Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003423 & UI-2025-003424

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60286/2023 &
PA/60285/2023
LP/06137/2024 &
LP/10904/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

TM & HM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, IAS solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 19 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants and any member of their family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellants claim to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Egypt. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellants’ case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of their identity.

2. The appellants appeal with permission against the decision, dated 21 May 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeals on international protection and human rights grounds.

Background

3. The appellants are Egyptian nationals and sisters. They were originally dependants on their father’s (‘F’) asylum claim lodged upon arrival in the United Kingdom on 26 June 2012. That claim was refused, withdrawn, and reconsidered over several years, culminating in multiple appeal hearings before the First-tier Tribunal and remittals by the Upper Tribunal. In a decision, dated 4 April 2024, to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of a fresh claim, the FTT rejected the proposition that he was at risk on return to Egypt on account, in part, of his sur place political activity in the UK. Permission to appeal against that decision was refused on renewal to the Upper Tribunal in November 2024. Since the dismissal of his appeal in April 2024, F has continued to engage in overt political activity in the UK against the Egyptian regime. Against this backdrop, each appellant lodged her own protection claim in October 2021, which the Secretary of State refused in October 2023. Their appeals were dismissed by the judge in May 2025, giving rise to the present proceedings. In separate appeal proceedings, F purported to appeal to the FTT against the refusal of the refusal of further submissions. I say “purported” because there is a jurisdictional dispute which, at the time of the error of law hearing in these proceedings, was yet to be resolved. In broad summary, the covering letter, which accompanied the refusal to treat the further submissions as a fresh claim under paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules, indicated that the refusal decision carried a right of appeal. However, the body of the refusal decision did not treat the further submissions as a fresh claim which carried a right of appeal.

4. Both appellants assert a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Egypt, primarily by reason of their imputed political opinion arising from their father’s opposition activities. It is said that he supported Dr Mohamed El Baradei, was detained and mistreated on several occasions in 2011–2012, and that TM herself was detained and sexually assaulted in March 2012. The father’s sur place activities in the UK—attending demonstrations in London, Manchester, and elsewhere, and posting political content online—are relied upon as creating the risk to his family members. The appellants contend that Egyptian authorities maintain a zero-tolerance approach to dissent and target relatives of activists, a claim they say is supported by cogent country background information.

5. In addition to the protection claims, both appellants relied on Article 8 of the ECHR. Each has established family life in the UK: TM is married to a British citizen and employed as a graduate engineer, while HM is in a long-term relationship with a British citizen. They argue that removal would be disproportionate and result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, particularly given the protracted delays in decision-making and litigation, during which their private and family lives have substantially developed. Reliance was placed on EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

6. The appellants applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:

i. The judge did not provide lawfully adequate reasons for rejecting the proposition that F’s sur place political activity in the UK, including that which he had undertaken since April 2024, would put them at risk of persecution to a reasonable degree of likelihood. It was argued that the judge did not expressly address his mind to the factors identified in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 35 (IAC).

ii. The judge did not properly consider the position adopted by the respondent in relation to the appellants’ family finances when he concluded that neither would have access to adequate support and accommodation in the UK.

iii. The judge did not consider the impact of the respondent’s culpable delay in assessing the proportionality of the refusal decisions.

7. In a decision dated 2 September 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Owens granted permission for all grounds to be argued. The following observations were made in granting permission:
It is arguable that at [36] the judge has failed to properly apply BA (Demonstrators in Britain- risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 35 (IAC) and has failed to give adequate reasons for the finding that the appellants’ father has not come to the attention of the Egyptian authorities as a result of his “sur place” activities. The appellants are on notice that the materiality of this error will depend on whether the evidence before the judge supported the submission that family members of political opponents are also at risk.
[…]
8. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

Ground 1

9. The touchstone for considering inadequacy of reasoning as an error of law remains R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At [13]-[14] of the judgment of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning are articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57], the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as a whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.  

10. At the error of law hearing, the parties were agreed that the judge was bound to assess the substance of the father’s political asylum claim, as it then stood, because his daughters’ protection appeals were built upon this factual platform. The judge heard oral evidence from F and properly directed himself that he was required to treat the April 2024 dismissal of his last appeal as the starting point for considering whether he was at risk on return to Egypt. The April 2024 decision itself adopted, as a starting point, an earlier appeal dismissed against F in March 2020. The only meaningful difference between the settled position reflected in the April 2024 decision and the position advanced before the judge at the hearing in May 2025, just over a year later, was evidence of F’s sur place activity in the intervening period. The starting point taken from the April 2024 decision is clearly articulated at [26]-[38] of that previous decision. From this detailed analysis (in the April 2024 decision), the following key points emerge and must be regarded as the judge’s starting point in his analysis of F’s risk profile as of May 2025:

• F had an active Facebook account, under an assumed name, in which he posted critical commentary of the Egyptian regime. There was no real risk that the authorities in Egypt would take an interest in this limited activity. Threats which were said to have been received on this platform were not all they appeared to be given the F’s generally unreliable evidence. After pointing out deficiencies in the social media evidence before her, the judge said this at [30] of the April 2024 decision:
The Facebook evidence, therefore, carries limited weight before me in support of the Appellant’s contention that he has actively supported opposition politics whilst in Egypt, or from the United Kingdom, online and has a genuine interest in now continuing the same.
• The judge was not minded to depart from the starting point she took from the March 2020 decision, that F’s attendance at a demonstration at the Egyptian Embassy in November 2019 was most unlikely to have come to the attention of the Egyptian authorities.

• It was found, at [34], that “there has been little to no evidence of political activity on the Appellant’s part since the Appellant lodged his further submissions in October 2021”. The following overall conclusions were reached between [36] and [38]:
[36] I find, taking all of the Appellant’s evidence together with the documents and his witnesses, that the Appellant may well have supported, at a low level, opposition party politics in Egypt prior to his departure. However, he has not shown that his wish to support has maintained or grown to the extent that he would wish to openly advocate in opposition to the Egyptian authorities on his return. Indeed, I do not accept that he has shown he is doing so now.
[37] Drawing all of the strands together, considering the evidence before me in the round, and taking Judge Cruthers’ findings on the evidence before him as my starting point not my end point, for the reasons that I set out above I come to the following findings of fact:
(a) To the lower standard of proof, the Appellant has shown that he engaged in low level support for opposition politics between 2009 and December 2011 in Egypt;
(b) Even to the lower standard of proof, the Appellant has not shown that he has ever come to the adverse attention of the Egyptian authorities prior to his departure in 2012. I find no cogent evidential basis to depart from the findings of Judge Cruthers;
(c) Even to the lower standard, the Appellant has not shown that he ever engaged in significant support for opposition politics in Egypt, including by actively campaigning or renting offices for Dr ElBaradei. Again, I find no cogent evidential basis to depart from the findings of Judge Cruthers;
(d) Even to the lower standard of proof, the Appellant has not shown that his sur place activities have come to the adverse attention of the Egyptian authorities;
(e) The Appellant has not shown that he is otherwise of interest to the Egyptian authorities;
(f) Even to the lower standard of proof, the Appellant has not shown that he currently holds a political opinion that he would wish to advocate openly, privately or at all upon his return to Egypt.
Risk on Return – Issue (e)
[38] As to risk on return, there was broad agreement between the Parties before me that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant will be asked some questions at the airport upon his return to Egypt. On my findings above, that questioning is not reasonably likely to arise as a result of any adverse interest that the authorities have in the Appellant because he has not established that factual aspect of his account.
11. Taking the March 2020 and April 2024 decisions as his starting point, the judge attached little weight to F’s oral evidence ([31]) and found him to be lacking in credibility ([32]). After addressing supporting evidence adduced in respect to F’s brother, who continues to reside in Egypt, he said this at [35]:
[35] […] Moreover it begs the question as to why F’s daughters would be at risk in Egypt whereas apparently F’s brother continues to live there with little evidence that he is at risk.
12. The judge’s essential reasoning on the protection claims brought by F’s daughters is to be seen at [36]-[37]:
[36] In relation to F’s surplice [sic] activity I note that F claimed to have begun this activity in his testimony given in the hearing in front of IJ Frantzis. I accept that F may have continued this activity by attending a number of public demonstrations. Applying the rationale contained in the case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) I conclude that F has failed to establish that he possesses a profile that would attract the attention of the authorities which would lead to him being identified upon return to Egypt. By extension the appellants have failed to establish that F’s sur place activities would put them at risk if they returned to Egypt.
[37] Having taken into account all of the aforementioned “new evidence” (and the reiteration of F’s asylum claim made in the various witness statements and oral testimony before me) applying the principles in the case of Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702 I conclude that I should not depart from the decisions of the 2 previous Judges that F’s claim is not credible and by extension I do not accept the claims of the appellants which is based upon it.
13. During the error of law hearing, I was invited to consider the underlying evidence, which was before the judge, of F’s sur place activity in the UK since April 2024. This evidence is set out from page 374 of the consolidated error of law hearing bundle. Of particular note is a copy of an online and freely accessible article from December 2024 in which the sub-headline and full width photograph shows a protest in which F can be clearly seen in the foreground holding, together with five others, a large banner which is strongly critical of the Egyptian government. Mr Tan observed that the Facebook post of this article appears to have attracted limited engagement. This is a legitimate point but, as Mr Wood countered, it was not a point considered by the judge. The reality is that there is no meaningful analysis of the impact of F’s sur place activity since the April 2024 decision. While the judge has indicated that he took into account the factors identified in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return), it is impossible to make sense of what the judge made of whether F might now be readily identifiable as a vocal oppositional activist by the Egyptian authorities and what that would mean for his risk profile on return.

14. It is worth reminding oneself of what was actually decided in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702. While a previous decision stands as the authoritative judicial assessment of a claim at the time it was made and functions as the starting point for any relevant future assessment, important observations were made at [38] about the duty of a subsequent judge to engage with superseding developments:
The second Adjudicator must, however be careful to recognise that the issue before him is not the issue that was before the first Adjudicator. In particular, time has passed; and the situation at the time of the second Adjudicator's determination may be shown to be different from that which obtained previously. Appellants may want to ask the second Adjudicator to consider arguments on issues that were not - or could not be - raised before the first Adjudicator; or evidence that was not - or could not have been - presented to the first Adjudicator.
15. There was no dispute between the parties that the Devaseelan principles apply, with appropriate modification, where the previous decision relates to a relevant person who is not a party in the present proceedings, such as F here (see TK (Consideration of Prior Determination – Directions) Georgia [2004] UKIAT 00149, Ocampo v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1276, AA (Somalia) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1040 and SSHD v Patel [2022] EWCA Civ 36).

16. I am unable to conclude that there was a meaningful judicial assessment of the sur place activity which followed the April 2024 decision. If it was a case of ‘more of the same’, it may have been sufficient to conclude that there was nothing qualitatively different from the nature and extent of the activities previously, and relatively recently, considered in the April 2024 decision. However, that was not, in my judgement, what was before the judge here. The judge had before him evidence which tended to suggest that F was readily identifiable from an online article which, it was argued, showed him to be prominently involved in a public protest against the Egyptian regime. None of this to say that it will ultimately be concluded that F is at risk of being identified by the Egyptian authorities and being subject to persecution, or even that he genuinely holds the political opinions he has apparently expressed in this public setting. However, I am satisfied that it was a necessary ingredient of a lawfully reasoned judicial assessment to engage with the likely impact that the post-April 2024 political activity might have on F’s risk profile. His daughters’ protection appeals were built on the risk they claimed to face as a consequence of the risk their father might face. This was the fundamental issue the judge was required to consider.

17. I have carefully considered whether the reasoning error I have found is rendered immaterial by the judge’s observation at [35] that the appellants were hardly likely to be at risk from their father’s activities given the apparent safety in which F’s brother continues to live in Egypt. I am not satisfied that a direct parallel can be drawn between an adult sibling and members of the core family unit encompassed by parents and children. In any event, the passing comment which bookended findings about the reliability of supporting documents at [35] is difficult to regard as a settled finding that the appellants would not be at risk on account of remoteness from the primary target of any putative persecution. As the judge said himself, “it begs the question”, it does not answer the question.

18. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the judge’s decision involves a material error of law in how the protection claim was resolved.

Grounds 2 and 3

19. In view of the conclusion I have reached on the first and primary ground of appeal, it is unnecessary to assess grounds two and three in depth. This is because the protection ground necessarily functioned as a foundation for the overall claim including the human rights challenges. If the protection claim ultimately succeeds, the Article 8 grounds would necessarily fall away because there would no longer be any prospect of removal. In addition, it could hardly be concluded, as the judge has, that there are not very significant obstacles to integration in circumstances where the existence of a risk of persecution is yet to be resolved. In any event, it is worth noting that there was real substance to ground 3 in relation to both appellants and ground 2 in relation to HM. There is nothing on the face of the judge’s decision to indicate that the delay point, which was squarely raised in the papers, was considered in the context of whether the refusal decisions were disproportionate interferences. Equally, the concession made at [18] of the respondent’s review dated 24 July 2024 in relation to HM is exceptionally difficult to reconcile with the finding at [58(d)] of the judge’s assessment of proportionality in which it was noted that neither appellant had established adequate support.

Disposal

20. In view of the broad sweep of fact-finding which remains to be judicially assessed, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to remit the appeals to the FTT to be heard de novo. It is obviously desirable that these appeals are resolved jointly with any judicial determination of F’s pending protection appeal if the FTT concludes that it has jurisdiction to decide that appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the judge involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision without preserving any findings of fact. The matters are remitted to the FTT to be decided de novo by a different judge.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 January 2026