Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003407
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/59273/2024
LH/01369/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

PEARL OBOAGYE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rashid, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. The appellant appeals against the refusal of her application to remain in the UK on human rights grounds.

2. The appeal came before me to be remade in the Upper Tribunal after an error of law was found in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) to dismiss the appeal. The essence of the human rights claim is that the appellant claims to be unable to return to Ghana because she would be returning to the scene of traumatic memories she experienced with her mother after the death of her father. She relied on expert psychological evidence in an effort to establish that her mental health would greatly deteriorate on return and she would be at a significantly elevated risk of committing suicide if required to return.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

3. In a decision dated 13 November 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi found a material error of law in the decision of the FtT to dismiss the appeal. While no findings of fact were preserved from that decision, it involved a procedural and substantive development of some importance. At [7] of that decision, it was noted that Mr Rashid, of counsel – who appeared on behalf of the appellant in the FtT, and before me in the remaking hearing – confirmed that the appeal was not being pursued on Article 3 health grounds. This was entirely consistent with the appellant’s skeleton argument before the FtT where Article 3 did not feature at all. Instead, it was only argued that the appellant’s removal from the UK would only breach her Article 8 human rights. This was the basis on which the appeal was decided in the FtT decision which was later set aside as involving a material error of law in how the judge had approached the expert evidence which was before him. In the error of law decision, it was noted that the appellant may wish to rely on updated expert evidence going to her mental health. This appeared to be the impetus for the appellant’s representatives to seek to reintroduce an argument founded on Article 3 grounds. In the days leading up to the remaking hearing, I refused an adjournment to allow the expert further time to prepare answers to questions posed of him by the respondent. I also expressed concern about the failure of the appellant’s representatives to comply with case management directions made by Upper Tribunal Judge Mahmood in the wake of a previously adjourned remaking hearing. I directed the appellant’s representatives to provide a hearing bundle and skeleton argument as previously directed. I also clarified that the appellant’s representatives should set out their case as to why they should be permitted to withdraw the earlier concession (in accordance with the principles identified in MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 00351 (IAC)) which was previously made in relation to the Article 3 claim.

4. In their skeleton argument, it was suggested that justice required the withdrawal of the concession because to do otherwise would lead to an unlawful outcome. It was further noted that there was now additional evidence in support of the putative Article 3 case and that the respondent would suffer no appreciable prejudice. At [15b] of the skeleton argument, it was observed that a concession may be withdrawn where it was made in error or without fully considering the evidence. At the hearing, I asked Mr Rashid if this was a fair characterisation of the basis on which he had previously made the concession. After I allowed him time to take instructions, he indicated that he had made the concession on instructions. His instructions at the remaking hearing were to seek to withdraw that concession. He indicated that he was heavily influenced in adopting the position he did at the FtT by the settled position which was taken in the skeleton argument not to make an Article 3 health claim and proceed solely on Article 8 grounds.

5. Mr Rashid made oral submissions at the remaking hearing which were more geared towards the principles set out in MH. He clarified that it was not suggested that the concession was anything other than properly made at the time it was communicated to the tribunal and it was founded on a proper evaluative assessment of the evidence then in place. Instead, it was suggested that the change in the evidential picture since the error of law decision meant that it was appropriate to seek to resuscitate the Article 3 claim. It was observed that the respondent would suffer little prejudice as they had the evidence on which the claim was based and would have the opportunity to cross-examine Dr Siddique at the remaking hearing. Ms Simbi, on behalf of the respondent, argued that the medical evidence had not significantly changed to convert an Article 8 claim into an Article 3 health claim and that it was a weighty factor that the previous concession was founded on an evaluative assessment of the evidence. I indicated that I was not minded to permit the concession to be withdrawn and would set out my reasons in this reserved decision.

6. Applying the guiding principles in MH, I am in no doubt that the appellant has not established the required good reason to permit the concession to be withdrawn. Specialist advocates in this jurisdiction are properly taken to have a firm grip on the facts and law which underpin their case. Mr Rashid confirmed that the concession was not founded on a professional error of judgement but was more than justified at the time that position was adopted. The concession made in the face of the tribunal followed the distillation of the appellant’s case in writing in which Article 3 did not feature at all. I agree with Ms Simbi that the settled position adopted by the appellant’s representatives on her behalf was the result of an evaluative assessment of the evidence. Beyond some modest adjustments of the scoring of Dr Siddiqui’s mental health concerns, there was little to distinguish the current shape of the evidence to what had come before. Moreover, the respondent would be demonstrably prejudiced by having to respond to a wholly new human rights ground of appeal for the first time long after the proceedings were first decided in the FtT. An Article 3 ground of appeal should not generally emerge on remaking in the Upper Tribunal where an appellate tribunal will become the first judicial decision-maker on such a claim. Finally, an application to withdraw the concession was not made expeditiously. The relevant factors identified in MH weighed heavily against the proposition that there was good reason to permit the concession to be withdrawn and I declined to do so. However, I made it clear that the new evidence would be admitted under rule 15 of the procedural rules because it plainly went to the extant Article 8 claim.

7. I indicated that I would treat the appellant as vulnerable for the purposes of the hearing. The only adjustments sought to conventional hearing procedure was for breaks to be provided if needed and for questions to be asked using simple language.

8. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral evidence from Dr Siddiqui and the appellant. I then heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any evidence and submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Legal Framework

9. Article 8 of the ECHR provides: 

(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 

10. The central issue is whether the refusal breaches the appellant’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. That right is qualified. The appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities the factual circumstances on which they rely and that Article 8 (1) is engaged. If it is, then I must decide whether the interference with the appellant’s right is justified under Article 8 (2). If an appellant does not meet the immigration rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate. I consider the factors set out in s.117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant. 

11. Where an Article 8 claim involves a health dimension falling short of an Article 3 claim, GS (India) v SSHD [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3312 continues to provide the appropriate analytical framework. At [86] of his judgment, Laws LJ held:

If the article 3 claim fails (as I would hold it does here), article 8 cannot prosper without some separate or additional factual element which brings the case within the article 8 paradigm—the capacity to form and enjoy relationships—or a state of affairs having some affinity with the paradigm. […]

12. The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of integration in Kamara v SSHD [2016] 4 W.L.R. 152. At paragraph 14 of the judgment of Sales LJ (as he then was), the following interpretation was given:  

In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's “integration” into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.  

13. The meaning of very significant obstacles was considered by the Upper Tribunal in Treebhawon [2017] Imm. A.R. 790 where the following guidance was provided at paragraph 37:  

[…] The other limb of the test, " very significant obstacles ", erects a self-evidently elevated threshold, such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient in this context. […]  

14. The Court of Appeal, in Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932, clarified the Treebhawon summary of the threshold. Underhill LJ stated:  

I have to say that I do not find that a very useful gloss on the words of the rule. It is fair enough to observe that the words "very significant" connote an "elevated" threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by "mere inconvenience or upheaval". But I am not sure that saying that "mere" hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not "generally" suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as "very significant".

15. In TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, the Senior President of Tribunals provided guidance as to how competing public and private interests should be balanced in a case where the requirements of the Immigration Rules are satisfied. He said this at paragraph 34: 

[…] An evaluation of the question whether there are insurmountable obstacles is a relevant factor because considerable weight is to be placed on the Secretary of State's policy as reflected in the Rules of the circumstances in which a foreign national partner should be granted leave to remain. Accordingly, the tribunal should undertake an evaluation of the insurmountable obstacles test within the Rules in order to inform an evaluation outside the Rules because that formulates the strength of the public policy in immigration control 'in the case before it’, which is what the Supreme Court in Hesham Ali (at [50]) held was to be taken into account. That has the benefit that where a person satisfies the Rules, whether or not by reference to an article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person's article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that it would then be disproportionate for that person to be removed.  

[Underlining added] 

16. The appellant bears the burden of substantiating the primary facts of the appeal. The standard she must meet is on the balance of probabilities. 

Discussion

17. The appellant’s case, that the refusal decision would breach her Article 8 human rights, turned on a number of factual propositions: that she experienced traumatic events at the hands of her neglectful mother in the wake of her father’s death; that these events, and the prospect of enforced removal, had caused a range of serious mental health conditions including PTSD, Generalised Anxiety Disorder (‘GAD’) and severe depression; that the combination of the mental health conditions and being forcibly returned to Ghana would cause a grave deterioration in those conditions and greatly elevate the risk of suicide; that the appellant’s current supportive environment with her uncles in the UK provided the best circumstances in which she could recover and enjoy her Article 8 rights to a family and private life. The evidence in support of these factual propositions came primarily from the appellant’s narrative evidence and the expert evidence of Dr Siddiqui, both of whom were cross-examined at the remaking hearing.

18. Having heard Dr Siddiqui give oral evidence, I have the gravest of concerns about the cogency of his opinions and the safety of the methods by which he came to those conclusions. I was struck not only by the fact that he does not generally consider medical records to come to his conclusions, and certainly did not consider any such records here, but the high handed and dismissive attitude he took to the medical professionals who complete such records. He was frank in stating that he placed little to no stock in medical records because General Practitioners had little grounding in mental health conditions. This appeared to me to be an extraordinarily flippant approach which leaned heavily on unsupported generalisations about the skills of General Practitioners. In failing to look to the recorded medical history of a person he was assessing, he deprived himself of potentially highly relevant information which might inform his opinions. By way of example, he would render himself entirely ignorant of any past episodes of malingering or of previous records of narrative details which might shed light on whether a claim had been exaggerated. Equally, he might deprive himself of any records of a background of documented mental illness and treatment which might support and strengthen any opinions that such conditions continue to exist.

19. I asked Dr Siddiqui to clarify whether he was aware of the guidance in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111(IAC) which stressed the importance of expert witnesses in this field considering medical records. He frankly confirmed that he was unaware. The following guidance was given at [1]-[6] of the headnote:

(1) Where an expert report concerns the mental health of an individual, the Tribunal will be particularly reliant upon the author fully complying with their obligations as an expert, as well as upon their adherence to the standards and principles of the expert's professional regulator. When doctors are acting as witnesses in legal proceedings they should adhere to the relevant GMC Guidance.

(2) Although the duties of an expert giving evidence about an individual's mental health will be the same as those of an expert giving evidence about any other matter, the former must at all times be aware of the particular position they hold, in giving evidence about a condition which cannot be seen by the naked eye, X-rayed, scanned or measured in a test tube; and which therefore relies particularly heavily on the individual clinician's opinion.

(3) It is trite that a psychiatrist possesses expertise that a general practitioner may not have. A psychiatrist may well be in a position to diagnose a variety of mental illnesses, including PTSD, following face-to-face consultation with the individual concerned. In the case of human rights and protection appeals, however, it would be naïve to discount the possibility that an individual facing removal from the United Kingdom might wish to fabricate or exaggerate symptoms of mental illness, in order to defeat the respondent's attempts at removal. A meeting between a psychiatrist, who is to be an expert witness, and the individual who is appealing an adverse decision of the respondent in the immigration field will necessarily be directly concerned with the individual's attempt to remain in the United Kingdom on human rights grounds.

(4) Notwithstanding their limitations, the GP records concerning the individual detail a specific record of presentation and may paint a broader picture of his or her mental health than is available to the expert psychiatrist, particularly where the individual and the GP (and any associated health care professionals) have interacted over a significant period of time, during some of which the individual may not have perceived themselves as being at risk of removal.

(5) Accordingly, as a general matter, GP records are likely to be regarded by the Tribunal as directly relevant to the assessment of the individual's mental health and should be engaged with by the expert in their report. Where the expert's opinion differs from (or might appear, to a layperson, to differ from) the GP records, the expert will be expected to say so in the report, as part of their obligations as an expert witness. The Tribunal is unlikely to be satisfied by a report which merely attempts to brush aside the GP records.

(6) In all cases in which expert evidence is adduced, the Tribunal should be scrupulous in ensuring that the expert has not merely recited their obligations, at the beginning or end of their report, but has actually complied with them in substance. Where there has been significant non-compliance, the Tribunal should say so in terms, in its decision. Furthermore, those giving expert evidence should be aware that the Tribunal is likely to pursue the matter with the relevant regulatory body, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the failure.

20. Dr Siddiqui should familiarise himself with this guidance as a matter of priority before providing expert evidence in future.

21. An additional concern with Dr Siddiqui’s expert opinions was the certainty with which he expressed himself when seen against the limited information he gathered. He repeatedly expressed the opinion that the PTSD and GAD disorders were “100%” caused by the traumatic index events in Ghana (see, for example, page 2 of his 10-page report dated 31 December 2025 at p.30 of the remaking bundle). This was troubling on two counts. Firstly, people of science tend to be cautious before coming to conclusions to a degree of absolute certainty which 100% denotes. Secondly, it was exceptionally difficult to understand precisely what the traumatic events were said to be beyond highly generalised assertions of neglect by the appellant’s mother at times of her life when she was always an adult. Dr Siddiqui did not explore with her the nature of the traumatic events because of his concern that such exploration might have the effect of retraumatising the appellant and that he was engaged in a process of assessment, not treatment which might lend itself more to discussing the underlying facts of the trauma experienced. I found it difficult to understand how it could be concluded that traumatic events, about which the expert knew very little because he had purposefully not discussed or explored them, were 100% causative of the conditions he observed. It appeared that he relied on the most uncertain of factual foundations to come to the most certain of causative diagnostic conclusions.

22. It appeared to me that there was considerable tension in several of the clinical conclusions which Dr Siddiqui came to. He noted an improvement in the most recent scores he had noted for the appellant’s condition of bipolar disorder. He put this down to the stable and supportive environment the appellant enjoyed in the UK with her uncles. However, these positive environmental and circumstantial factors appeared to have played no part in the deteriorating scores he noted for PTSD and GAD which was said to have worsened because of the continued threat of removal action. When I asked for clarification as to the apparent tension in the suggested underlying causes when it came to improvements or deteriorations in underlying conditions, Dr Siddiqui indicated that he ‘took the point’. I also noted some unexplained tension in the conclusion that the depressive disorder was caused by continuing removal efforts whereas there seemed to be no consideration of whether the traumatic index events experienced in Ghana, found to be the 100% cause of PTSD and GAD, played any part in this condition. Finally, Dr Siddiqui appeared to base his conclusions on the positive role which would be played by the appellant’s uncles, one of whom works as a psychiatric nurse, on his general understanding of the skills exhibited by such professionals rather than any particular skills held by the uncles with whom he had little direct engagement. He placed considerably greater stock in the “close quarters” support on offer from the appellant’s uncles than any mental health treatment which might be available to the appellant, noting that she had not received any medicinal or therapeutic treatment since she arrived in the UK as a visitor in 2022.

23. The tenor of Dr Siddiqui’s expert commentary left me with a profound sense of concern about his impartiality and objectivity. There were several occasions over the course of his reports where he appeared to take on the mantle of advocate or drifted into territory where he simply had no expertise or competence:

• The client does not present as an economic migrant. [paragraph 1.1 of report dated 25 January 2023]

• This abhorrent behaviour towards her daughter Pearl Aboagye after the death of her husband caused Pearl Aboagye to feel alienated and ostracised which conclusively led to Pearl Aboagye ﬂeeing Ghana and seeking refuge with her two uncles in the UK. [P. 3 of the 31 December 2025 report]

• As in the previous report of 25.01.2023, the prospect for safe and effective treatment in Ghana is extremely remote and unlikely at best. [P. 3 of the 31 December 2025 report]

• Pearl Aboagye hopes to be in a position to try to obtain paid professional work in the UK sanctioned and supported by the Home Ofﬁce she would in my opinion make a valued contribution to society. [P. 7 of the 31 December 2025 report]

• It is very normal and culturally typical for adults to live with their parents in Ghana until they are married or ﬁnancially stable enough to move out. [Answer to question 1 of the respondent’s written questions at p. 40 of the remaking bundle]

• Mental health provision does exist in Ghana but the number psychiatrists (or Practioner [sic] Psychologists or equivalent) per capita of the overall population in Ghana does not remotely approach that available in the UK. let alone having close quarters support from a qualiﬁed relative as is the case with Pearl Aboagye. This information is readily available in the links that the home office have supplied. [Answer to question 7 of the respondent’s written questions at p. 40 of the remaking bundle]

24. To the extent that Dr Siddiqui commented on conditions in Ghana, he based his opinions on the observations of Ghanaian medical professionals he had supervised while he remained in the UK. He has not been to Ghana.

25. When I draw all of the above concerns together, I find myself unable to attach any meaningful weight to Dr Siddiqui’s opinions. He showed little to no interest in any medical history which might assist him in coming to an objective assessment. He displayed a willingness to pass comment on matters about which he simply had no expertise and exhibited a lack of objectivity and professional distance when he appeared to unquestioningly accept everything he was told by the appellant and engaged in advocating on her behalf. His expert opinions appeared to be tainted by methodological frailty and internal incoherence. In keeping with his professional responsibilities as an expert witness, this decision should be disclosed when he is asked to provide expert evidence in future and should be disclosed in any expert report which is put before any tribunal or court in future.

26. I turn next to the narrative evidence of the appellant. Under cross-examination, she explained the nature of her relationship with her uncles since she arrived in the UK in 2022. Her uncle, Mr Marfo, worked as a psychiatric nurse and provided her with emotional support when he was with her at home and not working lengthy 12-hour shifts in an NHS hospital. Mr Agbeshie lives in Bradford and he has provided her with practical support such as free accommodation and funds to meet her needs for clothing, food and other essential supplies. She divided her time between living with him and Mr Marfo who lives in the Birmingham area. She was asked to explain why neither uncle had attended the hearing to support her appeal with evidence. In response, she said that she had forgotten to inform Mr Marfo of the hearing and he was at work. While I have letters from each uncle before me, I can only attach limited weight to their untested accounts because they have not attended the hearing without good reason for their absence.

27. The appellant was asked about her relationship with her mother who continues to reside in Ghana. Surprisingly, given the trauma she claims to have suffered at her mother’s hands, the appellant accepted that continued to be in regular contact with her. She estimated that she spoke to her on the phone approximately four times per month and last spoke to her the day before the hearing to wish her a happy Mother’s Day. It was further clarified that she had never received any treatment of any description for her mental health concerns in either Ghana or the UK. She explained that it was an unthinkable prospect for her to return to Ghana to live with her mother. She was concerned that living alone in Ghana would be unaffordable given the rent which would be payable.

28. The first question I must consider is whether there are very significant obstacles to integration which stand in the way of the appellant returning to Ghana to live independently as a mature adult woman who left the country a matter of 4 years ago when she was in her thirties. I do not doubt that she has grievances with her mother which mean that she would rather not return to share a home with her. However, I agree with Ms Simbi that despite the length of these appeal proceedings and all of the evidence provided in support of the appeal, there is precious little to explain precisely what traumatic events unfolded in the appellant’s past to make her return to Ghana quite so difficult and unpalatable. It is for the appellant to establish her factual case on the balance of probabilities and she has not come close to doing so. I am not prepared to blindly accept, as Dr Siddiqui appeared to do, that the range of mental health conditions he identified and the suicidal ideation he pointed to can be directly traced back to wholly unspecified traumatic events about which we know almost nothing. It seemed to me that there was real friction in the claimed extent to which the traumatic relationship with her mother prevented lawful return and yet she has maintained regular and apparently cordial contact with the very source of that trauma. The appellant has not established on the evidence that she has mental health conditions which function to erect very significant obstacles to integration. I find that she can return and use the experience she gained as an insider in Ghanaian society until her early thirties to so again on return. I have no reason to think that she would be unable to find work and obtain the treatment she might need to overcome any mental health challenges she may have.

29. The respondent accepted that the appellant’s Article 8 right to a private life was engaged given the period of time she has now resided in the UK. It was not accepted that family life was engaged by her adult relationship with her uncles in the UK as these were said to be no more than normal emotional attachments to family members outside of the core family unit. I am just prepared to accept on the facts that the relationship between the appellant and her uncles involves additional elements of dependency in keeping with the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in IA and Others v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 given the unchallenged financial, accommodation and emotional support they provide to the appellant. The real issue is whether the interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights is disproportionate.

30. The fact that the appeal has not succeeded on the strength of the private life parts of the Immigration Rules weighs in favour of the public interest in the respondent’s refusal decision. The fact that the appellant cannot succeed under the rules means that she does not meet the required conditions established by the Secretary of State in the settlement of her broader policy position. I also bear in mind that the appellant has never been on a path to settlement in the UK arriving as she did on a visit visa and overstaying once that expired. It follows that the legislative scheme at s.117B(5) of the 2002 Act applies in that little weight generally applies to the private life accumulated since her arrival. I see no reason to take a different approach to the weight which falls to be attached to her always precarious stay in the UK. I have no reason to think that she would not continue to be financially dependent on her uncles in the UK such that she is unlikely to become a burden on taxpayers and she gave her evidence in English. These factors do not weigh against, but neither are they positively in her favour.

31. On the appellant’s side of the scales, I accept that she would rather not return to Ghana and her mother’s orbit. I also accept that she has established family life with her uncles in the UK and that this family would not continue in the same form were she to return to Ghana. However, they would be able to continue to offer her some support, both financial and emotional, from the UK. It would not be of the same quality but it would remain meaningful and helpful to her. There is no reason to think that she cannot return to Ghana and live an independent life as a 35-year-old woman. I reject the proposition that the evidence supports the notion that she is at risk of suicide on return. I have explained in detail why I am unable to accept the evidence of Dr Siddiqui and there was little else to underpin the existence of any such risk. There was considerable tension in the appellant’s evidence that she was quite so traumatised by her mother’s neglect that she could not countenance returning to live with her and the admitted regular and apparently cordial line of communication she has maintained with her since coming to the UK. The evidence does not support the notion that she would experience unjustifiably harsh consequences on return.

32. The refusal decision is not a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.

Notice of Decision

On remaking this decision, I dismiss the appellant’s appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 March 2026