Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003383

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64087/2023
LP/06076/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

MS (BANGLADESH)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Turner, of Imperium Chambers
For the Respondent: Mrs A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 January 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh born 12 March 1998, appeals with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton‑Taylor on 1 September 2025 against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 1 April 2025, which dismissed his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim. Permission was granted on Ground 2 only.

2. I had before me at the error of law hearing a composite bundle of 536 pages, and the Respondent’s Rule 24 response dated 7 October 2025. The parties confirmed that no additional material was required or expected.

The Appellant’s case

3. MS claimed asylum on 16 September 2021. It is his case that, as a low‑ranking member of the Jatiotabadi Chhatra Dal (“JCD”) (which is the BNP student wing), he engaged in demonstrations, and was threatened by activists of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (“BCL”) (which is the Awami League student wing), and his father was threatened by the Rapid Action Battalion (“RAB”). He says that he was attacked and threatened during the December 2018 general election campaign while putting up campaign material. He relied, inter alia, upon what were asserted to be police and court documents said to arise from a December 2020 incident, as well as what is said to be a newspaper report naming him, and letters including a report from a Mr Foyez Uddin Ahmed (said to be a dual‑qualified Bangladeshi barrister).

The Respondent’s refusal letter and position before the First‑tier Tribunal

4. The Respondent refused the claim in a decision dated 5 December 2023. The Respondent in that decision did accept identity and nationality, and that MS was a low-ranking member of the JCD. The Respondent did not accept he had received adverse attention from the Bangladeshi authorities, relying upon what was asserted to be an inconsistency as to whether MS was placing a poster inside a polling centre or a banner outside, and noting departure from Bangladesh on his own passport and therefore doubting any live adverse interest at exit. A Respondent’s review dated 20 June 2024 and a Supplementary Review dated 2 December 2024 were filed, maintaining the refusal. Although not relied upon in the refusal or reviews, the Respondent also argued before the FTT (see paragraph 21 of the FTJ’s decision) that credibility was damaged with reference to due to MS’s entry on a student route and later asylum claim. The Respondent did not accept in a review the authenticity or reliability of documents, in light of the CPIN on Documentation. The Respondent maintained that MS would not face persecution or serious harm, and asserted that given the change in government there would be sufficient state protection, and that internal relocation would be available.

The FTJ’s decision

5. In the decision, the FTJ accepted that MS was involved in student politics until he left Bangladesh in 2021 (see paragraph 39), but found that he was not credible with regard to his claim that the threats made against him were not considered by him to be genuine at that time and found that he left knowing he did not intend to return because he had been subject to adverse interest for his political activities. The FTJ also found that it was not credible that MS was unaware of the allegations regarding the incident in December 2020.

6. The FTJ set out what were considered to be shortcomings in the report of Mr Ahmed because it lacked an expert’s declaration of duty, did not identify the documents considered in preparing the report, cited what were said to be unverified sources, did not engage with the CPIN entitled Bangladesh: Political Situation, version 1.0, December 2024, nor with the police and court documents, and ventured what were said to be speculative risk opinions.

7. The FTJ noted the letter from a lawyer in Bangladesh which was said to support the credibility of the court case but observed that the lawyer’s opinion, as to the consequences for MS upon return to Bangladesh, was uncertain. The FTJ further noted that the court case had been inactive since 2021 and there had since then been a change of government. The FTJ also considered that the lawyer did not address the reforms made by the interim government, including the establishment of commissions on police, the judiciary and anti-corruption, and other features set out in paragraph 33 of the decision.

8. The FTJ concluded at paragraphs 39-41:

“39. Considering the evidence in the round, I am satisfied to the required standard that the Appellant was involved in student politics in Bangladesh until he decided to leave in 2021; his application for a student visa was made as the most expedient method of travel to UK; he knew when he left that he was not intending to return because he had been subject to adverse interest for his political activities, and that undermines the credibility of his claims.

40. I find to the required standard that he will be able to avail himself of protection by State actors against any risk he might face from AL or from any hostile factions there may be within BNP; the evidence of such risks is uncertain and the actual risk faced by the Appellant is speculative, since the party he supports is now in power.

41. I find to the required standard that, should he wish to do so, the Appellant can relocate within Bangladesh to avoid any geographically-based risk there may be, by reference to the information in para 35 above.”

9. The FTJ dismissed the appeal asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights grounds.

The Appellant’s arguments on appeal to the Upper Tribunal

10. MS sought permission to appeal on three grounds before the FTT, which refused permission and declined to extend time. MS applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal, arguing (in summary):
• Ground 1—misapplication of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004;
• Ground 2—failure properly to deal with:
(i) attacks/threats in 2018 and the corresponding relevance of paragraph 339K of the Rules,
(ii) the report by Foyez Uddin Ahmed, and
(iii) the criminal proceedings;
• Ground 3— failing to properly consider and make clear findings on Article 8 ECHR within and without the Rules.

11. Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor extended time and granted permission on Ground 2 only, it being “just about arguable” that the FTJ had not adequately addressed and made clear findings on in particular the claimed criminal proceedings (albeit he noted his “reservations” about aspects of the Mr Ahmed report and the changed political climate in Bangladesh).

12. At the error of law hearing before me, Mr Turner relied on Ground 2 and did not make any application to renew either of the other grounds.

13. He submitted that the FTJ failed to make clear findings on what happened in 2018, the FTJ’s treatment of paragraph 339K was inadequate, and the FTJ failed to properly appreciate and take into account Mr Ahmed’s expert analysis. He argued inter alia that, even if the FTJ accepted the threats in 2018, this should have affected the global credibility assessment and risk analysis, and that the approach to the expert was overly dismissive.

The Respondent’s Rule 24 response and submissions before me

14. In the Rule 24 response the Respondent contended there was no material error, arguing that the FTJ gave adequate reasons for criticisms of the report from Mr Ahmed and expressly addressed the country position under the December 2024 CPIN and the interim government. The Respondent says it was open to the FTJ to conclude there would be sufficient protection, or alternatively internal relocation.

15. Mrs Nolan adopted those submissions at the hearing. She argued the FTJ accepted MS’s student political activity and that he had been subject to adverse interest, but the core issue was future risk; the FTJ then made a sufficiency of protection finding which was reasonably open to them based on up‑to‑date CPIN evidence. As to the complaints made about the findings of fact surrounding what happened in 2018, she submitted that the arguments were no more than a demand for “reasons‑for‑reasons”.

Legal principles

16. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

Error of Law Analysis

17. Complaint was made in the grounds that at paragraph 23, the FTJ mentioned that MS had been unaware of the newspaper report until late 2024 or early 2025 when it was sent to him; but in fact, MS did not mention that he was unaware of the newspaper report. This is argued to be contrary to the evidence before the FTJ when looked considered alongside paragraphs 23 and 25 of MS’s witness statement. I note that no request has been made for the transcript of the hearing to establish that, what the FTJ wrote at paragraph 23 was wrong:

“23… On or about 16 December 2020 it was reported that he was involved in a political meeting in Sunamganj which became violent, and he was one of several people wanted by the police as a result. He claims to have been unaware of the newspaper report until late 2024 or early 2025 when it was sent to him; he denies being present at the event.”

18. I also note that there is no challenge to what the FTJ recorded MS as saying at paragraph 22:

“22. The Appellant states that he had intended to return to Bangladesh on completion of his studies, in accordance with the terms of his visa; however, he claims that after he arrived he became aware that the threat against him had become more serious. He said he was not able to concentrate on his studies. He said the threats made in Bangladesh in 2018 were not genuine because there was no case against him. He said he continued studying until after he claimed asylum.”

19. The FTJ was I am satisfied rationally entitled to characterise MS’s case as being that he was unaware of many of the details about his case for a very considerable period. In his witness statement MS stated:

“23. I did not know many details about the case. I was informed about this case by one of my colleagues, who is also a member of the JCD. The case was about violence and the destruction of public property. The case was lodged against me to harass me and stop me from protesting against the current regime.

24. I am sure that if I return to Bangladesh, the police and other security officials in Bangladesh will arrest me. Then, they will torture me and kill me because of my political involvement with BNP and JCD.

25. I provided supporting documents including the charge sheet and newspaper articles to the Home Office following my asylum interview. The Learned Judge will note my name is mentioned in the chargesheet and also the newspaper article mentions that a case has been lodged against me.”

20. In his witness statement MS did not volunteer when he first became aware of the 2020 newspaper article. I find it is more probable that MS was asked about this and gave the evidence that the FTJ recorded, rather than the FTJ simply recording something specific that MS never said out of nowhere especially given MS did not mention the newspaper article in his interview on 27 November 2023; but, even if I am wrong about that, given the FTJ’s other findings I am, not persuaded that this would have been material to the outcome.

21. Weighing the competing arguments, and looking at the decision as a whole, I find that the FTJ did adequately engage with the account of the 2018 incident. The FTJ accepted that it happened at paragraph 24, where the FTJ made findings that were reasonably open to them on MS’s narrative of threats, and of his intentions when entering the UK on a student route. At paragraph 39, the FTJ expressly recorded being satisfied that MS was involved in student politics until he left in 2021, and that MS used the student route as an expedient method to travel, and that he left knowing he would not return because of adverse interest for his political activity—yet found that this undermined his broader credibility claims. That in my judgment was consistent with the findings at paragraph 24:

“I do not find it credible that the Appellant was unaware of threats to his safety up to the date on which he applied for the visa; I do not accept as credible his claim that the threats were not genuine; I find that when he entered UK he did not intend to return to Bangladesh because of the existing threats he claims were made; I do not find it credible that he was unaware of the allegations regarding the incident in December 2020.”

22. The FTJ was rationally entitled to accept elements of MS’s political activity, and that he had received adverse interest, whilst also making a finding about embellishment of his subjective fear claim and MS’s asserted ignorance of the December 2020 allegations.

23. The fact the FTJ did not expressly quote paragraph 339K does not, in my judgement, that the FTJ was unaware of it, or denote a failure to take past persecution into account, where, as here, the FTJ’s decision expressly grappled with, and accepted, adverse interest in the past, as well as the current country conditions and sufficiency of protection.

24. In my judgement the FTJ was reasonably entitled on the evidence to set out specific serious shortcomings in the report of Mr Ahmed (in particular):

(i) There was no recognition of any duty to the Tribunal;
(ii) It was presented as advice to MS (see pages 372 and 380 CB);
(iii) Lack of identification of what documents were considered in preparing the report;
(iv) Reliance on some unverified sources, such as Wikipedia;
(v) No comment upon or any assessment of authenticity of the police/court documents relied upon by MS (indeed the FTJ later made a finding at paragraph 37 that Mr Ahmed did not see them);

I do consider that it was not open to the FTJ to hold against Mr Ahmed a lack of engagement with the December 2024 CPIN because that had not been published at the point in time he wrote the report. However, I am not persuaded that that being factored out of the consideration would have materially affected the FTJ giving what was plainly very limited weight to the report, or moreover that it would have led to a different conclusion on the FTJ’s ultimate finding that sufficiency of protection was now available. The Tribunal had before it the Respondent’s supplementary review which at paragraph 8 pointed to numerous cases being withdrawn, as well as the December 2024 CPIN. Despite being asked to opine on the likelihood of review or withdrawal of the politically motivated cases, Mr Ahmed’s analysis at paragraphs 16–19 could reasonably and fairly be characterised as speculative and, given the deficiencies elsewhere in his report, set out above, insufficiently reliable.

25. In my judgment the FTJ’s determination, when read as a whole, demonstrates that the FTJ was prepared to accept, or at the very least not rule out, that there were proceedings that had been lodged against MS, however what the FTJ found was seriously lacking was whether there was anything beyond undue speculation that this would put MS at risk of persecution, given the significant change in the political climate in Bangladesh and the country information evidence before the FTJ.

26. I am satisfied that the FTJ set out and engaged with the country information evidence and the December 2024 CPIN. The FTJ concluded that, even taking MS’s history at its highest, there would be effective state protection, and that in any event internal relocation to major urban centres would be reasonable and effective. Those findings were, I find, properly anchored to the country information evidence and were in my judgement rationally open to the FTJ.

27. There was sufficient evidence before the FTJ to justify the conclusion that there would now be sufficiency of protection for MS. The December 2024 CPIN and other evidence disclosed that the interim government was undertaking major structural reforms within the police service, including the forced retirement, reinstatement or transfer of officers loyal to the Awami League, the replacement of officers implicated in abuses, and the arrests of senior figures (see paragraph 4.1.4). It further stated that both the Inspector General of Police and the Head of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) were replaced shortly after the interim government assumed office. The CPIN also confirmed that these reforms extended to the judiciary. The Chief Justice, who resigned following the protest period, was replaced, and approximately 300 lower‑court judges had been transferred or promoted, a measure intended de-politicise the judiciary. A senior judge told the International Crisis Group that the judiciary no longer experienced the political pressure that had existed previously. It is relevant that the CPIN disclosed that the interim government had also established six formal reform commissions, tasked with reviewing and restructuring the police, judiciary, election system, public administration, Anti‑Corruption Commission, and the constitution (see paragraphs 3.1.12; 11.3.7). In addition, it disclosed that the interim government had released thousands of prisoners, including those detained during the protests and longer‑term political detainees, and had signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (see paragraphs 3.1.12; 11.3.3). the CPIN did disclose that law‑and‑order capacity did initially weaken during the transition, but it set out that police stations were now increasingly manned and functional, and that the broader criminal justice system was operating, though still affected by structural weaknesses relating to corruption and infrastructure (see paragraph 4.1.5).

28. To succeed on his appeal, MS had to show that there was a 'real risk' of harm, or of a breach of Convention rights. While I accept that the FTJ did not refer to Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 271, or MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216, I am not able to accept that the FTJ was not aware of those cases, because the self-directions at paragraphs 11-12 of the determination and conclusions demonstrate that the FTJ was approaching the case in line with them; and in my judgment the decision when looked at in totality does not justify a conclusion that the FTJ departed from them. The FTJ’s assessment at paragraph 40 that the evidence of risks was uncertain, and that the actual risk was speculative must be seen in the context of the FTJ’s wider factual findings and the FTJ’s assessment of the country information evidence. I remind myself that in SR (Iran) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 460 it was stated:

“9. There is nothing wrong with the differential levels of proof or disproof of primary facts found by the tribunal. In §41, for example, they find it likely that the appellant would continue with Christian communion in Iran and that this would bring her to the attention of the authorities, but they do not accept that she would bear witness to her friends. In §46 they find that the fact that her parents are pensioners does not necessarily mean that they would be unable to protect her economically from persecution. The law does not demand, at least in this field, that each finding of fact, whatever its degree of certainty or uncertainty, be fitted into a single matrix of risk. The fact-finder's task is, to the extent made possible by the evidence, to find facts, and some facts are more certain than others. It would have been as unjust to the appellant to treat as mere possibilities things which, on the AIT's findings, were highly likely as it would have been to the respondent to treat possibilities of hardship as probabilities.

10. The critical adjudicative task is to assemble these findings into an evaluation which answers the question posed by law. In asylum and human rights claims, that is the question of real risk, and it is at the point of decision and not sooner that it arises.”

29. The December 2024 CPIN referred to by the FTJ disclosed that during the period of unrest, (i.e. after MS’s case had been lodged against him), very large numbers of criminal cases were filed, including over 450,000 “unknown persons” and 2,000 identified suspects registered across 286 cases in Dhaka alone (see paragraph 3.1.9). However, the CPIN stated that the progress of these cases was unknown, stating that it was unclear how many were being, or would be, prosecuted (see paragraphs 3.1.9; 4.1.6). The CPIN noted that many cases were filed for political reasons or to settle personal scores, taking advantage of Bangladeshi law permitting individuals to lodge cases directly with the police (see paragraph 4.1.6). It recorded that although the interim government could not legally prevent such filings, there was no evidence that those cases were actively being taken forward, and their future progression remains uncertain (see paragraph 4.1.6). In assessing risk, the CPIN stated that leaders, members and supporters of the BNP and its student wing (JCD) were, in general, not at risk of persecution or serious harm from the state under the interim government, in contrast to high‑profile AL politicians, who were now the subject of legitimate prosecution efforts relating to events under the former administration (see paragraphs 3.1.1–3.1.3). In my judgment, this is not a case where the FTJ impermissibly curtailed reasonable speculation. Rather, it is to be characterised as a finding that MS had not shown a real, as opposed to a fanciful, risk, given the prolonged inactivity of the case, his relatively junior position, the marked changes in the political landscape, the reforms within the justice system, and the discontinuation of a significant number of politically motivated cases coupled with the release of many detainees.

30. Here, the FTJ found that the criminal case relied upon against MS had been inactive since 2021, with no subsequent investigative or prosecutorial activity (see paragraph 38). In my judgment, when seen in the context of the CPIN’s analysis, the FTJ was entitled to find in essence that the risk was too speculative and not made out. There was evidence in the CPIN showing the non‑pursuit or uncertain progress of a very large number of politically‑registered cases, and the absence of state hostility towards BNP/JCD rank‑and‑file under the interim government. The FTJ was entitled, looking at the case holistically, to find that the evidence did not demonstrate any real risk that MS’s historical case would now be revived or pursued. Instead, what was in the main reflected in the country information evidence before the FTJ was increasing accountability for senior AL figures and the de‑politicisation of the criminal justice system, rather than the prosecution of low‑level opposition activists.

31. Even if the FTJ ought to have found that there was a real risk of the criminal case against MS being revived, I am not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that he faced persecution or serious harm, i.e. that he was facing injustice rather than justice, in the current political climate. Facing being arrested on a warrant or a potential prosecution is not necessarily the same as facing persecution. I remind myself that in Muzafar Iqbal v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 02239, the Tribunal summarised how asylum claim based on a fear of prosecution amounting to persecution should be dealt with. Although it is not the purpose of the asylum determination process to judge guilt or innocence, nonetheless a factual evaluation as to whether there is a real risk that the claimant faces injustice rather than justice must be made. Whether prosecution amounts to persecution is a question of fact, and all relevant circumstances must be considered on a case-by-case basis. The criminal justice process in the country of origin must be looked at as a whole, with possible harms considered cumulatively and not separately. Whether prosecution amounts to persecution must be analysed by reference to international human rights norms. Prosecution does not amount to persecution unless likely failures in the fair trial process go beyond shortcomings and pose a threat to the very existence of the right to a fair trial. When considering whether there is a general risk of persecution to any person subjected to the criminal law process in a given country, it is important to establish the scale of relevant human rights violations, particularly in relation to mistreatment in detention and the right to a fair trial, and, using Article 3 ECHR as a benchmark, it is useful to ask whether the level of human rights abuse rise to the level of “consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” This approach of the Tribunal in Iqbal (above) was approved by the Court of Appeal in Hariri v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 807 and Batayav v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1489 (with Sedley LJ sounding a note of caution to the effect that the need to show a “consistent pattern” of human rights violations was “intended to elucidate the jurisprudential concept of real risk, not to replace it.”).

32. Here, the evidence before the FTJ was that MS had access to a lawyer, and family support, if he returned to Bangladesh. The lawyer’s evidence did not suggest he could not, in the presence of his client, make an application to the court to have the charges against him dismissed on the basis that the allegations were false and politically motivated, or, if that did not succeed, help him defend them at trial. The evidence before the FTJ did not disclose whether MS would be denied bail if arrested on the warrant or how long he would be held in pre-trial detention, but in any event, it was held in SH (prison conditions) Bangladesh CG [2008] UKAIT 00076 that prison conditions in Bangladesh, at least for ordinary prisoners, do not violate Article 3 ECHR. Here, given the Awami League’s fall from power, were he detained MS would be seen an “ordinary” prisoner rather than the political enemy of those prosecuting him. Given the country information evidence before the FTJ, had the FTJ made a finding that there was a real risk of the criminal case being revived, the FTJ would have been constrained to find that the changes to the criminal justice system and the judiciary meant that MS had failed to show that he faced a real risk of injustice rather than justice.

33. The situation before the FTJ was that MS’s case had been dormant for some years, which was consistent with the CPIN’s position that BNP and JCD members were generally no longer at risk from the state, and in circumstances in which the focus of criminal proceedings had very much shifted to former Awami League officials. And, even if the case against MS were revived, he had access to a lawyer who could help him in ensuring it was justly determined. I am satisfied that the FTJ was rationally entitled to make a finding that MS had not established a real risk that the historic allegation against him would be pursued in a manner amounting to persecution or serious harm, nor that he faced a real risk of Article 3 ill‑treatment.

34. As set out in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC), a judge need not rehearse every detail provided that key conflicts are resolved with clear reasons enabling the parties to understand why they have won or lost. I am satisfied that the FTJ did that. For the reasons set out above nothing raised under Ground 2 demonstrates a material error of law. The decision was open to the FTJ on the evidence, and the reasoning on the expert and documentary evidence, the country information evidence, on risk on return and sufficiency of protection were adequately explained.

Notice of Decision

The decision does not contain a material error of law.

The appeal is dismissed.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11.2.26