Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003359
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54481/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

RN (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr V Jagadesham, Counsel, instructed by TRP Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester on 2 December 2025

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his asylum and human rights appeal. The decision was sent to the parties on 19 May 2025.
Anonymity Order
2. The First-tier Tribunal issued an anonymity order with attendant reasons at [2] of its decision. Neither representative requested that the order be set aside.
3. I observe paragraphs 27 to 30 of the Upper Tribunal’s Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private. I consider that at the present time the appellant’s private life rights, as protected article 8 ECHR, outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, as protected by article 10 ECHR. The order is confirmed above.
Relevant Facts
4. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq and is presently aged 33. He states that he is an ethnic Turkman but speaks Kurdish having been born and raised in Erbil. His claim for international protected is founded upon his having met a female at a friend’s wedding in 2017. The female is by religion Kaka’i, whilst the appellant is Muslim. They commenced a relationship and the female agreed to marry the appellant. They were disturbed during sex by members of the female’s family and the appellant fled her home. Members of the female’s family attended the appellant’s home looking for him. The appellant subsequently left Iraq as he was fearful of being killed. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2018 and asserted that he had a well-founded fear of persecution as he would be a victim of an honour crime on return to Iraq.
5. The appellant’s asylum application was refused by the respondent, and his subsequent appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 23 December 2019. The appellant was found to be an untruthful witness who did not possess a well-founded fear of persecution.
6. The appellant submitted further representations in 2022 relying upon an expert country report prepared by Dr Kaveh Ghobadi, dated 25 November 2022, and a medico-legal report prepared by Dr Valerie Hawes MB ChB, MSC, Independent Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 9 March 2023. The respondent accepted the further representations as constituting a fresh claim under paragraphs 353 of the Immigration Rules but refused to grant the appellant status in this country.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
7. The appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester on 8 April 2025. The appellant relied upon a psychiatric report written by Dr D Bell, BSc, MB, MRCP, FRCPsych. Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 23 September 2024, and an accompanying addendum report, dated 20 February 2025. Dr Bell opined that the appellant suffers from psychiatric disorder, showing symptoms of anxiety and depression sufficient to satisfy the diagnostic criteria of Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder. It is not clear to this tribunal as to the underlying cause of his health concern, though there is reference to the appellant having been bullied at school and being affected by having been involved in many fights. Dr Bell opines that the appellant’s evasiveness as to discussing the disturbing events that occurred in his past is a result of his psychiatric disturbance.
8. The appellant’s diagnosis of depressive disorder was initially made after the dismissal of the appellant’s appeal in 2019, and though there is reference in Dr Hawes’ report to the appellant stating that he cut himself with a piece of glass soon after arrival in the United Kingdom, this incident was not repeated to Dr Bell.
9. Reliance was also placed by the appellant upon a country report prepared by Ms Sheri Laizer, dated 29 July 2024, and an addendum report, dated 7 January 2025.
10. The First-tier Tribunal did not consider the appellant to be a credible witness.
Grounds of Appeal
11. Grounds of appeal were prepared by Mr Jagadesham, who did not represent the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal.
i. The First-tier Tribunal erred in relation to its consideration of the appellant’s vulnerability and the impact thereof on the appellant’s credibility.
ii. The First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of credibility was further undermined by its treatment of plausibility and credibility, as well as its failure to consider or address material evidence, with legally adequate reasons.
iii. It was procedurally unfair for the First-tier Tribunal to find that the appellant’s kiss in the park was inconsistent with the country expert evidence.
iv. The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider or address, with legally adequate reasons, material evidence regarding the appellant accessing healthcare in the IKR; the First-tier Tribunal failed to address the practicalities of access to healthcare even with the existence of family support.
v. In concluding that the appellant has contact with his family and that the appellant could rely on family, the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider or address, with legally adequate reasons, material evidence and considerations.
12. Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson granted permission to appeal by a decision dated 1 September 2025. Whilst Judge Jackson considered ground three to have little arguable merit, she granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
Discussion
13. The core of the appellant’s challenge is identified as paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the grounds of appeal, in relation to ground 1:
“3.1 [The First-tier Tribunal] (arguably) approached the appellant’s vulnerability and its impact on an incorrect basis: the Judge wrongly reasoning that such vulnerability related only to the appellant’s engagement and the manner in which he gave/ had given evidence previously (i.e., in a previous appeal ...), as opposed to the credibility of and inconsistencies in the appellant’s account (see the Judge’s decision, paras. 16 & 17 and the FtT grounds, para,2).
3.2 This was notwithstanding the psychiatric evidence indicating that the appellant’s vulnerability did impact on his ability to provide a coherent and consistent account (FtT grounds, para. 3) and the established guidance requiring a Judge to consider whether discrepancies or inconsistencies can be explained by the individual’s vulnerability (FtT grounds, para. 4).
14. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Tan conceded that the challenged decision was subject to material error of law and should properly be set aside in its entirety. Mr Tan considered several of the grounds to overlap, and the primary challenge being directed to the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the medical evidence placed before it. He accepted that there has been inadequate engagement with the medical evidence that, akin to a rolling ball, adversely impacted the rest of the decision. I agree. Though it is clear to me that the First-tier Tribunal sought to take care in its decision, and the medical evidence may give rise to as many questions as it answers, I accept that paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the grounds of appeal identify a material error of law.
Resumed Hearing
15. Mr Jagadesham requested that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal as to date the appellant has not enjoyed a fair hearing. Mr Tan did not identify a strong view as to the venue for the resumed hearing, but understood the position adopted on behalf of the appellant.
16. I observe the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in this appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
17. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 19 May 2025 is subject to material error of law and is set aside in its entirety.
18. The appeal is remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal sitting in Manchester.
19. An anonymity order is made.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 December 2025