Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003476

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00942/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

LG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Litigant in person (Spanish interpreter present)
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 29 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. This is because of the nature of the matter under appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Columbia who appeals the decision of FtT Judge Khan who dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection claim.
Grounds of appeal and permission
2. The grounds of appeal contend grounds as follows:
(i) The judge applied an incorrect standard of proof in evaluating the asylum claim. The relevant legal threshold was whether there was a “reasonable degree of likelihood” of persecution as established in Karanakaran v Secretary of State [2000] EWCA Civ 11. The judge used language such as ‘implausible’ and incoherent open brackets 18, 28, 31 close brackets indicating a standard more akin to the balance of probabilities.
(ii) The tribunal failed to assess properly and give appropriate weight to key supporting evidence including medical records confirming the appellants injuries, the death certificate and newspaper article regarding the assassination of the father, claims of ongoing threats and extortion. The judge accepted the appellant suffered injuries at [26] but dismissed any connection to FARC/Group 33 without substantial reasoning or analysis. This ran counter to Mibanga [2025] EWCA Civ 367.
(iii) The tribunal conducted a flawed analysis of internal relocation and state protection when considering the appellant could safely relocate within Columbia without a full consideration of the reasonableness of such relocation, the appellant’s vulnerability and circumstances and alleged health issues and proper analysis of the allegations that Colombian police were colluding with FARC. This was contrary to Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5.
(iv) That was an incomplete analysis of Article 8. The judge acknowledged that the appellant had established a private life in the UK but gave little weight to it on the basis that his immigration status was precarious [60]. This approach overlooked the requirement for a proportionality assessment and was further contrary to Additionally, the Secretary of State properly applied the Immigration rules and the relevant test under Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11.
(v) But to consider properly key documentary evidence relating to the murder of the appellant's father. The judge erred at [21 that there was “no evidence to indicate that the appellant's father was targeted by FARC/ group 33”. This was plainly incorrect in the light of the documentary evidence submitted by the appellant in the form of an official investigative record entitled quote format of evidence of the Investigation and Prosecution Process – Jorge Orlando Valbuena Angarita” issued by the Fiscalia general de la nacion of Colombia (Fiscalia).
3. Permission was refused by FtT Judge Cartin who held that the grounds of appeal essentially amounted to a disagreement with the judge. Permission however was granted by UTJ Landes who considered that the judge was arguably wrong to say that there was not any evidence to indicate that the appellant’s father was targeted by FARC and the judge did not analyse the investigation process document the Colombian Fiscalia (the Fiscalia) and thus arguably that she did not give adequate reasons for not accepting that there was any evidence to indicate that the appellant’s father was targeted by FARC. UTJ Landes stated that ‘the lack of evidence connecting the appellant’s father’s death with FARC was arguably a central plank of the judge’s findings’.
4. The appellant attended the hearing before me without representation but with the assistance of an interpreter him he confirmed he could understand. He provided a speaking note which he wished to submit to the Secretary of State but because Mr Lawson was attending remotely, I read out the note with the appellant’s consent in English. The opponent confirmed that he understood his own speaking note.
5. This speaking note effectively outlined the grounds of appeal, and I went through the grounds and documents carefully with the appellant to clarify not least the contradiction of the dates on the Fiscalia. The appellant indicated that's that must have been a mistake with the translation.
6. Mr Lawson confirmed that there was a rule 24 notice which was detailed and to which the appellant had responded with a rule 25 notice which again effectively set out his grounds. Mr Lawson noted that the original Fiscalia contained a yet further contradictory date and I was invited to apply the guidance in the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1st November 2024.
Conclusions
7. I take each ground in turn as follows.
Ground (i)
8. On reading the decision carefully the judge did not apply an incorrect standard of proof.
9. The judge at paragraph 14 under ‘Legal Framework’ specifically set out that section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applied as did JCK (s32 NABAA 2022) Botwsana [2024] UKUT 00100.
10. It is important not only to note the relevant standard of proof, which the judge did apply, but also to be clear as to what the judge actually said. The judge’s reference at [18] was a preamble and he stated that ‘there are elements of the account which are inconsistent, incoherent or so implausible as to be capable of belief’. That preliminary conclusion was open to the judge. The proper context and framing of the word implausible clearly showed the judge applied the correct standard. Nothing in the judge’s treatment of the evidence indicated that the approach breached the lawful standard of proof.
11. At [28] there was no ambiguity about the adverse credibility finding. The judge clearly found it incredible that if the family were targeted as claimed and did not pay the extortion money as demanded that the appellant and his mother and later his wife and daughters could remain in Colombia for such a long time.
12. At [31] the findings were clear and the judge stated that he did not accept that the appellant’s family were threatened as claimed.
Ground (ii)
13. The judge clearly referenced the relevant documentation. As the Court of Appeal said at para 18 of Herrera v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 412, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors.
14. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at 2(iii) confirms that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not refer to a document does not necessarily indicate that it has not been consdiered.
15. S v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 which held at 32 as follows:
“32. I would also refer to the AIT determination of 25 November 2005 in HH Medical Evidence Effective Mibanga Ethiopia [2005] UKAIT 00164. The tribunal there said:
‘20. In the present case it is manifest that the immigration judge has arrived at his conclusions as to credibility by looking at the evidence in the round. At paragraph 16 of the determination he reminded himself that ‘I must look at the case in the round in light of all the relevant circumstances’. At paragraph 20 the immigration judge confirmed that he had 'considered the appellant's evidence in the round together with the background evidence and her interview record'. Plainly the medical report was part of the appellant's evidence.
21. The tribunal considers that there is a danger of Mibanga being misunderstood. Judgments in that case are not intended to place judicial fact finders in a form of forensic straightjacket. In particular the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as laying down any rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. To take Wilson J's cake analogy, all its ingredients cannot be thrown together into the bowl simultaneously. One has to start somewhere. There is nothing illogical about the process by which the immigration judge in the present case chose to approach his analytical task.’
I would approve those comments and emphasise how close the present case is to the circumstances of HH as distinct from those of Mibanga.”
16. As in S, I would not expect the judge to be placed in a judicial fact-finding forensic straightjacket. There is no rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact-finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. A judge has to start somewhere.
17. As to the detail of analysis by the judge at [21] the newspaper article makes no reference to the father being killed FARC as claimed and nor does the death certificate.
18. The judge specifically referenced the pieces of evidence in relation to the alleged killing of the father by FARC in 1995. The judge recognised that the appellant stated his father was formerly a policeman, but it was open to the judge to conclude that the death certificate and the newspaper article relating to the death did not identify FARC as responsible. At [21] the judge accepted that the father was a policeman and ‘may have been killed in view of his role’ but did not accept there was any evidence to indicate that the appellant’s father was targeted by FARC/Group 33 ‘as alleged’ by the appellant’ that is , killed.
19. When considering the Fiscalia the judge specifically referenced the document at [35] and placed limited weight on the documents.
20. I specifically invited the appellant to take me to the Fiscalia and we went through it. I note that the Fiscalia does not state either, as the judge records at [21], that the FARC killed his father. The document actually stated ‘the second prosecutor of the Life Unit decide to release the citizen JOCP, member of the FARC guerrilla group, who was linked to the case because the citizen victim had denounced threats and extortion by the said guerilla group , but he in turn was released’, apparently owing to expiry of the time limit. This does not state that the appellant was murdered by FARC. Indeed the suspect was released.
21. There are a number of further points to make about this document in order to assess whether the analysis by the judge was adequate. There was no explanation of why the date of issue of the document was said to be 24/07/2022, whilst the content stated ‘Today the thirtieth (30th) of September of the year two thousand and twenty-four (2.024) it is hereby noted that the SUUF System was consulted in search of the process in progress where Mr JOVA [the appellant’s father] identified with citizenship card No *** ** *** acted as victim and no record was found with any information provided by the applicant of the information.’ Thus, there were two contrasting dates even within the document.
22. Further, the translated Fiscalia also stated ‘
‘1. The General Prosecutor's Office of the Nation conducted Investigation No. ****, in which investigative actions were carried out for the incidents that occurred on November twenty-eight (28), 1995. However, on April sixteenth (16), 1996, the proceedings were ordered to be closed.’ [my underlining]
23. As pointed out by Mr Lawson, the original Fiscalia document had even yet another date on it this time 24th July 2021.
24. This document does not state what the appellant purports it states and on analysis does not bear close scrutiny. The judge’s lack of reliance on the document was wholly justified. There was no material error of law.
25. The appellant’s medical evidence from 2006 (over 20 years ago) showed a reference to a gunshot wound to the left leg but there is no Istanbul Protocol compliant medical report and no indication of the circumstances under which this occurred.
26. It should be noted that the judge’s findings were made in the further context that the mother remains in Colombia and it was entirely open to the judge to conclude that it was ‘incoherent that if the appellant’s mother has been continually threatened since 1995, for approximately 20 years that she would refused to leave Colombia with the appellant.
27. The judge addressed the issues of the attached and continued threats from [25] - [34] and was entitled to reject the claim that the appellant and his family had been targeted ‘over so many years’ by FARC/Group 33. Not least the judge found it effectively inconceivable that if the family had received such threats that the family could ‘remain in Colombia for such a long period without having sufferance more severe consequences’.
Ground (iii)
28. Bearing in mind the findings above as to the lawfulness of the judge’s treatment of the evidence, the approach to relocation and the personal circumstances of the appellant was also sustainable.
29. In terms of relocation the judge addressed this matter at [41] in accordance with Horvath [2000] UKHL 37 and I note the Country Policy and Information Notes on Colombia as to relocation. The judge specifically referenced the respondent’s reasons for refusal letter which cited documentary evidence on Colombia and stated that the fear of FARC was inconsistent with external information which has them disarming and demobilising concluding in 2017 and further there was no evidence to suggest they were known to target civilian individuals.

Ground (iv)
30. As to article 8, the judge properly legally directed herself and gave adequate and sound reasons from [48] onwards.
31. S117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA) does not assist the appellant. S117B (5) NIAA specifies that
‘Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.’
32. The appellant entered the UK after November 2022 (his screening interview was in 2023) and at the very least his status in the United Kingdom is precarious. This judge properly applied this section and see [50]-[52].
33. The balancing exercise and relevant factors were addressed at [58] – [61 having already found the appellant was not at risk of serious harm on return to Colombia and where his mother still resides.
Ground (v)
34. I have addressed the issue of the Fiscalia above in the context of the documentation as a whole and find no material error in the judge’s approach.

Notice of Decision
I find no material error of law in the decision of the FtT judge and the decision will stand.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29th January 2026