Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003437

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65336/2023
LP/13817/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUTH

Between

NK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gajjar of Counsel, instructed by Law Lane Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant asserts a fear of serious harm on return to Georgia. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 20 May 2025, of First-tier Tribunal Judge Davies (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

Background

3. The procedural background and immigration history which led to the appeal proceedings are not in dispute between the parties. The essence of the protection claim is that the appellant asserts she is at risk of serious harm from her father in Georgia. This is because of her previous relationship with her second cousin from 2019, discovered by the father and leading to him threatening to kill the appellant. She fled through various European countries and claimed asylum in the United Kingdom in October 2021.

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

4. The appellant appealed against the refusal of her claim by the respondent on 1 December 2023. The appeal was heard by the judge on 7 April 2025 and dismissed on all grounds on 20 May 2025. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision:

• The judge summarised the appellant’s factual claims at [4], noting at [8] that the appellant had conceded her claim was not linked to one of the reasons set out in the Refugee Convention.

• From [21] the judge made a number of adverse credibility findings against the appellant. These included, at [21] and [29], that it was not plausible the appellant’s father was sufficiently well-connected in Georgia that he could track down the appellant, but not the second cousin, who remains in Georgia. Further, the judge concluded, at [36], that the appellant’s admitted deliberate destruction of her passport on arrival in the UK damaged her credibility. He also took the view, at [37], that she had provided no reasonable explanation for her failure to claim asylum in Poland, Hungary or Spain.

• At [48] the judge, taking the claim at its highest, notes the relationship with the cousin has ended and that the father took no serious action against the appellant when she was in Georgia. He concludes there is no continuing risk, but, at [49], takes the view that sufficient protection would be available if the appellant were to need it in any case.

• From [53] the judge also concluded the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate to Tblisi. He agrees with the views of the respondent, at [54], that the father would not be able to locate her in Tblisi. At [56] the judge concludes that relocation would be reasonable given the level of education, work experience and family support available to the appellant and her lack of particular vulnerabilities.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance, essentially, on the following grounds, which I summarise:

• Ground 1 – the judge’s findings are inadequately reasoned and fail to engage with the evidence and explanations given by the appellant;

• Ground 2 – The judge’s conclusions in respect of credibility are unreasonable/ irrational.

6. In a decision dated 29 July 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner granted permission on limited grounds. Judge Turner concluded:

“The grounds assert that the Judge erred in the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility. The grounds cite several points in which adverse findings were arguably made. The IJ finds that it lacks plausibility that the Appellant could be found by her father in Georgia whereas her brother [sic][partner] could not however fails to note the Appellant’s evidence that it was the Appellant that was the target...The grounds note that the IJ finds that the Appellant’s concession that she disposed of her passport to prevent her removal should go against her credibility whilst failing to note the further point made in the determination that genuine asylum seekers do just this. The IJ concludes that the Appellant’s actions were not on account of her being a genuine asylum seeker without giving adequate reasons for this conclusion. The IJ also rejects the Appellant’s account that she did not claim asylum until she reached the UK to reduce the risk of her father locating her in Schengen area countries however again fails to explain why this explanation was rejected. In isolation, these various findings may not be material however cumulatively it is arguable they are material to the overall assessment of credibility.“

7. At the error of law hearing I had the composite bundle, a rule 24 response from the respondent and a skeleton argument from Mr Gajjar, for the appellant. The parties confirmed they had all relevant documents and I then heard submissions. I deal with any submissions of significance below.

Discussion

Credibility

8. The appellant confined her challenge to the judge’s findings of fact to the three issues set out in summary above and identified in the grant of leave.

9. Dealing first with the reach of the father in Georgia, and his apparent inability to find the second cousin. The appellant argues the judge, at [21] and[29], failed to take into account her explanation that she is the main target of the father and he has a greater interest in her than in her second cousin. I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent in this point, however. The second cousin remains in Georgia and is also a family member involved in a relationship said to bring dishonour upon the family, as the judge noted at [29]. Even in the context of the woman in such a situation bearing the greater burden of honour, the evidence did not suggest no interest at all in the other family member. The appellant herself stated, at paragraph 18 of her statement of 21 May 2024, as pointed out in submissions, that her father is angrier at her and she is the main target [emphasis added]. She does not say the father has no interest in the cousin and is not angry with him. It was therefore open to the judge to conclude that the lack of effective pursuit of the second cousin is a negative factor.

10. The appellant argues that the judge has failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding, at [36], that, although some genuine asylum seekers do destroy their passports, this appellant destroyed hers for more nefarious reasons. In my judgement, however, the explanation given in this paragraph must not be artificially detached from the credibility findings the judge has made in the round. It is quite clear that he does accept there could be a good explanation for the destruction of the passport, but in the context of a significant number of other negative credibility conclusions, takes the view that hers is not one of them. That was a conclusion entirely open to the judge when his factual findings are considered together and in the round.

11. As to the suggestion by the appellant that the judge, at [37], fails to provide adequate reasons for not accepting the explanation given by the appellant as to why she did not wish to claim asylum within the Schengen area, I agree with the submissions made by the respondent. The argument of the appellant is that she was afraid of claiming asylum in the Schengen area because her father would have easier access to that area than he would to the United Kingdom. The judge concludes that is not a reasonable explanation. Again, in my judgement, these findings cannot be artificially cut off from the other findings made by the judge. Having concluded the power and influence of the father, even in Georgia itself, was not as asserted, at [21] and[29], and having noted the father had not harmed the appellant in Georgia after discovering the illicit relationship, at [48], it was well within the range of reasonable conclusions open to the judge that the father’s access to the Schengen area was not a reasonable explanation for the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in three safe countries.

Materiality – Sufficient Protection – Internal Relocation?

12. Even if I had concluded the credibility findings of the judge contained the suggested errors, those errors would not have been material. Firstly, the grounds did not challenge the findings of the judge in relation to sufficiency of protection, at [51] and internal relocation, at [54]-[56]. Secondly, the grant of leave was not in relation to those findings, which stand as they were made. Thirdly, I reject the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the credibility findings, if they did contain errors, infected the judge’s findings in relation to sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

13. In essence, the appellant argued that the influence and reach of the father was relevant both to the willingness and ability of the state to protect the appellant and to the safety of internal relocation. The suggestion was that, the judge having erred in rejecting the belief of the appellant that her father was influential and had sufficient reach to trace her, this meant the findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were undermined. It was also suggested the judge had not taken the claim at its highest when assessing the questions of sufficient protection and internal relocation.

14. There is no merit in these arguments. Even if the appellant genuinely and credibly believes that her father is sufficiently influential and well connected to trace her or to influence the authorities against her, her beliefs on the matter are not sufficient evidence to establish this is even reasonably likely to be the case. I note there was no other good evidence before the judge going specifically to the reach of the father or his influence either with the authorities or throughout Georgia.

15. Furthermore, at [47], the judge explicitly states that he assesses sufficient protection and internal relocation on the basis that the claims made by the appellant are credible. It is clear from the following paragraphs that this is exactly what the judge has done.

16. The credibility findings, even if they had contained the errors contended for, would not have undermined the judge’s conclusions as to the availability of sufficient protection and internal relocation.

Conclusion

17. For the foregoing reasons I conclude the decision of the judge did not involve the making of material errors of law. The decision stands.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the judge did not involve the making of material errors of law. I dismiss the appeal brought by the appellant. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Evan Ruth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 October 2025