Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003401

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57069/2024
LP/02239/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

AH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sowerby, Counsel instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant was granted anonymity. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue to anonymise these proceedings.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 June 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 05 March 2024 to refuse his asylum claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in the UK on a student visa in 2021 and claimed asylum on 09 November 2022. He claimed to be at risk of being killed and serious harm in Bangladesh from the Awami League (“AL”). He claimed to have been involved in the student wing of the BICS, namely the BJEI and that he was targeted by the AL as a result of his political involvement with the BICS. This included attempts to harm him and the making of false cases against him, in particular a case filed against him in November 2018. The Appellant left Bangladesh on a UK student visa and claimed asylum when he says that he realised that he was still being targeted in Bangladesh by the authorities. Further, the Appellant claimed that he has engaged in sur place activities and this would in addition be a reason that he would be targeted on return.
The Respondent’s decision
3. In decision dated 05 March 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s application made on 09 November 2022 for asylum.
4. Within the refusal letter, the respondent did not accept the material facts of the claim or that he was active as claimed and said that the political activity was low level and that the CPIN confirmed that such activity was not sufficient to cause the adverse attention of the authorities. The Respondent noted that the Appellant did not provide evidence of the claimed arrest warrant, charge sheet etc until 2 years after he made his claim and it was not accepted that the documents were reliable. The Respondent also relied on the changed political regime in Bangladesh and did not accept that the appellant was at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Bangladesh.
5. As regards Article 8, the respondent did not accept that he had family life with the sponsor or in any event was satisfied that the decision to refuse was proportionate under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.
6. In a review document dated 10 January 25, the grounds of refusal were maintained. The respondent noted the expert report relied upon but submitted that the report was created before the change in government in Bangladesh and averred that the country situation had materially changed.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appellant appealed to the First Tier Tribunal. The appeal came before the First Tier Tribunal Judge for full hearing on 04 June 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Soloman of Counsel and the respondent was represented by a Dr Kikugawa, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. The Judge heard submissions from both representatives.
8. The Judge refused the appellant’s appeal for the reasons set out in a decision dated 16 June 2025.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal on nine grounds. The first ground can be summarised as carrying out a credibility assessment before considering the documentary evidence relied upon in support of the appeal and described as ‘putting the cart before the horse’. Grounds 2-4 can be summarised as a failure to properly engage with documentation relied upon. Grounds 5-6 are an adequacy of reasons challenge. Ground 7 relates to a failure to consider parts of a CPIN referred to within submissions. Ground 8 can be summarised as an error of law in findings relating to plausibility and whether it is sufficient to meet the applicable threshold. Ground 9 pleads that the Judge failed to make a proper assessment of the sur place activities and evidence relevant to risk on return.
10. On 17 July 2025 the First Tier granted the appellant permission to appeal on grounds that it was arguable that the Judge had not given adequate reasons for rejecting the documents when considering the appellant’s account and the evidence of provenance and all of the grounds were said to be arguable.
11. The respondent opposed the appeal for the reasons set out in her response made pursuant to rule 24 of the Procedure Rules dated 30 July 2025.
12. The hearing on 11 December 2025 was conducted by hybrid format, with myself and the SPO attending at Field House and Mr Sowerby and the appellant and interpreter by CVP videolink. We all had the benefit of a composite appeal bundle made up of 543 pages.
13. I heard submissions from both representatives, Mr Sowerby and Mr Terrell.
14. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
15. I am not satisfied that the appellant’s first ground has been made out. The appellant’s first ground states that the Judge reached adverse credibility findings and then went on to evaluate the documentary evidence and rejected this evidence based on earlier adverse credibility findings. In deciding the first ground of appeal, I remind myself of the caselaw of QC (verification of documents: Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 wherein the Upper Tribunal confirmed that a Judge must start somewhere and how they go about the task of making their decision by reference to all the relevant evidence is a matter for them.
16. Having considered the decision as a whole, I do not accept that the Judge has carried out a credibility assessment without considering the documentary evidence. At paragraph 14 the Judge confirms that he has had regard to all of the written evidence “including the documentary evidence as well as the oral and written submissions of both parties.” Again at paragraph 20 the Judge confirms that he has assessed the documentary evidence “in round taking into account the other evidence provided by the appellant”. Whilst the assessment of the documentary evidence at paragraph 19 falls after the assessment of the other evidence at paragraphs 15-18, I do not accept that there is an overall credibility conclusion prior to his assessment of the documents at paragraph 19 of the decision. At paragraph 21 the Judge makes an overall credibility assessment of the appellant’s account and I do not accept that the Judge has ‘put the cart before the horse’ as claimed in Ground 1 or during submissions. A Judge has to start somewhere. The Judge assessed the evidence at paragraphs 15-18 but did not reach a credibility conclusion before his assessment of the documentary evidence at paragraph 19. The reasons provided are very clear and adequate. I cannot find that the Judge has erred in law as I do not accept that the Judge has carried out a credibility assessment without consideration of the documentary evidence or that inadequate reasons are provided.
17. In considering the remaining grounds of appeal I remind myself that a Judge is not required to set out every step of their reasoning and I remind myself of the principles governing the approach to decisions of the First-tier Tribunal that are set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. When it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out, as recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin at [50] and [51].
18. I also remind myself of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the SPT Practice Direction on Reasons for decisions dated 04 June 2024 which is consistent with the caselaw on sufficiency of reasons for decisions and states as follows:
5. Where reasons are given, they must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute. They must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. These fundamental principles apply to the tribunals as well as to the courts.
6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.
19. Grounds 2-4 claim that the Judge has failed to adequately consider, engage with and reach findings in relation to an advocates letter, a newspaper article and a letter from Nazrul Islam. I am not persuaded that the Judge has erred in law with regards to his consideration of the evidence in this appeal. At paragraph 16 the Judge gives clear reasons as to why only limited weight can be placed on the letter from Nazrul Isam and I do not accept that it was a finding that was not open to the Judge to make; the stated credentials within the letter are not independent confirmation of the role of the Nazrul Islam within the stated organisation. The Judge did not err in law in his assessment of the weight to be attached to this letter. Whilst no specific reference is made to the advocates letter or the newspaper article within the decision, I note that at paragraph 15 of the decision the Judge confirmed that he had had regards to all the written evidence including the documentary evidence provided and at paragraph 20 of the decision, the Judge makes clear that he has assessed the documentary evidence submitted for the appeal in the round taking into account the other evidence provided by the appellant and gives clear reasons as to why he doubts the authenticity particularly given that the provenance of the documents is unclear. These were findings that were open to the Judge to make on his assessment of all of the evidence. The Judge is not required to set out his findings in relation to each individual piece of evidence relied upon. I find that paragraphs 15 and 20 make clear that the Judge has engaged with and adequately considered all of the evidence relied upon and has made a clear finding as to why no weight was attached to the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant.
20. The reasons challenge set out within Ground 5 has not been made out as dealt with below. In relation to Ground 6, I accept Mr Terrell’s submission that the Judge did not make a specific finding that the appellant was a low level member of the BICS. What the Judge says is that he was not satisfied that the appellant had provided evidence that clearly indicated he was anything other than, at best, a low level member of BICS. In any event, even if such finding had been made, namely that he was a low level member of the BICS, I do not accept that a Judge, in making such finding, was required to set out reference to specific answers given by the appellant during his interview, as claimed at paragraph 5 of the grounds of appeal. At paragraph 15 of the decision, the Judge makes clear that he has read through the asylum interview record and had considered the refusal letter and rebuttal statement of the appellant and on assessing that evidence, the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had provided evidence that clearly indicated that he was anything other than, at best, a low level member of BICS. The Judge went on to provide even more reasons for his finding within the remaining part of paragraph 15 and I do not accept that the Judge has failed to provide adequate reasons for any findings made within paragraph 15.
21. Ground 6 states that the Judge found that being a low level member of the opposition is not enough to have put him at risk based on the country information and failed to give adequate reasons for this with reference to the background material. First, I do not accept that the Judge made such a finding. At paragraph 15 the Judge says “Indeed, it was also my view that the appellant’s answers were not sufficiently specific about his activities for the party to enable me to find that his involvement was more substantial than that of a low level member of the opposition which on the country information was not enough to put him at risk on return.” I am satisfied that the finding was about whether there was a risk on return and not whether low level supporters were previously subject to adverse treatment by the authorities. At paragraphs 18-21 the Judge has given clear findings as to why the appellant’s account about his past experiences in Bangladesh was not found to be credible and paragraphs 18-21 makes clear that this was based on an assessment of the documents and the oral and written evidence of the appellant. At paragraph 7(ii) the Judge sets out the submissions that he heard from the appellant’s representative regarding that the appellant did not need to show that he was a high profile member to attract the adverse attention of the authorities and I note that the Judge records that he had been referred to previous CPINs and a specific example of where a student with no particular political profile was adversely targeted by the authorities. I am not satisfied that it has been shown that the Judge has failed to take into account the submissions (which are specifically set out within the decision) in making his decision on whether to accept the appellant’s account of the adverse interest in him in Bangladesh.
22. Further, at paragraph 22 the Judge makes clear reference to the country information setting out the change in regime and gives clear reasons for his finding that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh. I do not accept that the Judge has failed to provide adequate reasons or has failed to consider material evidence/background information relied upon by the appellant. Further, I am not persuaded that the Judge has failed to properly evaluate the claim by considering external consistency as claimed within the grounds. The Judge has recorded the submissions and made clear that he has taken into account all of the evidence and he is not required to set out and specifically deal with each individual piece of evidence, whether individual or external background evidence. On reading the decision as a whole I am satisfied that the Judge had considered all of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and properly assessed all of the evidence in reaching his decision.
23. I find that there is no error of law in the Judge’s findings relating to plausibility at paragraph 17 of the decision. The Judge sets out that the appellant’s account about an incident is plausible but that that is not sufficient in itself to meet the evidential threshold given the nature of the injuries he sustained and the number of people attacking him. This is not an error of law and the Judge has not failed to take account of plausibility in evaluating credibility but has set out his conclusions on the weight to be attached to mere plausibility in meeting the evidential threshold applicable in this appeal.
24. I find that the remaining grounds of appeal have not been made out. At paragraphs 21 and 22, the Judge set out clear well reasoned findings and conclusions in relation to whether the appellant is at risk. The grounds at paragraphs 10 and 11 are a disagreement with the conclusions reached. The Judge rejected the appellant’s account regarding the arrest warrant and accepted the Respondent’s submissions on his sur place activity as set out at paragraph 6(vi) of the decision. The Judge did not need to replicate paragraph 6(vi) as actual findings as it is clear from paragraph 21 the basis on which the Judge rejected the appellant’s account of sur place activities and that he faced any risk on return arising from such activities. Further, the findings at paragraph 22 as to the new political landscape in Sri Lanka are clear and well reasoned and there is no error of law in the Judge’s decision rejecting that the appellant genuinely fears persecution on return or that he had ever come to the adverse attention of the authorities or that it will be a problem for him on his return.
25. Accordingly, for these reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

S. Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 13 January 2026