Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003409

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59084/2024
LP/01386/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

AS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gibson, IAA authorised representative through Gibson Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant was granted anonymity. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue to anonymise these proceedings.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 30 June 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 20 March 2024 to refuse his asylum claim.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Tunisia. The appellant and his wife and two children left Tunisia and entered the UK on 14 November 2022. The appellant claimed asylum on 06 December 2022. His appeal includes his three dependants, being his wife and their two children. He claims to be at risk of being killed and serious harm in Tunisia from his wife’s paternal cousin (who he claims was her intended betrothed). The appellant claims that he and his wife received threatening calls from her cousin and concerned family warning them and that when their eldest son was born the threats turned towards him. He claims to have tried to seek help from the authorities but to no avail.
The Respondent’s decision
3. In decision dated 20 March 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s application for asylum. Within the refusal letter, the respondent did not accept the material facts of the claim nor that the Appellant is of adverse attention to his wife’s cousin. The Respondent decided that s.8 adverse credibility findings were engaged due to the delay in claiming asylum. The Respondent also averred that there would be sufficiency of protection from the authorities and that internal relocation in Tunisia was a reasonable option.
4. As regards Article 8, the respondent did not accept that removing him from or requiring him to leave the UK would be contrary to Article 8.
5. In a review document dated 30 December 2024, the grounds of refusal were maintained. The respondent noted that the appellant’s second witness statement contained details about his wife’s cousin and questioned why these details had not been provided in his first statement. The respondent also noted the country expert report of Dr Hafidh and raised issues with respect to the same.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant appealed to the First Tier Tribunal. The appeal came before the First Tier Tribunal for a full hearing on 16 June 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Keskin of Counsel and the respondent was represented by a Mr Bowden, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant and his wife gave oral evidence and were cross-examined. The Judge heard submissions from both representatives.
7. The Judge refused the appellant’s appeal for the reasons set out in a decision dated 30 June 2025. The Judge found that the Appellant did not qualify under the Refugee Convention as a member of a particular social group and therefore only considered the claim of risk of persecution on the basis of Humanitarian Protection. The Judge found that the appellant had failed to establish to the required standard that he is at risk of persecution upon return to Tunisia in relation to being threatened by his wife’s cousin and found that even if such conclusions and findings of fact had not been reached, that there were sufficiency of protection from persecution in Tunisia and that the appellant could relocate elsewhere in Tunisia.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal on six grounds. The first ground can be summarised as a perversity challenge on matters relating to the country expert report and giving weight to immaterial matters. The second and third grounds are a perversity challenge on findings made on the appellant’s evidence on the timeline of his wife’s escape and their marriage, and on matters relating to the wife’s claimed escape from imprisonment in her family home. The remaining grounds are also a perversity/irrationality challenge on findings relating to the appellant’s provision of detail of his wife’s cousin and on findings relating to sufficiency of protection.
9. On 28 July 2025 the First Tier tribunal granted the appellant permission to appeal on all grounds, with grounds 1, 4 and 6 being arguable and there being sufficient degree of overlap with the other grounds such that permission to appeal was granted on all six grounds.
10. The respondent opposed the appeal for the reasons set out in her response made pursuant to rule 24 of the Procedure Rules dated 31 July 2025.
11. The hearing on 11 December 2025 was conducted by hybrid format, with myself and the SPO attending at Field House and Mr Gibson by CVP videolink. We all had the benefit of a composite appeal bundle made up of 204 pages.
12. I heard submissions from both representatives, Mr Gibson and Mr Pugh.
13. I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
14. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, it is helpful to remind myself of the principles set out within the case law and in particular in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I remind myself that the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal and that where a relevant point or evidence was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account. Further, when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out, as recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51].
15. I also remind myself of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the SPT Practice Direction on Reasons for decisions dated 04 June 2024 which is consistent with the caselaw on sufficiency of reasons for decisions and states as follows:
5. Where reasons are given, they must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute. They must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. These fundamental principles apply to the tribunals as well as to the courts.
6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved
No material error of law
16. The significant difficulty for the appellant in this appeal is that the Judge considered the reasonableness of internal relocation within Tunisia based on taking the appellant’s evidence at its highest. At paragraph 98 & 99, the Judge notes:
“[98] Further, I agree with the respondent that even if the material facts of the appellant’s claim had been accepted, he could nevertheless relocate elsewhere in Tunisia and outside of his family's home area and where I do not consider it has been established (to the required standard) that his wife's cousin has sufficient power or influence elsewhere in Tunisia.
[99] Indeed, taking the appellant’s evidence at its highest in this regard, he was able to continue to reside in Tunisia without ever meeting or coming across his wife’s cousin for the entire period since returning from a short trip to Turkey after his wedding on 04 July 2019, after his first child was born on 15 May 2020 and until he applying [sic] for a visitor’s visa for the UK 28 September 2022 and ultimately leaving Tunisia for the UK on 22nd November 2022.”
17. The findings as to internal relocation and the Judge’s findings as to appellant’s evidence, as set out at paragraph 99 of the decision, are not challenged before this Tribunal.
18. Therefore, even if there were errors of law made out relating to Grounds 1-6, which I do not accept has been shown as set out below, the claimed errors of law are not material. Even if his account had been found to be credible and insufficiency of protection had been made out, his appeal would have failed as he was able to internally relocate in Tunisia as reflected by his own evidence as to the lengthy periods that he resided in Tunisia without ever meeting or coming across his wife’s cousin, as set out in paragraph 99 of the decision.

Ground 1
19. This ground as drafted is focused on making perverse or irrational findings on the country expert’s report, taking into account immaterial matters such as the legal representative’s view in the letter of instruction, and making a mistake as to a material fact that could be established by the country expert report such as through the links and information of tribal violence/sexual abuse victims being forced to marry their attackers.
20. I observe paragraph 44 of the decision:
“44: Therefore mindful that the tribunal remains the ultimate decision maker and after considering matters in the round, I give the conclusions of the expert report of Dr Hafidh only some limited weight and for the reasons given above.”
21. I also observe paragraph 95 of the decision:
“95: Turning then to assess all the evidence and the credibility of the appellant’s account in the round and balancing the positive and negative factors, I find that the appellant’s account is not credible. Whilst the appellant clarified some misunderstandings in terms of his evidence and supplied further information, the core aspects of his claim and in particular his wife’s previous imprisonment and submitted fear of his wife's cousin continue to be vague, lacking in detail and contain unexplained inconsistencies in circumstances where the country background evidence indicates honour crimes where the primary victims are male or children in Tunisia are rare and all substantially undocumented.”
22. I conclude that at paragraph 44 the Judge did not say that he was placing no weight on the report but the finding was that he was, for clearly stated reasons, placing only limited weight on the expert’s conclusions. Further, the Judge’s finding was not that little weight was being placed on the conclusions due to the contents of the letter of instructions, as replicated in paragraph 43, and on reading paragraph 38-44 I am satisfied that this was included to provide context to the expert report finding itself at paragraph 13 of ‘…there being very little reports of honour-based violence in Tunisia.’
23. Whilst there is no reference within the decision to the Judge having clicked on the links within the expert report, there is no error of law with regards to the assessment of the expert report. There was no persuasive evidence that the Judge was taken to the links in submissions and I am satisfied that a Judge is not required to click on every link in an expert report. The Judge has, at paragraphs 38-44, carried out a comprehensive assessment of the expert report and there is no error of law in the assessment of and findings of amount of weight to be placed on the report.
24. The Judge, again, at paragraph 95 and 97 refers to and places some weight on the country expert report. The challenge would therefore seem to be the amount of weight that the Judge placed on the expert report. The Judge carried out a well reasoned assessment of the weight that he could place on the report and the conclusion of placing limited weight on the report was one that was open to the Judge to make and involved no error of law.
25. This ground is dismissed.
Ground 2
26. By means of this ground, the appellant contends that the First Tier Tribunal reached perverse and irrational findings in stating at paragraph 64 that the timeline of the relationship and his wife’s claimed imprisonment “remains as an unexplained inconsistency.” This is because the ground states that the appellant’s wife gave oral evidence which explained this issue. However, there is no note or transcript of the hearing before the First Tier. I also observe that at paragraph 64 the Judge makes clear reference to consideration of the oral evidence of both the appellant and his wife at the hearing:
‘The Respondent also questioned the timeliness of the relationship and imprisonment with the Appellant and his wife at the hearing. Both were clear that their relationship had started in 2018 and lasted about a year and before the Appellant’s family found out at the end of 2018 and before the Appellant’s wife was imprisoned for which the Appellant said was for a period of three months and the Appellant’s wife said was for a period of three to four months. Finally, both confirmed that they had then got married immediately after her escape and on 4 July 2019. I therefore agree with the Respondent that this remains as an unexplained inconsistency in the timeline of their evidence….’
27. The Judge considered the oral evidence of both the Appellant and his wife and was entitled to make the findings set out in paragraph 64.
28. This ground is dismissed.
Ground 3
29. This ground as drafted is that the findings of paragraph 68 are perverse and irrational in relation to the wife’s claimed escape from family imprisonment and that the Judge failed to comment on the appellant’s explanation provided in his substantive interview, that he knew his wife’s family would be outside on a Friday and that Friday would likely be an opportunity to escape.
30. I am not satisfied that this ground has been made out. At paragraph 68 the Judge gives clear reasons as to why he did not consider it adequately or sufficiently explained how they were able to keep in touch so easily during the claimed imprisonment or how she would be able to escape simply because ‘most of her family would be out of the house on a Friday’. This finding was based on the appellant’s own evidence [Q46 of asylum interview p189 SB] and it is of note that the appellant’s evidence was not that all of the family were in the mosque on a Friday and he himself made reference to ‘most’ of the family being in the mosque or doing prayers on a Friday. At paragraph 54 the Judge refers to having considered the full transcripts of the appellant’s screening and substantive interviews and paragraph 68 does not indicate an ignorance of the appellant’s case as to why most of the family would be out on a Friday, namely that most of the family would be at the mosque as he said in his asylum interview. The Judge’s finding that it had not been not properly or sufficiently explained as to how her ultimate escape was able to be successful ‘simply because the most of her family would be out of the house on a Friday’ was one open to the Judge to make and there is no error of law in the assessment of the evidence pertaining to this issue. The finding is not perverse or irrational.
31. This ground is dismissed.
Ground 4
32. This ground as drafted is focused on the lack of reference to the appellant’s legal representative’s response to the respondent’s review wherein the representative confirmed that the omission of the cousin’s background in the appellant’s first statement was not the appellant’s fault and confirmed that a lack of direct questions about his cousin’s background had been asked.
33. Having considered paragraph 83-86 of the decision, I conclude that this challenge cannot withstand even limited scrutiny. At paragraph 84 the Judge noted that the appellant had (as part of an amended witness statement uploaded on 18 December 2024) now provided further details of the wife’s cousin, including that he was considered wealthy and has connections with the government. The Judge notes that when asked at the hearing why he had not mentioned this at any stage or earlier in his evidence, the appellant answered that he had not been asked to give any of these details. At paragraph 85 the Judge found that these details could and indeed should have been provided earlier by the appellant and who had ample opportunity to do so both in his various asylum interviews and in his earlier statement. The Judge did not make reference to the legal representative’s letter but did not accept ‘as a valid reason that he was not asked about this previously’. Given the facts of this appeal and that the cousin was someone that the appellant claimed to fear and to have received threats from, the finding that the further details of the cousin could and should have been provided earlier by the appellant during his interviews is not a perverse or irrational finding but was one open to the Judge to make. It is not perverse or irrational to expect an appellant, during interviews, to mention government connections or extreme wealth of a person that they claim to fear or to have received threats from. The Judge considered the explanation for the details only having been provided in December 2024 and did not accept the explanation provided, a finding that was open to the Judge to make. The Judge did not have to make reference to every piece of evidence in support of an issue or explanation.
34. This ground is dismissed.
Ground 5
35. This ground contends that there are perverse and irrational findings at paragraph 86 of the decision as that there is no requirement within the Immigration rules or case law that an appellant must meet or come face to face with their persecutors.
36. This ground is dismissed. The Judge does not state that there is any such requirement as set out in paragraph 23 of the grounds of appeal. Paragraph 86 contains a further assessment of the appellant’s late evidence regarding further details of his wife’s cousin. The findings made are ones that were open to the Judge to make on the evidence before him and there is no error of law within paragraph 86 as contended.
Ground 6
37. Ground 6 was drafted as a perversity/irrational findings challenge but during submissions it was pursued as a reasons challenge. Mr Gibson said that there was no consideration of why the Judge came to the conclusion that the police took no further action due to a lack of evidence rather than a lack of will or corruption and he submitted that the appellant did not know how the Judge arrived at that conclusion. It was said that the decision was perverse as there should have been an explanation and that there should have been a working out behind the rational. I observe paragraph 97 of the decision:
“… However, whilst it is indicated at the police ultimately took no further action in this regard, this appears to have been on the basis of a lack of evidence rather than any sort of lack of will or corruption and where the appellant was unable to give the police any further or detailed evidence.”
38. Having been taken to the appellant’s responses in his asylum interview at p196 of the bundle, which the Judge makes clear within the decision that he has fully considered, I reject the perversity/irrationality argument and I am satisfied that there is clear and detailed reasoning as to why the finding was made and specific reference is made to the appellant having been unable to give the police any further or detailed evidence, as is consistent with the evidence at p196 of the bundle. This was a finding that was open to the Judge to make on the evidence before him and the decision is not perverse or irrational as claimed within the drafted pleadings.
39. In any event, the Judge had, prior to paragraph 97, rejected the appellant’s account and there is no error of law made out with respects to the Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s account or preceding paragraphs. At paragraph 97 the Judge found that even if he had not reached the conclusions and findings of fact set out within his decision, that he considered that sufficient protection from persecution in Tunisia is available to the appellant. This was an alternative finding that was open to the Judge to make. Further, even if there had been an error of law in the Judge’s assessment of the sufficiency of protection in Tunisia, which has not been made out, such error would not be a material error of law as the appeal failed at the first hurdle, namely as to the credibility of the account and at paragraph 99 the Judge makes clear that even taking the appellant’s evidence at its highest, he was able to safely internally relocate within Tunisia. Any claimed error of law, of which none has been proven, would not be a material error of law in these circumstances.
40. This ground is dismissed.
41. Accordingly, for these reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

S. Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 14 January 2026