Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003485

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00933/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R FRANTZIS

Between

TASADAQ SAJJAD
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Janjua (Solicitor)
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwnycz (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 8 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision, dated 6th March 2025 (“the Decision”), of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) to allow the Appellant’s appeal on Human Rights grounds. For ease, the Parties are referred to in these proceedings as they were before the FtT.
Background
2. The Appellant was born on 1.8.1989 and is a citizen of Pakistan. On 26.8.2020 he made a human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of his family and private life. Since the 6.6.2013 the Appellant has had lawful residence in the United Kingdom and as such has now completed 10 years lawful residence in the United Kingdom (albeit he had not accrued this period of residence at the time that he made the application). The application was refused by the Respondent on 10.5.2024. The Appellant appealed upon the only statutory ground available to him, namely that that the decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as being contrary to his right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
3. At [2] the FtT records that “[the Presenting Officer] informed me that she had done a PNC check in respect of the Appellant’s criminal records and confirmed that there were 2 offences recorded there. She informed me that the PNC could not be disclosed to anyone apart from myself. I checked the details of the 2 offences and informed her that they had already been referred to in the ACCRA police report provided by the Appellant. When the hearing commenced, I informed Mr Janjua of the same Mr Janjua informed me that his position was simply that the 2 offences being referred to had become spent and so would not impact the Appellant’s suitability requirements.”
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The FtT, in allowing the appeal, made the following findings of fact:
a. “Based on the limited evidence I cannot find that in respect of his relationships with his adult family members that there exists anything other than normal emotional ties” [19]
b. “Therefore, I accept that the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for 10 years and continues to do so whilst his appeal remains ongoing” [21]
c. “I cannot say that he meets all the requirements under Appendix Private Life to enable him to obtain settlement on account of 10 years lawful residency. This will nevertheless be a matter I consider under proportionality later in my decision” [22]
d. “In respect of the criminal convictions which may impact the suitability requirements were the Appellant to make an application for settlement (as result of 10 years lawful leave) or were the Home Office to consider granting him leave on the same basis I find as follows. There were 2 incidents which took place. The first offence was on 19.6.2016 for a violent disorder and the second was on 17.8.2022 for possession of cocaine. Mr Janjua submitted that both of these offences have become spent and therefore have no impact on the issue of suitability. I find that I am in agreement with Mr Janjua and as such spent offences are exactly that and so I find that the Appellant’s ability to meet the suitably requirements is not undermined or impacted.” [23]
e. “As of the 10.8.2025 he would have been living in the UK for 20 years (and there are provisions to allow people to obtain leave if they have been in the UK unlawfully for 20 years). This is a factor that weights in his favour. … The Appellant I re-affirm has held lawful residency since 6.6.2013 a period now approaching nearly 12 years. Once again this is a factor that weighs in his favour.” [26, 27]
f. “I find that having arrived at 16 and spent almost 20 years in the UK with large parts of that being lawful leave, especially the last 10 plus years the Appellant has established a private life in the UK. I also find when considering the factors noted above and given his family members are here in the UK then it is reasonably likely that he would not have family, or a support network were he to return back to Pakistan. Although he knows the language, having been away since 16 and only making 3 visits would not be sufficient for him to be familiar with the environment or the culture. I find that these factors are all relevant in my assessment of proportionality.” [29]
g. “For the reasons set out at paragraphs 20 to 23 and 26 to 29, and in adding that there is no evidence before me that that the Appellant has been a burden on the state I find that in the particular circumstances of this Appellant’s case refusal of leave would be disproportionate.” [31]
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The Grounds for permission to appeal contend that the FtT has erred in law in the following ways. Whilst not enumerated in the Grounds, I will set out the arguments as follows:
a. By making contradictory findings in respect of the Appellant’s family relationships in the United Kingdom (“Ground 1”)
b. By finding, without adequate reasoning, that the Appellant would experience very significant obstacles to reintegration within Pakistan (“Ground 2”)
c. By applying a ‘near miss’ approach when giving significant weight to the length and nature of the Appellant’s residence in the United Kingdom (“Ground 3”)
d. In failing to provide adequate reasoning when balancing the public interest, and in particular the suitability requirements of the Immigration Rules, against the Appellant’s private life rights (“Ground 4”)
6. In a decision dated 16th July 2025, a different judge of the FtT granted permission to appeal on all grounds.
7. At the error of law hearing, Mr Diwnycz relied upon the Grounds of Appeal. Mr Janjua made oral submissions in response.
Discussion
8. I turn to Ground 4 first. It was common ground before the FtT that the Appellant had been convicted of two offences. The first offence was on 19.6.2016 for violent disorder. The Appellant was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment wholly suspended for 12 months. The second was on 17.8.2022 for possession of cocaine. The Appellant was fined £200. It was also common ground that by the time of the appeal hearing before the FtT those convictions were spent for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (“the 1974 Act”). Mr Janjua told me that the Appellant had provided details of his criminal offences to the Respondent and FtT prior to the hearing before the FtT.
9. The FtT at [2] records that the issue discussed at the preliminary stage of the appeal hearing was the question of whether the Appellant’s convictions could impact the suitability requirements of the Immigration Rules. It was agreed before me that these requirements, where relevant, mandate that an application for leave will be refused where the Secretary of State determines that the presence of the applicant in the United Kingdom is not conducive to the public good because their conduct (including convictions which do not fall within other paragraphs), character, associations, or other reasons, make it undesirable to allow them to remain in the United Kingdom.
10. At [23] the FtT finds that “Mr Janjua submitted that both of these offences have become spent and therefore have no impact on the issue of suitability. I find that I am in agreement with Mr Janjua and as such spent offences are exactly that and so I find that the Appellant’s ability to meet the suitably requirements is not undermined or impacted.”
11. The FtT finds that the Appellant cannot meet the requirements of Appendix Private Life in any event [22].
12. The FtT then proceeds to weigh a number of factors in the Appellant’s favour in the proportionality analysis [25-31]. The FtT does not, however, appear to weigh any factors in favour of the public interest. In addition, there is no further reference to the Appellant’s spent convictions. The difficulty with that is the 1974 Act provides at s7(3) that:
“If at any stage in any proceedings before a judicial authority in [F12England and Wales] (not being proceedings to which, by virtue of any of paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (2) above or of any order for the time being in force under subsection (4) below, section 4(1) above has no application, or proceedings to which section 8 below applies) the authority is satisfied, in the light of any considerations which appear to it to be relevant (including any evidence which has been or may thereafter be put before it), that justice cannot be done in the case except by admitting or requiring evidence relating to a person’s spent convictions or to circumstances ancillary thereto, that authority may admit or, as the case may be, require the evidence in question notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of section 4 above, and may determine any issue to which the evidence relates in disregard, so far as necessary, of those provisions.”
13. It would appear that the FtT was not taken to this subsection of the 1974 Act but the reading is clear. There required to be a judicial finding as to the relevance of the Appellant’s spent convictions to the issues before the FtT. The FtT, conversely, has put any relevance of the spent convictions from their mind because “spent offences are exactly that”.
14. I cannot say that had the FtT approached the Appellant’s spent convictions in the way envisaged by the 1974 Act, that the outcome of the appeal would have been no different.
15. Consequently, for this reason, I find that the Decision of the FtT to allow the appeal involved the making of a material error of law.
16. I do not determine the issues raised in Grounds 1-3 because I am satisfied that the effect of my finding on Ground 4 is such that a complete proportionality analysis requires to be undertaken and no findings of fact should be preserved.
Disposal
17. I have given careful consideration to the Joint Practice Statement of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal concerning the disposal of appeals in this Tribunal and have done so in light of the submissions of the Parties. As to the remaking of the Decision, I am satisfied that in light of the error of law identified and the fact findings which will be necessary, the appeal falls within paragraphs 7.2 (b) of the Practice Statement. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for that hearing to take place.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the FtT involved the making of a material error of law. I allow the appeal and set aside the Decision. I remit the appeal to be re-heard by the FtT with no findings of fact preserved.

Roxanne Frantzis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th October 2025