Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003404

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/62881/2023
LP/10249/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

TDV
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Fisher, Counsel instructed by Thompson & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam who came to the UK in 2007 on a student visa and remained without leave following the expiry of his visa in 2009. In 2021 he applied for asylum. He claims to face a risk in Vietnam as a follower of Hao Hoa Buddhism who has previously been persecuted on account of his religion and who has, whilst in the UK, attended demonstrations opposing the Vietnamese Regime. His asylum application was refused in November 2023.
2. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Cameron. In a decision dated 29 April 2025 Judge Cameron dismissed the appeal.
3. In a decision dated 3 December 2025 I set aside the decision of Judge Cameron. A copy of my error of law decision is appended to this decision. I now remake the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Preserved findings of fact
4. I preserved Judge Cameron’s findings of fact. The key preserved findings of fact are:
(a) The appellant is a follower of unregistered/pure Hoa Hao Buddhism.
(b) In 2003, 2005 and 2006 the appellant was arrested, detained and mistreated for attending or preparing religious services. The detention in 2006 lasted for 21 days; and during all three of the periods of detention he was physically and verbally assaulted.
(c) The appellant attended anti-regime demonstrations in the UK in 2020 and 2023. The photograph of him at the 2023 demonstration shows him holding a photograph of the person who the appellant identifies as Master Huynh Phu So, the founder of Pure Hoa Hao, along with a sign the content of which indicates he is opposed to the current regime.
New evidence
5. The appellant submitted a witness statement for this hearing dated 24 December 2025. The statement repeats much of what he has been said previously. The significant new evidence in the statement is the following:
(a) The appellant states that on 4 May 2025 he attended a protest outside the Vietnamese Embassy in London that was organised by the Brotherhood for Democracy and the Viet Tan Party.
(b) The appellant states that on 9 May 2025 the Vietnamese police visited his family home in Vietnam and instructed his mother to attend the police station where she was questioned about his activities in the UK including in particular the protest he attended on 4 May 2025. The appellant states that he believes this occurred because the chairman of the Brotherhood for Democracy and other activists uploaded photographs of the protest to public Facebook pages. He states that the police warned his mother that if he returns to Vietnam he will be required to attend the police station. He also states that the police officers have continued to visit his family home two or three times per month where they have questioned his mother about his political activities in the UK and demanded that she persuade him to stop his political involvement and return to Vietnam to present himself to the authorities.
6. The appellant submitted with his statement a photograph taken at the demonstration on 4 May 2025. This shows the appellant standing opposite the Vietnamese Embassy holding a megaphone and a photograph of the person who the appellant identifies as Master Huynh Phu So, the founder of Pure Hoa Hao. The photograph shows the appellant in a prominent and visible location.
Oral evidence at the hearing
7. At the hearing Mr Walker cross-examined the appellant about the claimed visit by the police to his mother’s home in May 2025. The appellant repeated what he had said in his witness statement.
8. Mr Walker asked the appellant what he did in the UK between 2007 and 2021. He did not give a clear answer to the question; but stated that he was fearful to approach the authorities and did not understand the law; and that it was only after speaking to people in his temple that he realised he should find a solicitor and claim asylum. He also stated that he did not attend demonstrations between 2007 and 2020 because his life was unstable and he was frightened to do so.
Objective Evidence relevant to risk on return
9. The respondent has two relevant Country Policy and Information Notes concerning Vietnam that were referred to at the hearing. The first is the Country Policy and Information Note: Hoa Hao Buddhism, Vietnam, January 2024 (“the Hoa Hao CPIN”). The second is the Country Policy and Information Note: Opposition to the state, Vietnam, September 2025 (“the Opposition to the state CPIN”).
10. In the Hoa Hao CPIN it is stated in the Executive summary that:
“Hoa Hao Buddhists who openly criticise the government or who participate in activities that are, or may be perceived to be, against the state may face harassment, arrest or detention. Whether a Hoa Hao Buddhist activist is at risk of persecution or serious harm will depend on their profile and activities”.
In paragraphs 3.1.2 to 3.1.3 the following is stated:
“3.1.2 A Hoa Hao Buddhist who is a member of unregistered group, practising their faith at home or in a small group cooperating with local authorities is unlikely to face adverse attention from the authorities. Some may face difficulties, such as police harassment, disruption of religious activities, confiscation of property, pressure to join the registered Church and arrest but in general such treatment is not sufficiently serious by its nature and/or repetition to amount to persecution.
3.1.3 Hoa Hao Buddhists activists or leaders who openly criticise the government or participate in activities that are, or may be perceived to be, political in nature are likely to attract adverse attention including harassment, monitoring, arrest, interrogation and detention which may amount to persecution. Whether a person is at risk of persecution will depend on their profile and the nature of their activities, not solely due to their faith”.
11. The Opposition to the state CPIN states in the Executive summary:
“A person who is a member of an illegal political party and openly expresses their political opposition is likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state”.
12. It states in section 13, in respect of monitoring Vietnamese citizens who are outside of Vietnam:
13.1.1 The DFAT 2025 report stated that:
‘Vietnam is sensitive to the activities of foreign-based dissident organisations led by members of the diaspora, including the Viet Tan, and considers such groups “reactionary” (some, including the Viet Tan, have been proscribed by the Government of Vietnam as terrorist organisations). According to international media, Vietnam has targeted dissidents outside of its borders in recent years, including high-profile cases in Thailand and Germany. In-country sources reported in October 2023 that Vietnam monitored dissidents abroad and their families inside Vietnam, who had also been subjected to questioning about their relatives’ activities and travel plans. DFAT is aware of reports of Vietnamese state agents attempting to attend closed door conferences organised by organisations of this profile. According to in-country sources, the Government of Vietnam had sophisticated surveillance capabilities and was able to monitor dissidents abroad, including online.’ [footnote 95]
13.1.2 In relation to the Vietnamese government’s interest in the diaspora, DFAT assessed:
‘Vietnamese people living abroad who have an established record of criticising the party and government, particularly those who are prominent in the diaspora, have high-profile affiliations with dissident diaspora groups and/or have large online followings and networks in Vietnam, are likely to be known to, and have their activities monitored by, Vietnamese authorities. This may occur online and through party sympathisers and informants within the diaspora. Vietnamese people living abroad with a lower profile, including people attending public protests or expressing anti-government views, including online, are likely to be of significantly less interest, and their activities may not necessarily be known to the authorities.
‘Vietnamese people living abroad may also have their social media monitored, particularly people of high profile who are critical of the party and government, such as: people who hold leadership positions and have influence in the diaspora; have known affiliations with dissident diaspora groups; organise public protests against the party or government; and/or have large online followings and networks in Vietnam. Vietnamese people living abroad with a lower profile, including people attending public protests or expressing anti-government views, including online, are likely to be of significantly less interest.
Submissions
13. Mr Walker argued that the appellant does not face a risk on return because:
(a) a very significant amount of time has elapsed since the previous interest of the authorities in him;
(b) the fact that he did not attend any demonstrations or involve himself in any way in sur place activities until 2020 strongly indicates that he attended demonstrations in the UK solely to bolster a weak asylum claim; and
(c) the Hoa Hao CPIN indicates that although a person following unregistered Hoa Hao Buddhism may face some harassment, it indicates that such a person is not at a real risk of facing ill-treatment arising to the threshold of persecution.
14. Ms Fisher argued that the appellant’s claim needs to be considered through the framework of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. This stipulates:
“The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated”.
15. She submitted that it was plain that the arrest and detention in 2003, 2005 and 2006 amounted to persecution as the appellant was detained for a not insignificant period of time and suffered serious ill-treatment during the detention. The question to be resolved, therefore, was whether there was a good reason to consider that such persecution would not be repeated. She argued that there was not such a good reason given the authorities’ ongoing interest in the appellant and his sur place activities which may well have brought him to the attention of the authorities. She drew attention to the objective evidence set out in the CPINs, as set above in paragraphs 10 and 11.
Analysis
16. The appellant’s claim for asylum was made in February 2021. Accordingly, as it predates the implementation of NABA 2022, the standard of proof is “reasonable degree of likelihood”.
17. Before me, there is photographic evidence of the appellant attending demonstrations in London in 2023 and 2025 where he is in a prominent position directly opposite the Vietnamese embassy. In one photograph he is holding a sign with wording indicating his opposition to the current regime in Vietnam; in another he is holding a megaphone.
18. Given the sensitivity of the Vietnamese authorities to foreign based dissent (as explained in the Opposition to the State CPIN) and their suspicion of followers of unregistered Hao Hoa Buddhism (as explained in the Hao Hoa CPIN) there is, in my view, a reasonable degree of likelihood that by attending demonstrations directly opposite the Vietnamese embassy and positioning himself in a prominent position with a sign (and in 2025 with a megaphone), the appellant has attracted the attention of the Vietnamese authorities who have identified that he was detained on three occasions before leaving Vietnam and is a person who is potentially hostile to the regime.
19. It follows that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that that the Vietnamese authorities visited the appellant’s family home shortly after the demonstration in May 2025, as claimed by the appellant in his witness statement; and that, if the appellant returns to Vietnam, the authorities will arrest and detain him because they perceive him to be an opponent of the regime. This is the case even if the appellant’s attendance at the demonstrations in 2023 and 2025 was to bolster his asylum claim and is not a reflection of a genuinely held political belief. Accordingly, even if the appellant’s sur place activities are contrived, he nonetheless has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his attendance at the demonstrations in 2023 and 2025. He therefore is entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention.
Notice of Decision
20. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside in my decision of 3 December 2025. I now re-make the decision and allow the appellant’s appeal.

D. Sheridan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 January 2026

Appendix: The Error of Law Decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003404

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/62881/2023
LP/10249/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

TD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms D Revill, Counsel instructed by Thompson & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam born in February 1987. He came to the UK in 2007 on a student visa and remained without leave following the expiry of his visa in 2009. In 2021 he applied for asylum. The application was refused in November 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Cameron (“the judge”). In a decision dated 29 April 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals against this decision.
The Appellant’s Claim
2. The appellant claims to face a risk in Vietnam for three related reasons.
3. First, he claims to face a risk because he is a follower of Pure Hoa Hao Buddhism who was previously persecuted because of his religious beliefs and practices. He claims that he was arrested, detained and mistreated when attending or preparing for religious services in 2003, 2005 and 2006.
4. Second, the appellant claims to face a risk because the Vietnamese authorities became aware of an email he sent to a friend (from the UK) containing an anti-government flyer. He claims that, as a result of sending the email, the police came to his family home in Vietnam and arrested his mother.
5. Third, the appellant claims to face a risk because of his anti-regime sur place activities in the UK.
The First-tier Tribunal’s Decision
6. The judge did not accept that the appellant sent an incriminating leaflet to his friend or that he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities. However, the judge did accept that:
(a) the appellant is a follower of Pure Hoa Hao Buddhism who practises daily and would continue to do so on return to Vietnam; and
(b) the appellant was arrested and detained on three occasions as he claimed.
7. With respect to the sur place activities, the judge found that the appellant had attended demonstrations but did not have a prominent role such that it would be reasonably likely that he would have come to the attention of the authorities.
8. The judge considered whether the appellant would face a risk on return as a practising Pure Hoa Hao Buddhist who had previously been arrested with reference to the respondent’s CPIN: Country Policy and Information Note Vietnam: Hoa Hao, January 2024 (“the CPIN”).
9. The judge concluded in paragraph 61:
“61. Although the evidence does indicate that those from an unregistered religion will face harassment I am not satisfied to the lower standard of proof that the authorities have any current interest in the appellant and I do not find that simply by his returning and continuing to practice his religion that he would face treatment amounting to persecution. I do not accept even to the lower standard of proof that the appellant has been active against the authorities when in Vietnam nor do I accept that he would be so on return but would simply continue to practice his religion at home or at other people’s homes”.
Grounds of Appeal and Permission
10. The appellant advanced five grounds of appeal. However, at the hearing Ms Revill, who did not draft the grounds, reformulated the appellant’s case into two distinct submissions.
11. The first submission, which refines and consolidates the first three grounds of appeal, is that the judge failed to apply paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules.
12. The second submission is that the judge failed to properly apply the principle in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 because, having found that the appellant would not demonstrate against or engage in any activities opposing the authorities on return to Vietnam, the judge failed to go on to consider the reason for this; i.e. whether the reason he would refrain from such activities was fear of persecution.
13. Mr Ojo argued that it does not necessarily follow that because a person was ill-treated in the past they would face persecution in the future. He relied on Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5. Although this case is usually cited for what it says about internal relocation, he argued that it is relevant because it demonstrates that a person can be returned notwithstanding that there has been persecution in the past. He submitted that, in this case, there is a clear reason why the previous ill-treatment does not mean there is a present risk, which is that there has been a significant passage of time since the previous persecution.
14. With respect to Ms Revill’s HJ (Iran) argument, Mr Ojo commented on how little evidence there was of the appellant engaging in any sur place activity. He noted that in his witness statement the appellant claims to have attended only two demonstrations in the UK despite living here for almost two decades. He submitted that the lack of engagement in demonstrations (or any other anti-regime activity) whilst in the UK (where there is no risk attached to such activity) demonstrates that the sur place activity of the appellant does not demonstrate a genuine belief. It follows from this that the reason the appellant would not attend demonstrations or engage in anti-regime activity in Vietnam is not fear of persecution but lack of an interest in doing so.
Paragraph 339K
15. Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules stipulates:
“339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated”.
16. There is no reference to paragraph 339K in the decision. However, failure to refer to paragraph 339K does not mean the judge fell into error. What matters is whether it was applied in substance.
17. In this case, in order to apply paragraph 339K, the judge needed to, firstly, determine whether the arrests and detention in 2003, 2005 and/or 2006 (which the judge accepted occurred) amounted to “persecution or serious harm” such that paragraph 339K was relevant; and, secondly, in the event that there had been persecution or serious harm in 2003, 2005 and/or 2006, the judge needed to determine if there was a good reasons to consider that the persecution would not be repeated.
18. The judge did not undertake either of these steps. First, although the judge accepted the appellant’s account of what occurred in 2003-2006, there is no consideration (or finding) as to whether this amounted to persecution or serious harm. Second, although there may well be a good reason the appellant will not face a repeat of what occurred in 2003-2006 (such as that the objective evidence about the current situation in Vietnam indicates that such treatment would not occur today) there was no assessment of this by the judge, who appears to have assessed the risk faced by the appellant without applying the framework in para. 339K. I am therefore persuaded by Ms Revill’s argument that the judge erred by not applying para. 339K.
The HJ (Iran) Principle
19. The HJ (Iran) principle establishes that it is no answer to a claim for asylum that an individual would conceal their sexual identity in order to avoid persecution that would follow if they did not do so. At paragraph 82 of HJ (Iran), Lord Roger, JSC, set out the correct approach to be adopted by decision-makers in the context of an individual claiming to be at risk in their country of origin by virtue of wishing to live openly as a gay man:
“82. When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of nationality.
If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the applicant's country of nationality.
If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were returned to that country.
If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he could avoid the risk by living "discreetly".
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so.
If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, eg, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution and the Convention does not offer protection against them. Such a person has no well-founded fear of persecution because, for reasons that have nothing to do with any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted because he is gay.
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution. To reject his application on the ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution. By admitting him to asylum and allowing him to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution, the receiving state gives effect to that right by affording the applicant a surrogate for the protection from persecution which his country of nationality should have afforded him.”
20. That the HJ (Iran) principle applies to cases concerning political opinions was confirmed by Lord Dyson, JSC, at paragraphs 26 and 27 of RT (Zimbabwe):
“26. The HJ (Iran) principle applies to any person who has political beliefs and is obliged to conceal them in order to avoid the persecution that he would suffer if he were to reveal them. Mr Swift accepted that such a person would have a "strong" case for Convention protection, but he stopped short of an unqualified acceptance of the point. In my view, there is no basis for such reticence. The joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Appellant S395/2002 contains a passage under the heading "'Discretion' and 'being discreet'" which includes the following at para 80:
"If an applicant holds political or religious beliefs that are not favoured in the country of nationality, the chance of adverse consequences befalling that applicant on return to that country would ordinarily increase if, on return, the applicant were to draw attention to the holding of the relevant belief. But it is no answer to a claim for protection as a refugee to say to an applicant that those adverse consequences could be avoided if the applicant were to hide the fact that he or she holds the beliefs in question. And to say to an applicant that he or she should be 'discreet' about such matters is simply to use gentler terms to convey the same meaning. The question to be considered in assessing whether the applicant's fear of persecution is well founded is what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality; it is not, could the applicant live in that country without attracting adverse consequences."
27. I made much the same point in HJ (Iran) at para 110:
"If the price that a person must pay in order to avoid persecution is that he must conceal his race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinion, then he is being required to surrender the very protection that the Convention is intended to secure for him. The Convention would be failing in its purpose if it were to mean that a gay man does not have a well-founded fear of persecution because he would conceal the fact that he is a gay man in order to avoid persecution on return to his home country."”
21. The judge found (in para. 61) that the appellant was not active against the authorities before he left Vietnam and would not be active following his return. The judge did not, however, take the next step required by the HJ (Iran) principle, which is to assess why the appellant would not engage in such activities and whether a material reason for not doing so would be a fear of persecution.
22. Mr Ojo made a strong case as to why the appellant’s activities in the UK may well not reflect a genuine belief and therefore why it is lack of interest, rather than fear of persecution, that explains why the appellant would refrain from ant-regime activity in Vietnam. However, the judge did not make this finding and in circumstances where it was not found that the appellant’s sur place activities were disingenuous the judge needed to address the question of why the appellant would not participate in anti-regime activity in Vietnam. The failure to do so was a material error of law.
Disposal
23. Both parties were of the view that in the event I found an error of law the case could be re-made in the Upper Tribunal with the First-tier Tribunal’s credibility findings preserved.
24. Generally, findings of fact will be preserved where the findings have not been undermined or infected by an error of law: see AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 000268. Neither of the two errors identified in this decision affect the findings of fact. I therefore agree that the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact should be preserved.
25. The general principle is that cases will be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. However, there are exceptions to this, as set out in paragraphs 7.2.(a) and (b) of the Practice Statement. Neither exception applies, as (i) neither party was deprived of a fair hearing in the First-tier Tribunal; and (ii), it does not appear that extensive further fact-finding is likely to be required given the preserved findings of fact. I recognise that by retaining the matter in the Upper Tribunal the parties will lose the benefit of the two-tiered decision-making process, the significance of which was highlighted in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 IAC. However, as this case does not fall within the exceptions set out in paragraph 7.2, retaining the matter in the Upper Tribunal is, in my view, the appropriate course of action.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
27. The findings of fact are preserved.
28. The decision will be re-made at a renewed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
29. The parties have permission to rely on evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. Any such evidence must be filed and served at least fourteen days before the renewed hearing.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 November 2025