors can be material.

13. These two issues must be considered in the context of the claim as a whole which is that the appellant claimed to fear her ex-husband because of his connections to the Awami league who controlled the police. At [34] the judge found:

“But regardless of the weakness of the appellant’s claims of facing danger from the Awami League and her ex-husband, the situation in Bangladesh has now changed dramatically, as a result of the fall of the Awami league government headed by Sheikh Hasina…… The Army has been loyal to the new government and the stranglehold of the Awami League over the institutions of the state has been broken. That is shown by the December 2004 CPIN: see, e.g, the executive summary and paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.2.1. The Awami League’s political activities have very recently been curtailed by law. The tribunal finds that there is a sufficiency of protection.”

14. As I have set out elsewhere the Judge made unimpeachable findings that the Awami League does not pose a threat to the appellant. Therefore, any error could not be a material error of law.

15. Further, even if the Judge had accepted that the appellant’s ex-husband was an Awami league supporter and that he had been violent to her, given the unchallenged finding that the appellant has been divorced for some time and the political changes in Bangladesh, any errors identified cannot be material to the risk that the appellant would face on return to Bangladesh particularly in light of the Judge’s unchallenged finding that she would have family support and the position that the Awami League have been curtailed and do not pose a risk.

16. Therefore, I conclude that there is no a material error of law in relation to this ground.

Ground 2

17. Mr Slatter submitted that the appellant’s supplementary bundle contained objective information which showed that BNP supporters still face a risk of harm in Bangladesh and the Judge had failed to explain why preference was given to the December 2024 CPIN over that evidence. It was submitted that this was a failure to provide adequate reason.

18. I referred Mr Slatter to MU V SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 in which the judgement of the Court of Appeal was given by LJ Underhill on 15 July 2025. Mr Slatter stated that he was not aware of the case but he did read it during the course of the proceedings and made submissions on it. I felt obliged to draw Mr Slatter’s attention to that case. His submissions were that that case was not binding on me, it was a decision in the context of certification of an asylum claim relating to risk in Bangladesh.

19. I asked Mr Slatter if there was anything in the objective information that was specific to the appellant or her risk in Bangladesh and he confirmed that it was general, largely news articles.

20. Mr Hume submitted that the respondent’s CPIN at 3.2.2 acknowledges that there is some violence to BNP supporters in Bangladesh but that low numbers of people are affected.

21. At paragraph 14 of MU V SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 Underhill LJ quotes the executive summary of the December 2024 CPIN, paragraphs 16 and 17 go on to state:

[16] Mr Collins' response was that the CPIN did not show an unequivocal picture. He noted that the passage quoted said only that it was "unlikely" that BNP members or supporters would face persecution or serious harm from the government, and he drew our attention also to the final paragraph about the inappropriateness of certification. I am afraid that that is clutching at straws. It is quite clear that the term "unlikely" is used in this context to connote no real risk, and that is unsurprising in the context of the overthrow of the Awami League from whom the feared risks would emanate. In so far as the statement about certification implies a degree of uncertainty, it is evidently related to the possibility of risk to Awami League supporters: without going through the full text of the CPIN, one can see that, as I say wholly unsurprisingly, that is the area where there is the possibility of some risks continuing.

[17] The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.”
22. I agree with Mr Slatter that MU is not direct authority on the matter. However, I find that the judge did not need to expressly set out how he considered the objective evidence. Even taking the objective evidence at its highest, it cannot support a country wide risk for BNP members or supporters as the appellant claimed to be. The objective evidence does not relate to any risk to the appellant individually. The criticisms about the judge’s reliance on the December 2024 CPIN are unfounded.

23. I find that there is no error of law in relation to ground 2.

Ground 3

24. Mr Slatter did not make submissions beyond the written submissions on ground three. I find that the appellant’s ability to speak English is a neutral factor and there is no requirement to set out the article 8 ECHR assessment in a particular format. I find that there is no error of law in relation to ground three.

Ground 4

25. Mr Slatter submissions were that the judge made a material error of law when he stated “neither party proved a strong connection to the United Kingdom. Mr Mac is of Vietnamese origin and has naturalised as a British citizen.”

26. I considered that paragraph 39 needs to be read as a whole and it goes on to state “Clearly he is a person who can adapt to other cultures. There was no clear evidence to show that he would be unable to live in Bangladesh with the appellant, especially as she and her family will be there to assist him. The tribunal finds that there would be no very significant obstacles to living as a couple in Bangladesh.”. Paragraph 20 records that Mr Mac did not have a witness statement but that he gave evidence and was cross examined.

27. Mr Slatter made submissions about the deep connections that Mr Mac had with the United Kingdom but when I asked him where it was shown that evidence and submissions to this effect had been made to the First-tier Tribunal he accepted he was unable to establish this had been raised with the First-tier Tribunal.

28. I find that it was unfortunate that the judge made the statement about Mr Mac not having proved a strong connection to the United Kingdom. He is a naturalised British citizen and it is self-evident that he does have a strong connection to the United Kingdom because of that. I consider that the judge’s statement discloses an error of law and so I have gone on to consider if that is a material error in relation to the article 8 ECHR assessment.

29. The judge made a finding that was open to him that Mr Mac was a person who can adapt to other cultures [39], that there was no clear evidence that he would be in unable to live in Bangladesh with the appellant [39] and that the appellant’s family would be able to assist him [39].

30. The test of insurmountable obstacles is applicable where a spouse or partner is “in the United Kingdom and is a British citizen, settled in the UK, or in the UK with protection status…”. It is therefore a given that the connections a British citizen would have to the United Kingdom are already factored into the test at some level. What is required is an assessment of whether or not there are insurmountable obstacles

31. I find that the judge gave consideration to the correct matters which were the difficulties that would be faced by the appellant or her partner continuing their family life together outside the United Kingdom. The judge found that there were no such difficulties. Mr Slatter has failed to provide any evidence of matters that the judge overlooked or that his findings about their ability to continue life together outside the United Kingdom were unsustainable. In addition, he has failed to identify any evidence before the judge that could establish there were reasons related to their ties to the United Kingdom which amounted to insurmountable obstacles. Therefore, I find that any criticism about the application of the insurmountable obstacles test is without merit.

32. The Judge also considered art 8 ECHR generally and I find that there is no merit to the submission that he committed an error of law in assessing the evidence before him. It has simply not been identified that there was sufficient evidence for an article 8 ECHR claim to succeed even taking the appellant’s article 8 ECHR claim at its highest.

33. Therefore, I find that the error of law is not material.

Ground 5

34. Mr Slatter not did not make oral submissions in respect of ground five and I consider that that it is merely a disagreement with the judge’s findings.

Notice of Decision

The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 27 May 2025 did not contain an arguable error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Judge Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 November 2025