Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER)
Case No: UI-2025-003460

(First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/00258/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18/11/2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

A A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Sepulveda, Legal Representative, instructed by Fountain Solicitors (by CVP)
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer (by CVP)

Heard on 11 November 2025 at Field House

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal against a decision, promulgated on 4 March 2025, of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Manchester (“the Judge”) dismissing his appeal against a decision of the Respondent, dated 20 December 2023, refusing his protection claim.
2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order because this is a protection appeal. I continue that order because the risk of harm outweighs the usual requirement for open justice. As such I am satisfied, having had regard to the guidance in the Presidential Guidance Note No 1 of 2013: Anonymity Orders, that it would be appropriate to make an order in accordance with Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in the following terms:
“Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, or the Appellant’s protection claim is finally determined, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.”
The factual background and First-tier Tribunal decision
3. The Appellant is an Iraqi citizen of Kurdish ethnicity. He left Iraq in 2015 and entered the United Kingdom in 2021 to claim asylum. It is accepted that the Appellant was a former policeman from Kirkuk. In essence, his claim is that he is at risk as a consequence of his having reported three prominent Kurdish leaders for corruption. He produced an arrest warrant said to show he was wanted as a result of his leaving his post as a police officer. He additionally claimed to be at risk from ISIS because a photograph had been circulated showing him pulling down an ISIS flag. He argued his return to Iraq would breach Article 3 because of his lack of identification documents. He also fears the Shia militia which control his home area.
4. The Judge made an adverse credibility finding against the Appellant, noting the initial failure of the Appellant to give any detail regarding the three men he said he feared, one of whom is now dead. He placed weight on the fact the Appellant had spent time in various other safe countries before claiming asylum in the United Kingdom. He rejected the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family, noting he had been in contact with them prior to receiving the refusal letter. He inferred the Appellant would have family support to obtain identity documents and that he would have a CSID. As regards the situation for the Appellant in his home area, the Judge said this:
“43. The Appellant has raised his position as an ethnic Kurd returning to Kirkuk, a formerly contested area. SMO (2)1 held that an individual who lived in a former ISIS stronghold may fall under suspicion and that ethnic differences may give rise to problems given the significant presence and control of largely Shia militia in these areas. However, being treated with suspicion does not necessarily amount to facing a real risk of serious harm.”
5. The Judge also dismissed the Appellant’s Article 8 appeal.
6. The grounds seeking permission to appeal argue (1) the Judge’s adverse credibility findings were unsound due to inadequate reasoning; (2) the Judge failed to make findings on a material matter concerning the risk as a Sunni Kurd in Kirkuk; and (3) the Judge erred by failing to apply country guidance (SMO (2)) when making his finding on the safety of the Appellant’s home area.
7. Upper Tribunal Judge Landes, sitting as a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, granted permission to appeal on all grounds as follows:
“2. I consider grounds 2 and 3 are arguable. Whilst the way the claim was framed was not the clearest, the skeleton argument set out that the appellant would not be able to return to his home area in any event because of the risk from the PMF. The judge’s conclusion “being treated with suspicion does not necessarily amount to facing a real risk of serious harm” [43] arguably: (a) does not address the test appropriately, (b) conflates suspicion from having lived in an ISIS stronghold with problems from the Shia militia and (c) does not consider the background material referenced in the country information evidence schedule properly. It is arguable that the judge should have made findings on the appellant’s risk from Shia militia based on the current situation in the appellant’s home area. Whilst it might be difficult for the appellant to prove even to the low standard applicable that he would be at real risk of serious harm from Shia militia (as opposed to potentially experiencing some problems), I cannot say without considering the background material in detail that if the judge erred, any error could not possibly be material.
3. Whilst the judge specifically considered the appellant’s explanation about the delay in naming the three men whom he feared and appears to have considered Tanveer Ahmed appropriately, he was arguably wrong factually about the appellant not claiming asylum in Switzerland and did not explicitly consider the appellant’s reasons for not claiming asylum in Italy and France. I do not consider that this is likely to have made any difference to his ultimate conclusion that the appellant was forum shopping, but I do not restrict the grounds which may be argued and accordingly I also grant permission on ground 1.”
8. The Respondent has filed a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.
The submissions
9. Ms Sepulveda’s submissions expanded on the written grounds. In relation to Ground 1, she said the Judge had, in making an adverse credibility finding on the Appellant’s account, placed disproportionate weight on the timing of the Appellant’s disclosure of details of his claim, namely, his late identification of the three individuals he claimed to fear. She argued it was reasonable for the Appellant to name them only when the issue had been raised in the refusal letter.
10. Ms Sepulveda argued the Judge’s finding on section 8 of the 2004 Act was erroneous because he wrongly recorded that the Appellant did not claim asylum in Switzerland. She said the section 8 consideration was inadequate.
11. Ms Sepulveda argued the Judge gave inadequate reasons for disbelieving the Appellant’s evidence that he had lost contact with his family. This was linked to the Appellant’s ability to re-document himself.
12. In relation to Ground 2, Ms Sepulveda argued the Judge had failed to consider the risk to the Appellant in his home area in Kirkuk. The Appellant had raised this point in his witness statement and skeleton argument. In [43] the Judge appeared to have regarded the fear as being from ISIS. The Appellant had submitted background evidence on the risk from the PMF. Ms Sepulveda took me to that evidence.
13. Ground 3 relates to Ground 2. Ms Sepulveda argued he Judge had not applied SMO (2) and she took me to the relevant parts of the headnote.
14. In reply, Mr Mullen argued the Judge had not erred. The Judge’s assessment and conclusions on the Appellant’s credibility were perfectly reasonable. The Judge was entitled to take account of matters such as the late disclosure by the Appellant of whom he actually fears. Absent perversity, the weight to be given to evidence was a matter for the Judge. Any error in the section 8 analysis was immaterial.
15. Turning to what he classed as the SMO (2) points, Mr Mullen argued the Judge was entitled to be suspicious about the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family only after his asylum interview. The background evidence relied on did not support the argument that the Appellant would be at risk on return to Kirkuk solely on the basis he is Kurdish. The background evidence does not show the PMF is systematically abusing Kurds in Kirkuk and Kurds continue to form a significant part of the population there. Mr Mullen argued the Judge’s consideration of this issue at [43] was adequately reasoned, although “a bit on the brief side”.
16. Ms Sepulveda had nothing to add to the submissions she had made already.
17. I reserved my decision on error of law.
Decision on error of law
18. I agree with Judge Landes that Grounds 2 and 3 are more persuasive than Ground 1, which I shall deal with quite shortly. I consider the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s credibility to be sustainable and free of error. The Judge was perfectly entitled to place significant weight on the Appellant’s failure to disclose the three people he claimed to fear much earlier in the process, despite being given opportunities to do so. This clearly went to the heart of the case and the Appellant had known the identities of the people since he was in Iraq. There was no reason not to know their identities and, therefore, the Judge was entitled to draw an adverse inference from his failure to name them until a late stage. The Appellant claimed to have worked as a driver for these people and to have photographs of them. They had contacted him to give him the chance to retract his complaint. There is no doubt he would have known precisely who they were and he should have been able to provide details. In contrast, his evidence was vague. In the circumstances the Judge was entitled to reject what he termed the Appellant’s “excuses” for not naming the men earlier. I agree with Mr Mullen that the Judge was entitled to place such weight as he saw fit on this discrepancy.
19. The Judge also gave other reasons for the adverse credibility finding he made. He reasoned that it did not make sense for the Appellant to face problems given the information he said he had exposed was already common knowledge. The photographs were in line with the claim but it was not disputed the Appellant was a police officer and, without more, they did not advance his claim. The Judge also gave a cogent reason for giving the arrest warrant little weight in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed2. The Judge’s reasoning is sound.
20. It is correct that the Judge was mistaken when he stated at [34] that the Appellant had not claimed asylum in Switzerland, when he had. In fact, his claim was refused there in less than a month. He claimed asylum in Germany but left before a decision had been made. He also spent four years in Sweden, where he also claimed asylum. He was “granted status” there. However, he left the country because his status was revoked. He passed through other countries, including Greece, Italy and France. The Appellant provided partial reasons for failing to remain in Germany and for not claiming asylum in Italy or France in his witness statement.
21. I can see that the Judge might have erred by giving the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Switzerland weight as damaging his credibility in accordance with section 8. However, despite this, the evidence points overwhelmingly to the Appellant, as the Judge put it, “asylum shopping” and overall the Judge’s decision that this undermined the Appellant’s credibility was a reasonable one and probably the only one he could rationally have reached on the evidence. I do not find a material error has been made in the application of section 8.
22. Finally, I do not agree the Judge gave inadequate reasons for disbelieving the Appellant’s claim in his witness statement that he had lost contact with his family since the interview. At the interview, held on 2 October 2023, he said he knew his father and sister were in Sulaymaniyah. The refusal letter, dated 20 December 2023, reasoned he could get assistance from his father or sister to document himself on return. In his witness statement, signed on 4 February 2025, he simply says he is no longer in contact with his family in Iraq because he has been unable to contact them by telephone. No detail is provided about what efforts the Appellant had made to re-establish contact. The Judge found at [39] that he did not find it credible that the Appellant had lost contact with his family so recently. At [40] the Judge showed he was looking at credibility in the round and noted that the Appellant’s evidence was tailored to “put obstacles in the way of his return”. I consider that was a conclusion which it was open to him to reach on the whole of the evidence. The ground is simply disagreement with the Judge’s finding.
23. Grounds 2 and 3 can be taken together. They both focus on the Judge’s paragraph [43].
24. It is helpful to have regard to the country guidance on the risk on return to disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, and what the background evidence available to the Judge said about the risk to Kurds from the PMF in Kirkuk.
25. Ms Sepulveda highlighted the following parts of the headnote of SMO (2):
“A. INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE IN IRAQ: ARTICLE 15(C) OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
…
3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact-sensitive, “sliding scale” assessment to which the following matters are relevant.
…
5. The impact of any of the personal characteristics listed immediately below must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area. Within the framework of such an analysis, the other personal characteristics which are capable of being relevant, individually and cumulatively, to the sliding scale analysis required by Article 15(c) are as follows:
…
(ii) Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;

D. INTERNAL RELOCATION WITHIN GOI-CONTROLLED IRAQ
…
24. Relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas. With the exception of the small area identified in section A, the general conditions within the Formerly Contested Areas do not engage Article 15 QD(b) or (c) or Article 3 ECHR and relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas may obviate a risk which exists in an individual’s home area. Where relocation within the Formerly Contested Areas is under contemplation, however, the ethnic and political composition of the home area and the place of relocation will be particularly relevant. In particular, an individual who lived in a former ISIL stronghold for some time may fall under suspicion in a place of relocation. Tribal and ethnic differences may preclude such relocation, given the significant presence and control of largely Shia militia in these areas. Even where it is safe for an individual to relocate within the Formerly Contested Areas, however, it is unlikely to be either feasible or reasonable without a prior connection to, and a support structure within, the area in question.”
26. I note at this stage that this country guidance case was decided on 16 March 2022 at which time there continued to be an internal armed conflict in certain parts of Iraq but, in general, there was not a sufficient risk of indiscriminate violence to qualify a civilian to humanitarian protection solely for that reason. However, in Kirkuk, there needed to be a fact-sensitive sliding-scale assessment3. That is the ambit of section A of the headnote. Section D was concerned with internal flight to GOI-controlled Iraq.
27. In this case, the Appellant’s claim was expressed in his appeal skeleton argument as follows. He could not return to Kirkuk because it is controlled by the PMF, a Shia militia group, which targets Sunni Muslims and Kurds for extortion, arbitrary arrest, detention and imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture and execution. In his witness statement, the Appellant did not specifically name the PMF but stated he feared returning to Kirkuk because of Shia militia who work with the Iraqi government and who target Sunni Muslims and Kurds because they perceive them as inferior and do not want them there. He had said at his interview that his mother and sister had moved to Sulaymaniyah because the situation in Kirkuk was “not good”.
28. Ms Sepulveda took me to parts of the background evidence. This consisted of some selected passages from country information reports. An EUAA report from 2022 stated that the PMF manned checkpoints and engaged in extortion and detention of Sunni on false charges. They were also reported to have committed violence against minorities and perpetuated ethnic conflict. Especially in Kirkuk, the denial of returns of Kurds was also reported.
29. The material included a passage from the September 2024 CPIN on religious minorities in Iraq setting out that a USCIRF report in May 2023 stated that the Iraqi Federal Government had not brought the PMF under control. Such groups used checkpoint interrogations and detentions, enforced disappearance, extortion and physical violence targeting Sunnis, Christians and Yazidis. Also the US State Department report on Human Rights Practices in Iraq in 2023 referred to an excessive number of PMF checkpoints in many parts of the country liberated from ISIS control, including Mosul and Sinjar region.
30. I note the grounds seeking permission to appeal only refer to a failure to have regard to country guidance, not background evidence. The appeal skeleton argument did not reference any background evidence and I have no way of knowing whether anything was expressly brought to the attention of the Judge. The matter of the PMF was not the main focus of the case. Even assuming the Judge was expected to find these references for himself, they only provide limited support to the Appellant’s case. They were around two years’ old at the date of hearing and only one of them specifically references Kirkuk. The EUAA report requires a log-in and I cannot open it. I note the passage relied on from the CPIN is incomplete and the paragraph does not refer to Kirkuk expressly. The areas highlighted in the paragraph are Mosul and the Ninevah Plains. The CPIN as a whole focused mainly on non-Muslim minorities.
31. I agree with Mr Mullen’s description of [43] as brief. However, I do not read it as showing the judge treated the matter as arising from the perception that the Appellant was pro-ISIS. He noted the issue was “ethnic differences”. It is true the Judge did not conduct a sliding-scale analysis as suggested by SMO (2) in the context of applications for humanitarian protection. However, the challenge set out in the grounds is exaggerated when it suggests the Judge failed to make findings on a material matter. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim that he could not safely return to Kirkuk. I find that his assessment was adequate given the paucity of supporting evidence specific to the Appellant’s home area. The Judge might have understated the situation by referring to the issue as that of minorities being treated with suspicion. However, the background evidence could not rationally have led to a finding that there was a real risk of persecution to the Appellant on the bases put forward or that, applying the sliding-scale assessment, the Appellant was entitled to humanitarian protection.
32. I find the Judge did not make a material error of law and the decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the Appellant’s appeal shall stand.

Signed
N Froom

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 14 November 2025