Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-003484
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/00543/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

6th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

Nazar Abbas
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Hyat, the Sponsor
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 27 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Pakistan born on 19 December 1986. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for an EEA Family Permit under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.

2. The appellant applied in 2019 for an EEA Family Permit as the extended family member of a relevant EEA citizen, his cousin, Asad Hyat, a French national. His application was refused on 10 January 2020 on the grounds that the respondent was not satisfied that he was financially dependent on his sponsor and, as such, was not satisfied that he was a family member in accordance with Regulation 8 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016. That was because the respondent was not satisfied with the evidence of the appellant’s financial circumstances and financial position in Pakistan and was not satisfied that it was sustainable for the sponsor to financially support him whilst meeting his own needs and the needs of the family members already reliant upon him.

3. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision. For some reason it took several years for the case to come before the Tribunal and the appeal eventually came before a First-tier Tribunal Judge in June 2025. The judge determined the appeal on the papers, as the appellant had elected. The judge gave consideration to the evidence provided by the appellant and accorded it little weight, expressing concerns as to the reliability of some of the documents. The judge concluded that the evidence did not show that the appellant was dependent on his sponsor as claimed and he accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 12 June 2025.

4. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds of procedural unfairness, asserting that he had requested an oral hearing of appeal. He explained that he had initially elected a paper hearing when he lodged the appeal in 2020 but given the delay in listing the matter he withdrew that election and requested an oral hearing. He claimed that on 10 October 2024, he formally notiﬁed the Tribunal by email of his request for an oral hearing and asserted that the failure to give eﬀect to his request for an oral hearing materially aﬀected the outcome of the appeal and rendered the determination fundamentally unfair. The appellant asserted that even in the absence of any request for an oral hearing, the judge was under a duty to apply his mind to whether case was ﬁt for determination on the paper in light of the exceptions provided under rule 25 of the First-tier Tribunal Procedural Rules.

5. Permission to appeal was refused in the First-tier Tribunal but was subsequently granted upon a renewed application to the Upper Tribunal.

6. Following the grant of permission, directions were made by the Upper Tribunal for the appellant to provide a copy of his email of 10 October 2024 requesting an oral hearing. Having received a copy of the email, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman made directions on 27 January 2026 to the effect that:

“In these circumstances, my provisional view is that it would not be consistent with the overriding objective to proceed to an error of law hearing before the Upper Tribunal. If the respondent agrees, the appeal can instead be allowed on the papers and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reconsidered.”

and directed that:

“Within 14 days of receipt of this order, the respondent shall confirm to the Upper Tribunal and to the appellant whether she agrees that this appeal should be allowed and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.”

7. On 10 February 2026 the respondent filed and served a rule 24 reply opposing the appeal, stating that on receipt of the Upper Tribunal’s directions the respondent had contacted Taylor House to enquire as to whether the email produced by the appellant was received by Taylor House and they had replied that “no correspondence is on the file re oral hearing.” The respondent did not accept, therefore, that the email the appellant claimed to have sent was a reliable document as per the principles in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 439, and did not accept that there had been procedural unfairness. The respondent requested an oral hearing.

8. The appellant filed a rule 25 response in reply, confirming that his email was sent to the First-tier Tribunal but also asserting that the respondent had not responded to the second part of his grounds, that the judge’s decision was tainted with error of law as he had failed to discharge the mandatory duty under rule 25 of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Procedure Rules 2014 to consider whether fairness required an oral hearing.

9. The matter was then listed for a hearing in the Upper Tribunal and came before me. The sponsor was in attendance at the hearing.

10. Mr Wain submitted that the grounds raised two issues: firstly, whether an email had been sent by the appellant requesting an oral hearing; and, secondly, whether the judge had followed the correct procedure as per rule 25 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 in determining the appeal on the papers. With regard to the first issue, he relied upon an email from Taylor House, attached to the Rule 24 response, dated 10 February 2026, which stated that there was no correspondence on the file about an oral hearing and that no payment notice had been issued for an oral sub hearing. With regard to the second issue, Mr Wain submitted that, whilst it was not disputed that the judge had not specifically referred to rule 25 of the procedure rules, he clearly had rule 25(1)(a) in mind, and gave an adequate explanation as to why he decided that an exception to holding an oral hearing applied in accordance with the guidance in SSGA (Disposal without considering merits; R25) Iraq [2023] UKUT 12. Mr Wain submitted that in any event the appellant had been put on notice of the respondent’s concerns arising out of the refusal decision and had had a fair opportunity to comment on those matters.

11. In response, the sponsor said that his cousin had sent the email some two to three years after receiving no response from the court about his appeal and so he wanted an oral hearing to go through his case again.

12. I have had sight of the email of 10 October 2024 relied upon by the appellant which he claims to have sent to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House requesting an oral hearing in place of the previously requested papers determination of his appeal. The email is addressed to I.F.A.TaylorHouse@justice.gov.uk. and the document containing the message appears to be a confirmation of the email having been sent. I see nothing untoward about the document. The appellant has provided what appears to be a credible and plausible explanation for the email being sent, namely the delay in determining his appeal, a matter commented upon by the judge at [6] of his decision. It is also consistent with the email correspondence at page 39 of the consolidated bundle following the appeals referral sheet in which it is apparent that the appellant was making enquiries in February 2024 about the progress in his appeal and was told that the appeal could not be located on the court system, Aria.

13. The respondent does not accept that the document relied upon by the appellant is a reliable one and, in so doing, relies upon the response to a recent enquiry of 9 February 2026 to Taylor House which stated that there was no correspondence on the file about an oral hearing. However that response, in my view, inspires little confidence given the confusion that there evidently was about the existence of the appeal and the delay in having the matter put before a judge. On balance, and given the risk of unfairness otherwise arising, I am prepared to accept the appellant’s claim to have sent the email of 10 October 2024 and to accept that his request was overlooked. I share UTJ Hoffman’s view that, in such circumstances, the appeal was tainted by procedural unfairness in that the appellant was deprived of a full and proper opportunity to respond to the respondent’s concerns in the refusal decision through the attendance of his sponsor at an oral hearing.

14. In the circumstances the second issue, which relies upon rule 25 of the Procedure Rules, is not relevant. It is of note, nevertheless, that the judge did not refer to rule 25 and did not expressly address the issue of whether the appeal before him was one which was suitable to be determined on the papers without an oral hearing, in accordance with the guidance in SSGA.

15. For these reasons I am in agreement with UTJ Hoffman’s provisional view that, whilst the judge was evidently not aware of the appellant’s request for an oral hearing, the consequence of him proceeding to determine the appeal on the papers as he did was that the appeal was tainted by procedural unfairness. For that reason the decision must be set aside by reason of material error of law and must be determined afresh, at an oral hearing.

16. The case is accordingly to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo oral hearing before a different judge with no findings preserved.

Notice of Decision

17. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside.

18. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be dealt with afresh, by way of an oral hearing, pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(a), before a different judge.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2026