Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003398

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66208/2023
LP/10281/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

GKA (IRAQ)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Hussain, of Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. GKA is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, aged 32, who appeals with permission granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) dated 10 June 2025 (“the decision”) to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the Respondent to refuse his further submissions protection claim on 7 December 2023 (“the refusal letter”).
2. GKA says, inter alia, that he fears persecution in Iraq on the basis of a fear of becoming a victim of a blood feud. This issue and the issue of redocumentation was considered in two previous FTT appeals in which inter alia he was not found to be credible. GKA still relies on that aspect of his claim but now also asserts that he has been politically active in the UK. He has said that from July 2023 until March 2025 he was involved with an organisation called DAKOK which is opposed to the Kurdish and Iraqi government, and that he helped to organise demonstrations, recruited people, promoted events and publicly spoke at political events on 5 May and 16 October 2024. He still says he is not in contact with any family members in Iraq and does not have his identity documents and it is not possible for him to obtain any. Since April 2025 he has said he was involved in an organisation called Regay Azadi and was interviewed at a demonstration on 4 May 2025, which was broadcast by an Iraqi based news agency, Zoom. He also says he was present at a demonstration out of the Iraqi embassy on 19th May 2025 and delivered a speech.
3. The Respondent’s position in this appeal was that GKA had been found not credible regarding the blood feud and redocumentation at his previous appeals, and he had not raised sur place activities then. It was argued that his sur place activities were an embellishment to try to bolster his claim and his views were said to be not genuinely held. The Respondent also queried the reliability of the social media evidence and whether, if it was reliable, it would have come to the attention of the authorities. The Respondent disputed the extent to which DAKOK could be said to be political; and still did not accept that GKA was unable to contact his family or redocument.
The decision
4. In the decision the FTJ set out her findings at paragraphs 13-30, (inter alia):
a. She accepted at [18] that GKA had an active Facebook account, on which he had posted and not concealed his political views which she accepted could be considered critical of the “state authorities”. She accepted that he had been actively involved with DAKOK and Regay Azadi, that he had helped at demonstrations including crowd control, maintaining security and with basic organisation.
b. At [19] she accepted that she had been shown country information evidence that demonstrators within Iraq were targeted, and faced arrest and ill-treatment, but she did not accept that GKA had shown that the authorities in Iraq or the IKR would have any knowledge about his activities in the UK or that he had been critical of the “state authorities”.
c. She did accept, at [20], that GKA had spoken on camera and shared his views with both Zoom and BK4, but said that he had failed to say where either of those channels broadcast their material, whether it was broadcast on television or online, or what their reach was. She did not accept that GKA appearing on those TV channels would give rise to a risk on return.
d. At [21] she said that GKA had failed to show that the threats he claimed to have received via Facebook had come from the Iraqi authorities and he had not received any similar threats for the last few years. She did accept, at [22], that it was likely that a fellow Facebook user (a number “8” appears in the text but I find that must be a dictation slip) disagreed with his views and made “unhelpful and threatening” comments towards him “suggesting that he stopped expressing his views”. She found that if GKA was concerned about that particular person, he could seek the assistance of the state authorities.
e. At [23] the FTJ considered that GKA’s immigration history impacted upon his credibility. At [24] she found that he had failed to establish that he had a fear based on his Convention reason or that it would be reasonably likely he would face persecution for that Convention reason. At [25] she found that it was likely he maintained contact with his family and in light of the previous findings from 2017 and 2022 he could contact them who could help him with redocumentation.
Grounds of appeal and submissions
5. The application for permission argued, firstly, that the FTJ materially erred at paragraph 20 of the decision by making her finding on whether or not appearing on the TV channels would give rise to a risk on return, without having regard to relevant evidence, in particular: a witness statement from GKA dated 30 May 2025; information contained within a printout of the Facebook profile of Zoom News; information on Zoom’s website, Instagram, and TikTok; and information regarding the number of followers for BK4.
6. The grounds next argued that the FTJ placed an unrealistic evidential burden on GKA, in circumstances where she appeared to have accepted that those critical of the authorities in Iraq or the IKR would face adverse attention. It was argued that the FTJ imposed a requirement on him to produce affirmative evidence of the covert tactics of the authorities which would not have been possible or realistic.
7. The grounds also argued that the FTJ failed to consider how GKA would act upon return to Iraq, in circumstances where the FTJ had accepted his political activity and found him to be credible in his political views.
8. The Respondent argues in her Rule 24 response that the FTJ did not simply focus on the reach of the television channels but examined the absence of clear evidence as to how and where the specific material was broadcast. The Respondent asserts that the passages in the supplementary bundle, said in the grounds to demonstrate the reach of the television channels, was not sufficiently detailed, and it was not for the FTJ to make assumptions on it, rather it was for the Appellant to direct the FTJ specifically to what the information meant, nor was there evidence to show that “Nilesat” and “Yahsat” were broadcast in Iraq. The Respondent argued that the country information evidence failed to disclose evidence of the monitoring of Iraqi nationals’ overseas activities; and that the FTJ was entitled to find that GKA had failed to establish his sur place activities would give rise to risk on return. The Respondent argues that it was reasonable for the FTJ to find that there was insufficient evidence of any real risk of identification by the Iraqi or Kurdish authorities, and that her approach was consistent with HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31, because she assessed the risk arising from the activities of the Appellant, not merely the existence of the activities themselves.
9. The Respondent asserts that the FTJ was entitled to find that she was not satisfied that the evidence showed any realistic prospect of identification or targeting, which was not imposing an unrealistic evidential burden on the Appellant, and the Appellant had failed to provide any expert report on the Iraqi state’s capabilities or methods of monitoring activities of its citizens abroad.
10. The Respondent also argues that the way in which the Appellant would act upon return to Iraq (i.e. the HJ (Iran) point) was not an issue for consideration at the hearing before the FTJ.
11. At the error of law hearing before me both parties relied upon and amplified their respective arguments, and I have considered their submissions with care, along with all of the material before me.
Legal principles
12. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
13. At paragraph 55 of QY (Vietnam) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 607, Dingemans LJ said:
“It was also common ground that appeal courts should not interfere with judgments by trial judges just because the appellate court takes a different view of the facts. Findings of fact made by primary fact finders should not be set aside by the appellate court, unless the appellate court is bound to act. The trial judge should "give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties, and if need be [the appellate court] the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision", see Fage at paragraph 115. There is no duty to refer to every argument of counsel, and the mere fact that a judge does not mention a piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it, see Volpi at paragraph 57. These principles apply to the FTT and Upper Tribunal, see generally Terzaghi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm AR 461, particularly given that rights of appeal from the FTT to the Upper Tribunal are limited to errors of law. Findings of fact made by FTT judges should not readily be set aside.”
Analysis
14. It is relevant that in YB (Eritrea) [2008] EWCA Civ 360, Sedley LJ said at [18]:
" … the tribunal, while accepting that the Appellant's political activity in this country was genuine, were not prepared to accept in the absence of positive evidence that the Eritrean authorities had 'the means and the inclination' to monitor such activities as a demonstration outside their embassy, or that they would be able to identify the Appellant from photographs of the demonstration. In my judgment, and without disrespect to what is a specialist tribunal, this is a finding which risks losing contact with reality. Where, as here, the tribunal has objective evidence which 'paints a bleak picture of the suppression of political opponents' by a named government, it requires little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility — and perhaps more — that its foreign legations not only film or photograph their nationals who demonstrate in public against the regime but have informers among expatriate oppositionist organisations who can name the people who are filmed or photographed. Similarly, it does not require affirmative evidence to establish a probability that the intelligence services of such states monitor the internet for information about oppositionist groups. The real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. If, for example, any information reaching the embassy is likely to be that the claimant identified in a photograph is a hanger-on with no real commitment to the oppositionist cause, that will go directly to the issue flagged up by art 4(3)(d) of the [Qualification] Directive [i.e. whether the activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned]."
15. In EM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 1294 Patten LJ noted at [27] that the real issue was "…whether the Appellant's activities were such as to have come to the attention of the CIO [Zimbabwean intelligence] in this way", and that, while EM had not produced positive evidence that her activities were known to the regime, she had argued that there was country guidance about the high level of monitoring and that this sufficed, stating:
"The [country] guidance in HS requires the Tribunal to take into account that there is active scrutiny by the CIO of MDC activities in the UK. But it goes too far to say that that creates a presumption that the system of monitoring is somehow foolproof. In most cases …. the issue of disclosure will be a matter of inference and degree. There will rarely, if ever, be case-specific evidence as to whether the Appellant's activities are known to the CIO and it will therefore normally be unrealistic to attempt to divorce the issue of whether those activities have become known to the regime from the question of whether they would be of any real concern to it. The more significant the political activity, the more likely that it will become apparent and therefore be of interest to those monitoring it."
16. In TM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 916, Elias LJ said:
"27. A further issue with respect to sur place activities is whether they are likely to be known to the authorities in the home state. It is not necessary, and indeed would usually be impossible, for the claimant to produce direct evidence that the authorities have such knowledge. It may depend upon the rigour with which the state seeks to police and stamp out dissident or opposition conduct. In YB (Eritrea), Sedley LJ observed (para 18): …
28. In HS, still extant country guidance case relating to Zimbabwe, the AIT recognised that the CIO send infiltrators into the UK to discover who is opposing the regime, and spent considerable resources on that objective (para 104).
29. That is not to say, however, that relatively minor sur place activities will necessarily be known to the Zimbabwe authorities. In EM (Zimbabwe) … one of the issues considered by the Court of Appeal was whether the authorities in Zimbabwe would necessarily become aware of low level sur place activities. This court held that notwithstanding the guidance given in HS that there was careful scrutiny of opposition activities in the UK, it did not follow that the only reasonable inference was that such low level activities would be likely to be known to the authorities. Patten LJ … observed (paras 28-29): …
30. This is the principle which we must apply when reviewing these AIT decisions. It means that a conclusion by an AIT that low level sur place political activity is likely to be not known to the authorities in Zimbabwe will be difficult to challenge."
17. In WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894, WAS relied on sur place activities on behalf of a Pakistani opposition group (MQM-L) led by “AH”, in London. There was evidence about MQM-L before the UT, including an expert report on to what extent the Pakistani authorities were likely to be aware of its activities, and evidence that the seniority of an MQM-L member was not relevant to risk. There was evidence that the authorities wanted to eliminate AH and his powerbase, and background evidence as to the likelihood of security forces monitoring MQM-L on the ground. The UT did not accept that WAS would be at risk mainly because: (i) it rejected expert evidence that there was a real risk that members of the group would become informers to ingratiate themselves, and that those who posted on social media would be identified by them; (ii) there was insufficient evidence to make findings on "the level and mechanics of" monitoring in the UK; and (iii) while the security services could detect social media posts, they had insufficient resources or capacity to detect all relevant posts, let alone to identify those responsible. In that context Elisabeth Laing LJ said:
"84. I paraphrase a question which Phillips LJ asked Mr Holborn in argument, 'What evidence did the UT expect?' It is very improbable that there would be any direct evidence of covert activity by the Pakistani authorities, whether it consisted of monitoring demonstrations, meetings and other activities, monitoring social media, or the use of spies or informers. I do not consider that Sedley LJ was suggesting, in paragraph 18 of YB (Eritrea), that a tribunal must infer successful covert activity by a foreign state in the circumstances which he described. He was, nevertheless, making a common-sense point, which is that a tribunal cannot be criticised if it is prepared to infer successful covert activity on the basis of limited direct evidence. Those observations have even more force in the light of the great changes since 2008 in the sophistication of such methods, in the availability of electronic evidence of all sorts, and in the ease of their transmission. To give one obvious example, which requires no insight into the covert methods which might be available to states, it is very easy for an apparently casual observer of any scene to collect a mass of photographs and/or recordings on his phone, without drawing any adverse attention to himself, and then to send them anywhere in the world.
85. I consider that, on this aspect of the case, the UT erred in law by losing sight of the fact that direct evidence about 'the level of and the mechanics of monitoring' in the United Kingdom is unlikely to be available to an asylum claimant or to a dissident organisation, and by imposing too demanding a standard of proof on A. … "
18. In MH (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 688 Arnold LJ stated, after having referenced the above authorities:
“37. It can be seen from the cases considered above that the FTT (and the Upper Tribunal if remaking an FTT decision) must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities. It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. Accordingly, tribunals are not merely entitled, but required, to use their common sense.
38. As Singh LJ pointed out during the course of argument, however, there are limits to this. As Elisabeth Laing LJ observed in the passage I have quoted from WAS (Pakistan), a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the ease with which persons attending a demonstration can be photographed and filmed and the resulting photographs and films transmitted abroad. Similarly, a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that publicly-accessible websites and social media postings can readily be monitored by electronic means. Beyond the fact that it is generally understood that targeted monitoring is technically easier, but more resource-intensive, than bulk monitoring, however, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter that requires expert evidence, not least because (i) states differ in their capabilities and (ii) such capabilities change over time.
39. Furthermore, as Patten LJ made clear in EM (Zimbabawe), the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and, if not, whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest to the regime. To take a simple example, if there is a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, then there is a considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing a slogan hostile to the government and a person who stands at the back with no placard: it is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noticed by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance and monitoring than the latter.
40. What an applicant for asylum can be expected to produce is evidence to put news media coverage, social media posts and the like into context. To give an illustration from the present case, one of the newspaper articles relied upon by the Appellant which we were shown in the course of argument is an article from Daily Nayadiganta published online on 30 November 2022 headlined (in the English translation) "Full Committee of UK Zia Parishad formed" which reports that an 81-member committee has been formed. The Appellant's case is that he is named in the article. Leaving aside an issue raised by the Upper Tribunal as to whether the person named in the article is the Appellant, Judge Cary was correct to draw attention to the absence of any evidence as to the aims and activities of ZP (see paragraph 16 above). Counsel for the Appellant tried to repair this omission by relying upon a paragraph from another online article from a different source dated 13 December 2022, but it does not appear that Judge Cary's attention was drawn to the paragraph in question, and in any event this is no substitute for first-hand evidence from the Appellant or another witness.”
19. In my judgment, carefully evaluating the competing arguments on both sides, the FTJ did materially err in a number of respects.
20. It is relevant that in GKA’s case, the FTJ stated at [19]:
“However, although Mr Hussain has directed me to country evidence to confirm that demonstrators within Iraq are targeted, they face arrest and ill treatment, the Appellant has failed to show that the authorities in Iraq or the IKR would have any knowledge about his activities in the UK. He has not shown that they monitor or have any means of discovering what activities returnees have been involved in abroad. I am therefore not satisfied the Appellant has shown that the Iraqi authorities would have any knowledge on return that the Appellant has engaged in any political activities or has been critical of the state authorities. Unlike other countries there is no supporting evidence before me to establish that the authorities in Iraq monitor internet activity or any other activities in the UK. Accordingly, I am not satisfied the Appellant has shown a risk will arise from his sur place activities in the UK.”
[emphasis added]
21. By phrasing things the way she did (in the underlined parts above) the FTJ gave the impression that she was imposing a sine qua non requirement on the Appellant to produce affirmative evidence of the mechanics of monitoring, which was, in my judgment the imposition of an unfair and unrealistic evidential burden, and a material error of law, which infects her wider findings on risk on return.
22. It is also argued that the FTJ, having found that GKA had spoken on camera and shared his political opinions with both Zoom and BK4, materially erred when she stated at [20] that
“the Appellant has failed to state where either of these channels broadcast their material. Whether it is broadcast on national television or simply online. What their reach is and whether it is even broadcast within Iraq. I note BK4 states it has 1.9 K YouTube subscribers however no other details are provided. In their letter they have provided no details about they reach or about their broadcast. Accordingly, I do not find the Appellant has shown that appearing on these TV channels will give rise to a risk on return.”
[emphasis added]
While it was argued in the grounds that, at pages 31-34 of supplementary bundle 3, the Zoom website printout confirmed at page 34 that ‘Zoom News is a Kurdish News channel based in Sulaimani and Baghdad', Mr Hussain in submissions was unable to find where it said this on those pages (or elsewhere) in the composite bundle; and nor can I. However, I do note that in GKA’s statement from 30 May 2025, at paragraph 3 (see page 493 of the 902-page composite bundle), the Appellant said, “On Facebook, where Zoom has over 400K followers and on TikTok, with over 300K followers and millions of likes. I was really pleased to have such great exposure for Regay Azadi, both in Iraq, Kurdistan and worldwide”. GKA did therefore give some evidence as to which regions the Zoom channel was available, the extent to which it was televised or online (he said it was online in that part of his evidence), and what he said was their reach. The FTJ in my judgement was mistaken to state that GKA had not stated anything about the matters she cited at [20] of the decision. He had; and the FTJ should have assessed whether what he was saying was reliable and credible. Also, at page 27 of supplementary bundle 3 (see page 517 of the 902-page composite bundle), what was said to be a printout of Zoom News’ Facebook profile was before the FTJ, which gave a figure of “403K” followers - and “173K” likes. At page 35 of that bundle (page 525 of the composite bundle), what was said to be a printout from Zoom News’ Instagram gave a figure of “59.2K” followers. At page 37 what was said to be Zoom News’ TikTok appeared to give a figure of “311.6K” followers and “15.7M” likes. Further, at page 45 of that bundle (page 535 of the 902-page composite bundle), there was before the FTJ what was said to be the Facebook page of BK4 which purportedly gave a figure of “64K” followers on their Facebook account. The FTJ made no reference to this material or whether the information contained within it was reliable.
23. Also, I find that the FTJ materially erred in that, if it was the case that GKA was sincere in his protesting and political opinions, it was incumbent upon her to consider, in line with HJ (Iran), how he would behave upon return. The Respondent asserts that HJ (Iran) was not argued in the ASA, and that GKA did not explicitly state how he would behave if returned in terms of whether he would conceal his opinions (and whether he would do that to avoid persecution), or whether he would continue to engage (or try to) in political activity at a similar level. However, I observe
(i) it was GKA’s case that his political opinions and activities were sincerely undertaken, and, although the FTJ made some adverse credibility findings, she appeared not to take issue with that; and
(ii) the further submissions letter on behalf of GKA dated 25 September 2023, (see pages 660-661 of the 902-page composite bundle), cited RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 as authority for the proposition that
“Nobody should be forced to have or express a political opinion in which he does not believe. He should not be required to dissemble on pain of persecution. Refugee law does not require a person to express false support for an oppressive regime, any more than it requires an agnostic to pretend to be a religious believer in order to avoid persecution... The argument advanced by Mr Swift bears a striking resemblance to the Secretary of State's contention in HJ (Iran) that the individuals in that case would only have a well-founded fear of persecution if the concealment of their sexual orientation would not be "reasonably tolerable" to them. This contention was rejected on the grounds that (i) it was unprincipled and un/air to determine refugee status by reference to the individual’s strength of feeling about his protected characteristic (paras 29 and 121) and (ii) there was no yardstick by which the tolerability of the experience could be measured (paras 80 and 122).”
(iii) the solicitors, having cited this in their letter, argued “As has been stated the Appellant does have a significant political profile in this matter and accordingly due to his political opinion, he will be at risk on return to his home country.”
(iv) The Respondent herself had considered and dealt with the HJ (Iran) issue - albeit she did not accept GKA was at risk – at paragraphs 40-41 of the refusal letter (see pages 608-609 of the composite bundle).
In those circumstances, the HJ (Iran) principle was before the FTJ, and I find that it was incumbent upon her to make findings upon it, if she accepted GKA genuinely held the political opinions he claimed, because it was capable of being highly relevant to risk. One of the key issues the FTJ needed to resolve with clarity and adequate reasoning was whether GKA genuinely held his political opinions or not.
24. If GKA’s sur place activities were not undertaken sincerely – i.e. if GKA did not sincerely hold the political opinions he claimed and was just taking part in a performance to bolster his claim - then (subject to the wider risk assessment and the principles in Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000), on the HJ (Iran) point it followed that there would be no breach of the Convention to expect him to delete his social media accounts, and upon returned he would not be required to suppress any genuinely held characteristic that he ought not to be required to suppress.
25. The FTJ accepted GKA had posted online, and that he had not concealed “his political views”, which on the face of it appeared to be an acceptance that they were genuine – i.e. that the views were his - but she did not explain how she arrived that that conclusion in sufficient detail given the principal controversial issues delineated before her. The findings made by the FTJ at [18], regarding the extent to which GKA’s opinions were genuinely held, were not adequate, in my judgment, in circumstances where
(i) the Respondent at paragraphs 12-19 of her review had taken clear issue with the sincerity of the claimed beliefs,
(ii) the FTJ noted previous adverse credibility findings at the two prior appeals,
(iii) the FTJ made her own finding at [23] that GKA’s credibility had been “impacted”, (but did not set out precisely how), and
(iv) the FTJ made her own findings (some of which, for reasons set out above, were flawed due to not having regard to relevant evidence) regarding the social media evidence not putting GKA at risk.
In those circumstances, and in particular given what the Respondent argued at paragraphs 16-18 of the review, the FTJ ought to have more thoroughly assessed the social media evidence in accordance with the principles in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC).
26. Because of this, the FTJ’s reasoning was not adequate, and contains errors of law which, in my judgement, were material to the outcome of the appeal.
Disposal
27. At the hearing I canvassed the views of the parties as to the nature and venue of any remaking. The parties agreed that this was partially dependent on the extent to which any fact-finding should be preserved, and whether there was a need for more detailed fact-finding.
28. In my judgment, this is not a case where I can simply re-make the decision for myself, without hearing evidence, because there must be significant fact finding undertaken regarding the reliability of the Appellant’s assertions in his statement as to the reach of the TV channels he states broadcast his political opinions, the extent to which the social media evidence is reliable, and his sur place activities in general. I have not had the benefit of seeing and hearing GKA give evidence. These issues must be considered in the round, and they are relevant to the wider credibility of GKA, which was in issue in relation to the sincerity of his political beliefs, as well as more broadly.
29. Applying the principles in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the Appellant was deprived of fair consideration of this protection claim appeal. I have decided that, given the nature and extent of the errors of law, the matter must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because there remains significant fact finding which must be made.
30. As set out above, I have considered whether it is right that the FTJ’s findings on sur place activity should be preserved before the next FTT judge. I have borne in mind what was said by the then President, Lane J, in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), and I have concluded that that would be inappropriate in circumstances where the analysis of the Appellant’s sur place activity, his motivations, how he would act on return, and the extent of risk arising from his activities have been found wanting in a number of respects as set out above. I have reached the conclusion that none of the positive credibility findings can be safely and fairly preserved. In my judgment, it would be artificial, unfair and impractical to try to ‘ring-fence’ parts of the FTJ’s assessment of the Appellant’s account, given the scope of the enquiry which must now take place. It is in those circumstances that I direct that the appeal be remitted to the FTT for hearing de novo before a different judge. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and on that basis, I remit the appeal to the FTT.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8.12.25