Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003466
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54859/2024
LP/12607/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between

AM
(Anonymity Direction Made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Holmes (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 25 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or his family, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I maintain the anonymity order in these proceedings. The underlying claim involves international protection issues - the Appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the Appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
Background
2. In a decision promulgated on 10th December 2025, I, together with Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato, found a material error of law in the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) and set that Decision aside in the following terms (full Error of Law Decision and Reasons attached at Annex 1):
“18. We find that the FtT has fallen into material error in failing to ask itself the question of what will happen upon the Appellant’s application for an ETD or on return to Tehran airport and in particular (i) what the Appellant will do/say in respect of his sur place claim (ii) whether he genuinely holds the political opinions he has espoused and (iii) what the response of the Iranian government will be in the context of the risk factors identified and set out above in HB.
…
20. We have found a material error in relation to the assessment of risk arising from the Appellant’s sur place activities in the UK and to that extent we set aside the Decision. We preserve the findings at [21-27] as they did not involve the making of a material error of law.
21. In light of our analysis above, we find that the appropriate course is for the matter to be retained in the Upper Tribunal and listed for re-hearing on the question of the risk arising from the Appellant’s sur place activities in the UK.”
3. Following a re-hearing before myself on 25th February 2026, I reserved my decision on the assessment of risk arising from the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom which I now give with my reasons.
Evidence and Preserved Findings
4. The Appellant relied upon a Supplementary Bundle running to 2093 pages, in addition to the documents contained in the Consolidated Bundle (581 pages). Of the 2093 pages in the Supplementary Bundle, all save for 20 pages comprise “Facebook download” information. In light of Mr McVeety’s position that he accepted the evidence relied on by the Appellant demonstrated a valid Facebook account in the Appellant’s name, Mr Holmes stated that he would not be relying upon pages 21-2091 of the Supplementary Bundle and he did not refer to them further.
5. For completeness, the preserved findings of the FtT are as follows:
“Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004
21. I am obliged to consider the application of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 in this case. I find under section 8(4) the appellant failed to claim asylum while in a safe country (Italy and France). His explanation for not claiming asylum in those safe countries was that he was "under the control of an agent”. I find that it is a plausible explanation. Taking all the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant’s actions under section 8(4) do not damage his credibility in the particular circumstances of this case.
Activities in Iran
22. I find that the appellant’s evidence as to his activities in Iran was not credible because it was internally inconsistent across his various accounts, and he was inconsistent and evasive in his oral evidence. For example, I find that the appellant did not give a credible explanation as to why he had not tried to contact his family in Iran, not even to try to find out what happened to his cousin who he claimed was in trouble with the Iranian authorities for having killed an official, and not even to check if there was an arrest warrant or court summons extant for the appellant.
23. The appellant said he does not know if his family still live in the same place. He did not provide a credible explanation for why he could not try to contact them. The appellant is illiterate but by his own admission he has made a lot of use of a contact in his hotel to post content on Facebook and make contacts on Facebook. When asked in cross-examination why he could not ask the same person to help him try to contact his family the appellant was evasive and did not directly answer the question as to why that person could not have helped him try.
24. I find that even by the appellant’s own account he does not know what, if anything, happened to his cousin, let alone if the Iranian authorities have any interest in the appellant himself. The appellant’s evidence was that he saw his cousin fighting a member of the Iranian regime but I find it is not obvious from the appellant’s evidence why this would bring him to the adverse attention of the authorities when by his own admission he was not involved in the fight.
25. In relation to the alleged fight he claims he witnessed his cousin taking part in, under cross-examination the appellant’s evidence was that he could not remember the date it occurred. When pressed he said it was on either a “Wednesday or Thursday” but could not remember the day or month. In response to question 54 of his asylum interview he claimed it occurred “either on the 11th September or the 9th of November”. I find it is implausible, without a credible explanation, that the appellant would not know even the month such a critical incident occurred given he claims it led to him having to flee his country. The appellant said the reason for forgetting when the incident occurred was because he had a poor memory when he was stressed. I find that no credible medical evidence was presented to support this contention about the appellant’s memory and no application for an adjournment was felt necessary to try and obtain such evidence. I find that these inconsistent and evasive responses from the appellant are on the balance of probabilities indicative of a fabricated account to bolster a weak asylum claim.
26. The appellant claimed in cross-examination that his father was angry with him due to his activities distributing political leaflets in Iran. He was later internally inconsistent when he said his father did not know about his distributing leaflets but was instead “angry with me because I fled”.
27. The appellant was a shepherd. He claimed under cross-examination that he hired an agent to leave Iran and raised $16,000 from selling animals to pay for this. The animals were owned by the appellant’s father for whom the appellant worked. The appellant claimed under cross-examination that he managed to do this without his father’s knowledge. I find that is implausible given the appellant worked for his father. When pressed in cross-examination on how long it had taken him to amass $16,000 from selling his father’s animals the appellant replied, “I sold the animals even before the incident [with his cousin]. I was prepared.” When pressed on why he was prepared to leave Iran even before the claimed incident with his cousin, the appellant replied that, “The aim was not to use the money to leave Iran, it was to buy more animals.” I find that on the balance of probabilities that is not likely to be true because the appellant earlier claimed he was selling the animals his father owned and for whom he worked without his father’s knowledge. I find it implausible that he could sell such a valuable stock of animals without his knowledge. But I also find it to lack credibility that he would hide all of this activity from his father just for the purpose of buying more animals (as opposed to paying an agent). Taking all the evidence in the round, I do not find the appellant’s account of his activities in Iran to be a credible one.”
The Issues
6. It was agreed between the Parties that the issues to be resolved in this appeal are:
i. Are the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom motivated by genuine political opposition to the Iranian Regime? If so, it is agreed that his appeal succeeds. If not;
ii. Do the Iranian authorities have any current knowledge or interest in the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom? If so, it is agreed that his appeal succeeds. If not;
iii. Are the Appellant’s sur place activities likely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities at the pinch point of applying for a travel document (ETD) and /or on his return to Iran. If so, it is agreed that his appeal succeeds. If not;
iv. If the Appellant lies to conceal his contrived political activities in the United Kingdom would that offend the principles in HJ (Iran) v SSHD UKSC [2011] 1 AC 596 and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38;
v. I was not addressed in any detail on the emerging country situation in Iran, nor was there any evidence placed before the Upper Tribunal in respect of the same, save that Mr Holmes argued that the current climate was of particular significance to the interest the authorities will have in the Appellant as a Kurd returning from the West.
The Proceedings
7. The Appellant was called to adopt his three witnesses statements in these proceedings. He did so through an interpreter in the Kurdish Sorani language. There was no request to expand those witness statements nor cross-examination. Mr McVeety stated that he relied upon the record of the Appellant’s answers before the FtT as contained in the Decision of that Tribunal.
8. I invited both representatives to address me on the recent Court of Appeal authority of OM v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585 which they did in the course of their submissions.
Findings of Fact and Discussion
9. I confirm that I have reminded myself of, and applied, the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC); SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC); HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430, PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC).
Are the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom motivated by genuine political opposition to the Iranian Regime?
10. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As his claim to protection was made after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’), in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, I must determine this first question on the balance of probabilities.
11. I have considered all of the evidence before me in the round.
12. I take into account the preserved findings of the FtT and that the Appellant’s account as to the facts which led him to leave Iran is not credible.
13. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in October 2022 and I note that on 11th December 2023 he told that Respondent that he had taken part in demonstrations against the Iranian Regime in the United Kingdom. I take into account that the Appellant claims (in his witness statement dated 7th June 2024) that he has been a “political activist in the UK since September 2023” [7] and (in his witness statement dated 15th May 2025) that “I am a genuine political activist” [4].
14. I find, on the unchallenged evidence, that the Appellant was present at some 14 demonstrations, possibly more, in the United Kingdom and that when viewed in the context of the photographs taken from the evidence of the Appellant’s Facebook account, those demonstrations were political in nature and in opposition to the Regime in Iran. I find, however, that the evidence before the Tribunal of the Appellant’s role at those demonstrations is limited. In his witness statement dated 16th May 2025 the Appellant refers to what “we” did at the demonstrations but does not identify himself as having a particular role or profile within the demonstrators: save for one photograph of the Appellant in a high viz vest (which was not expanded upon nor placed in context in the evidence) the Appellant is either one of, or apart from, a large crowd. Whilst in his witness statement dated 7th June 2024 the Appellant states that he chanted and held up slogans [9] there is no evidence before me as to how long the Appellant spent at the demonstrations and undertook these activities for. It is for the Appellant to prove the facts of his case.
15. I take account of the fact that the Appellant stated that he had never been a member of a political party in Iran nor has he thought about joining an Iranian political party in the United Kingdom (as recorded by the FtT [28]). I find that his claimed genuine political activity in the United Kingdom it not, therefore, a continuation of previous action.
16. I take account of the Appellant’s evidence before the FtT that his friends asked him to attend demonstrations [28] and that when asked in cross-examination in the FtT why he asked his friends to take photographs of him holding posters in a demonstration the Appellant had replied, “To have evidence for myself”. I have considered Mr Holmes submissions that everyone must start their political journey at some point, often through friends, and that gathering evidence is a perfectly understandable motivation on the Appellant’s part not inconsistent with a genuine political animus at the Iranian Regime. I find, however, that the Appellant’s answers before the FtT point away from his claim to be a “genuine political activist” because by that time, the Appellant on his case had been attending demonstrations and had been such an activist for over 18 months. His answers before the FtT simply do not support that claim, rather they lack the detail to be reasonably expected of an individual with genuine political conviction who attends demonstrations in support of the same.
17. Turning to the Appellant’s Facebook account itself, I was not taken to any particular posts on behalf of the Appellant in support of his claim to genuine political motivation. Again, Mr McVeety pointed to and relied upon the Appellant’s answers before the FtT, particularly that he could not read nor understand the posts on his Facebook page [34]. Mr Holmes argues that the Appellant has tackled this point in his earlier witness statement dated 7th June 2024 wherein he states that “I do need help sometimes with what I am posting and writing in Kurdish. My friends at the hotel help me post sometimes but before they do they explain to me that the posts are about. They read the posts to me, explain what the post is about and then I chose (sic) what I post. I tell them what to write so everything is my opinion and not that of my friends. I can also recognise the posts by the photos sometimes” [7]. First of all, I was not taken to any specific post that the Appellant claims he asked his friends to write. Second, I find that the Appellant’s answers before the FtT are inconsistent with the claims he makes at [7] of his witness statement. If the Appellant tells his friends what to write, then it must follow that he understands what has been written. Third, no one attended on the part of the Appellant nor provided a witness statement to support his assertion that they write what the Appellant asks them to. The evidence of Facebook activity does not, I find, support his claimed political motivation when considered in the round.
18. I have carefully considered Mr Holmes’ submission that there is a spectrum of political belief and that, although not Mr Holmes’ primary case, it is open to me to find that even if the Appellant has exaggerated his claim to political belief he must still, in the current climate and in light of the historic persecution of Kurds, be opposed to the Regime in Iran on some (even if low) level. The difficulty with that submission is that it is not the Appellant’s case. The Appellant’s clear case is that he is a “political activist” not someone merely passively opposed to the Regime in Iran. I do not accept Mr Holmes’ submission on this point.
19. Standing back and considering all of the evidence before me in the round, I find that the Appellant has not satisfied me on the balance of probability that he is genuinely politically motivated against the Iranian Regime. I find that the Appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom, both in attending demonstrations and the Facebook account and posts in his name, are contrived purely to fabricate a claim to protection.
20. I remind myself that this Tribunal in XX [100] found that “a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution.” (My emphasis)
21. Bringing forward my findings above, I do not accept, on balance, that the Appellant will not delete his Facebook account prior to the application for an ETD. I do not accept that the Appellant intends to engage in any political activity in Iran.
Do the Iranian authorities have any current knowledge or interest in the Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom?
22. I invited Mr Holmes to address me on the standard of proof applicable to this second question. To an extent I accept his point that it isn’t entirely clear as the question is informed by both subjective (the Appellant’s account) and objective (forward looking) evaluation. I find, however, that this assessment falls within the question posed at [18] by this Tribunal in JCK, namely whether in fact the Appellant is afraid of return to Iran for the reason claimed. This requires to be resolved on the balance of probabilities.
23. Mr Holmes submitted that the sheer volume of Facebook activity is demonstrative of the fact that the Appellant is probably known to the Iranian Regime. I consider that below.
24. It is a preserved finding of fact that the Iranian authorities had no interest in the Appellant at the time that he left Iran.
25. I remind myself of the finding of this Tribunal in XX: “While we accept Mr Jaffey’s submission that the Iranian government may have the motivation and past record in other endeavours, the evidence fails to show it is reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities are able to monitor, on a large scale, Facebook accounts, in the sense described by Dr Clayton, of the automated extraction of data. More focussed, ad hoc searches will necessarily be more labour-intensive and are therefore confined to individuals who are of significant adverse interest. We accept Mr Thomann’s submission that the risk that an individual is targeted will be a nuanced one. Whose Facebook accounts will be targeted, before they are deleted, will depend on a person’s existing profile and where they fit onto a “social graph;” and the extent to which they or their social network may have their Facebook material accessed.” [87 – my emphasis]
26. I remind myself of the guidance provided by this Tribunal in BA and as confirmed in XX “this case is authority for the finding that the Iranian government is unable to monitor all returnees involved in UK demonstrations. A decision maker must analyse the level of involvement of an individual, including the nature of sur place activities.” [10]
27. I bring forward my findings above at [14] in respect of the nature of the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations. Other than being present as part of a larger crowd, there is nothing to suggest that the Appellant is identifiable as a leader or organiser of any demonstration; indeed it is not his claim to be. Whilst the Appellant is photographed holding up pictures as he poses for photographs, there is no photographic or video evidence I was taken to going to how long he remained at any demonstration. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the Appellant was observed by the Iranian authorities or that he would come to their attention as standing out from the crowd.
28. Whilst I note that the Appellant stated before the FtT that officials inside the Iranian Embassy had monitored his activities and taken photographs, that claim is not expanded upon at all in the Appellant’s most recent witness statement. It is not a claim that the Appellant has made in his earlier witness statements nor in his asylum interview. I note that the Appellant, in his witness statement dated 7th June 2024, states that there were protestors filming and phones were pointed towards him [9], however, he does not know if he was filmed and, even if so, any posting and onward circulation is unevidenced and entirely speculative.
29. As for the Appellant’s Facebook account, I have considered the evidence of the posts before me and make the following findings of fact:
i. unlike the appellant in XX, there is no evidence that the Appellant has been photographed in close proximity to a prominent member of any Kurdish political party or individual;
ii. despite having 5000 ‘friends’ on Facebook, the number of ‘likes’ of his posts are low;
iii. he does not say that he has received any negative or threatening messages as a result of his posts.
30. The Appellant has not established that, through his contrived activities, his social graph has become the subject of targeted social media surveillance by the Iranian Regime or that his attendance at anti Regime demonstrations is known to them.
31. For the avoidance of any doubt, before moving on to the assessment of risk to the Appellant given my findings above, I would not have found for the Appellant on the first of the two questions before me, even to the lower standard of proof.
Are the Appellant’s sur place activities reasonably likely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities at the pinch point of applying for travel documents and returning to Iran?
32. I answer this question to the lower standard of proof.
33. I have rejected the Appellant’s account that he would not delete his Facebook account in a timely manner prior to an application for an ETD to facilitate his return to Iran. Following XX “The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.” There is no reason why the Appellant could not close his Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD, given that the postings were not a reflection of any genuinely held political belief. I have found that the Appellant’s Facebook account was not and would not be monitored prior to its closure and a basic internet search in the Appellant’s name at the ETD ‘pinch-point’ would not yield any information of concern to the Iranian Regime [4 & 6 XX Headnote]. The Appellant’s sur place activities are not, I find, reasonably likely to come to the attention of the Iran Regime at the ETD application stage.
34. The country guidance, PS, shows that the Appellant would be questioned as a Kurd returning from the United Kingdom and is reasonably likely to be asked questions about why he claimed asylum. In terms of how Mr Holmes puts the Appellant’s case, the risk arises at this stage were the Appellant to disclose his attendance in the United Kingdom at demonstrations and/or of his having posted on Facebook as evidenced before me.
35. When considering the pinch point of return I remind myself of the point that Mr Holmes took me to at [58] RT (Zimbabwe), of HB and of the current unrest in Iran. Mr Holmes set out the risk factors in the Appellant’s case as follows:
i. he is Kurdish and the Iranian Regime demonstrate a ‘hair-trigger’ approach meaning that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme (see HB [10 Headnote])
ii. he left Iran illegally
iii. he is returning from the West, which, in the current climate is of particular significance (see BA [67])
iv. there is an inherent difficulty in assessing how effective a liar the Appellant would be (having been disbelieved by authorities in the United Kingdom).
36. The Court of Appeal have had cause to consider the position of the risk to ethnic Kurds returning to Iran having conducted contrived sur place political activities in the United Kingdom in both S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 and OM. The Court of Appeal in S found as follows [54-56]:
“54 … In my judgment, bearing in mind the retained finding that the appellant's activities whilst in the UK were opportunistic and not genuine, the judge was entitled to find that the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about those activities. Furthermore, that as the appellant had no involvement in PJAK or politics before he left Iran, there would be no other reason for the Iranian authorities to have any suspicion about the appellant, such that on his return to Iran, there would be no risk to the appellant either of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment either by reason of second-stage questioning or otherwise.
55. In the course of oral submissions, Ms Patel on behalf of the appellant brought to our attention RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] 1AC 152, ("RT") and submitted that it was necessary for Judge Kebede to have considered the type of issues which Lord Dyson mentioned at [57] before being properly able to reach a view as to the risk to the appellant on his return to Iran, including what the appellant might be asked by the authorities on his return and how well he would be able to lie to them. However, as was pointed out in XX at [98], the issues which the Supreme Court were considering in RT, arose in a very different context, namely the return of a non-political Zimbabwean to an area in which it was likely that he would have to provide a convincingly false account of his allegiance to the ruling party when stopped and questioned by ill-disciplined militia at roadblocks.
56. In contrast, as was pointed out in XX at [99] the Iranian authorities do not persecute individuals because of their political neutrality. Moreover, in the present case, and in the light of both the retained findings and those made by Judge Kebede as to the unlikelihood of the appellant having already come to the attention of the authorities and his lack of genuine political belief in the PJAK, the appellant was not in a position where he would have to prove his political loyalty, rather it would be one in which, as Judge Kebede found, the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK.”
37. The Court of Appeal held in OM [53-55] that:
“53. The country guidance demonstrates that a Kurd returning from the UK as a failed asylum seeker would be questioned. However, those factors would not lead to second stage interrogation unless something of concern to the Iranian authorities arose during the initial questioning. On the findings of Judge Power, such concern would only emerge if the appellant disclosed his attendance at the UK demonstrations to the authorities. The truth, as found by Judge Power, was that the appellant was not politically motivated but had attended demonstrations to secure evidence to use in his asylum claim.
54. The appellant claimed that he would not delete his Facebook page and would wish to continue to protest if he returned to Iran. Judge Power did not believe him. It is apparent that the question of what the appellant might say during questioning has only been brought into sharp focus during the hearing before this Court. Although Judge Power did not expressly find that the appellant would not volunteer the fact of his attendance at demonstrations when questioned, it is clear from reading the judgment as a whole that the judge would inevitably have reached that conclusion given the unassailable findings of fact she had made. Given the findings that the appellant’s activities were contrived and not genuinely motivated, it is reasonable to infer that he would not disclose them on return.
55. On that basis, his position is not materially distinguishable from the appellant in S.”
38. The question of what the Appellant will say on return to Iran when questioned is acutely fact sensitive. I have found that the Appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom are contrived and not genuinely motivated. I find that it is not reasonably likely that the Appellant would, nor would he be required to, volunteer information about those activities. The Appellant has already fabricated the facts of a claim to remain in the United Kingdom. Whilst Mr Holmes’ relied upon RT and [57 & 58] I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in S as set out above:
“55. … as was pointed out in XX at [98], the issues which the Supreme Court were considering in RT, arose in a very different context, namely the return of a non-political Zimbabwean to an area in which it was likely that he would have to provide a convincingly false account of his allegiance to the ruling party when stopped and questioned by ill-disciplined militia at roadblocks.
56. In contrast, as was pointed out in XX at [99] the Iranian authorities do not persecute individuals because of their political neutrality. Moreover, in the present case, and in the light of both the retained findings and those made by Judge Kebede as to the unlikelihood of the appellant having already come to the attention of the authorities and his lack of genuine political belief in the PJAK, the appellant was not in a position where he would have to prove his political loyalty, rather it would be one in which, as Judge Kebede found, the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about his activities in the UK.”
39. It follows that the Appellant’s sur place activities are not reasonably likely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities at the pinch point of applying for travel documents and/or on his return to Iran.
40. Whilst Mr Holmes contended that the current climate in Iran heightened the risk to the Appellant as a returnee from the West, I was taken to no background evidence of that fact nor that there is a durable change such as to depart from the extant country guidance of this Tribunal on the subject of the questioning that will be take place on return to Iran.
If the Appellant lies to conceal his contrived political activities in the United Kingdom would that offend the principles in HJ (Iran) v SSHD UKSC [2011] 1 AC 596 and RT?
41. I find that the answer to this fourth question is provided by this Court in XX and the Court of Appeal in S.
42. In contrast to the position in RT where the appellant would have to prove a political loyalty that he did not have in order to avoid persecution, the Appellant before me (as in the case of S and OM) would not be required to volunteer information about contrived political activities in the United Kingdom. Consistently with the findings of the Court of Appeal (above), this Tribunal in XX has found “Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution.” [100 – my emphasis] There is no right not to be required to supress contrived political activity.
43. This fourth question is answered in the negative.

Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.

Roxanne Frantzis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th March 2026