Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003434
UI-2025-003435

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01363/2023
PA/01364/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

28th October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

TK and MJUU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The appellant acting in person
For the Respondent: Mr A. McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at the IAC on 6 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This direction applies both to the appellants and to the respondent.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Caswell) promulgated on 26 April 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decisions dated 11 September 2023 to refuse their protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of their appeal involve a protection claim and also as the second appellant is a minor and that the rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know their identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
3. The factual background can be summarised as follows. The appellants are nationals of Namibia. The first appellant, arrived in the UK in January 2020 and claimed asylum, humanitarian protection, and leave to remain on human rights grounds. Her son, the second appellant was born in the UK in March 2020.
4. The FtTJ summarised the factual background to the appeal between paragraphs 4 –9 of her decision. The appellant is from X in Namibia and also spent time in (another city identified). She had undertaken work in a bank. She had an affair with a married man (who will be referred to as “M”). In 2017 she became pregnant by M. M’s wife (who is referred to as “E”) and her sisters came to the appellant’s home and beat her, so that she had a miscarriage. The appellant called the police, and they came and helped. A restraining order was made against E. In 2018 the appellant became pregnant by M for a second time. E came to the appellant’s house and forced her to have an illegal abortion. The appellant also has two other children (not the children of M). She was frightened of E, so sent those two children to live with her mother. The appellant came to the UK accompanied by M, where she gave birth to the second named appellant who is the son of M.
5. Her son is in school but is not settling well and the appellant is trying to get additional support for him. The appellant is in employment as a healthcare assistant. The appellant is no longer in a relationship with M.
6. The appellant fears to return to Namibia, because she believes she will face societal discrimination and harm, as a woman who has had an affair with a married man and has had his child. She also fears E. The appellant does not believe the police would help her and does not believe she can safely and reasonably relocate within Namibia, as it is a small country and people know each other. She is worried she will be harassed on social media.
7. The appellant is in touch with her mother and children, and also her brothers in Namibia.
8. The respondent refused the claims in decisions taken on 11 September 2023 which led to the appeal before the FtT.
9. In her decision the FtTJ set out the principal issues in dispute at paragraph 12 as follows:
(i) is the appellant’s account of her affair with M and her problems with E credible?
(ii) would the appellant be at real risk of harm from society generally and/or on return the appellant risk on return?
(iii) Would there be sufficiency of protection for the appellant?
(iv) can be safely and reasonably relocate within Namibia with her son
(v) with particular reference to the interests of her son, would it be a breach of article 8 rights of the appellant to be returned with her son to Namibia?
10. In her decision promulgated on 26 April 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal.
11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, and permission was granted by a Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal on 13 June 2025.
12. The hearing took place on 22 January 2025. The appellant appeared in person as she did before the FtTJ and the respondent by Mr McVeety senior Presenting Officer. At the start of the hearing and in recognition of the relevant guidance I explained the procedure that would be adopted during the hearing and explained who was representing the respondent and what their role would be. I attempted to put her at ease and that she would be able to provide her replies and that she could take a break at any time.
13. I ensured that the appellant had access to the documents. The Tribunal have a duty to provide a bundle of documents in advance of the hearing as prepared by the Tribunal staff for appellants who are representing themselves. This was sent to the appellant in an email dated 24 September 2025. She confirmed that the email address on the electronic file was correct and was able to check via her phone that the bundle had been sent to her. She confirmed that she had the bundle open at the hearing and in addition she was provided with a hardcopy of her grounds which she had sent the Tribunal and had prepared herself and a hardcopy of the decision of the FtTJ.
14. As to the provision of other evidence, the appellant had sent an email referring to Rule 24 response and that supporting evidence had also been sent. However, on the electronic file the email was present, but no supporting evidence had been uploaded. Mr McVeety was able to find this email and supporting evidence and he was able to provide a copy for the tribunal. Time was taken to read the documents along with the appellant and to identify those documents.
15. They comprised of the following:
(1) an email dated 19 May 2025 to the head teacher at her son’s school referring to concerns that she had expressed. There was an undated letter which had been sent to the head teacher (which appears to have been written after 4 April 2025 but before the hearing on 23 April 2025). This was a document which was put before the FtTJ.
(2) There is a pastoral support plan, dated November 2024 and an additional needs plan between the appellant as parent and the school. Neither document was put before the FtTJ.
(3) There is a report dated 29 July 2025 based on assessment taken on 7 July 2025 and 25 July follow up relating to the appellant’s son. This took place three months after the hearing before the FtTJ and therefore was not available to her.
(4) There was an email dated 3 July 2025 to the Deputy Head Teacher referring to having a meeting and requesting a further meeting.
(5) There was a letter to the Home Office requesting a relocation to a different address nearer to her sister (which was not before the FtTJ). Also, a letter dated 24 March 2025 from the appellant’s sister requesting a relocation for the appellant refusing that request.
(6) There is a letter dated 17 April 2025 written by an employee of her GP practice. This was a document that was before the FtTJ (p45Cef).
(7) There were a series of emails provided. The appellant had applied for an adjournment relying on the letter of 17 April 2025. The application was refused on 17 April 2025 by a FtTJ with reasons. The email response was confirmed by the appellant and later she confirmed that her son had an appointment on the same day, but she would be attending the hearing.
(8) There is a copy of the handwritten grounds for the appeal which are also the same as those set out in the bundle for this hearing at page 14.
(9) There is a document email dated 4 September 2025 to the admissions team to request school transfer for her son. This event post -dates the hearing before the FtTJ and therefore was not before her.
(10) There is a sheet from her medical records (accessed on 8/9/25) relating solely to the consultation taken on 10 April 2025 referring to poor sleep and the problems due to her son having problems at school. The appellant was provided with advice as to sleep hygiene.
16. Mr McVeety opposed the admission of these documents on the basis that they were not available to the FtTJ when she made her decision. Some of those documents predate the hearing and the report relating to the appellant’s son was not available until three months after the hearing had been concluded. The appellant sought to rely on the material as she stated it was relevant to her son. I have read that material de bene esse and will refer to it later.
17. The grounds relied upon (as attached to the grounds of appeal in handwriting) are as follows:
18. Ground 1: there is an error in the assessment of risk on return. The judge accepted the credibility of my account regarding past persecution from E but erred by concluding that I would not face a real risk of harm now. The judge failed to properly consider that absence of recent contact does not eliminate ongoing risk in a close-knit community where threats could re-emerge upon my return, especially given the traumatic history.
19. Ground 2: there is an error in considering sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The FtTJ found that police would protect me based on a historic incident without considering the reliability and sustainability of that protection now, or the potential social repercussions on re-engaging authorities in a small community. The judge also underestimated the difficulties of relocation within Namibia for a single mum including social stigma, emotional trauma and lack of local support.
20. Ground 3: there was a failure to consider my child’s best interests under article 8. While the judge acknowledged my son is not settled at school and requires additional support, insufficient weight was given to the impact of uprooting him from his only known home, education and access to healthcare in the UK. It was an error to conclude that returning us to Namibia where no specific arrangements for support or education were addressed, was proportionate.
21. Ground 4: failure to take into account my deteriorating mental health and well-being. The tribunal did not sufficiently consider the serious emotional toll this long running case has taken on me. I am emotionally exhausted and unable to sleep properly and struggling to cope. There is medical evidence already on record confirming this. Earlier this month I formally requested to be relocated closer to my sister because I am no longer coping where I currently live.
22. In addition, my young son is struggling at school due to significant speech delays. He often responded shouting, screaming and hitting which has been extremely distressing for both of us. I am currently in the process of trying to secure additional support him through special educational needs services. This constant struggle to advocate for his well-being has placed an overwhelming burden on me. The tribunal failed to consider how these ongoing difficulties affect not only my own welfare but also my ability to care for my child
23. Furthermore, if we were returned to Namibia we would have no access to the vital speech therapy, child development support and SEN but my son urgently needs which would have a devastating impact on his speech development.
24. There was also a further typewritten document which the appellant had sent to the tribunal referenced as a Rule 24 response.
25. That document was intended to stand as an answer to the Rule 24 response filed on behalf of the respondent and essentially reiterates the same points made in the grounds.
26. At the hearing the appellant confirmed that she relied upon those written grounds and the typed response that those documents set out what she would like to say in respect of the points raised against the decision of FtTJ Caswell.
27. When asked if there was anything additional, she would wish to say she referred to a written statement that she had with her which she read to the tribunal. The contents of that letter related to her request to be relocated to a different area to be near a family member and that it was not a matter of preference but for the well-being of herself and her son.
28. The respondent had filed a reply to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 5 September 2025. Mr McVeety relied upon that reply and in addition made the following oral submissions. As regards the additional documents that were relied upon by the appellant, he submitted that whilst they could have relevance if any error of law is established, the documents that she sought to rely upon had not been placed before the FtTJ and therefore the FtTJ could not be said to be in error in not addressing any issues that have been subsequently raised in documentary evidence. He submitted the judge could not be expected to know what the later position was in respect of either the appellant or her child but in any event the judge took into account the evidence that had been placed before her relating to the second appellant and correctly at paragraph 26 and that her son was having difficulties. However, there was no evidence from any professional available or any diagnosis and even on the material that the appellant sought to rely upon not available to the FtTJ, there was still no diagnosis as to the cause of any difficulties with his speech.
29. As to the grounds of challenge they were addressed in the Rule 24 response that there was nothing to undermine the FtTJ’s assessment of the evidence or the conclusions that she reached. The grounds do not identify any material error of law in the decision reached and the findings were based on the evidence had been presented at the hearing. He submitted that whilst the appellant would have preferred for a different outcome, the grounds do not demonstrate any error of law in the approach taken by the FtTJ.
30. He submitted that the judge dealt with the evidence as to sufficiency protection including the appellant’s own evidence to show that the police had taken action. The Home Office decision referred to the objective evidence, and ground 1 to no more than a disagreement with the decision.
31. As to ground 3 and the assertion that there was a failure to consider the child’s best interests, Mr McVeety made submissions about the grant of permission and that it appeared to have been granted without reference to the evidence. There was no medical evidence before the FtTJ concerning either the appellant or her son. There was very limited evidence about the child’s needs and what evidence there was had been addressed by the FtTJ at paragraph 26. The FtTJ only had the letter from the appellant she had written herself. The FtTJ addressed the child’s best interests which were to remain with her mother and the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant was not a qualifying child, nor was he a British citizen or had spent seven years in the United Kingdom.
32. As to any medical grounds, there was no medical evidence before the FtTJ, and the burden was on the appellant to demonstrate that there was evidence in support of any Article 3 or 8 claim based on her medical condition. Additionally, there was no country materials or any evidence that she could not obtain assistance for her mental health in Namibia and there was no of any ongoing treatment. In the circumstances there was no evidence to establish that she could demonstrate a breach of Article 3 to the recognised level of severity. He submitted that he was not wishing to downplay her issues or those of her child, but the evidence submitted did not meet the applicable threshold. There was no error of law in the FtTJ’s decision.
33. By way of reply the appellant submitted that there was a threat at home which was a very small community. She stated that the appeal was for her son and that she had really struggled and that she had to complain to the school governors relating to an incident that had taken place. She confirmed that she had trouble sleeping but could not be prescribed sleeping tablets and was given some antidepressants in April 2025.
34. After each of the parties had the opportunity to set out what they wished to say about the appeal, I explained to the appellant that I would give my decision in writing on whether an error of law was established in the decision of the FtTJ and in the circumstances the decision would be reserved.
35. I have addressed those respective submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
Analysis and conclusions:
36. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play and the evidence that has been presented for th FtTJ to assess.
37. The first ground relates to the assessment of risk on return. Reference has been made by the appellant that having accepted her past claim the FtTJ should have found that there was a real risk on return.
38. At paragraph 19 of her decision the FtTJ set out the appellant’s account was largely consistent with a written statement and record of interview and thus applying the lower standard of proof of “a reasonable likelihood”, the FtTJ accepted her account of what had happened in Namibia as credible. Whilst the appellant refers to past persecution the FtTJ applied in substance Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules and concluded from the evidence that there were “no good reasons” to consider that such harm would be repeated. The assessment also based upon a consideration of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation which the FtTJ assessed and concluded were reasonably available to the appellant.
39. At paragraph 20 the FtTJ assessed the issue of risk as at the date of hearing, which is the requisite date, but found that in respect of E the appellant had no contact with her since she had left Namibia. The FtTJ also found from the history of events that the current position was that the appellant was no longer in contact with M (E’s husband) and did not even know if E and M remained married. As this had been the cause of the original problems between the appellant and E the FtTJ was entitled to take into account that the circumstances were different, there had been a lack of contact between them over a significant period and that the appellant would not be at real risk from E.
40. Insofar as the appellant had relied upon future harm in the context of societal discrimination, the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant had not substantiated this claim with any objective evidence. Furthermore, the FtTJ referred to the factual claim and that the appellant had not described any real problems faced by her from society generally before she left Namibia.
41. Having considered the decision, the appellant’s grounds do not establish that the FtTJ’s findings of fact were in error when reaching the conclusion that she did on the evidence that was before her.
42. In the alternative, the FtTJ also found that even if there was a threat from E and/or anyone else that there was a sufficiency of protection available in Namibia for her. In other words, the appellant had not demonstrated that the police would not protect her (see FtTJ’s assessment at paragraph 21).
43. The appellant’s grounds challenge that assessment on the basis that the FtTJ did not consider the reliability of the protection or the “potential social repercussions on re-engaging with the authorities.” In support of the grounds the appellant does not refer to any objective evidence relevant to Namibia or engage with that which was referred to in the decision letter which was before the FtTJ and as such the grounds amount to no more than a generalised criticism of the FtTJ’s decision. The FtTJ was entitled to consider the evidence and that the appellant had not demonstrated in relation to her circumstances that the police would not provide protection for her. When assessing sufficiency of protection available, the FtTJ was entitled to assess the steps taken by the police. The appellant’s evidence was that she had made a complaint to the police and that they had acted upon this by applying for a restraining order. The document was in the bundle before the FtTJ (see p49Cef) and that there was a Protection Order made under section 1 of the Combating of Domestic Violence Act 2003.
44. The decision letter had set out the objective country information relating to Namibia and whilst recognising that there were serious concerns concerning gender-based violence, it set out that the law provided for procedural safeguards including Protection Orders. Reference is made in the material to the establishment of 17 Gender-Based Violence Protection Units (GBVPU) within NAMPOH across all 14 regions which provided support and assistance to gender-based victims and to their families. This is taken from paragraph 7.3.1 of the Country Policy and Information Note-women fearing gender-based violence (September 2021) and also paragraph 2.5.3 of the same report. Reference is made to magistrates courts in each town and also periodical courts in populated settlement areas. Reference is made to police stations offering services by the police even for the smaller settlements which assisted women accessing justice.
45. The FtTJ was entitled to consider not just the general protection available as set out in the decision letter but also that the appellant herself had been able to access protection previously and it was open to the FtTJ to make her finding of fact taking that into account.
46. In this context the FtTJ made a finding at paragraph 22 that the appellant would also be able to move to a different area of Namibia. The FtTJ addressed the competing arguments at paragraph 22 noting that the respondent had argued that the appellant would not be known to have had an affair and therefore would not face any societal discrimination at all and in addition she would be less likely to come across E. The appellant had argued that the country was small and that “everyone knows everyone”.
47. Having set out the above it was open to the FtTJ to reject the appellant’s argument. As to the size of Namibia the decision letter out that Namibia was a vast country with approximately 2.5 million people (taken from the CPIN at paragraph 2.6.2). The finding made by the FtTJ that the appellant could relocate to a place where her background was not known was consistent with the country evidence. There was no evidence before the FtTJ which would support any finding that E had the influence or power to find the appellant wherever she lived.
48. The appellant has argued that in reaching that conclusion on internal relocation the FtTJ has underestimated the difficulties of her locating as a single mother. However, that submission is not supported by any evidence. It was open to the FtTJ to take into account the personal circumstances of the appellant who, whilst a single mother, had received a good education and had demonstrated employment skills both in Namibia having worked in a bank but also transferable skills obtained from her work as a health assistant in the United Kingdom. The appellant’s finding that she could find work in Namibia to support herself and her son was a finding open to the FtTJ based on the evidence of the appellant’s own circumstances. The appellant had family members remaining in Namibia including her mother and male siblings and even if she lived in a different place, it was not established that they would not provide support for her. Consequently, the grounds do not demonstrate that the FtTJ erred in her assessment of internal relocation on the evidence provided to her and sufficiently addressed the issue of potential hardship, or in other words whether it would be unduly harsh for her to relocate at paragraph 22 of her decision.
49. The grounds challenge the decision on the basis that there was a failure to properly consider the best interests of the appellant’s son.
50. It is necessary to consider the evidence or material that was before the FtTJ when addressing this ground. As to the appellant’s son’s specific circumstances there was a letter before the FtTJ (see p46Cef). It is an undated letter but when reading its contents and the reference is made to meetings on 1 April 2025 and 4 April 2025, it must have been written between those dates and the date of the hearing which was 23 April 2025. It consists of a letter written by the appellant herself where she outlined the difficulties that she said there were which included that her son had struggled to settle into the school environment having started school in September (this must be referring to September 2023) and that she had worked proactively with the school, but challenges persisted. Reference is made to a meeting with the school on 1 April 2025 and the replies given by the staff who referred to school being a different setting from home and at the meeting she referred to needing further individual support. Reference is also made to requiring speech therapy and that she had requested this in 2023 but was still waiting.
51. This was the only evidence that was before the FtTJ concerning the appellant’s son. As Mr McVeety submitted there was no medical evidence provided in respect of her son. Although the grant of permission referred to this, in fact there was very limited evidence concerning the appellant’s son. As set out previously the new evidence submitted along with the rule 24 response was evidence that was not put before the FtTJ. It cannot be an error of law for the FtTJ not to address evidence of circumstances which had not been placed before her. In light of the evidence that was available to the FtTJ, it is plain that the judge took steps to address that evidence at paragraph 26 and directly referred to the undated letter within that paragraph.
52. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account it was written by the appellant and that in substance it referred to her son being unsettled at school and needing extra help and support. That was reflected in her summary of the evidence both at paragraph 6 and paragraph 26 of the evidence. The letter referred to the request for provision of the speech therapy in 2023 but that both she and her son was awaiting this. The new evidence filed with the rule 24 response post-dates those events as it refers to an assessment made on 29 July 2025. The meeting with the deputy head teacher (see email dated 3 July 2025) is in the same terms as the undated letter that the FtTJ had regard to, and the latest email of 4 September 2025 refers to requiring the school transfer.
53. The new material does not satisfy the test in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1WLR 1489 as some of that evidence plainly was available before the hearing but was not provided and as such the evidence does not demonstrate that the FtTJ erred in law (see paragraph 68 of R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982)). The report arising from the assessment made on 29 July 2025 took place 3 months after the hearing and therefore could not have been available to the FtTJ. In any event the evidence does not undermine the decision of the FtTJ as to the “best interests” assessment. As Mr McVeety submitted whilst there has been some assessment relating to her son’s speech there is no diagnosis of the causes or what the short or long-term prognosis is nor is there any objective material presented on behalf of the appellant to demonstrate that any treatment that may be required is not available in Namibia.
54. The documents before the FtTJ did not provide any medical evidence or any diagnosis of the appellant’s son’s circumstances nor did the appellant provide any country materials in support of the claim that she would not be able to access medical or other support for her son in Namibia. Nor has there been any subsequent objective material. Given the limited evidence provided to the Tribunal, the FtTJ addressed that in her decision and did so in the context of the best interests of the child concerned. Given the very young age of the child, the assessment made that his best interest to be met by him remaining with his mother whom she found to be his “only primary carer” was an assessment open to her. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account the young age of her son, the relatively short time that he lived in the UK and that section 117B (6) did not apply as the appellant’s son was not a qualifying child as he was not a British citizen and had not lived in the UK for seven years or more and that whilst he attended school, his significant links were with his mother as his primary carer who is able to meet his needs. The FtTJ also found that there were members of the family living in Namibia who would also be able to provide support for them. Those were findings that addressed the best interests of the child in accordance with the limited evidence that was available to the FtTJ.
55. Dealing with the last ground, it is submitted that the FtTJ failed to take into account her mental health which was deteriorating. The appellant has referred to the medical evidence that she had already provided which confirmed this.
56. Again, the evidence before the FtTJ was limited. The appellant was interviewed on 3 June 2022 and was asked if she had any medical conditions and she replied that she had not (Q7) she also confirmed that she did not take any medication at that time nor were there any mental health conditions or problems identified (see page 97 – 98Cef). There was no medical report from her GP setting out any past medical history, or any diagnosis and the letter that was provided to the FtTJ and dated 17 April 2025 (p45) had been written by an employee at the practice but not the GP. As such the letter stands in isolation. The letter appears to have been principally sent to support the application for an adjournment, which was refused by a judge of the First-tier Tribunal prior to the hearing, and which was not renewed. The provision of the GP extract does not add anything to that evidence. At its highest, it sets out that the appellant attended at the surgery on 15 April 2025 and had a consultation for her poor sleep as a result of the difficulties she relayed. This accords with the appellant’s summary at this hearing where she confirmed that she had attended due to poor sleep and that she was not provided with sleeping tablets but antidepressants.
57. Whilst not seeking to underestimate the appellant’s present circumstances as described during that consultation and that she has faced delays and uncertainties during the process relevant to her future and that of her son the evidence does not demonstrate that it met the level of severity or high threshold for either a breach of Article 3 or Article 8. It does not appear to have been a point argued before the FtTJ and in any event there was no support by way of objective evidence that any medical treatment she was currently receiving, which was in the form of antidepressants, could not be provided in Namibia. It is therefore not been demonstrated that firstly the judge failed to consider the evidence that was before her but that the evidence as it stood even taken at its highest, did not demonstrate any breach of Article 3 or Article 8.
58. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
59. On a fair reading of the decision when taken as a whole, I am satisfied that the FtTJ did give adequate reasons for reaching the overall conclusions that she reached in terms of risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation and her assessment of Article 8 of the ECHR. In conclusion and when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out and amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. Having considered the decision the FtTJ was required to consider the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal, and she plainly did so by giving adequate reasons for that decision. Consequently, for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
60. Whilst the appellant seeks to raise reliance on further evidence that pertains to the circumstances of her son, and if there are any changes in her circumstances or that of her son that can be addressed by way of a fresh claim.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

13 October 2025

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber