Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003458

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64445/2023
LP/13129/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

JW
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S.Anzani, Counsel instructed by MDL Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant appeals with permission, the decision of First-tier Judge Scullion dated 27 June 2025, on the basis that it contains an error on a point of law. The judge had dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection claim by a decision dated 20 November 2023.
2. The appellant is a Chinese national, born on 20 January 1992. She suffered domestic abuse from her husband (for which he was subsequently jailed) and he took out significant loans in her name without her consent, and she was subjected to threats and violence by the loan sharks when these were not repaid. Her husband agreed to divorce her but only on the basis she accepted responsibility for the loans and fearing for her safety she went into hiding in China before arriving in the UK on 27 June 2019 and claimed asylum on 30 December 2020 based on her fear of violence if she was returned to China. Initially on the appellant’s arrival in the UK she was detained by a third party and forced to work against her will.
3. The respondent’s refusal of the protection claim was based on her fear of persecution not being for a convention reason and the appellant’s version of events lacked credibility due inconsistency and absence of corroborating evidence. In addition, the respondent considered there was sufficiency of protection and the opportunity to relocate if returned and that there were no grounds for claiming humanitarian protection or making a successful claim under Article 8 of the ECHR.
4. The appeal was heard by the judge on 26 June 2025. By a decision dated 27 June 2025 he dismissed the appeal. The appellant did not give evidence in person and relied on the psychiatric report of Dr Lawerence (the “Expert”) dated 30 May 2025 (the “Report”) that she was “vulnerable, emotionally dysregulated, and easily confused under pressure” and not fit to give evidence (page 25 of the Report).
5. The judge found (i) the appellant’s account lacked credibility and did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution placing limited weight on her witness statement; (ii) it was not reasonably likely the appellant would be persecuted on her return to China for membership of a particular social group (female victim or trafficking); (iii) If returned to China, she would enjoy sufficiency of state protection or could internally relocate; (iv) there were no grounds for humanitarian protection under Article 2 or 3 of the ECHR and (v) the respondent’s decision refusing the appellant’s application under Article 8 ECHR was proportionate and lawful under the Human Rights Act 1998.
6. On August 2025 permission to appeal was granted by First-tier judge Boyes on the following basis:
“1. The application is in time.
2. The grounds of appeal assert that the Judge erred that the Judge erred in law in the following respects.
3. The first ground relates to a claimed flawed assessment of the risk of trafficking. The complaint being that the Judge artificially severed the chain of events so as to create a distinction between events in China and events in the UK.
4. Having considered the judgment on this issue I do not think that the Judge arguably fell into error. The judge was entitled to separate the factual matrix given that which was claimed and also how the appellant ended up in the UK. Although the appellant does not agree with the conclusion of the Judge there is no arguable error.
5. Ground 2 alleges that the Judge failed to apply the Presidential Guidance on Vulnerable witnesses and unfairly levelled criticism at the appellant for not giving evidence when this was beyond her control especially in light of the medical evidence.
6. Having considered the grounds and the judgment I am satisfied that this is arguable. It is arguably unfair to hold that an appellant cannot give evidence due to her psychological problems and then criticise the weight to be attached without giving an opportunity for comment in the least.
7. Ground 3 alleges that the Judge erred in the assessment of the medical evidence. Paragraph 33 of the judgment is said to be the most egregious.
8. Having considered the matter I agree that the manner in which the Judge dealt with the medical evidence and importing his ow[n} view of the PTSD is arguably erroneous.
9. With respect to grounds 5 and 6, in light of the above, I will grant permission on them also as they are arguable”
7. I note there is no mention of Ground 4 was made in the substance of the permission but in the heading it specifically referred to Ground 4 as being a permitted ground of appeal.
8. The matter came before me at an error of law hearing on 31 October 2025. Having heard submissions from the parties, I reserved my decision which I set out below together with reasons.
Submissions
9. Ms Anzani adopted her grounds of appeal. In relation to Ground 2, she acknowledged that the quote attributed to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note of No.2 of 2010 on the treatment of vulnerable witnesses (the “Guidance Note”) in her grounds was incorrect and that paragraph 3 of the Guidance Note did empower the judge to determine the weight to be placed on the evidence in light of the vulnerability but erred in law in his approach to the application of the Guidance Note and medical evidence.
10. In relation to Ground 3, Ms Anzani submitted that the judge had substituted his own view of the severity of the PTSD for that of the Expert’s without any proper basis to do so. The judge had given undue weight to the data on which the medical diagnosis being self-reported when there was supporting additional medical evidence and a structured clinical interview. Ms Anzani relied on R (AM Angola) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 521 for the proposition that appropriate weight should be given to an expert's report and any identified distortion would be taken into account by a competent expert in reaching his diagnosis.
11. In relation to Ground 4, Ms Anzani submitted that the judge, by requiring the appellant to provide corroborative evidence of her injuries inflicted by her ex-husband or police reports documenting her domestic violence had misapplied the law as reaffirmed in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 215 that corroboration should not be treated as a legal requirement.
12. In relations to grounds 5 and 6 Ms Azani’s reasoning was fully set out in her grounds and she noted that if I found no error of law on Ground 5 relating to sufficiency of protection then Ground 6 on internal relocation no longer became relevant notwithstanding the judge considered both grounds in the alternative.
13. Mr Ojo adopted his Rule 24 response. On ground 2, whilst acknowledging the judge did not refer to the Guidance Note he clearly took it into account referring to the appellant's vulnerability throughout the decision and only attributing limited weight to her evidence by virtue of his assessment of the medical evidence. He also noted that the judge had complied with paragraph 8 of the Guidance Note by identifying the areas of dispute in paragraphs 9 and 10 of his decision.
14. On Ground 3, Mr Ojo submitted the judge was able to form his own view on the medical evidence provided and directed me to JL (medical reports-credibility) China 2013 UKUT 00145 and HA and SSHD [2022] UKUT 00111 for consideration.
15. On Ground 4, Mr Ojo, in addition to disagreeing with Ms Anzani’s submission on MAH (Egypt), referred me to Rule 339L of the Immigration Rules setting out the conditions where corroborative evidence is not required and the home office guidance that even if those conditions were not satisfied a fact finder was still required to look at credibility in the round. This was consistent with the approach adopted by the judge.
16. On grounds 5 and 6. Mr Ojo submitted that the judge had correctly applied the relevant CPIN and Country guidance cases set out in paragraphs 42 to 45 of the decision.
Discussion and decision
Ground 2 (Vulnerable witness)
17. In relation to the issue of treatment of the appellant’s vulnerability by the judge, the Guidance Note sets out principles which First-tier judges should take into account when considering the evidence of a vulnerable witness and the Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 made it clear that failure to follow such guidance could result in an error of law.
18. The starting point is paragraph 3 of the Guidance Note which provides that it is for the judge to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence adduced:
“The consequences of such vulnerability differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole.”
19. Whilst the judge did not expressly refer to the Guidance Note he clearly acknowledged the appellant’s vulnerability in paragraph 31 and assessed how much weight to place on the Expert’s diagnosis in paragraph 33 of his decision. Clearly there is significant overlap between this ground and ground 3 relating to whether the judge could come to the conclusions he did on the medical evidence and I consider those issues below. In any event, the approach adopted by the judge was entirely consistent with paragraph 3 of the Guidance Note in that he did determine the extent of the vulnerability, concluding the appellant did suffer from PTSD but it was not “as severe as she is claiming” and considered whether such vulnerability impacted on the quality of the evidence. The judge was entitled to reduce the weight attributed to the evidence of the appellant given that there was no opportunity to cross examine her nor was there any evidence to suggest her identified vulnerability impacted on her failure to claim asylum earlier than she did or obtain corroborative evidence. I also note, as Ms Azani confirmed, that the decision for the appellant not to give oral evidence was the appellant’s alone based on the medical evidence received and the judge was not asked to consider the issue or what special measures could be put in place to enable her to do so.
Ground 3 (Flawed assessment of the medical evidence)
20. Turning to the medical evidence, the judge noted the Expert’s competency in his field but considered that his assessment of PTSD was largely based on self-reporting by the appellant in the knowledge that it would be used to assist her in her asylum claim. He also noted that the Expert had identified two elements of distortion that were present in identifying the appellant’s medical state. First, the process of translation since the appellant was a mandarin speaker and that a number of the answers to the questionnaires had been given their highest numerical rating which, if taken at their face value, would have meant the appellant’s symptoms were so severe “her ability to function in any capacity would be virtually impossible”. For these reasons the judge, whilst he accepted that the appellant suffered from PTSD as diagnosed by the Expert, he did not consider it as severe as she claimed.
21. JL v SSHD made it clear that notwithstanding an expert relies heavily on the account of the person concerned it did not result in the report losing its status as independence evidence but that it may reduce “very considerably” the weight that can be attached to it (headnote (4)). Accordingly, the judge was able to take this reliance, as he did, into account when determining the weight that he attached to the Report.
22. Further, this Tribunal has long recognised the dichotomy between the need for an expert’s report to provide evidence of a claimant’s state of mental health and the possibility of an individual exaggerating their symptoms to prevent their removal from the UK. This was expressly acknowledged in HA and SSHD and for that reason this Tribunal emphasised the importance of viewing any expert report in the context of GP records so as to give a broader picture of an individual’s mental health particularly where the individual and GP would have interacted over a significant period of time. The Tribunal further held that given GP records are likely to be regarded as directly relevant to the issue of mental health they should be engaged with by the expert in the report. Indeed, the Tribunal went further at paragraph 5 of the headnote which provided:
“The tribunal is unlikely to be satisfied by a report which merely attempts to brush aside GP records”.
23. The only medical history of the appellant referred to in the Report is at page 10 where there is a reference to a Central and North West London NHS Outcome of Referral dated 21 August 2024 and contained on pages 175-6 of the consolidated bundle. This seems to be (part of the document is unreadable) a record of a face-to-face discussion with a mental health professional but does not contain any medical diagnosis and I note that the appellant had not been receiving any medication for her condition at the time of her appointment in 2024 and that she had declined referral to further mental health support. No explanation was given in the Report for the absence of previous medication given the severity of the diagnosis. The appellant has been in the UK since June 2019 and I note that there were some GP medical records for January 2023 to April 2025 on pages 111 to 120 of the consolidated bundle, but these were not referred to or considered in the Report. Given this was not the case nor any explanation made for why this was not done the judge was entitled to place less evidential weigh on it and to come to the conclusions that he had. I find no error of law.
Ground 4 (Improper requirement of corroboration)
24. Ms Anzani suggested that the judge had erred in requiring the appellant to provide corroborative evidence in order to establish her case and relied on MAH (Egypt) in support.
25. It is clear that corroborative evidence is not a requirement for a successful protection claim. The ratio of MAH (Egypt) was, however, that there is no legal requirement to produce corroborative evidence in circumstances where the appellant had already satisfied the relatively low standard of proof. The failure to produce such evidence could not then be used to undermine the appellant’s credibility (see paragraph 87). This was not the case here – the judge had identified concerns with the appellant’s credibility before considering the issue of corroborative evidence. MAH (Egypt) made specific reference to Immigration Rule 339L which sets out the conditions to be met where a claim is not supported by any objective evidence in order to avoid further corroboration. Where those conditions are not been met (which was the case here as asylum was not claimed at the earliest opportunity and general credibility had not been established) then, in accordance with the Home Office guidance (specifically quoted with approval by the court at paragraph 77), credibility needs to be considered in the round having regard to all facts.
26. The judge’s approach is entirely consistent with this guidance - the judge expressly stated that he had given limited weight to the appellant’s witness statement due to the inability for the appellant to be cross-examined, gave reduced weight to the appellant's vulnerability identified in the Report due to his concerns with the conclusions of the Report and considered the damage to the appellant’s credibility by not claiming asylum promptly. The absence of corroboration was not seen as determinative by the judge but just one factor that he took into account in determining the appellant’s overall credibility as set out in paragraph 24 of his decision.
Ground 5 (Flawed assessment risk)
27. Ms Anzani submitted that the judge, in his assessment of whether the appellant would have state protection from any continuing violence from her ex-husband if returned, failed to take into account the evidence that China’s national Anti-Domestic Violence Law does not apply to former spouses and excludes protection from certain types of abuse such as sexual and economic violence as set out in an article by Yang, Hao and Yuan, Feng in 2020 and set out on pages 348-352 of the consolidated bundle.
28. The judge, in paragraph 43, found that there would be sufficiency of protection on return to China based on paragraph 2.2.7 of the Country Policy and Information Note, China: Background information, including actors of protection, and internal relocation (March 2018) that in general a person is likely to obtain state protection against persecution or serious harm from non-state actors. In addition, the judge found that the appellant’s ex-husband had neither the power nor influence with the police nor political individuals such that the appellant would not be able to seek protection.
29. For this ground to succeed the appellant would have to show that this article, written after the date of the CPIN, provides sufficiently cogent evidence to alter the conclusion of the judge reached on sufficiency of protection and, in effect, rebut paragraph 2.2.7 of the CPIN in the case of possible violence by an ex-husband putting the appellant at risk on any return.
30. My conclusion is that it does not. The article deals solely with the application of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law 2016 and whilst it seems clear that it may be limited in scope and may not provide protection for the appellant, it does not put the legislation in the broader context of other protection that the appellant could seek under the criminal law against violent behaviour, particularly in the circumstance where the individual has already received a prison sentence for domestic violence against the appellant. Accordingly, I find that the observations made in the article are not, in themselves, sufficient to undermine the judge’s conclusions on availability of suitable protection that he made relying on the CPIN.
Ground 6 (Flawed assessment of internal relocation)
31. In light of my decision on ground 5 relating to sufficiency of protection I do not need to consider this ground as internal relocation become unnecessary. Even so, I would briefly add that this ground relies on the judge accepting the appellant’s witness statement at face value relating to the practical difficulties that the appellant would face in registering under the Hukou system and he was entitled, having placed limited weight on the appellant’s evidence, to follow the CPIN as set out in paragraph 45 of his decision.
Notice of Decision
32. For the reasons set out above, there were no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.
33. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025