Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-003427
First-tier Tribunal Number: HU/56542/2023
LH/06766/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued

On 13 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

MD RAFIQUL ISLAM
(Anonymity order not made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr H Broachwalla, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 1 October 2025
The Appellant
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 4 September 1978. He appeals against a decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Webb dated 13 May 2025 to dismiss an appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 4 May 2025. That decision in turn was to refuse the appellant’s application for leave to remain made on 24 February 2022. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 9 June 2010 with leave to enter as a spouse. That relationship broke down and there was a divorce on 1 March 2016. Subsequently the appellant made the February 2022 application for leave on private and family law grounds.
The Appellant’s Case
2. The appellant’s case is that he has been in a relationship with a United Kingdom citizen Ms Natalie Hone (“the sponsor”) since May 2022 which had thus continued for more than two years at the date of hearing. The sponsor gave evidence to the Tribunal at first instance and at [37] of the determination the judge accepted the existence of the relationship and its genuineness finding the appellant and sponsor credible on that point. The appellant has been living in the United Kingdom for 15 years and his mental health would suffer if he were to be returned to Bangladesh. His previous marriage ended in divorce and he was the victim of domestic violence during that marriage. Although he has family still in Bangladesh, there would be significant obstacles to his return there. The sponsor would encounter significant obstacles of her own as she was westernised; she would not be able to drink alcohol or socialise as she does in the United Kingdom. Bangladesh society would not accept the relationship.
The Decision at First Instance
3. In relation to the interference with the couple’s relationship the judge said at [43] to [45]:
“43. I accept that moving to Bangladesh would mean lifestyle changes for [the sponsor]. However, her evidence about the support [she gave to] her parents did not show that they were dependent upon her for their everyday needs. I find there is a relationship between [the sponsor] and her parents, but this would not prevent her from leaving them and living in Bangladesh.
44. In assessing any difficulties that [the sponsor] may face in Bangladesh because of the lifestyle difference I have taken into account that she would not be moving there alone, but would have the support of the appellant who is familiar with Bangladeshi society and would be in a position to support her during any transition.
45. Having considered the evidence I have before me I find the appellant has not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the difficulties the couple may face in Bangladesh amount to insurmountable obstacles.
4. In relation to the appellant’s mental health issue the judge stated at [25] to [27]:
“25. While accepting that the appellant was mentally well at the moment, [counsel for the appellant] pointed to the medical evidence that showed the appellant had depression in the past (SB 425-427).
26. With respect to that submission the medical evidence does not support that the appellant’s mental health would deteriorate in the way in which [counsel] submitted. Nor was there any suggestion that even if the appellant’s mental health did deteriorate that he would not have support from his family or medical professionals in Bangladesh to enable him to continue with day-to-day activities.
27. Having considered the evidence I am satisfied that the appellant’s mental health would not prevent him from engaging in everyday activities in Bangladesh. “
5. Although the immigration rules were not met in this case the judge acknowledged that article 8 was engaged. At [51] to [55] the judge conducted the balancing exercise before concluding at [56]:
“I find the factors raised by the appellant do not outweigh the public interest in removal. The decision does not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences and does not breach Article 8 ECHR. “
He dismissed the appeal.
The Onward Appeal
6. The appellant appealed this decision on two grounds while accepting there was considerable overlap between the grounds themselves. Ground 1 argued that the judge had failed to consider relevant factors such as the difficulties the sponsor would face in Bangladesh. She did not speak the language, would not have help from her family to integrate, had western values which would be frowned upon and there would be no societal acceptance of her. The appellant had himself been a victim of domestic violence but the judge had not considered how the appellant would be perceived or dealt with because of this abuse.
7. Ground 2 argued that the proportionality assessment was flawed because the judge had not considered that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence nor the fact that the appellant was likely to succeed in an application for entry clearance if returned to Bangladesh. Insufficient weight was placed on the difficulties the sponsor would have if the appellant returned to Bangladesh.
8. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal stating:
“The Appellant argues that the IJ failed to consider the Sponsor’s Westernisation, the history of domestic abuse suffered by the Appellant which led to embarrassment and a removal of family support, the impact that the Appellant’s removal would have on the Sponsor’s health and whether it would be proportionate for the Appellant to be required to return to Bangladesh to make an application for entry clearance. In isolation, it could be said that these omissions would have made no material difference to the overall outcome. However, all of these issues were raised as factors in the skeleton argument and may be material when considered cumulatively.”
9. The respondent filed a notice under Rule 24 in response to the grant of permission submitting that the judge had directed himself correctly. The grounds amounted to nothing more than a mere disagreement and an attempt to re-argue the case as it was before the FTT. The FTTJ has considered all the factors put forward in the appellant’s case before reaching his decision. In terms of the sponsor’s westernisation, the Respondent submitted that [43] of the determination (see paragraph 3 above) cannot be read in isolation. It was clear from [42] that the Judge had considered the point in the context of the sponsor’s lifestyle and appearance which would include the way someone dresses. The judge had dealt with the issue of societal acceptance in some detail. “
The Hearing Before Me
10. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place where there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.
11. For the appellant Counsel stated that there were two grounds: a failure to take into account material factors and a failure to assess the proportionality of the interference with the appellant's family life. There was a significant overlap between the two grounds. As to ground one, the judge had not given proper consideration to the fact that the appellant's relationship with the sponsor would be unacceptable in Bangladesh or what the result would be if they did go there.
12. The second material error was how the judge had assessed the sponsor’s westernisation. On return to Bangladesh the sponsor would need to make lifestyle changes including dressing in an Islamic way and this was more than a lifestyle change. Such factors were ingrained into the fabric of someone's character. The judge wrongly assessed these changes which went to a person's identity. The judge had failed to take into account the sponsor’s intolerance of heat. She would be a Christian in a predominantly Muslim country. Counsel conceded that on their own these factors might not be enough to amount to very significant obstacles but they were cumulative. They could have swayed the decision.
13. That it was not illegal to live together without being married did not mean that the relationship would be acceptable to society. These were two different things. There was evidence of minorities being mistreated in Bangladesh. The couple would face discrimination in housing and obtaining employment. The judge had said that the partner's parents were not dependent on the sponsor for everyday needs but had failed to consider the regular care that the sponsor provided to her parents. She visited them once or twice per week and had taken her father for hospital visits. The question was what would happen to her parents if she and the appellant were removed.
14. On the subject of proportionality the appellant's experience of domestic violence was raised as an issue in this hearing and there was correspondence in support of the appellant's claim. As the judge had found the appellant to be a credible witness, the appellant was therefore credible on the issue of whether he had suffered domestic violence. If the appellant were to be returned to Bangladesh he would succeed with an application to return to the United Kingdom to be with the sponsor. Thus the case of Chikwamba would apply. The couple were not choosing where to conduct their family life they were saying that there was not a choice because there were too many difficulties in having them family life in Bangladesh.
15. In reply the respondent relied on the rule 24. The judge had considered the arguments in the case it was not a matter for the appellant and the sponsor to choose where to settle. What was being put to the tribunal was not corroborated. The couple would have been aware of their differences and that they might well have to live together elsewhere. Whether the partner might not be able to tolerate heat was not a relevant consideration. There was no evidence the sponsor had any medical issues affected by heat. As to the sponsor's parents there was no evidence that the parents would be unable to continue their relationship with the sponsor if she were to relocate to Bangladesh. The parents could access support if they needed it and make alternative arrangements. There was no evidence that there were no other family members who might take over assisting with the care of the parents.
16. A consideration of the appellant's private life and the factors in section 117B of the 2002 Act appeared at [46] to [56] of the determination. Although the appellant claimed to be a victim of domestic violence he was not in fact claiming under the rules as a victim. The appellant was legally represented but he had not put to the respondent as the main part of his case any application to consider this aspect and the rules relating to domestic violence cases. Although there was correspondence from the appellant's solicitors on the point it was not put to the respondent that they were making a formal application.
17. In conclusion Counsel stated that there was an NHS letter in the bundle which confirmed the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence. The couple wanted to live in the United Kingdom because society in Bangladesh would not accept their relationship. The section 117B factors had been considered in the case of GM Sri Lanka [2019] EWCA Civ 1630. At paragraph 32 thereof, the Court of Appeal had stated that the list of factors to be taken into account in a proportionality exercise under Article 8 was not closed. “There is in principle no limit to the factors which might, in a given case, be relevant to an evaluation under Article 8, which is a fact sensitive exercise…. Nonetheless, there is in practice a relatively well trodden list of factors which tend to arise in the cases”
Discussion and Findings
18. This is a reasons based challenge, the appellant arguing that the judge failed to take into account relevant matters and has failed to carry out an adequate balancing exercise when considering the proportionality of interference in the appellant's family life. The appellant argues that he can bring himself within the immigration rules because there are insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of his family life with the sponsor if he were returned Bangladesh. He can also bring himself within the rules in respect of his private life under Appendix PL 5.1 (D) because there are very significant obstacles to his integration into Bangladesh.
19. Notwithstanding his claim that he can bring himself within the rules he also argues that his appeal should in any event be allowed under article 8 because the respondent's decision disproportionately interferes with his family and private life that he has established in the United Kingdom even if the respondent's decision is pursuant to the legitimate aim of immigration control.
20. The appellant argues that in arriving at his decision the judge failed to take into account certain relevant matters. For example, in relation to the appellant's claim that there would be very significant obstacles to integration the judge did not factor in that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence in the past. It is correct that the judge does not refer specifically to the appellant's claim to have been a victim of domestic violence but it is difficult to see what relevance such a claim has in the appellant's present circumstances. As the respondent pointed out although the appellant's representatives were in correspondence with the respondent, no specific application was made under the immigration rules relating to domestic violence claims. There was no specific medical evidence that the appellant's health or ability to cope on return to Bangladesh were adversely affected by this domestic violence.
21. The appellant has put the argument on the basis that Bangladesh society will look down upon him because he was a victim of domestic violence but it is difficult to see in a country the size of Bangladesh how people would know that such had occurred. It is not a material error of law for the judge to fail to mention an irrelevant matter.
22. The appellant has been in United Kingdom for a number of years but his February 2022 application for leave to remain was refused in part because he could not bring himself within the immigration rules since at the time of his application he was not in a relationship. He failed to meet paragraph 276 ADE (1) of the rules. He speaks Bengali and is familiar with the country having spent the first 32 years of his life there before coming to the United Kingdom. He has family there.
23. The main issue in this case is the appellant's argument that the family life he has established with the sponsor would be disproportionately interfered with by the respondent's decision because there were very significant and insurmountable obstacles for the appellant and the sponsor continuing their family life in Bangladesh. Further under article 8 outside the rules, it would be unduly harsh such that the appellant should succeed in his appeal outside the immigration rules. Whether the appellant and sponsor were or were not married, the relationship is not illegal in Bangladesh as the judge pointed out. The appellant refers somewhat vaguely to societal disapproval of his relationship with the sponsor but again it is difficult to see what such disapproval would consist of. It is not argued that it would reach the level of article 3 treatment. The appellant argues that he might face discrimination whether in obtaining housing or employment but he is very familiar with his country of origin and as a Bangladesh citizen seeking employment or housing, it is difficult to see what discrimination he would suffer or why his family members could not help him. There was no expert evidence before the judge to indicate the appellant would face such difficulties because of his relationship with the sponsor or otherwise.
24. It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that this appeal is simply a disagreement with the determination of the judge and an attempt in the grounds to re-argue matters already decided. The judge gave cogent reasons for his decision why there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant and sponsor enjoying their family life in Bangladesh. He carefully carried out the balancing exercise. There is nothing to indicate that he has made a material error of law in the determination.
25. There were a number of matters raised such as the sponsor's westernisation, her concern over the heat in Bangladesh and the fact that she and the appellant have different religions. It was conceded that these matters do not in themselves indicate very significant obstacles but it was claimed that cumulatively they cross the necessary threshold. At [40[ to [45] of the determination the judge set out very clearly both the claimed obstacles themselves and importantly the difficulties the appellant had in seeking to establish the existence of obstacles to a return to Bangladesh. This included the obstacles the sponsor claimed she would have. The burden of proof rested on the appellant and it was for him to show what he meant by societal discrimination or other adverse consequences that he and the sponsor might suffer upon his return to Bangladesh. The judge noted the absence of such evidence see [39] where the judge cites the CPIN. For the reasons given, the judge was entitled to find that the appellant could not make out his case.
26. Given the appellant’s immigration history, that he was making an application for leave to remain in circumstances where his previous leave was no longer valid it could not be said that he was so certain of being issued with leave to enter that it was a mere bureaucratic formality to expect him to return to Bangladesh and make his application from there. This is not a Chikwamba case.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal
Appellant’s appeal dismissed

Signed this 3rd day of October 2025

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge