Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003364

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64978/2024
LP/03785/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARIA

Between

HA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood instructed by Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (FtJ) granted an anonymity order in this appeal and no party before me requested that it be set aside. In the circumstances, I have taken into account the starting point for consideration of anonymity orders is the principle of open justice and find that in this case because the appellant claims a risk of persecution on return to Egypt, the obligations of the United Kingdom (UK) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice and an anonymity order is appropriate.
Background
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the FtJ who dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal in a decision promulgated on 24 June 2025.
3. The parties know the detail of the appellant’s protection and human rights claim so I need not set it out in full. In summary, the appellant a national of Egypt claimed that he would be at risk on return to Egypt due to his imputed political opinion because of his father’s and his uncle’s membership of the Muslim Brotherhood which is a proscribed organisation in Egypt. Alternatively, the appellant claimed he is entitled to humanitarian protection. The appellant was an unaccompanied minor when he entered the UK on 29 September 2022.
4. The respondent accepted the appellant’s nationality and identity but did not accept the appellant’s claim that he would be subject to adverse attention from the Egyptian authorities due to his father’s and his uncle’s involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood.
5. The FtJ agreed with the respondent and dismissed the appeal.
6. Permission to appeal was sought on a single ground and permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Bowen. In summary, the grounds assert the FtJ materially misdirected herself as the FtJ whilst stating at [40] the court documents relating to the appellant’s father will be considered in the round failed to make any reasoned findings on the court documents rendering the assessment of the appellant’s case incomplete and therefore unsafe.
The Hearing
7. The hearing was held in a hybrid format. Mr Wood who appeared for the appellant joined by video link and Mr Nappey who appeared for the respondent was present in the Tribunal hearing room at Field House. I was present in the Tribunal Hearing room at Field House. I am satisfied there were no technical difficulties during the hearing, and the parties were able to engage fully in the hearing.
8. I heard oral submissions from both representatives. Mr Wood relied on his grounds seeking permission and briefly expanded on the grounds. He submitted that the FtJ had failed to undertake a holistic assessment of the evidence as there was no analysis or direct findings in relation to two court documents relied upon by the appellant. In addition Mr Wood submitted the FtJ at [28] makes a factual error finding that the appellant’s father had continued to preach about the Muslim Brotherhood after repeated arrests and detentions when the appellant’s claim was that it was his uncle who had been subjected to repeated arrests.
9. Mr Wood also sought to challenge the FtJ’s finding at [28] that the CPIN does not support the appellant’s claim that only a few months after his father’s repeated arrests and detentions he continued to preach about the Muslim Brotherhood. Mr Nappey objected to this challenge on the basis that it had not been pleaded in the grounds seeking permission and there was no application to amend the grounds. Mr Wood did not pursue this ground.
10. Mr Nappey confirmed that the respondent opposed the appellant’s application for permission and relied on the respondent’s Rule 24 response which in summary submits that the FtJ provided clear reasons on a thorough consideration of the evidence in the round. The respondent submits the FtJ properly engaged with the court documents and provided reasons for the findings. The respondent refers to [21] where the FtJ makes criticism of the appellant claiming his family assisted him in obtaining the court documents but refused to provide the appellant with supporting information to substantiate his protection claim. The respondent in the Rule 24 response states that the FtJ at [24] to [29] explores the evidence relating to the arrests of the appellant’s father and his uncle and considers the court judgment dated 7 July 2015 at [27]. The respondent also refers to the FtJ’s findings at [28] criticising the appellant’s claim that his father would have been repeatedly released after short periods of detention.
11. Having heard the submissions from both representatives I declared that I found there to be a material error of law in the FtJ’s decision such that none of the findings made by the FtJ would be preserved. I now give my reasons and deal with the issue of the disposal of the appeal.
Findings and reasons
12. I remind myself of the many authorities including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] on the approach an appellate court or tribunal should take when considering findings of fact reached by a first instance judge.
13. An appellate tribunal must avoid the temptation of “island-hopping” and instead must look at the FTT’s reasoning as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
14. I have exercised that restraint and considered the FtJ’s decision holistically.
15. Having considered the submissions of the representatives, I find there is a material error of law arising from the FtJ’s failure to make any reasoned findings in relation to the court documents relied upon by the appellant in support of his claim.
16. The appellant relied on two court documents in support of his claim, the first dated 4 January 2014 sentencing the appellant’s father to a year with hard labour and the payment of legal fees and the second dated 7 July 2015 sentencing the appellant’s father in absentia to 10 years with hard labour and payment of legal fees. These court documents are specifically referred to in the Appeal Skelton Argument, the respondent’s refusal decision and the respondent’s review. The FtJ at [27] refers to only one of the two court documents, namely the 7 July 2015 document. At [40] the FtJ states the court documents provided by the appellant relating to his father “…shall be considered in the round below”, but then proceeds in the remaining three paragraphs of the decision to conclude the appellant has failed to show that he is of adverse interest to the Egyptian Government without making any findings in relation to the court documents.
17. Whilst not conceding the matter, Mr Nappey very fairly accepted on behalf of the respondent that there are no clear findings on the court documents. Mr Nappey submitted that the FtJ made numerous adverse credibility findings against the appellant none of which have been challenged and thus the failure to make findings on the court documents was not material. I do not accept this submission as the court documents are significant documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant in support of his claim and it was necessary for the FtJ to engage with these documents to make findings on them.
18. It is well established that in any asylum claim there is an obligation for the reasons to show that the most anxious scrutiny was given to every factor which might tell in favour of the appellant. In failing to make any findings on the court documents the FtJ has undertaken an incomplete assessment of the evidence and has failed to give adequate reasons demonstrating anxious scrutiny of the evidence.
19. I am satisfied that the error identified means that the whole decision has been infected and needs to be set aside. I am satisfied that no findings of fact can be preserved. The parties agreed that if I found that the FtJ had erred in the manner outlined in the grounds, it was appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law, and accordingly the decision is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.
This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge.

N Haria
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 January 2026