Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2025-003495

FtT Nos: PA/54402/2023 & PA/02614/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

31st October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

EH (EGYPT)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Bazini, Counsel, instructed by Spector, Constant & Williams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 28 April 2025. His underlying appeal relates to an application for international protection which was refused by the Secretary of State on 23 June 2023.
2. With the application having been made on 14 September 2021, this is not an appeal to which sections 31 to 36 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.
Anonymity
3. By its decision the First-tier Tribunal issued an anonymity order, though no reasons were provided. It is a requirement that reasons be given. They may be short. Open justice requires, as a general rule, that tribunals must conduct their business publicly unless this would result in injustice. Exceptions to the rule must be justified by some more important principle, most often where the circumstances are such that openness would put at risk the achievement of justice which is the very purpose of the proceedings: R (Guardian News & Media Ltd) v. City of Westminster Magistrates' Court (Article 19 intervening) [2012] EWCA Civ 420; [2013] QB 618, per Toulson LJ at [2] and [4].
4. Whether a departure from the principle of open justice is justified in any particular case will be highly fact-specific and will require a balancing of the competing rights and interests. R (Yalland) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] EWHC 629 (Admin).
5. Neither representative before me requested that the order be set aside.
6. The appellant seeks international protection. I note UTIAC Guidance Note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, particularly its introduction and paragraphs 27 and 28. I observe the confidential nature of the material submitted in support of the appellant’s asylum claim. On balance, at the present time I consider the appellant’s protected right to a private life under article 8 ECHR outweighs the right of the public to know that he is a party to these proceedings, the latter right protected by article 10 of the ECHR.
7. The order is detailed above.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. The appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Hatton Cross on 28 March 2025. The appellant attended the hearing. He was represented by Ms Smeaton, Counsel, and not by Mr Lemer, Counsel, as recorded in the Tribunal’s decision and reasons. The respondent was represented by Ms Kelly, Presenting Officer. The appellant adopted his two witness statements and gave evidence.
9. Before the First-tier Tribunal was an expert report from Dr Hasan Hafidh, Academic Consultant in Middle East Studies, Visiting Research Fellow, King’s College, and Senior Teaching Fellow, SOAS, dated 9 October 2024. At paragraph 6 of his report, Dr Hafidh confirmed his instructions, namely to:
i. Comment on any risk that the appellant would face on return since an arrest warrant and a court order have been issued against him.

ii. Comment on the plausibility that the gangs who are very influential could still target the appellant on return.

iii. Comment on the plausibility that the appellant would suffer upon return in terms of employment and support.

iv. Comment on the plausibility that the appellant could relocate to any part of Egypt.

v. Comment on the appellant’s documents, whether genuine or not.

vi. Comment on police corruption and bribery in Egypt, especially since the gangs are very well connected.
10. I observe at the outset that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision is entirely silent as to this report. It fails even to record that the 73-page document was placed before it. Consequently, there has been no judicial assessment as to whether Dr Hafidh is expert on the issues upon which he has been asked to opine: Kennedy v. Cordia (Services) LLP (Scotland) [2016] UKSC 6; [2016] 1 WLR 597, at [43]-[44]. The Upper Tribunal confirmed in MH (review; slip rule; church witnesses) [2020] UKUT 125; [2020] Imm AR 983, at [39], that whilst no question of admissibility arises in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber the criteria considered in Kennedy are nevertheless relevant in deciding whether evidence is properly described as ‘expert evidence’. Ultimately, findings of fact and law are for a judge, not an expert.
11. Nor has there been judicial assessment as to whether Dr Hafidh has been, as an expert witness, alive to his duty to the First-tier Tribunal, and consequently to this Tribunal, and been very careful not to go beyond the remit of his expertise: R (AB) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3453 (Admin); [2014] 2 CMLR 22, at [67], and direction 10.2 of the Practice Directions of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (18 December 2018). This is a particular concern where a witness asserts expertise over a range of different issues, for whilst an expert may possess in-depth knowledge of a particular issue or issues existing in a country, often through study or in-country research, this does not alone bestow upon them expertise in relation to any and all issues existing in the country.
12. The failure to engage in any way with expert evidence is a significant concern, which I address further below.
13. Consequent to the issues arising in the appeal before me, I recite several paragraphs in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, retaining the additional emphasis in bold.
14. At [30]:
“30. I must scrutinise the evidence before me and draw reasoned conclusions from it. I cannot turn a blind eye to obvious discrepancies or issues apparent on the face of a document. If a document refers to a particular law, it is my duty to consider that law—even if it has not been specifically cited by the parties. This is not independent research; it is the fulfilment of my obligation to properly analyse the evidence and reach informed conclusions, even where the parties have failed to do so. I am not prepared to take any document at face value”.
15. The self-direction above is a prelude to findings at [33]–[39]:
“33. The court ruling indicates that the appellant was charged with supplying weapons, ammunition, and cartridges to the Muslim Brotherhood, allegedly in breach of the Egyptian Penal Code. However, it references several articles of the Penal Code which do not exist.
34. I have reviewed the relevant sections of the Penal Code online. Some of the articles cited appear loosely related to the alleged offences, but others are entirely inapplicable.
35. For example, the appellant is purportedly sentenced under Egypt’s Telecommunications Regulation Law No. 10 of 2003, with reference to Articles 77, 448, 44, and 1. This law regulates the telecommunications sector and establishes the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA), focusing on licensing, oversight, and penalties within the telecommunications industry. It is unclear how this legislation is relevant to charges of assisting a terrorist organisation.
36. Furthermore, Article 448 is cited, yet Egypt’s Telecommunications Regulation Law contains only 87 articles. This suggests that the citation is either inaccurate or fabricated.
37. I have also carefully read through the verdict. Much of it is nonsensical, even allowing for potential issues in translation or legal terminology. For example, at the bottom of page 2 continuing onto page 3, it reads: ‘Then the court rules to convict the accused in the manner that will be stated in the operative part, with reference to the application of the text of Article 32 of the Penal Code for the connection.’ This is a meaningless sentence.
38. More concerning is that Article 32 of the Egyptian Penal Code, which is referenced here, actually deals with the legal consequences of abortion—making it entirely irrelevant to the alleged charges.
39. I find that the court ruling document has been fabricated. It contains nonsensical language, refers to laws that do not exist, includes citations that have no logical bearing on the case, and even references a law related to abortion in the context of terrorism charges”.
16. The First-tier Tribunal concluded that various letters from Egyptian lawyers were “not written by qualified legal professionals”. The letters were identified as misrepresenting the law, contained factual inaccuracies, and appeared to have been “fabricated on the assumption that they would not be subject to scrutiny”, at [40]–[44]:
“40. I have no corroborative evidence that Hazem Karim Abdel Majeed is officially recognised as a member of the Egyptian Bar Association or holds any official position at the ‘High Court of Appeal or the State Council.’ Likewise, I have no evidence confirming that Mohamed El Syed Talis is a lawyer qualified to appear before the ‘High Court of Appeal and Supreme Court’ in Egypt.
41. Confirmation of such legal qualifications and affiliations would be publicly available and easily verifiable. In the absence of such documentation, and having regard to the evidence as a whole, I am unwilling to accept that these individuals are who they claim to be.
42. In relation to the content of the letters, I note that they reference Article 237 of Egypt’s Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 23 of 1971), which addresses the procedures for withdrawing a civil claim introduced during criminal proceedings. The relevance of this to the appellant’s alleged prosecution for assisting a terrorist organisation is not explained, nor is it apparent.
43. The letters also cite ‘Article 179 of Law No. 23 of 20024 of Criminal Procedure,’ which appears to be a typographical error. The proper reference is Article 179 of Egypt’s Criminal Procedure Code (Law No. 23 of 1971), which deals with the prescription period for criminal offences. However, the description in the letters does not reflect the content of this article.
44. In fact, the quote included in the letter—‘the accused in a felony or misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment which the law requires to be executed immediately upon the issuance of the judgment must personally attend the trial sessions’ —is taken from Article 237 of the Egyptian Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 150 of 1950), not the version cited in the letter”.
Grounds of Appeal
17. The appellant’s grounds of appeal were drafted by Ms Smeaton. The first challenge is founded upon procedural unfairness. I consider it appropriate to recite paragraphs 4 to 6 of the grounds in full:
“4. In response to the Determination, the Appellant has put the points of concern raised by the FtT Judge to the lawyers he has engaged in Egypt. Their responses to the concerns are illustrative of why the FtT Judge ought not to have conducted his own research.
5. In particular:
5.1. At paragraph 38 of the Determination, the Judge notes that Article 32 of the Egyptian Penal Code deals with the legal consequences of abortion and is therefore irrelevant. Further enquiries with the Egyptian lawyers (Mohamed Tales) confirm that that reference by the FtT Judge is incorrect. Instead, Article 32 of the Egyptian Penal Code deals with the legal treatment of multiple crimes arising from a single act or from acts committed with a unified purpose. Its main purpose is to prevent duplicative punishment for closely connected criminal conduct. The Appellant was alleged to have done a single act which resulted in the commission of multiple criminal offences and the court was required, under Article 32, to consider the offence with the most severe punishment. It is, accordingly, not irrelevant as the FtT Judge found. A copy of the Penal Code provided by Mohamed Tales is attached. An application will be made under rule 15(2A) to rely on those documents if permission is granted. This was not raised during the hearing by the FtT Judge or the Respondent.
5.2. At paragraph 42 of the Determination, the FtT Judge notes that the letters from the Egyptian lawyers reference Article 237 of Egypt’s Criminal Procedure Code which addresses the procedures for withdrawing a civil claim introduced during criminal proceedings, the relevance of which to the Appellant’s claim is not explained nor apparent. Mohamed Tales has provided a copy of Egypt’s Criminal Procedure Code in which Article 237 relates to the obligation to appear in person before the court. The Article was cited in support of the assertion given by Mohamed Tales that the lawyers were unable to appeal the ruling because the Appellant is not able to attend in person. The FtT Judge has not considered the correct law. A copy of Egypt’s Criminal Procedure Code provided by Mohamed Tales is attached. An application will be made under rule 15(2A) to rely on those documents if permission is granted. This was not raised during the hearing by the FtT Judge or the Respondent.
5.3. At paragraph 40 of the Determination, the FtT Judge notes that he has no evidence confirming that Hazem Majeed or Mohamed Tales hold any official positions or are qualified lawyers. The Bar Association identification card of Mohammed Mustafa, who had conduct of the case, was provided. Further enquiries have been made with the Egyptian lawyers who explained that senior lawyers with conduct of the case, such as Mohammed Mustafa, often delegate matters to other qualified associates with the firm and that this was the case for the Appellant. An application may be made under rule 15(2A) to rely on additional identification cards if permission is granted. This was not raised as an issue during the hearing by the FtT Judge or the Respondent.
6. Further, At paragraph 36 of the Determination, the Judge notes that Article 448 of Law No. 10 of 2003 regarding the regulation of communications is cited, but that that law has only 78 articles. This is plainly a typographical error in the translation. It is clear when reading the email at page 23 of the Appellant’s additional bundle (an email between an Egyptian lawyer, Mohamed El Sayed Tales, and the Appellant’s UK lawyer, Nadia Bazzaz) that the correct reference was to article 48. This was not raised during the hearing by the FtT Judge or the Respondent”.
18. The appellant further contends that the appellant should have been given fair notice of the concerns raised by the First-tier Tribunal and provided with an opportunity to respond.
19. The second ground is concerned with three specific instances where it is said the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider material evidence, or immaterial evidence was considered.
Grant of permission
20. First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu granted the appellant permission to appeal by a decision dated 15 June 2025.
Rule 24 response
21. The respondent did not file a rule 24 response.
22. At the hearing, Ms Ahmed provided the Upper Tribunal with the respondent’s undated review filed with the First-tier Tribunal, evidencing that she continued to rely upon her decision letter. In respect of the letters from the Egyptian lawyers, their contents were noted but “no documents or objective evidence have been provided” to support the claim that the appellant has been unable to appeal the ruling as he is not present in Egypt. The respondent also noted “that there is an absence of communication records between [the appellant] and his lawyer about this court order against [the appellant] which further casts doubt on the legitimacy of [the appellant’s] claims.” There was no express contention that the statutory provisions relied upon in the letters and accompanying charge either did not exist or were unrelated to issues arising in this matter.
Rule 15(2A) application
23. The appellant filed a rule 15(2A) application seeking to rely upon various documents, inter alia:
i. A witness statement from Ms Smeaton accompanied by counsel’s note of hearing before the First-tier Tribunal on 28 March 2025.

ii. Egyptian Criminal Procedural Code (with English language translation).

iii. Letter from Ahmed Mohamed Ramadan, Egyptian lawyer accompanied by ID (with English language translation), dated 1 May 2025.

iv. Letter from Hazem Abdel Majeed, Egyptian lawyer, accompanied by ID (with English language translation), dated 15 September 2025.
24. By their letters, the Egyptian lawyers address, between them, various articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law No. 23 of 2004 on Criminal Procedure as well as the Telecommunications Law.
25. I admitted these documents insofar as they aided consideration as to whether the First-tier Tribunal’s understanding of domestic Egyptian law was accurate. As explained at the hearing, I have not found sections of Mr Majeed’s statement easy to understand, particularly as it replies to unknown observations and additionally replies to a “lawyer’s reference”, but ultimately such failure did not go to the core of the issues before me.
Analysis
Ground 1
Fairness
26. The common law imposes minimum standards of procedural fairness, often referred to as due process.
27. I observe that fairness is conducive to the rule of law: R (Osborn) v. Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61; [2014] AC 1115, at [67]–[68], [71]. The principle of the right to have a fair hearing is an essential characteristic of natural justice. It is a fundamental principle of public law.
28. The courts have regularly identified the content of procedural fairness to be infinitely flexible: Hopkins Developments Ltd v. Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWCA Civ 470, per Jackson LJ at [85]. Lord Denning observed in R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain Ex p. Benaim [1970] 2 QB 417, at 439, that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as everything depends on the subject matter.
29. Though the extent of fair procedure requirements is context-based, there are core minimum process rights required, involving notice and some form of hearing. There is an expectation that individuals should not be taken unfairly by surprise. Lord Steyn noted in R (Anufrijeva) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36; [2004] 1 AC 700, at [30], that “[i]n our system of law surprise is regarded as an enemy of justice.”
30. As observed by Singh LJ in R (Citizens UK) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1812; [2018] 4 WLR 123, at [82], the underlying rationales for why fairness is important include that “one of the virtues of procedurally fair decision-making is that it is liable to result in better decisions, by ensuring that the decision-maker receives all relevant information and that it is properly tested”.
31. In R (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity can make a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings.
32. A party must be taken to know that a tribunal is concerned with the issues raised by proceedings, for example concerns and doubts raised in the respondent’s decision letter and her review filed in response to the appellant’s skeleton argument.
33. May LJ held in Baron v. Secretary of State for Social Services, Times, March 25, 1985, that a tribunal need not explain to the parties at a hearing whether or not they are inclined to decide the issues raised one way or another. However, a tribunal may have to inform the parties of its doubts about a party’s case, or elements of it, in order to allow the doubts to be dealt with, if the concerns are not readily identifiable on the face of the evidence, whether documentary or oral. The establishment of a requirement to inform is founded, in part, on permitting a party possessing evidence that is relevant to the issue the ability to allay a tribunal’s concerns. Mann J said in R v. Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex parte Clatworthy [1985] 3 All ER 699, at 704, that if a tribunal “desires to proceed on the basis of some point which has not been put before it and which on the face of the matter is not in dispute”, it must be put to the parties for comment. This observation continues to have procedural force.
34. The Upper Tribunal confirmed in the reported decision of AM (fair hearing) Sudan [2015] UKUT 00656 (IAC) that independent judicial research is inappropriate. It is not for a judge to assemble evidence, rather it is the duty of a judge to decide each case on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, duly infused, where appropriate, by the doctrine of judicial notice. By its decision, the Presidential panel confirmed that if a judge is cognisant of something conceivably material which does not form part of either party’s case, this must be brought to the attention of the parties at the earliest possible stage, which duty could in principle extend beyond the hearing date, at [7 (v)]:
“(v) If a judge has concerns or reservations about the evidence adduced by either party which have not been ventilated by the parties or their representatives, these may require to be ventilated in fulfilment of the “audi alteram partem” duty, namely the obligation to ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to put its case fully. This duty may extend beyond the date of hearing, in certain contexts. In this respect, the decision in Secretary for the Home Department v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173, at [3] – [5] especially, on which the Secretary of State relied in argument, does not purport to be either prescriptive or exhaustive of the requirements of a procedurally fair hearing. Furthermore, it contains no acknowledgement of the public law dimension and the absence of any lis inter-partes.”
Parties’ submissions
35. By means of her careful submissions Ms Ahmed contended that the First-tier Tribunal had not engaged in independent research. She relied upon headnote (iv) of AM where a Presidential panel confirmed that footnotes to decisions of the Secretary of State are an integral part of the decision and, hence, may legitimately be considered and accessed by tribunals. She contended that as Egyptian legislation had been raised before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge could lawfully undertake independent research to satisfy himself as to its substance and nature. Additionally, Ms Ahmed relied upon guidance in the starred decision of Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKIAT 00439, [2002] Imm AR 318 as the First-tier Tribunal could properly consider whether the lawyers’ letters were reliable after looking at all the available evidence, and this permitted consideration of the Egyptian legal regime addressed in the letters. Ms Ahmed was unable to confirm whether the respondent had raised concerns as to the referenced Egyptian legislation at the hearing. Ms Smeaton’s contemporaneous note of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal does not record this concern being advanced by Ms Kelly in closing submissions.
36. Mr Bazini succinctly identified on behalf of the appellant that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision was fundamentally, fatally flawed from its self-direction onwards.
Material error of law
37. Ultimately, there is only one lawful conclusion to the complaint advanced by the appellant; the approach adopted by the First-tier Tribunal was procedurally unfair and the only proper conclusion is for the decision to be set aside in its entirety.
38. There is no merit to the respondent’s preliminary submission that no research was undertaken at all by the First-tier Tribunal. It is abundantly clear from several paragraphs, such as [34], that the Tribunal engaged in post-hearing online reading of the Egyptian Penal Code. This satisfies the definition of “research” provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, namely “systematic investigation or inquiry aimed at contributing to knowledge of a topic by careful consideration, observation, or study of a subject”.
39. Nor is there merit in the analogy with footnotes considered in AM (Sudan). The Presidential panel identified reference to the documents in footnotes placed in the respondent’s refusal decisions to be integral to the decisions. I take judicial notice that the footnotes often reference a website relating to specific country evidence or a CPIN / COI report from which express reasoning in the decision letter is drawn. The same is not the case for foreign legislation arising in this matter.
40. The guidance in Tanveer Ahmed does not aid the respondent in this matter. Whilst a tribunal should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round, it must undertake its consideration fairly. The conclusions as to the documents founded upon procedurally unfair assessment is unsustainable in this matter.
41. The First-tier Tribunal’s self-direction at [30] is hopelessly inadequate, being founded upon a failure to identify that foreign law is a question of fact that requires expert evidence: Hussein & Anor (Status of passports: foreign law) [2020] UKUT 00250 (IAC). The self-direction is underpinned by an erroneous understanding that because it was considering legal provisions, the First-tier Tribunal had the experience and knowledge to assess the scope and substance of foreign legislation. By undertaking research, the Tribunal appeared wholly unaware that it was embarking upon the undertaking of independent research of fact, which in the circumstances of this case was clearly procedurally unfair and a material error of law.
42. I turn to the concerns raised at paragraph 5 of the grounds of appeal. I am not expert in Egyptian law. I am aided by the recent statements of two Egyptians lawyers addressing the purported errors, Ahmed Mohamed Ramadan and Hazem Abdel Majeed. For the purpose of this decision, I am satisfied that they are expert witnesses. Their expertise may have to be considered in greater detail when the decision in this appeal is remade.
43. I have examined the English language translation of the Penal Code filed with this Tribunal. Article 32 is to be found within Section 3 of the Code concerned with “multiple penalties” and states:
“If the same act constitutes multiple offences, the offence punishable by the most severe shall be considered and the penalty shall be imposed exclusively.
If several crimes are committed for the same purpose and are linked to each other so that they are indivisible, they shall all be considered one offence and the penalty prescribed for the most severe of those crimes shall be imposed.”
44. The representatives before me agreed that the approach identified is consistent with the English criminal procedural approach to concurrent sentencing. What this Article of the Penal Code cannot be said to be concerned with is “abortion” as found by the First-tier Tribunal at [38] of its decision.
45. Article 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned with the “appearance of litigants”, and was amended by virtue of Law No. 170 of 1981:
“A person accused if a misdeamour punishable with imprisonment with immediate effect must appear in person before the court. As regards other misdemeanours and petty offences, the accused may appoint an attorney to present his defence, without prejudice to the right of the court to order the accused to appear in person.”
46. On its face, this Article relates to the obligation to appear in person before a court. What it is clearly not directed to is the procedure for withdrawing a civil claim introduced during criminal proceedings as found by the First-tier Tribunal, at [42].
47. Additionally, I am satisfied that the reference to “Article 448 of Law No 10 of 2003” in a document is a typographical error in the translation. I accept, as contended by Mr Bazini, that when reading the original email between Mohamed El Sayed Tales and Nadia Bazzaz from which the reference is drawn, it is clearly written as “Article 48”.
48. These are three examples of the failure by the First-tier Tribunal to identify its concerns at the hearing, and to fail to understand that consideration of foreign law requires findings as to fact.
49. I note that the First-tier Tribunal provides no detail as to the sources of its research, beyond its reviewing “the relevant sections of the Penal Code online”. Research appears to have been wider, with the Tribunal having read the Telecommunications Regulation Law to ascertain that it contains 87 articles, and the content of the Criminal Procedure Code. I observe Mr Majeed’s concern that the University of Minnesota online Human Rights Library at hrlibrary.umn.edu purports to provide access to Egyptian Criminal Procedures but includes text from Iraqi law and not Egyptian law. Whether this website formed part of the First-tier Tribunal’s research is unknown to this Tribunal, but it does identify the real danger of a judge researching foreign law in the absence of the parties.
50. This Tribunal can appropriately proceed on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal was prepared at the outset of the hearing. It can properly be observed that having prepared, judicial concerns as to the translation of the verdict, at [37] of the decision, and whether Hazem Karim Abdel Majeed and Mohamed El Syed Talis hold the legal qualifications and positions stated, at [40]-[41], should have been raised at the hearing by the First-tier Tribunal if not relied upon by the respondent.
51. If, post-hearing, the First-tier Tribunal was concerned as to whether Egyptian law was adequately identified in the charge and referenced by Egyptian lawyers, there were two options available to it; either require the parties to attend a resumed hearing, or to permit the parties to address concerns in writing. What the First-tier Tribunal could not fairly do in the circumstances arising was undertake its own research in a language other than the relevant legislative regime and rely upon its research of fact without more.
52. It is extremely unfortunate that despite the reported decision of Hussein, and its previous confirmation by the High Court in R (MK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 1365 (Admin), at [5]-[8], and in the Presidential panel reported decision of CS and Others (Proof of Foreign Law) India [2017] UKUT 199 (IAC) the First-tier Tribunal appeared unaware of the well-established principle that foreign law needs to be proved by expert evidence as it is a matter of fact. The approach adopted in this matter by the Tribunal can only be considered procedurally unfair.
53. In additional to the procedural unfairness arising in this matter, it is a real concern that expert evidence was not considered by the First-tier Tribunal in its decision. It was not even referred to. The failure to correctly identify counsel representing the appellant at the hearing is also suggestive of a lack of care that should not underpin a judicial decision.
Ground 2
54. I address ground 2 in brief terms, as I have found a material error of law in respect of ground 1. I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider evidence from the appellant that went directly to issues of concern for the Tribunal and upon which adverse credibility findings were made. It may be said that the First-tier Tribunal built up a head of steam in concluding that that it did not believe “any aspect” of the appellant’s claim, and in doing so swept past the appellant’s evidence without engaging with it.
Resumed Hearing
55. Having found a material error of law on the ground of procedural unfairness, the only appropriate course is for this matter to be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Hatton Cross and for it to be heard by a different judge.
Notice of Decision
56. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 28 April 2025 is subject to material error of law. It is set aside in its entirety.
57. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Hatton Cross.
58. The anonymity order issued on 28 April 2025 is confirmed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2025