Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003381
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51739/2023
LP/09732/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

GK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Moksud, counsel, instructed by IIAS Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal shall continue in force. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant, including her name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. By a decision dated 26 June 2025, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s 1 March 2023 decision to refuse her 28 September 2022 protection and human rights claim.
2. Thereafter, the Appellant applied in-time for permission to appeal. By a decision dated 17 July 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 29 September 2025.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of India now aged 41 years. She entered the UK on a visit visa on 21 July 2019, with her husband. He is a national of India now aged 43 years. Subsequently, the Appellant and her husband have had twin daughters. They were born in the UK and are now aged 5 years.
4. On 16 January 2020, the Appellant made a protection and human rights claim. On 8 April 2021, the Respondent refused the claim and decided that it was clearly unfounded, meaning that the Appellant was not entitled to appeal against the refusal decision in-country.
5. On 21 May 2021, the Appellant made a set of further submissions, which purported to be a fresh protection and human rights claim. On 19 January 2022, the Respondent refused the further submissions and decided that they did not amount to a fresh claim, meaning that the Appellant was not entitled to appeal against the refusal decision in-country.
6. On 28 September 2022, the Appellant made a further set of further submissions, which again purported to be a fresh protection and human rights claim. On 1 March 2023, the Respondent refused the further submissions but decided that they did amount to a fresh claim, meaning that the Appellant was entitled to appeal against the refusal decision in-country. She did so by way of these appeal proceedings.
7. The claimed factual basis for the Appellant’s claim has developed over time. By the time that she filed her undated appeal skeleton argument for her First-tier Tribunal appeal, it had crystalised as follows (in short summary): (1) she feared ill-treatment by state actors on return because of her political opinions, on the basis of claimed political activities for the Lok Insaaf Party; (2) she feared ill-treatment by her husband and/or family members on return because of her gender, on the basis of claimed previous domestic violence by her husband and a resultant 6-month period of separation from him which would be perceived as having transgressed social norms (notwithstanding that she had since reconciled with her husband); (3) her daughters were stateless; (4) she was in poor health, and it would deteriorate if she were to return to India; and (5) she had formed private and family life ties to the UK and, in particular, it was in her children’s best interests to remain here.
8. For her part, in her 4 December 2023 review for the Appellant’s First-tier Tribunal appeal, the Respondent maintained her refusal decision on all grounds.
9. In the First-tier Tribunal’s 26 June 2025 decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
10. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal raised seven grounds (although there were two distinct elements to Ground 1). In my view, the grounds are excessively lengthy and fail clearly to identify the specific errors of law alleged. I summarise them as follows.
a. Ground 1(a). The Judge erred in finding that the Appellant was not a member of a particular social group.
b. Ground (1)(b). The Judge erred in finding that the Appellant did not have a subjectively genuinely-held fear of gender-based violence on return to India.
c. Ground 2. The Judge erred in failing to make findings in respect of the political opinion element of the Appellant’s claim.
d. Ground 3. The Judge erred in finding that the Appellant’s children were not stateless.
e. Ground 4. The Judge erred in finding that the Appellant had not demonstrated a real risk of serious harm on return to India.
f. Ground 5. The Judge erred in dismissing the appeal under Article 3 ECHR on health grounds.
g. Ground 6. The Judge erred by failing to make a lawful assessment of the Appellant’s children’s best interests in dismissing the appeal under Article 8 ECHR.
h. Ground 7. The Judge erred in finding that, because the Appellant was not at risk on return, it was not necessary for her to internally relocate.
11. On 17 July 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted of permission to appeal. I note that, in their reasons, the permission Judge referred only to Ground 1 and granted permission on the following basis:
“From paragraph 36-48, the judge considers PSG, in doing so they make findings on the appellant’s credibility on the balance of probabilities. It is asserted that the Judge has not applied JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, as credibility is assessed at the higher standard and the Judge has not taken the appellant’s claim at its highest when considering convention reason. This is arguable.”
Hearing
12. Before me, the documentation was contained in a consolidated bundle of 280 pages. In addition, on behalf of the Respondent, Ms Kerr filed and served a rule 24 response by email. It opposed the appeal on all grounds. Mr Moksud did not object to it being filed and served late, and so I was content that it was in the interest of justice to permit Ms Kerr to rely on it.
13. Mr Moksud applied for the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal to remain in force. Ms Kerr had no objection to this on behalf of the Respondent. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I grant the application because the Appellant is a protection claimant, and I consider that disclosing her identity could potentially cause her harm in the event that she is returned to India.
14. At the outset of the hearing, the representatives confirmed the following matters:
a. Citing Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC), Ms Kerr accepted that permission to appeal had been granted on all grounds, notwithstanding that the reasons referred to Ground 1 only, because the permission Judge had granted permission without any express limitation.
b. Mr Moksud accepted that the reason that permission had been granted was misconceived. The grounds of appeal did not allege that the Judge had not taken the Appellant’s claim at its highest when considering whether a Convention reason was in play. The Judge considered the particular social group issue at §§30-35 (not §§36-48) and in doing so they did, expressly, take the Appellant’s claim at its highest. The Judge had made credibility findings on the balance of probabilities at §§36-48, but she was entitled to do so because that was in the context of whether the Appellant had a subjectively genuinely-held fear of gender-based violence on return to India. Therefore, Mr Moksud accepted that the arguable error identified by the permission Judge was not a material error of law.
c. Mr Moksud confirmed that it was not necessary for the purposes of the error of law hearing for the Tribunal to determine the Appellant’s application under rule 15(2A) to adduce further evidence (because the further evidence was not relevant to the assessment of whether the First-tier Tribunal had made a material error of law; it would become relevant if the appeal were to proceed to the re-making stage).
15. Mr Moksud adopted the grounds of appeal (which he had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1(a). The Judge’s application of BK (Risk – Adultery – PSG) India CG [2002] UKIAT 3387 was too rigid; the Appellant’s case was analogous to BK’s case because, by separating from her husband for 6 months, she would be perceived as having transgressed social norms in a similar way to adultery.
b. Ground 1(b). When I pressed him to do so, Mr Moksud specified the alleged error of law in the Judge’s finding that the Appellant did not have a subjectively genuinely-held fear of gender-based violence on return to India as being a failure to take into account that her claimed account was consistent with and therefore plausible by reference to country conditions in India.
c. Ground 2. Mr Moksud abandoned this ground of appeal. He accepted that the Appellant had abandoned the political opinion element of her claim at the outset of the First-tier Tribunal hearing (as recorded by the Judge at §9 of their decision). He accepted that, in such circumstances, the Judge was entitled not to make any findings in respect of that element of the claim.
d. Ground 3. Mr Moksud abandoned this ground of appeal. He accepted that the Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant’s children were not stateless in circumstances where it was accepted by the Appellant that no efforts whatsoever had been made to register them as Indian nationals.
e. Ground 4. The Judge had wrongly applied the balance of probabilities standard (rather than the lower standard) in assessing whether the Appellant had demonstrated a real risk of serious harm on return to India.
f. Ground 5. When I pressed him to do so, Mr Moksud specified the alleged error of law in the Judge’s dismissal of the appeal under Article 3 ECHR on health grounds as it being irrational, on all of the evidence assessed in the round, for the Judge to conclude that the Appellant was not a ‘seriously ill person’ for the purposes of the first stage of the test in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC).
g. Ground 6. When I pressed him to do so, Mr Moksud specified the alleged error of law under Ground 6 as a failure to undertake a proper, rounded welfare assessment in respect of the Appellant’s children.
h. Ground 7. If the Appellant were to succeed on Ground 1 or Ground 4, then she should succeed on this Ground also, because the Judge found that it was not necessary for the Appellant to internally relocate because she was not at risk. I note that, conversely, Mr Moksud accepted that if the Appellant were to fail on Ground 1 and Ground 4, then she should fail on this Ground also.
16. In response, Ms Kerr adopted the rule 24 response (which she had not drafted) and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1(a). The Judge’s reasoning for finding that the Refugee Convention was not engaged was not legally flawed. The Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant would be returning with her husband as a married woman and that society in general would not know that she had separated from him for 6 months in the UK unless she told them.
b. Ground 1(b). The Judge gave detailed reasons for finding that the Appellant did not have a subjectively genuinely-held fear of gender-based violence on return to India. This Ground was nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
c. Ground 4. The Judge had not applied the balance of probabilities standard; they expressly applied the lower standard at §§49 and 54.
d. Ground 5. The Judge gave detailed reasons for finding that the Appellant was not a ‘seriously ill person’. This Ground was nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
e. Ground 6. The Judge had undertaken a detailed best interests assessment. This Ground was nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
f. Ground 7. Ms Kerr accepted Mr Moksud’s submissions on Ground 7. That is, if Ground 1 or 4 were to succeed, then Ground 7 should also succeed; but if Ground 1 and 4 were to fail, then Ground 7 should also fail.
17. In terms of disposal, if I were to find a material error of law and set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, Mr Moksud’s view was that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard. Ms Kerr’s view was that, in such circumstances, the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal. Further, she submitted that, whether the appeal was remitted or retained, the Appellant’s abandonment of the political opinion and statelessness elements of her claim should be preserved (helpfully, Mr Moksud came back to say that he agreed with this).
18. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Decision and reasons
Ground 1(a)
19. The error of law alleged in Ground 1(a) is not made out, for the following reasons.
20. In my view, the Appellant’s argument is misconceived. The Judge did not apply BK (Risk – Adultery – PSG) India CG narrowly, as alleged: they did not find that the Appellant’s case was not analogous to BK’s because, by separating from her husband for 6 months, she would not be perceived as having transgressed social norms in a similar way to adultery. Rather, the Judge found at §34 that the Appellant would be returning with her husband and society in general would not know that she had separated from him unless she disclosed it (i.e. that, on the facts, she would not be perceived to have transgressed social norms by separating from her husband). This was a finding that was open to the Judge and has not been challenged.
21. Further, and in any event, this was not the only reason that the Judge gave for finding that the Appellant was not a member of a particular social group. At §31, the Judge cited the Respondent’s ‘Country policy and information note: women fearing gender-based violence, India’ in which it is accepted that women from rural India who have transgressed social norms form a particular social group. Similarly, in BK (Risk – Adultery – PSG) India CG at §13, the particular social group identified by the Tribunal was women who have committed adultery in rural India. Thus, in finding that the Appellant was not a member of a particular social group, the Judge additionally relied at §34 on the fact that she had not asserted that she was from a rural area. This was a finding that was open to the Judge and has not been challenged.
Ground 1(b)
22. The error of law alleged in Ground 1(b) is not made out, for the following reasons.
23. It is true that the Judge’s reasoning did not expressly refer to the Appellant’s claimed account being consistent with and therefore plausible by reference to country conditions in India. But there is nothing in the decision that suggests that the Judge considered that the Appellant’s account was inconsistent with and therefore implausible by reference to country conditions in India. Indeed, the Judge expressly referred to the Respondent’s ‘Country policy and information note: women fearing gender-based violence, India’ at §31 (albeit in the context of whether the Appellant was a member of a particular social group) – and can therefore be assumed to have been well-aware of the prevalence of domestic violence in India.
24. It is not necessary for every factor which weighs with a judge in their appraisal of the evidence to be identified and explained; rather, the issues the resolution of which were vital to the judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which they resolved them explained (English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409, per Phillips MR (as he then was) at §19). In my view, this was most certainly done in this case. At §§36-48, the issue to be resolved was clearly identified – whether the Appellant had a subjectively genuinely-held fear of gender-based violence on return to India – and the Judge then gave detailed reasons for finding that she did not. In short summary, the Judge found that Appellant had not made out her burden in this regard because: (1) her credibility had been damaged by the manner in which the factual basis of her claim had developed over time and raising the domestic violence element of her claim very late (§§38-42); (2) her account was lacking in detail – she had provided no detail about any specific incident of domestic violence (§§43-44, 47); and (3) she had reconciled with her husband in any event (§§45-46).
25. I remind myself that an appeal court should not interfere with a trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that they were plainly wrong, i.e. only if the judge’s conclusion was rationally insupportable (Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, per Lewison LJ at §2). This high threshold is clearly not met here. I accept Ms Kerr’s submission that, in reality, this Ground is nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
Ground 4
26. The error of law alleged in Ground 4 is not made out, for the following reasons.
27. I do not accept that the Judge applied the balance of probabilities standard. They referred to the lower standard at §49 (“[s]he must demonstrate that there are substantial grounds to believe that she is at real risk of serious harm”) and, expressly, at §54 (“the appellant has not demonstrated to the lower standard that there are substantial grounds to believe that she would face a real risk of serious harm”) (emphasis supplied).
28. I remind myself that the First-tier Tribunal is charged with administering a complex area of law in challenging circumstances and it is probable that, in understanding and applying the law in its specialised field, the Tribunal will have got it right (AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, per Baroness Hale at §30). In this particular case, in respect of the standard of proof applied to the assessment of a real risk of serious harm, there is simply no proper basis on which to consider that the Tribunal got it wrong.
Ground 5
29. The error of law alleged in Ground 5 is not made out, for the following reasons.
30. Irrationality is a high threshold. As it was put by McCloskey P (as he then was) in Greenwood (no. 2) (para 398 considered) [2015] UKUT 629 (IAC) at §§16-17, the test is:
“[W]hether the decision under appeal is one which no person acting judicially and properly instructed on the relevant law could reasonably have made. … Was it reasonably open to the Judge taking into account all material factors and disregarding everything extraneous to reach the conclusion under challenge? Another formulation is: did his conclusion fall with the band, or range, of conclusions reasonably open and available to him?”
31. The Judge stated that they had considered the medical documents provided and that, from them, the Appellant had demonstrated that she had depression, chronic pain and piles, and that she had been treated with talking therapy for the depression and at a pain clinic and with painkillers for the chronic pain (§§63-64). On the basis of this profile, the Judge found that the Appellant was not a ‘serious ill person’ (§65).
32. Mr Moksud did not suggest that the Judge’s summary of the Appellant’s medical conditions or treatment was wrong, or that the Judge had failed to take into account any particular medical evidence; rather, it was his submission that the only rational conclusion available to the Judge was that the Appellant was a ‘seriously ill person’. Respectfully, I do not agree. Based on the medical evidence before the Judge, I consider that their conclusion that the Appellant was not a ‘seriously ill person’ was well within the range of conclusions reasonably open and available to them. Again, I accept Ms Kerr’s submission that, in reality, this Ground is nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
Ground 6
33. The error of law alleged in Ground 6 is not made out, for the following reasons.
34. The Judge expressly considered “[t]he best interests of the children” at §70-1 in the context of whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration on return for the purposes of §5.1(b) Appendix PL Immigration Rules, concluding at §72 that it would be in their best interests to remain with both of their parents. The Judge then gave further consideration to the Appellant’s children’s interests at §§82-5, in the context of the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 ECHR assessed outside the Immigration Rules (expressly stating at §82 that “[t]he factor which bears the greatest weight in the proportionality exercise is the appellant’s children”).
35. In my view, the Judge’s assessment of the children’s best interests was careful and thorough and, indeed, unimpeachable. I note that, in submitting that the Judge failed to undertake a proper, rounded welfare assessment in respect of the Appellant’s children, Mr Moksud did not identify any specific matter that the Judge failed to take into account. Again, I accept Ms Kerr’s submission that, in reality, this Ground is nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions.
Ground 7
36. Mr Moksud and Ms Kerr agreed that if Ground 1 and 4 were to fail, then Ground 7 should also fail. As set out above, Ground 1 and Ground 4 have failed. Therefore, Ground 7 also fails – the Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant would not be required to internally relocate because they had found that the Appellant was not at risk on return.
Conclusion
37. For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain any material errors of law and so it stands.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain any material errors of law and so it stands.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 October 2025