Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003411

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/55261/2023
IA/01121/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
AND
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

RB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Forest, Counsel, instructed by, RH & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in Edinburgh on 13 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction & Background
1. The appellant is a national of Bulgaria. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The appellant appeals with permission granted on 28 July 2025 against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 28 June 2025 to refuse the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his application for Pre-Settled Status under the EUSS.
2. The appellant along with his mother, also a national of Bulgaria, applied on 26 October 2022 under the EUSS for Pre-Settled Status. Both applications were refused. The appellant’s mothers’ application was refused on 11 January 2023 and the appellant’s application was refused on 3 February 2023.
3. Both the appellant and his mother appealed those decisions to the FtT. The basis of the appeals was that the mother had been in a relationship with BA, a Bulgarian national, who does have settled status in the United Kingdon under the EUSS. The mother married BA in Bulgaria on 11 September 2022 and she and her son, the appellant, moved to the United Kingdom on 6 October 2022. Both the mother and the appellant had resided in Bulgaria prior to that date. The appellant is not the son of BA. He is the son of the mother’s previous husband. The mother submitted that she had been in a durable relationship with BA since 2017 and thus qualified for Pre-Settled Status. For the appellant it was submitted that as his mother’s son he qualified as a “joining family member of a relevant sponsor” under the Immigration Rules. The sponsor in both the case of the mother and the son being BA.
4. The FtT allowed the mother’s appeal on the basis that it was satisfied, on the evidence, that the mother was in a durable relationship with BA from 2017. However, the FtT refused the appellant’s appeal on the basis that he did not qualify as a “joining family member of a relevant sponsor” under EU14A of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. The FtT also rejected a submission that the appellant qualified as a “family member” of BA under the terms of Article 10(1)(e)(ii) of the Withdrawal Agreement.
5. The appellant appeals against the decision of the FtT.
6. The FtT in considering the application to appeal made an anonymity order, and we have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). We are satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant is a child and the need to protect the confidentiality of the appellant outweighs the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.

Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions
7. There were two grounds of appeal put forward by the appellant in this case. The first ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in law in that it had not correctly interpreted the meaning and application of the phrase “joining family member of a relevant sponsor” in relation to the appellant.
8. The second ground of appeal was that the FtT erred in law in that it did not correctly interpret the meaning of the phrase “directly related” in Article 10(1)(e)(ii) of the Withdrawal Agreement in relation to the appellant.
9. We heard submissions from both Mr Forest for the appellant and Mr Mullen for the respondent. For the respondent Mr Mullen submitted there was no error of law in the decision of the FtT. The FtT had correctly applied the relevant law.
The First Ground of Appeal
10. Mr Forest submitted that the concept of “family relationships” as used in the definition of “joining family member of a relevant sponsor” should be given a broad interpretation sufficient to include within it the concept of a durable relationship such as existed here between the mother and BA. He conceded that if you adopted a literal interpretation then the appellant would not be covered by the definition. However, his primary position was that the correct approach was to take a broader approach.
11. To qualify for Pre-Settled Status it is necessary that the appellant falls within the Immigration Rules. Rule EU14A of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules provides the route by which the appellant may achieve this status. It specifically provides that his application may succeed if he is a “joining family member of a relevant sponsor”. The Immigration Rules then provide a definition of the phrase “joining family member of a relevant sponsor”. The key part of that definition as it relates to a child is as follows:-
“(e) the child or dependent parent of the spouse or civil partner of a relevant sponsor, as described in sub-paragraph (a) above, and all the family relationships:
(i) existed before the specified date (unless, in the case of a child, the person was born after that date, was adopted after that date in accordance with a relevant adoption decision or after that date became a child within the meaning of that entry in this table on the basis of one of sub-paragraphs (a)(iii) to (a)(xi) of that entry)”
To qualify under this definition the appellant would need to be child of the spouse or civil partner of the sponsor BA and (critically) that must be a relationship that existed before the specified date. The specified date being 31/12/20. The reference to “all the family relationships: (i) existed before the specified date” must, in our view, be a reference to the relationship of child, spouse and civil partner. There is no scope within that definition for the child of a durable relationship (which is not marriage or a civil partnership) as at 31.12.20.
12. Mr Forest was not able to provide any authority for the proposition that the reference to “all the family relationships” should encompass a durable relationship that was not marriage or a civil partnership. We can see no basis upon which it would be appropriate to give the words used in the definition any meaning other than their ordinary meaning and it is clear to us that the reference to all the family relationships can only be a reference to the relationships referred to earlier in that paragraph (e) and that is the relationships of child, spouse or civil partner. There is no scope to broaden out that definition to include a durable relationship that is not marriage or civil partnership.
13. For the reasons set out above we do not consider that the first ground of appeal sets out any error of law in the determination of the FtT.
Second Ground of Appeal
14. Mr Forest submitted that it would be appropriate to take into consideration the Withdrawal Agreement between the United Kingdon of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union. In particular he referred to Article 10(1)(e)(ii) which refers to the inclusion within that Part of the Agreement of “family members” who are “directly related” to a “Union citizen who exercised their right to reside in the United Kingdom in accordance with Union law before the end of the transition period and continue to reside there thereafter.” He submitted that with reference to the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Union) the definition of “family member” included the spouse or partner and direct descendants under the age of 21 or dependents of either the person or the spouse/partner.
15. We do not consider that this second ground of appeal is sustainable on two grounds. Firstly, we are not convinced that there is any basis for taking into account the language and definitions contained within the Withdrawal Agreement and the Free Movement Directive in circumstances where the law to be applied here is that set out in the Immigration Rules. We asked Mr Forest on what basis it was relevant for us to go outside the Immigration Rules for an interpretation and he submitted that it was appropriate to take into account equivalent interpretations and that it would be appropriate and just to take into account related statutory provisions in this area. In our view there is no basis for us to go beyond the language that is clearly set out in the Immigration Rules and that we have considered under the first ground of appeal.
16. Secondly, and in any event, we are not satisfied that even taking into account the language and interpretations contained within the Withdrawal Agreement and the Free Movement Directive that the son of a person who enters into a “durable relationship” with an EU citizen who has exercised the right to reside in the United Kingdom prior to the end of the transition period (in the absence of marriage or a civil partnership) is apt to be included within the definition of “family member” or to be considered to be “directly related” to the sponsor. The appellant’s mother was not a spouse or in a civil partnership with the sponsor at the relevant date. The appellant is not a direct descendant of the sponsor and nor is there any evidence to suggest that he was a dependent of the sponsor at the relevant date. Accordingly, even taking into consideration the language used we do not accept that any error of law was made by the FtT under this second ground of appeal.
17. In considering the position both under the Immigration Rules and under the Withdrawal Agreement and the Free Movement Directive it strikes us that the consistent requirement is that there has to be a relationship of marriage or civil partnership at the relevant time. A “durable relationship” is not sufficient where there is a child who is not related to the sponsor. This is the position as determined by the FtT and we accordingly can find no error of law.
18. For the reasons set out above we do not consider that the second ground of appeal sets out any error of law in the determination of the FtT.
Conclusion
19. For the reasons set out above we find that there is no error of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15.01.26