Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003468

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63162/2023
LP/12200/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

BB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ferguson of counsel, instructed by Rasel Chambers Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of India. By a determination promulgated on 2 December 2025, his appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal was allowed to the limited extent that this tribunal was required to consider whether the appellant was a victim of trafficking, and if so whether he was at risk of ill-treatment on return as a result. Extensive findings made by FTTJ Cooper were preserved as detailed below. This matter now returns before me for rehearing on that limited issue.
2. Pursuant to directions the parties were permitted to file and serve additional evidence, and required to file and serve skeleton arguments. The appellant was required to file and serve an agreed composite bundle. In breach of those directions the appellant failed to file and serve a skeleton argument and failed to file and serve a composite bundle. I am told that this was for funding reasons. I am grateful to Ms Khan for the skeleton argument that she filed on the respondent’s behalf. The appellant filed and served two additional bundles.
3. At the outset of the hearing I raised with the parties the fact that when the matter had last come before the tribunal the respondent had placed considerable reliance on the fact that there had been a negative conclusive grounds decision in this case. That however had not been filed and served. In the event Ms Ferguson was able to provide me with a copy.
4. Accordingly, the documents in the hearing before me were as follows:
a. The composite bundle prepared for the previous hearing, consisting of: (i) documents relating to the appeal from the FTT decision; (ii) the appellant’s documents before the FTT; and (iii) the respondent’s documents before the FTT;
b. A bundle of additional material relied on by the appellant, filed and served on 5 December 2025, consisting of: (i) the determination of 2 December 2025; (ii) documents relating to threats to the appellant’s wife and her vulnerability; (iii) medical notes for the appellant;
c. A bundle of additional material relied on by the appellant, filed and served on 4 January 2026, consisting of: (i) what is described as an “Expert psychological country report on care capacity in India”; (ii) what is described as an “Expert country report on human rights and trafficking in India”;
d. A skeleton argument from the respondent dated 6 January 2026;
e. The conclusive grounds decision dated 10 April 2025.
5. Ms Khan additionally indicated that she intended to rely on the India CPINs in respect of Actors of Protection and Internal Relocation, each dated September 2025, to which she helpfully provided links in her skeleton argument.
Preserved findings
6. The following findings were preserved from the previous determination:
a. The appellant is not at risk from the BJP on return to India;
b. The appellant is not at risk from PJ or OM on return to India;
c. The appellant could internally relocate should he face any risk from PJ or OM or the BJP;
d. The appellant has a sufficiency of protection in respect of any risk he might face from PJ or OM or the BJP;
e. The decision to remove the appellant would not breach Article 8 ECHR.
7. The hearing was therefore, in principle and subject to the caveats in that determination, limited to resolving the question of whether the appellant faces a risk on return to India arising out of his account of having been trafficked.
The hearing
8. Ms Ferguson asked at the outset whether the appellant could be treated as a vulnerable witness. I agreed that he should in light of the contents of the expert psychological report, and the fact that he was treated as such by FTTJ Cooper. FTTJ Cooper referred to him as being “noticeably anxious”. That was also my impression. Ms Khan did not object. I canvassed what adjustments to procedure would be required and counsel suggested that all that would be required were appropriate breaks. In the event the appellant was clearly distraught throughout and became tearful repeatedly, necessitating breaks.
Oral evidence
9. In view of the fact that no further witness evidence had been adduced and because I considered that it would assist me in making my decision I permitted the appellant to be briefly examined in chief. Ms Khan objected on the basis that the May 2022 Practice Direction provides that the statements produced “…should be capable of standing as the totality of the evidence in chief of the person giving that statement”. While I agree entirely I was of the view that the relevant issues required further elucidation, given the lack of depth in the examination of that issue to date, and so I permitted further questioning limited only to the trafficking issue.
10. The appellant adopted his witness statement and the interpreter confirmed that they understood each other (part-way through the evidence he did raise the fact that the appellant’s Bengali was mixed in with Hindi, which he said did not prejudice communication between them – I note a similar issue arose in interview).
11. The appellant gave evidence of having been dropped at the airport where he was met by the person he claims trafficked him whom I shall refer to as “S”. He travelled alone. When collected he was brought from the airport by car to a place where he was locked in a room for several days before being taken to a restaurant where he was made to work for 18 months. While discussing his time in the restaurant the appellant broke down and was visibly very distressed. He clearly found it very difficult to recount these events and struggled to speak at a pace that would allow the interpreter to interpret properly.
12. The appellant said that at the restaurant he was forced to do the work of three people. He was kept in a basement. He repeatedly referred to his time in captivity as having ruined his life. He has skin problems as a result of years spent washing dishes. He was never given any medication while locked up and his fingers are still damaged.
13. The appellant was asked about how he raised the relevant money. He said he had a very small piece of land which he had sold. He was now left with nothing. He had given around £12-15,000 to S, piece by piece. When asked about the instalments the appellant said that S took what he wanted from the appellant over a period of one and a half months. He said he was being threatened by S and referred to the letter to his wife. The people threatening his wife always want more money, but he has no more money.
14. Ms Khan did not cross-examine the appellant on any aspect of his account.
15. In response to questions from me the appellant said that he cannot return to India because he cannot support his wife who is very vulnerable and disabled. He has three children. People are searching for him and he would rather commit suicide than return there. He has no money. He said that if he was returned he would end up falling victim to someone like S again because of the fact that he has no money.
16. Some of the evidence relied upon in the updated bundles, particularly regarding the appellant’s wife, appeared to be well outside the parameters of the remaking decision. There was also the suggestion of an Article 3 ECHR suicide risk claim. At the conclusion of the evidence I therefore asked the parties whether they agreed that the sole issue to be determined, in light of the preserved findings, was trafficking, and in particular:
a. Whether the appellant was trafficked; and
b. If so, whether he would be at risk on return of retrafficking.
17. The parties agreed with this framing of the issues and I will accordingly adopt it.
Documentary evidence
18. I have taken account of all of the documentary evidence detailed above.
19. The respondent’s refusal letter relied on the steps that the Indian authorities are taking in respect of trafficking, but does not actually engage with the question of whether the appellant’s account of having been trafficked is true (save that it accepts he paid an agent to come to the United Kingdom). The same may be said for the respondent’s review which focussed on those aspects of the claim rejected by FTTJ Cooper.
20. The respondent in her skeleton argument relied heavily on the conclusive grounds decision of 10 April 2025, although Ms Khan did not actually direct me to any specific part of it. Given the fact that the respondent did not challenge the appellant’s account of being trafficked in the United Kingdom in the refusal letter, the review, before FTTJ Cooper or before me (except to rely on this decision) this document was in substance the height of the respondent’s case on the factual question of whether the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
21. The CG decision notes that the appellant’s account is “broadly in line” with the known evidence of what happens both in the United Kingdom and India. However it does not accept the appellant’s account because of inconsistencies: (i) as to the circumstances of his arrival in S’s house; (ii) as to whether he was in a packaging centre between being in S’s house and the restaurant; (iii) as to the precise circumstances of his escape from the restaurant; (iv) as to the circumstances in which he funded his travel to the United Kingdom. Moreover, there was no psychiatric evidence to support his account or to explain the inconsistencies, and the dermatological evidence was not determinative. As his factual account was rejected due to these inconsistencies, the decision was negative.
22. The “Expert psychological country report on care capacity in India” is an unusual document in that it purports to be an expert report both in relation to the state of the appellant’s psychological health and also into the adequacy of medical care in India. The report finds that:

“…there is a direct causal relationship between [BB’s] experiences of exploitation and his current psychological presentation. Prolonged deprivation, isolation, coercive control, and psychological threat are well-established risk factors for severe depressive and anxiety disorders and for enduring disturbances in emotional regulation and cognition…”
23. The report finds that the appellant suffers from a Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. The report also notes that:

“His emotional responses when recounting these experiences, including tearfulness, distress, and fragmented recall, are clinically consistent with stress-related memory processing and altered autobiographical recall (Brewin et al., 2008; van der Kolk, 2014) and should not be interpreted as unreliability or exaggeration.”
24. The report concludes that the appellant:

“…is a psychologically vulnerable individual whose mental-health conditions are directly attributable to experiences consistent with modern slavery and exploitation. His severe depression and anxiety significantly impair his cognitive functioning, daily living capacity, and emotional regulation.”
25. I also note that the description of the appellant’s presentation in the interview with the experts is consistent not only with his presentation before me, but also the presentation as described by FTTJ Cooper and in his asylum interview.
26. The second additional report relied on is entitled “India: Expert report on human rights”. There are three authors. They are highly qualified, even if some of those qualifications appear to be of only tangential relevance to the matter in issue. Somewhat surprisingly they too interviewed the appellant, though it is again not clear which of the three.
27. While the report is generally couched in theoretical jargon, as regards individuals with profiles such as that claimed by the appellant it states the following:

“…individuals who present with a combination of prior trafficking, economic indebtedness, health limitations, psychological distress, and weak social support networks face a significantly elevated risk of re-trafficking or severe exploitation upon return. In practical terms, the protective mechanisms available in India do not reliably mitigate these intersecting risks for adult male returnees, particularly those returning after prolonged absence and without structured reintegration support.”
Submissions
28. Ms Khan in submissions relied on the reasons for refusal letter, the respondent’s review and her Appeal Skeleton Argument. Ms Khan very helpfully structured her submissions as between the two issue above.
29. In respect of the question of whether the appellant was trafficked, her submission was that the preserved credibility findings in respect of the other aspects of the appellant’s account were sufficient to justify the appeal being dismissed. She also relied on the negative conclusive grounds decision as detailed above, and the decision in DC(trafficking – protection HR appeal) Albania [2019] UKUT 00351 which provides that:

“(a) In a protection appeal, the "reasonable grounds" or "conclusive grounds" decision of the CA will be part of the evidence that the tribunal will have to assess in reaching its decision on that appeal, giving the CA's decision such weight as is due, bearing in mind that the standard of proof applied by the CA in a "conclusive grounds" decision was the balance of probabilities.

(b) In a human rights appeal, a finding by the tribunal that the CA has failed to reach a rational decision on whether the appellant has been the victim of trafficking, such as to be eligible for leave to remain in the United Kingdom for that reason alone, may lead the tribunal to allow the human rights appeal, on the basis that removing the appellant at this stage would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant's Article 8 ECHR rights. This scenario is, however, of narrow ambit and is unlikely to be much encountered in practice.

(c) In a human rights appeal, the question whether the appellant has been the victim of trafficking may be relevant to the issue of whether the appellant's removal would breach the ECHR, even where it is not asserted there is a trafficking-related risk of harm in the country of proposed return and irrespective of what is said in sub-paragraph (b) above: e.g. where the fact of trafficking may have caused the appellant physical or psychological harm. Here, as in sub-paragraph (a) above, the CA's decision on past trafficking will be part of the evidence to be assessed by the tribunal.”
[Headnote]
30. Ms Khan submitted that the evidence adduced by the appellant did not show that I should “depart from” the conclusive grounds decision.
31. In view of the fact that the appellant’s assertion that he had been trafficked within the United Kingdom appeared unchallenged in the hearing before FTTJ Cooper, was not challenged in the refusal letter, and was not the subject of cross-examination before me, I asked if she could point to any aspect of that account itself that was lacking in credibility. Ms Khan did not provide any, but relied on the conclusive grounds decision and said I should give it considerable weight.
32. In respect of the expert psychological report Ms Khan relied on MS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 941 in support of the proposition that I was not bound to accept its conclusions. She had several criticisms of the report: (i) there were no follow-up appointments made; (ii) she considered it “self-serving” as it was based on information put forward by the appellant himself; (iii) the authors were not experts in trafficking and comments made on that issue were outside their expertise, which undermined their conclusions as a whole; (iv) they were not neutral as required by the First-tier Tribunal Practice Direction of 1 November 2024 (and failed to understand their duty to the Tribunal).
33. Ms Khan was particularly critical of s11 of the expert report, entitled Psycho-Social and Mental Health Contexts in India and the United Kingdom and purported to compare the “psychosocial” environments of India and the United Kingdom, heavily favouring the latter. This included significant findings in relation to the availability of support for the mentally ill in India, and the types of treatment available, and was almost entirely unsourced. Moreover, it was outside the expertise of the authors. The inclusion of this section heavily undermined the report as a whole in Ms Khan’s submission.
34. In respect of risk on return Ms Khan asked that the appeal be dismissed because the appellant had not in fact been trafficked. The conclusions of the expert on risk on return could be dismissed because they were predicated on the appellant being a victim of trafficking which in fact he was not. She noted that section 6 of the report dealt with risk arising from those aspects of the appellant’s case that had already been rejected by the tribunal.
35. Ms Khan relied on the respondent’s September India CIPN in respect of Actors of Protection, in particular from 2.1.1 to 2.1.4. The onus was on the appellant to show he could not access such protection. I asked Ms Khan if there was anything in the CPIN that dealt explicitly with the issue of trafficking victims and she said there was not, though traffickers are non-state actors.
36. Ms Khan also relied on the respondent’s September 2025 India CPIN in respect of Internal Relocation. She relied on paragraph 2.1.1 in particular. She accepted that nowhere did the CPIN explicitly deal with the position of those who had been trafficked.
37. I asked whether there was any country evidence on which Ms Khan wished to rely that did in fact deal with the issue of trafficking but she did not direct me to any. I note however that that the refusal letter made reference to a US State Department report that suggested that India was making “significant efforts” to eliminate trafficking including the introduction of a bill to do so in 2018. I accessed the link in the refusal letter and the full quotation is as follows:

“The Government of India does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period; therefore India remained on Tier 2. The government demonstrated increasing efforts by nearly tripling the number of victims identified and increasing its budget for shelter programs for female and child trafficking victims. The government's inter-ministerial committee met during the reporting period to discuss and revise a draft anti-trafficking bill and India's border guard force on the India-Nepal border conducted several awareness activities on human trafficking for students and border communities. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Overall victim protection remained inadequate and inconsistent, and the government sometimes penalized victims through arrests for crimes committed as a result of being subjected to human trafficking. The government's conviction rate and the number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions was disproportionately low relative to the scale of trafficking in India, particularly with respect to bonded and forced labor. Despite reports of some officials complicit in trafficking, the government did not report investigating such allegations.”
38. I was not provided with any information as to what was contained within the bill, or whether it passed, or any more recent information on trafficking in India that the respondent wished to rely on (save what was in the conclusive grounds decision).
39. Ms Ferguson relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 9 in support of the proposition that notwithstanding the conclusive grounds decision I should proceed to decide for myself whether the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
40. Ms Ferguson accepted in terms that the appellant has been inconsistent as to the precise dates that he was kept in the room below the restaurant, but the core of his account has never wavered: he was forced to work in a restaurant washing dishes, living underground, never allowed to leave. Given he was describing events some ten years ago, and given how traumatic those experiences were, it was unsurprising that he had difficulty describing it. That position was supported by the expert psychological report. It was clear even in the asylum interview that he was incoherent and struggling to understand.
41. Ms Ferguson noted that the refusal letter does in fact accept that the appellant paid and/or borrowed money to come to the United Kingdom. Moreover, what the appellant says about being trafficked into the United Kingdom and forced to work is consistent with the known evidence. On the lower standard of proof it was clear that he had been treated in the manner described.
42. In respect of risk on return, Ms Ferguson noted that the appellant had a number of characteristics that placed him at particular risk of being retrafficked. He had a history of having previously been exploited. He was, as the psychological evidence demonstrated, exceptionally vulnerable. His ethnicity as a Bengali person was relevant since they were known to be marginalised (relying on an Al Jazeera article from June 2018). The appellant’s vulnerability to retrafficking predates his coming to the United Kingdom: his inability to provide for his family and his vulnerability had pushed him into the position of trafficking in the first place. He was yet more vulnerable now.
43. I put to Ms Ferguson that the Al Jazeera article relied on was somewhat dated. She accepted that but said that this was a long-running issue and matters had not changed. She submitted that the appellant’s ethnicity makes it more difficult for him to internally relocate.
44. Ms Ferguson relied on the prevalence of bonded and forced labour in India notwithstanding efforts made to improve the position. She relied on the fact that India was not taking adequate steps to deal with the problem of trafficking according to the 2022 US State Department report quoted above.
45. Ms Ferguson invited me to find that the appellant is credible. She relied upon the psychological report as corroborative of his account. His symptoms are consistent with a person who has suffered the experiences he claims to have suffered.
46. In respect of the shortcomings in the psychological report identified by Ms Khan, Ms Ferguson accepted that there were weaknesses in the report as regards the comparison between India and the United Kingdom. She accepted in particular that the sources had not been set out. She was therefore forced to accept that it could not assist me as regards conditions in India. She did not however accept that its conclusions in that regard were outwith the expertise of its authors in light of their extensive CVs and experience of the region. The fact that this aspect of the report was not properly sourced and appeared somewhat general did not undermine the rest of it.
47. Ms Ferguson relied on the fact that the appellant has problems with his hands (chronic paronychia and nail dystrophy) consistent with a person who has been forced to wash dishes. This is physical evidence that supports his account of what happened to him.
48. I put to Ms Ferguson that there was no actual expert evidence linking the appellant’s physical ailments with his history of being forced to wash dishes every day for 18 months. She accepted that but asserted that I could rely on his GP notes. She noted that he was currently being treated with mirtazapine (though there appears to be no evidence of that before me and she was unable to point to any).
49. In respect of risk on return she relied on the Al Jazeera report referred to above. She submitted that the appellant could only live in a very limited area of India. She accepted that the appellant could not reopen the findings in respect of the risk he alleged from the BJP, but submitted that the strength and influence of the BJP would nevertheless be relevant to what a person with his ethnic background would face on return. It limited his ability to go to the police for protection. The factors were interconnected.
50. Ms Ferguson relied on the expert country report of Dr Shaleen Das, Sukumar Mitra and Dr Narendra Singh Thagunna. She relied in particular on paragraphs 7-9 of that report. She submitted that, as the appellant had said in evidence, his economic conditions coupled with his vulnerability would lead him to someone like S again if he were removed. He was, she submitted, in a worse position than when he came to the United Kingdom because of his victimisation. She relied on paragraph 5.3 of that report which listed risk factors for rertafficking in India of those who had previously been trafficked. This provides inter alia that:

“Prior exploitation itself becomes a risk factor, as traffickers and exploitative employers actively target individuals perceived as economically desperate or socially marginalised.”
51. She relied further on paragraph 5.5 and the evidence that:

“Psychological sequelae of trafficking, including anxiety, depression, and trauma-related symptoms, are well documented and directly impair functional capacity, decision-making, and resilience during return and reintegration… [which can] materially increase vulnerability to renewed exploitation”
52. The absence of adequate state-led intervention and the prevalence of exploitative labour arrangements heightens the risk. The appellant’s experience of having been kept in an underground room and forced to work for 18 months had been profoundly destabilising.
53. Ms Ferguson noted that the CPINs were in general terms, and that neither relied on or dealt with the nuances of the appellant’s situation. In particular, they simply did not deal with risk of re-trafficking.
54. Ms Ferguson relied on the practical difficulties for the appellant of reestablishing himself. She relied on the difficulty of his travelling to other parts of India due to the linguistic issues and practical barriers referred to in the expert report at paragraph 7.2. Relocation was “disproportionately difficult” for those who were “older, poorly educated, in poor health, socially isolated, or previously exploited”. State protection could not be reliably effective where perpetrators were politically connected or economically powerful as traffickers likely would be. The traffickers would inevitably have more power than he did.
55. Ms Ferguson relied on the expert report’s account at 9.6 of the interacting and compounding of risk factors, including debt, prior exploitation, psychological distress and health limitations. The report considers at 10.3 that many of these factors apply to the appellant and that he is, consequently, at risk of renewed exploitation.
56. In reply Ms Khan noted that the medical notes did not refer to the appellant having mental health problems. She relied on the age of the Al Jazeera report which she said was substantially out of date. In her submission risk on return should be determined by reference to the CPINs. Although she accepted these did not deal directly with trafficking she said that they referred to non-state actors, which included traffickers. She noted that there was no evidence before the tribunal that the appellant was actually taking mirtazapine.
Decision and reasons
Was the appellant trafficked?
57. Leaving aside those matters not accepted before the FTT in findings that are preserved before me, the appellant’s account is that he faced significant discrimination while living in West Bengal. His wife is disabled and they were economically vulnerable as a family. The appellant was targeted for exploitation by S who trafficked him to the United Kingdom with promises of good employment.
58. On arrival the appellant had his passport and documents taken and, after a short period in S’s home, he was kept in a small dingy room below a restaurant where he was forced to work for somewhere over 12 months. He was not permitted to leave. He had no natural light and spent so much time washing dishes his hands were damaged. His wages were withheld and he was prevented from contacting his family or seeking assistance before he escaped. The actual events of his escape, like the circumstances of his confinement, are somewhat inconsistently described (e.g. he does not mention in his statement the man he says helped him flee, who features in his interview).
59. The appellant, following his escape, began working voluntarily in another restaurant in exchange for food and did not claim asylum for several years. He has been treated for chronic paronychia since at least 2017, which his medical records suggest is connected to his work washing dishes (certainly the letters record that he should avoid water and wear gloves if washing) though there is no relevant expert evidence.
60. The appellant’s representatives accepted both in written submissions to the First-tier Tribunal and in oral submissions before me that the appellant has not always been consistent as to exactly what happened to him in the context of his trafficking claim. The events were now some time ago. It was submitted that while he has found the events confusing, distressing and traumatic, resulting in considerable inconsistency on specifics, the kernel of his account has always remained the same.
61. I have had the advantage of seeing the appellant give evidence, unlike the author of the conclusive grounds decision. He was plainly and visibly upset and struggled to be coherent. I have had regard to the expert psychological report which finds that these emotional responses to questions (as with what was observed by FTTJ Cooper and in his asylum interview) “…are clinically consistent with stress-related memory processing and altered autobiographical recall … and should not be interpreted as unreliability or exaggeration”. While that assessment is hardly determinative and only one possible explanation, it is significant that the author of the conclusive grounds decision specifically relied on the absence of any medical evidence that might explain his serial inconsistency.
62. Insofar as the psychological report purports to give an account of the available healthcare for a person with the appellant’s conditions in India I reject it, including the entirety of section 11. As Ms Khan rightly submitted, its conclusions are completely unreferenced. While the two authors appear to be sufficiently qualified to produce an expert country report, they have not on any view done so in a way that complies with the Practice Direction. There is another oddity in the report, in that it is not entirely clear which of the two authors interviewed the appellant. Since both authors are qualified to do so that does not appear to me to be material, and this was not an issue that Ms Khan relied on.
63. I must reject however Ms Khan’s submission that the fact that the report comments on country conditions in section 11 is a basis for rejecting the entire report. The relevant psychological tests were applied and the authors of the report (a clinical psychologist and a consultant psychologist) are clearly qualified to apply them. I also reject the submission in her skeleton argument (and repeated orally) that the report cannot be relied on because the assessment was only two hours long. That is not in my experience unusual in such cases and no reasons were advanced as to why that period was not adequate. Nor is the fact that no follow-up appointments were made a proper basis for declining to place weight on the report. I do not accept that the report is not neutral and Ms Khan proffered no basis for concluding to the contrary. Nor do I accept that the report can be dismissed as “self-serving” because it treats the appellant’s factual account as correct – the report proceeded by means of reputable psychological tests. I conclude that I can place weight on the assessments in the report of the appellant’s mental health and I do so. It follows that I accept that he suffers from a Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder, and that his mental health presentation is consistent with his account of trafficking.
64. I accept that the appellant’s account contains numerous inconsistencies, but having seen him give evidence and read the psychological report I accept that these can be explained by his mental health conditions. His mental health symptoms are consistent with the trauma he claims to have suffered. His physical health conditions are prima facie consistent with his factual account, though in the absence of expert evidence that is not a matter on which I am prepared to place significant weight.
65. I note that the respondent’s decision letter did not challenge any aspect of the appellant’s account of his experience of trafficking. Nor was he cross-examined on this issue at all, either before FTTJ Cooper or before me. The bases on which the respondent sought to dispute the account were: (i) that the account should be rejected out of hand because the other aspects of his claim were not accepted by FTTJ Cooper; and (ii) that the conclusions of the conclusive grounds decision should be adopted. I cannot accept either of those submissions. For the reasons given at the previous hearing the trafficking aspect of the claim cannot simply be dismissed on the basis of the BJP/loan shark aspects of his claim, which are factually distinct. While I have considered the conclusive grounds decision it is overwhelmingly based on the inconsistencies above, and the fact that there was no medical evidence to explain them. Such evidence is available before me.
66. I accept the submission that the centrepiece of his account has remained constant, and that it is consistent both with what is known to happen in India and with what is known to happen in the United Kingdom.
67. Overall I accept the appellant’s account as I have summarised it above [57-59].
Risk of re-trafficking
68. Neither the refusal letter nor Ms Khan’s skeleton argument deals in detail with the question of risk on return for trafficking victims in India. I have read the sections of the CPINs Ms Khan relied on and neither is of particular assistance in the specific context of a risk of retrafficking.
69. The refusal letter relied on the United States State Department report from 2022. As Ms Ferguson submitted, this document showed that India’s efforts to combat trafficking were “inadequate and inconsistent”, with minimum standards not being met.
70. There can be no doubt that trafficking in India is a particular problem. The respondent’s conclusive grounds decision includes the following extract from the 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report from the United States Department of State:

“As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in India and traffickers exploit victims from India abroad. Traffickers use debt-based coercion (bonded labor) to compel men, women, and children to work in agriculture, brick kilns, embroidery and textile factories, rice mills, and stone quarries. Bonded labor and forced domestic work remain widespread in rural Indian society, and there is limited accountability for trafficking crimes against the historically marginalized castes. Traffickers often target victims from marginalized backgrounds, including the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, migrant laborers, people from low-income households, and individuals with limited employment options such as many women and people with disabilities. Law enforcement disproportionately identified fewer victims compared with the scope of the problem, with some studies estimating millions of trafficking victims in India, most of whom are bonded laborers or other victims of forced labor. Traffickers increasingly use technology and social media platforms, including mobile dating applications and websites, to lure victims into trafficking situations both domestically and internationally. Climate change, including sudden-onset disasters such as floods and slow-onset events like drought, increased large-scale displacement and migration, is exacerbating vulnerabilities to human trafficking.”
71. I have considered the appellant’s country expert report, “India: Expert report on human rights”. Unlike s11 of the psychological report, this report contains appropriate references, and insofar as it: (i) reaches properly referenced conclusions; and (ii) addresses matters not the subject of preserved findings, I am prepared to rely on it. I accept as Ms Khan says that the report is predicated on the appellant’s account being found credible, but as I have found it to be credible that does not cause any issues. Moreover, the report is highly consistent with the sources cited in the respondent’s own conclusive grounds decision.
72. I accept that the appellant has several risk factors for retrafficking. He has already been trafficked; he is vulnerable mentally (in my view exceptionally so); he does not have any financial resources (leaving aside the question of debt dealt with by FTTJ Cooper); he is no longer a young man; he is from an ethnic group that is marginalised. He is highly likely, I consider, to be seen as a target for exploitation by anyone who is seeking persons to exploit. It is of significance, as Ms Ferguson pointed out, that even when he escaped his traffickers he ended up in a situation where he was working in another restaurant only for the food provided.
73. On the evidence available I can only conclude that there is a real risk that the appellant would be retrafficked if returned to his home area. I am fortified in that conclusion by the appellant’s expert report quoted at [27] above.
74. I have read the CPIN on sufficiency of protection, and there can be no doubt that the Indian authorities are willing to pursue traffickers, and that the Indian state is taking action against trafficking. However the success of those actions is highly limited as set out in the reports quoted above. Also relevant is the particular manner in which modern slavery works, by systematically separating victims from actors of protection whether by manipulation or by threats. I do not consider that the measures in place could prevent the appellant actually being trafficked. In Kinuthia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] INLR 133, the Court of Appeal, per Tuckey LJ, noted that recourse after mistreatment does not provide adequate protection. On the facts I do not consider that there is a sufficiency of protection for the appellant.
75. I accept that the appellant could in principle internally relocate. However, wherever he went in India he would have the same factors of vulnerability, with the added factors of: (i) language difficulties; and (ii) unfamiliarity with the area. Again, it appears highly likely that he would be targeted for exploitation. Moreover, considering the difficulties facing internal migrants recorded at 4.3.8-9 of the respondent’s CPIN I find that internal relocation is either not reasonably available or would be unduly harsh to the Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426 standard.
76. I was not addressed by either party on whether the appellant would, if the two questions agreed on were answered in his favour, meet the requirements of the Refugee Convention. There is no reference anywhere in the appellant’s documents to his claiming membership of a particular social group and no submission to that effect was made before me. There is no other means by which he could claim refugee status given the findings of FTTJ Cooper.
77. It follows that the appeal is allowed on the basis that the appellant’s removal would breach Article 3 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on protection grounds.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 January 2026