Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003465
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01977/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

HR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Vokes, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House (by video) on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. I have considered whether to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal and have decided that it is necessary to do so because the need for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) promulgated on 25 November 2024, dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant is a national of Iraq. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 November 2021 and claimed asylum on 18 November 2021. The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution and/or serious harm in Iraq as a victim of tribal and honour based violence because of his extra-marital relationship with a woman. The appellant fears the woman’s family.
4. The appellant’s asylum claim was refused on 14 December 2023. He appealed the decision. His appeal was heard on 20 November 2024 and was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 25 November 2024.
5. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds that the judge made adverse findings on credibility based on a lack of detail in the appellant’s evidence on matters, many of which were not put to the appellant either at interview or in his oral evidence, resulting in unfairness.
6. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 15 July 2025 on the basis that it is arguable that the judge may have made adverse credibility findings including on matters which were not put to the appellant. The grant of permission was not limited.
7. The respondent filed a response to the grounds of appeal pursuant to rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the Procedure Rules) on 19 August 2025. The respondent opposed the appellant’s appeal.
8. The matter came before me to determine whether the judge’s decision contains an error of law. If I conclude that it does, I must decide whether to set it aside in consequence, either in whole or in part. If I do, I must then either remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal or re-make the decision in this Tribunal.
The hearing
9. The hearing was conducted by video and there was no objection to this being a suitable method of hearing.
10. I had before me a composite bundle and the respondent’s rule 24 response. The parties confirmed that there were no additional documents relied on. Mr Vokes advised that he had not seen the respondent’s rule 24 prior to the hearing but Ms Clewley had provided him with a copy, and he was content to proceed. I heard oral submissions, which I have considered together with the documents in reaching my decision.
The appellant’s submissions
11. Mr Vokes expanded on the grounds of appeal in his submissions. He accepted that that it is for the appellant to put his case in full but submitted that the appellant answered the questions he was asked and that he could not be expected to anticipate the judge’s thinking on other matters without those matters being put to him. He submitted that if there were matters which troubled the judge, the judge ought to have identified them and asked the respondent’s representative to put them to the appellant in cross-examination. Mr Vokes drew my attention to various parts of the appellant’s evidence to support his submissions on the following matters:
(i) That the appellant did provide sufficient detail in relation to his relationship and how it developed and that the detail the judge considered he ought to have provided was not put to the appellant.
(ii) That the appellant did mention who shot at him in his questionnaire.
(iii) That the appellant did not give inconsistent evidence about how he came to be shot at if he was in hiding as claimed.
(iv) That the appellant did provide an answer as to why his girlfriend’s father was not able to find him when he was in hiding with his uncle.
12. Mr Vokes also reiterated the submission in the grounds of appeal that there is a difference between living in the open and living in hiding, which was relevant to the judge’s finding on whether it was credible that the appellant was not discovered by his girlfriend’s partner.
13. Mr Vokes submitted that the appellant had provided a sufficiently detailed account of his relationship and how it developed and that this must be viewed in the context of the couple being in Iraq where they could not have an open relationship.
14. In relation to the appellant’s evidence about who shot at him, Mr Vokes submitted that the appellant had provided a detailed account of the incident, including that he was out shopping when it happened; and that it was a man in a car.
15. As to the judge’s finding that the appellant’s evidence about how he was able to remain in hiding without being located was inconsistent with his evidence about the influence and power of his girlfriend’s father, Mr Vokes submitted that this was based on speculation. He submitted that the appellant’s evidence at interview indicated that his girlfriend’s father was not aware of his family circumstances, and that in particular he did not know about his uncle with whom he was staying when in hiding.
16. When asked why the appellant had not sought to rely on either the record of proceedings or a note of the hearing, Mr Vokes indicated that he represented the appellant in the First-tier Tribunal, but that his instructing solicitors had not asked him for his note of the hearing. He stated however that he did not dispute the judge’s record of what was put to the appellant, which was set out in paragraph 42.
The respondent’s submissions
17. Ms Clewley relied on the rule 24 response. She submitted that the appellant was on notice of the issues on which the judge made negative findings and how they were relevant to his credibility. In particular, she noted the respondent’s criticism about the appellant’s account of his relationship and how it developed contained in the refusal letter. She submitted that he was asked numerous questions in interview and despite being given ample opportunity to provide more information, his answers were brief and lacking in detail.
18. Ms Clewley submitted that the burden of establishing unfairness because matters were not put to the appellant at the hearing is on the appellant. She noted that the appellant had not sought to rely on a record of proceedings, or a note from the appellant’s representative. Ms Clewley stated that she had looked at the respondent’s note of the hearing to try and assist, but that it was a record of the submissions, not of the cross-examination and was of no assistance.
19. I noted that the refusal letter did raise the issue of the appellant’s account of his relationship and asked where other matters relied on by the judge were clearly put such that the appellant would understand that they were in issue. Ms Clewley submitted that they were put to the appellant in interview and relied on WN (Surendran; credibility; new evidence) Democratic Republic of Congo [2004] UKIAT 00213 as set out in the rule 24 response. She submitted that they were all obvious credibility points.
20. Ms Clewley accepted that the appellant had in fact referred to the shooting in his questionnaire and submitted that the judge had essentially made a typographical error in the first bullet point of paragraph 42 by mixing up the questionnaire and the interview record. She submitted that the judge’s point was nevertheless a good one – the appellant’s evidence in these two instances was inconsistent.
21. In respect of other matters, such as ground relating to the apparent inconsistency between the appellants’ evidence about being about to remain in his home area without being discovered and the claimed power and influence of his girlfriend’s father that would enable him to find the appellant anywhere, Ms Clewley submitted that they amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings.
22. Mr Vokes gave a brief response, submitting that although it did appear the judge had simply referred to the evidence as being contained in the wrong documents, it called into question whether the judge understood the appellant’s case as put.
23. Both Mr Vokes and Ms Clewley submitted that if I were to find a material error of law, the extent of fact finding required meant that I should remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal de novo. Ms Clewley did however ask me to consider the overriding objective and the fact that remittal may result in a significant delay.
Discussion
24. The issue in this appeal is whether the judge made a material error of law by making adverse findings of credibility based on matters not put to the appellant, thereby giving rise to unfairness. These matters relate to both inconsistencies in and a lack of detail in the appellant’s evidence.
25. I find that the appellant was plainly on notice that the respondent did not accept that he had provided a sufficiently detailed account of how his relationship developed and that he had been unable to provide any detailed information about his relationship. The appellant was asked about this at interview, and it was raised in the refusal letter. It was for the appellant to address this point in his witness statement. The appellant deals with this point in a single paragraph in his witness statement, stating that the relationship did not last very long; that they were mainly talking on WhatsApp; that they had things in common; were of a similar age; and had similar personalities. The appellant did not elaborate on what they had in common, nor did he provide any detail about the relationship itself.
26. The kind of evidence that might have been expected can be seen from the questions asked of the appellant at interview, in particular questions 32 to 35. The appellant did not provide any more detailed evidence in his witness statement, and the judge was entitled to find that his evidence about his relationship and how it developed was vague and lacking in detail. It was not necessary for the judge to put specific matters such as those set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the decision, as they were reasonably matters that the appellant could have been expected to address in response to the refusal letter, which expressly referred to questions 31 to 35 of the interview.
27. I find that the judge made a mistake of fact as to where the appellant’s evidence was contained in relation to the shooting. The judge confused the questionnaire and the interview record, stating that the appellant did not mention who shot him in the questionnaire. This is incorrect, as the appellant does in fact refer to being shot at by a man in a car on his way home from shopping in the questionnaire. The point the judge was making here is that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent. The grounds of appeal do not deal with this point. This inconsistency is a matter that was put to the appellant in cross-examination as set out in paragraph 42, which Mr Vokes accepted was an accurate record (save for the judge having mixed up the two documents). The judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent on this point.
28. Based on what Mr Vokes accepted about paragraph 42 of the decision, the inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about how he came to be shot at if he was hiding was put to him in cross-examination.
29. He was asked about this at interview. At question 36 the appellant stated ‘well after they shot me I went to my uncle’s house to arrange to flee’. At question 37 the appellant was asked ‘ok, so up until the moment you were shot at did you think there was any danger in the relationship?’. The appellant replied ‘of course I knew there was danger in the relationship after this, because I knew how people thought of such relationship, that’s why I quite my job and stayed in my uncles house’. At question 43 the appellant was asked whether the relationship ended when he was shot at. His response was ‘no March 2021’. At question 44 he was asked to confirm that when he was shot at the relationship had already ended in March. The appellant confirmed that this was the case and that the shooting was by way of revenge. In his questionnaire the appellant stated that he and his girlfriend went on a date in a park in March 2021 and that this is when they were caught.
30. At questions 49 to 51 the appellant was asked questions about the circumstances in which he went to stay with his uncle. Question 49 was ‘Tell me more about the time you were caught on this date in the park, what happened?’. The appellant’s response was ‘well it was her cousin who saw us in the park… once we were caught I ran away and went to my uncles house about what happened’. Question 50 was ‘ok and what happened after you went to your uncles house?’. The appellant responded ‘well once I went to the house I clarified everything he told me to keep myself from such acts and not go to the house and go out so much and for a long time I stayed in the house, and didn’t go out much. Well I was staying at the house until I was shot in August I didn’t go out I stayed in the house until he arranged for me’.
31. The appellant did not expressly state that he did not go out at all when he was in hiding at his uncle’s house. His evidence is that he followed his uncle’s advice not to go out so much. I find that the last part of his answer to question 50 relates to what happened after he was shot at, which was that he stayed in the house until his uncle arranged for him to flee. This is consistent with the appellant’s answer to question 56, which was what steps he took to keep himself safe given that his uncle’s house is in the same town. The appellant replied ‘after I was shot at I didn’t go out anymore, he gave me food and clothes and everyday he told me not to go out until I get out of the country’. The judge does not record in paragraph 42 how what he believed to be an apparent inconsistency was put to the appellant or what his responses were. I find that the judge’s consideration of this point does not address the appellant’s actual evidence and amounts to a mistake of fact on this point. There is no inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence about how he came to be shot because while he was staying at his uncle’s house, his evidence was not that he never left the house, rather it was that he limited how much he went out before he was shot at.
32. In relation to the inconsistency identified by the judge between the apparent power and influence of the girlfriend’s father and his inability to find the appellant, Mr Vokes submitted that appellant provided a satisfactory answer to this point at question 57 of the interview. This is a matter that was put to the appellant, as recorded in paragraph 42 of the decision. The appellant’s evidence was that he believed his girlfriend’s father could find him anywhere in Iraq because of his power and influence. See for example paragraph 7 of his witness statement dated 3 September 2024 in which the appellant states that he would have the ability to locate him in ‘any place of proposed relocation’. See also the appellant’s questionnaire in which it is stated that ‘…the girl’s father has a very powerful position in the government, and that’s how politicians in his country use power’ and ‘… it doesn’t matter where he escaped to. They could use non-governmental groups to find him and kill him.’
33. The judge clearly identified that it was put to the appellant that it was not credible to suggest that in circumstances where the appellant claimed that his girlfriend’s father had power and influence and could find him anywhere in Iraq, he could not in fact find him when the appellant was staying in hiding in the same town. Mr Vokes criticised the judge for not referring to the appellant’s answer to question 57 of the interview in his decision. With respect, this does not assist the appellant, as it only serves to highlight the fact that notwithstanding the people who shot him were in contact with his father, they apparently did not take any steps to try and locate him. Any failure to refer to the appellant’s evidence that they were not aware of his uncle is not material, because even if the judge had mentioned it, it is not a satisfactory explanation for why, if the appellant genuinely believed that his girlfriend’s father could use his resources to find him anywhere in Iraq, he did not or could not use them to find him in the same town. In other words, the appellant’s evidence could not have reasonably changed the judge’s finding on this point.
Conclusions
34. Based on the reasons set out above, I draw the following conclusions:
(i) Relevant matters going to the appellant’ credibility were put to him at interview, were identified in the decision under appeal, and were put to him in cross-examination.
(ii) The judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence about his relationship and how it developed was vague and lacking in detail.
(iii) The judge made a mistake of fact as to which document contained the appellant’s evidence about who shot him.
(iv) On proper consideration of the appellant’s evidence, the judge would have found that he was not inconsistent in relation to the timing of when he was shot and when he went into hiding.
(v) The appellant did not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why his girlfriend’s father was unable to find him when he was in hiding in the same town, notwithstanding his claimed power and influence and ability to find him in ‘any area of relocation’.
35. I find therefore that the judge did make an error of law by making two mistakes of fact about where in his evidence the appellant had identified who had shot at him and about the timing of when he was shot versus when he went into hiding. I have considered whether these mistakes of fact are material and find that they are not. The first is not material because the point the judge was making was that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent and he did not provide a reasonable explanation for that inconsistency, which was put to him.
36. The second mistake of fact is more serious but even so, I do not accept that it is material. This is because it is one of several other matters going to the appellant’s credibility which were not challenged. When all the appellant’s evidence is considered in the round, the mistakes of fact would not have altered the judge’s overall conclusion that the appellant is not credible for the reasons given. There was no unfairness in the proceedings and the judge’s conclusions were reasonably open to her on the evidence and are neither irrational nor perverse.
Notice of Decision
37. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
38. The appeal is dismissed.

J K Swaney
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
21 November 2025