Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003451

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/02825/2024 & PA/50274/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUTH

Between

EO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Atas of Counsel, instructed by Kinas Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Turkey. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This remaking decision follows the agreement of the parties at an earlier error of law hearing, and my subsequent determination, that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) be set aside, in part, because of material errors of law in the assessment both of the credibility of the claims made by the appellant, and the risk to him in light of undisputed background country information. The findings of fact of the judge in paragraphs [18] and [28] of her decision were preserved, while the remainder of her decision was set aside.
3. The essence of the protection claim is that the appellant asserts he is at risk of serious harm from the Turkish state because of his involvement in pro-Kurdish activities in Corlu, northwestern Turkey. The respondent did not dispute the appellant had been involved in the Peoples’ Democratic Party (‘HDP’) as a supporter from 2014, but the appellant additionally claimed to have been a member from 2018 and involved in the local party neighbourhood committee canvassing, protesting, putting up posters and joining cultural events. He claimed to have siblings and cousins who had been killed or imprisoned as a result of PKK involvement. The appellant stated he had been detained in March 2014 and November 2016, where he had been beaten and verbally abused. His home having then been visited by police in August 2019 while he was out, and the local HDP offices raided, the appellant fled Turkey. He asserts two criminal investigations are ongoing against him in Turkey, subject to file restriction orders, and that an arrest warrant was issued in 2025.
The Remaking Hearing
4. In advance of the remaking hearing the appellant submitted some additional evidence which had not been placed before the FtT. This included a witness statement from his wife, a statement of support from a recognised refugee in the UK, photographs of the tombstone of his brother and father and a letter from a lawyer in Turkey with Turkish court documents.
5. In considering whether to admit these documents into evidence, I note there was no opposition from the respondent. The appellant explained that the court documents had come to his attention only after the hearing in the FtT and were not available at that time. The wife had only relatively recently arrived in the UK to claim asylum and her statement had not been available at the time. The appellant had been unaware of the importance of the death of his brother would play in the proceedings and had not produced the photographs of tombstones previously or the letter from the other refugee in the United Kingdom.
6. I decided to admit all of this evidence given there was no objection from the respondent and I was satisfied there were good reasons why the evidence had not been before the FtT earlier.
7. The documentation before me for this appeal therefore consisted of the consolidated bundle produced for the error of law hearing of 295 pages. There was then a supplementary bundle prepared by the appellant for the remaking hearing of 170 pages.
8. The factual matrix in this matter, either not disputed by the parties or preserved from the findings of the FtT is as follows:
a. The appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Turkey from Corlu with the identity he asserts;
b. The appellant was a supporter of the HDP from 2014;
c. The appellant became a member of the HDP in October 2018;
d. As a result of his involvement in the HDP, the appellant was arrested and detained in 2014 and 2016. He was mistreated in detention;
e. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum in September 2019.
9. The matters remaining in dispute are as follows:
a. The credibility of the appellant’s remaining claims including:
i. The involvement of his brother and other relatives in the PKK;
ii. The nature of the appellant’s activities for the HDP after 2016;
iii. The raid on his home and the HDP offices in Corlu in 2019;
iv. The reliability of the court documents and letter from his Turkish solicitor.
b. Whether, if credible, the appellant is at risk of persecution for a 1951 Refugee Convention Reason or of serious harm in breach of his Article 2 & 3 ECHR rights, or requires humanitarian protection.
10. At the remaking hearing I heard oral evidence from three witnesses, each speaking with the assistance of a Turkish interpreter. Unfortunately, the live interpreter became unavailable during cross-examination of the appellant. The hearing was then delayed until a remote interpreter could be found. Neither party raised any objection or suggested there had been any difficulty as a result of this situation. A full record of the oral evidence is in the digital record of proceedings and I deal with it below as necessary.
11. I heard detailed oral submissions from both parties, also contained in the digital record. I refer to relevant submissions below.
Legal Framework
12. This asylum claim was made on 25 September 2019.
13. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a 1951 Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection or human rights grounds an appellant must show a real risk of a breach of his Article 2 or 3 ECHR rights or otherwise a real risk serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
Discussion
Issue (a) - Credibility
14. In considering the credibility of the appellant’s remaining claims as to his past experiences in Turkey, I note that key aspects of his claim have been accepted as set out above and this must form the backdrop to my assessment of his additional claims. Furthermore, this asylum claim was made in 2019 and the lower standard of proof applies to both fact-finding and the question of risk on return. In that context, I regard the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran [2000] Imm AR 271 to be useful in the overall context of evaluating the additional claims made by the appellant.
15. In applying this guidance I note that the Court of Appeal in Karanakaran did not set out these tests for the first time but was referring to the majority decision in Kaja [1995] Imm AR 1 which, in turn, had referred to a long line of authorities dealing with the standard of proof in asylum appeals. A distillation of that guidance leads to the consideration of the following categories of evidence in asylum appeals. These categories are:
a. Evidence I feel certain about;
b. Evidence I think is probably true;
c. Evidence to which I am willing to attach some credence, even though I would not go so far as to say it is probably true;
d. Evidence to which I am not willing to attach any credence at all.
16. Having regard to the undisputed background country information before me, and particularly the country guidance cases of IA & Others (Risk – Guidelines - Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034 and IK (Returnees - Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312, there could clearly be potentially disastrous consequences to the appellant if I conclude he is not in need of international protection when, in fact, he is in such need. As a result I have followed the guidance in Musisi [1987] Imm AR 250 and given the most anxious scrutiny to this case.
17. Considering first the claim of the appellant that his brother, and other family members, were involved in the PKK. Particular emphasis was placed by the appellant on the role of his brother, said to have been killed while fighting for the PKK in around the year 2000.
18. Before dealing with the evidence of the appellant himself, I turn to the evidence of the third witness, Mr EK. He is a refugee in the United Kingdom, recognised by the respondent in July 2023. He gave evidence that he is also a Kurdish national of Turkey and was a childhood friend of the appellant and at school with him before the appellant and his family moved to northwest Turkey. He confirms his knowledge that the appellant came from a politically active family that experienced difficulties with the Turkish authorities that he witnessed himself. He also states he knew the appellant’s brother had been killed by State forces in 2000 and that it was this that led the family to leave southeast Turkey and move to the north.
19. Nothing arose in cross-examination to undermine the evidence of this witness and I note he is a recognised refugee with limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom. I consider that is relevant because he could place his own position in serious jeopardy if he were to give false evidence in court. I consider this witness is likely to be telling the truth and that he did know the appellant from the period before he and his family moved to the northwest, also being aware from his personal knowledge that the brother was said to have been killed by state forces. This is a positive indicator of credibility in relation to the claims the appellant makes about his brother.
20. I turn now to the evidence of the appellant himself on this issue. In my judgement, he has been essentially consistent about this matter at each stage during the asylum process when he has been asked about it. He has consistently maintained that he had a brother who was in the PKK, who had a particular code name and who was killed by state forces in around 2000. Valiant efforts were made on behalf of the respondent to undermine the evidence of the appellant on this point in cross-examination, but in my judgement those efforts failed. I found the appellant to be a compelling witness who gave his evidence in detail, coherently and I consider his evidence was consistent with that given by the third witness. This is also a positive indicator of credibility.
21. Much was made at the hearing about a document called the ‘Serxwebun’, at page [5] of the supplementary bundle. Copies of extracts from the document are contained in the bundle with translations provided at the hearing without objection (the appellant’s representatives having unaccountably failed to provide them in advance). The position of the appellant is that this is a booklet known as the register of martyrs and is contained in Kurdish community centres all over the UK. He stated that he found this booklet or magazine in a Kurdish community centre in London and that it contains the record of the “martyrdom” of his brother, including the code name and photograph. The position of the respondent is, essentially, that the document cannot be verified and is not reliable.
22. While I accept there can be no definitive verification of this document, I found the evidence of the appellant to be detailed and plausible and not undermined by a long cross-examination. Copies of the document itself are before me. It does indeed contain a photograph of an individual with the PKK code name given by the appellant earlier in the asylum process, as well as the date of ‘martydom’. Furthermore, that name corresponds to the name on a tombstone which is photographed in the bundle and that name gives the name of the father, also on an adjacent tombstone and also the name of the father of the appellant given in his bio-data earlier in the asylum process. The photograph also corresponds with other photographs provided by the appellant of a man he says is his brother. While there can be no certainty about such matters, I find this document, when combined with the photographs of the tomb, the other photographs and the oral evidence, is likely to be reliable. I place weight upon it.
23. Taking all of this into account, the claim of the appellant that his brother was a PKK fighter and was killed as such in 2000 is one I consider likely to be true. Having reached that conclusion, I do not consider it necessary to decide whether or not his cousins and other family members were also so linked.
24. As to the nature of the activities the appellant carried out for the HDP after he was released from his second detention in 2016, I consider his account has been sufficiently consistent across time and given in relevant detail. He has maintained throughout the asylum process that he was involved in relatively limited activities including leafletting, attending meetings and demonstrations and Kurdish cultural events linked to the local HDP office. Nothing arose in cross-examination to undermine this aspect of his evidence and I was particularly struck by his failure to exaggerate his role. At no point has the appellant claimed to have carried out higher profile activities and it has been accepted that those relatively middling activities already led to his being detained and mistreated twice. It has also been accepted that the appellant became a member of the HDP in 2018, suggesting ongoing activity with the organisation. There is therefore nothing implausible in his claim that he carried on with those activities, although he did reduce his engagement with the HDP after his negative experiences in 2016. In my judgement, this aspect of the claim is likely to be the truth.
25. There is then the very significant and key question of whether or not the claims of the appellant that his home was raided by the police in 2019 and that coincided with a raid on the local HDP office at around the same time are reliable. In that respect, I note there are press reports in the bundle at page [35] relating to a raid on the HDP officers in Corlu in September 2019. There was no effective challenge to those documents and I see no reason not to place weight up on them. I note they had been admitted into evidence at a previous error of law hearing in the Upper Tribunal in 2024, although it is not clear whether they were ever brought to the attention of the judge at the FtT hearing in April 2025. In any case, the fact of a reported raid on HDP officers in the same area in which the appellant lived does suggest renewed interest in that organisation by the authorities and this is consistent with the information about the activities of the authorities in relation to the HDP and its members in the background country information, including the respondent’s “Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission. Turkey: Kurds, the HDP and the PKK’ of October 2029, from page [60] of the supplementary bundle. That is a positive indicator of credibility in relation to the appellant’s claims.
26. I also take the view that any reasonable and rounded reading of the claims made by the appellant at the various points in the asylum process when he has been asked to describe this, as well as during his evidence at the remaking hearing, demonstrates that he has been essentially consistent about this issue over time. He is not able to describe the raid himself because he was not present, but I consider there is nothing implausible about the Turkish authorities reactivating an interest in a person who had previously been arrested and detained as a result of relatively middling HDP activity in the context of them also raiding the offices of the local organisation at around the same time. The fact is that the appellant also stood up well under a long and detailed cross-examination and I had no real doubts that he was probably a witness of truth in relation to this key issue. These claims are, in my judgement, probably true.
27. A question arises as to whether or not there is something suspicious in the appellant obtaining a letter of support from the HDP in May 2019 and again in June 2021. The judge in the FTT in April 2025 had concluded this undermined his credibility. I note that the second letter is a detailed letter of support confirming the activity of the appellant for the HDP and it was obtained in 2021. This cannot be the letter referred to by the judge and I assume she was referring to the letter at page 68 of the consolidated bundle and dated 31 May 2019. That is simply a confirmation of membership of the HDP and provides no detailed information about the activities the appellant. In my judgement, given the overall positive indicators of credibility in this matter, there is nothing suspicious about an individual who only officially became a member of the HDP in October 2018 receiving confirmation of that membership with bio-data, as set out in the letter of May 2019, a few months later. I do not consider this to be a negative indicator of credibility.
28. The evidence of the wife of the appellant was that after his departure the Turkish authorities came regularly to the house looking for him and that this frightened her and led her to depart with their children. That evidence was entirely plausible in the context of the activities of the Turkish authorities set out in the country guidance cases and the country information referred to above. While I note she is the wife of the appellant and not entirely objective, her evidence was very simple and again not undermined by cross-examination. I consider it may very well be the truth.
29. It is in that context that the appellant provides a letter from a lawyer in Turkey asserting that the appellant is under investigation by the prosecutor in relation to two criminal matters from 2025. The lawyer explains that because of a restricted reporting order, he has been unable to examine the documents or discover exactly what the charges are against the appellant. He states that there is an arrest warrant, although that warrant is not provided. The position of the respondent was, essentially, that these documents are not reliable and there is no explanation for the delay in instituting proceedings against the appellant. Furthermore, the court documents do not appear to contain any official stamps and I was asked to place little or no weight upon these documents.
30. I do accept the submissions made on behalf of the respondent that it is inherently strange the authorities would institute two criminal investigations against the appellant some six years after his departure from Turkey and nine years after his last detention. While I take the point made on behalf of the appellant that he cannot be expected to know why the authorities behave the way they do and there is no background information to suggest a court document such as that submitted should have any kind of official stamp, I also note the appellant gave no good explanation for why he did not appeal the decision set out in the court document as it invites him to do. He appeared to know very little about these proceedings and I found his evidence in relation to them to be vague. These are matters which do, in my judgement, reduce the weight that can be attached to these court documents, which cannot be subject to any real verification. Reminding myself of the standard of proof in these proceedings, however, I do not consider these are documents to which no weight at all can be attached. In the overall context of what I consider to be the generally positive credibility of this appellant and his witnesses; I do attach some weight to these documents.
31. In terms of the factual issues in dispute as set out above, I conclude the appellant's brother probably was a member of the PKK killed in 2000, the appellant probably did continue with his middling activities for the HDP to a reduced extent after 2016. I find there probably was a raid on the HDP offices in Corlu in 2019 and a raid on the appellant's home in Corlu shortly before that. I consider at least some credence can be attached to the claims of the appellant that the police have continued to come to his home regularly since his departure and some credence can be attached to his claim that there are criminal investigations ongoing and an arrest warrant issued against him.
Issue (b) - Risk
32. In considering risk to this appellant in light of the findings of fact set out above, I have regard first and foremost to the two relevant country guidance cases cited above. The parties did refer me to other background country information, including the Country Policy and Information Notes (‘CPIN’) relating to the HDP on the Home Office website, but neither party asked me to depart from the country guidance and I see no reason to do so.
33. At paragraph 46 of the decision in IA the tribunal sets out a number of risk factors, while emphasising that they are not a checklist. They are however material in considering whether there might be potential suspicion in the minds of the Turkish authorities that a particular individual has a separatist profile. I note also that the Tribunal found, in IK, that those subject to arrest warrants are likely to be stopped and questioned at the border on arrival, given the computerised system available to border officials. The risk factors are:
a. The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
b. Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.
c. Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.
d. Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.
e. The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.
f. Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP.
g. How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.
h. Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.
i. Kurdish ethnicity.
j. Alevi faith.
k. Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.
l. Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.
m. Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.
n. Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.
o. If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return. Following Sepet of course this alone is not a basis for a refugee or human rights claim.
34. In this appeal there are, in my judgement, a mixture of factors. Some of those factors point to a likelihood of suspicion against the appellant and some do not.
35. Factors suggesting reduced interest in this appellant would include the long period of time that elapsed between his last detention in 2016 and his departure from Turkey in 2019 and the fact there is not a causal link between the two. There is also a lack of any clear evidence that between 2016 and 2019 the appellant was being monitored while he carried out his activities for the HDP in Corlu. The appellant was not charged when detained and was not placed on reporting restrictions. He did not become and was not asked to become an informer.
36. On the other hand, the appellant was previously arrested twice and detained for activity that could only be described as middling. While the risk factors include an assessment of the level of his involvement, I note that the Home Office fact finding mission report referred to above, from page [60] of the bundle, confirms that action may be taken against HDP members even for such limited matters as leafleting, putting up posters and attending demonstrations. The fact that the appellant was twice arrested and subjected to mistreatment in detention directly because of his involvement in such activities does suggest to me that the authorities were suspicious of his separatist profile, even given that his activities were not high profile.
37. The risk factors suggest an assessment of the level of mistreatment experienced in detention and the position of the respondent was that, although he was mistreated, the level of harm was not of the highest order. In my judgement, however, being beaten by police in detention is sufficient and is a risk factor.
38. The appellant has established the probability that he has a brother who was a PKK fighter and was known as such, being killed by state actors in 2000 and leading to the appellant and his family relocating to a different part of Turkey. That is a risk factor.
39. There is then the fact that the appellant has established some credence can be attached to his claim that the police have continued to visit the family home over the years since his departure and that there is now a criminal investigation ongoing with an arrest warrant issued against him. That is a clear risk factor, as well as the fact that he has established likely direct police interest in him in 2019, when they raided his home and the local offices of the HDP. These are very significant risk factors, in my judgement.
40. While other risk factors plainly exist, I consider there is more than enough in this appeal to raise serious concerns this appellant is at real risk of being regarded as a separatist upon return to Turkey. The two country guidance cases establish a reasonable likelihood that an individual with the accepted profile of this appellant would be stopped on arrival at the airport and questioned. That could lead to his previous detentions being discovered, the background to the criminal investigations being uncovered, his links to the HDP and his family links to the PKK being revealed.
41. As the country guides cases set out, if the appellant were to find himself in that situation, there is a serious possibility that he could be detained and subjected to forms of harm amounting to persecution, including inhuman or degrading treatment or torture. Since these would be inflicted by the state, there can be no question of sufficient protection or internal relocation. Since they are linked to the Refugee Convention by way of both political opinion and race, they engage that Convention and also Articles 2 & 3 of the ECHR. That being the case, the appellant does not require humanitarian protection.

Notice of Decision
On remaking this appeal decision, I allow the appellant’s appeal brought under the 1951 Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds. I dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.

Evan Ruth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 January 2026