Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003501

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/01387/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

HARMEET PAUL SINGH BAINS
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms D. Revill, instructed by Spring & Co. Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 28 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the SSHD”) has been granted permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”) to allow the appeal of a foreign criminal against her decision to refuse his human rights claim and deport him from the UK.
2. The SSHD is the appellant in the proceedings before the Upper Tribunal, and Mr Bains is the respondent. However, for ease of reference we will refer to them throughout as they were before the FTT. All further references to “the appellant” are therefore to Mr Bains, and all further references to “the respondent” are to the SSHD.
Introduction
3. This is an appeal about the balance to be struck between, on the one hand, the rights of a criminal offender who has lived almost all of his life in the United Kingdom and has no remaining ties to his country of nationality and, on the other hand, the public interest in deporting him from the United Kingdom. The legal framework for striking that balance has been established by an Act of Parliament, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”). This statute sets out a ”complete code” for determining human rights appeals by foreign criminals.
4. At section 117C of the 2002 Act, Parliament set out that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest, and that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. However, Parliament has also set out two exceptions, where the public interest does not require a foreign criminal’s deportation:
(i) Exception 1: Where the foreign criminal has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of their life, and they are socially and culturally integrated into the UK, and there would be very significant obstacles to their reintegration in the country to which they would be deported. This is set out at Section 117C(4);
(ii) Exception 2: Where the foreign criminal “has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child”, and the effect of their deportation on the partner or child would be “unduly harsh”. This is set out at Section 117C(5).
5. If either exception is met, according to the statute, it will not be in the public interest to deport a foreign criminal, unless they have been sentenced to at least four years’ imprisonment.
6. As set out by Lord Reed in R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 at [68]:
“At the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society in this country. Democratic procedures exist primarily in order to ensure that the Parliament which makes those laws includes Members of Parliament who are chosen by the people of this country and are accountable to them. Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law.”
7. It was accordingly the role of the FTT in this appeal to ensure that the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim and deport him to Norway was consistent with the statutory scheme set out by Parliament.
8. It is not in dispute that the appellant is a foreign criminal as defined at Section 117D(2) of the 2002 Act. He is a citizen of Norway and he has been convicted of a series of criminal offences between November 2009 and September 2023.
9. The appellant’s first sentence of imprisonment for more than one day was imposed on 15 October 2014, when he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 32 months’ imprisonment. The respondent decided to deport him in September 2015, but the First-tier Tribunal allowed the his appeal against that decision on 26 February 2016. Various other criminal offences followed, for which the appellant received sentences of community orders and rehabilitation activity, suspended sentences of up to 16 weeks’ imprisonment and, in one case, nine weeks’ imprisonment. The respondent considered deporting the appellant in 2019 and again in 2020, but decided not to do so. Then, on 12 February 2024, the appellant was convicted of Threat to damage/destroy property, for which he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, and Threaten a person with a blade/sharply pointed article in a public place (a pair of scissors), for which he was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently.
10. Nor is it in dispute that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. He was born in Norway on 19 April 1984 and it is accepted that he entered the UK lawfully in 1989. In the 2016 FTT proceedings, the respondent accepted that the appellant had obtained a permanent right of residence in the UK under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 and on 24 March 2023, she granted him indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme.
11. The appellant’s February 2024 conviction and sentence led the respondent to consider once again whether any of the exceptions to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals still applied. On 12 July 2024, she decided that they did not and that he should be deported. The appellant appealed.
12. The appellant’s appeal turned entirely on whether he met Exception 1 to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals. As it was accepted that he had resided in the UK lawfully for almost all of his life, the issues in dispute were whether he was socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Norway. The First-tier Tribunal decided both factual issues in his favour and allowed his appeal in accordance with the statutory scheme established by Parliament.
13. The respondent has been granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision. She says that the First-tier Tribunal erred in both of its factual findings.
14. It is not the role of the Upper Tribunal to decide for itself whether it agrees or disagrees with the FTT’s assessment. It is our role to decide if the FTT made a legal error that requires the decision to be set aside.
15. For the reasons set out below, we have concluded that the FTT did not make a material error of law and the decision should not be set aside.
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision
16. The appellant’s appeal came before the FTT on 28 April 2025, and in a decision promulgated on 12 June 2025, the FTT allowed his appeal. Various sections of the decision deal with the question of whether the appellant’s appeal should be decided purely under domestic law, or whether some aspects of European Economic Area (EEA) law continued to apply. The FTT found that the appeal fell to be determined under domestic law only, and there is no challenge to that finding before us.
17. The decision began by setting out the that the appellant had been born in Norway in 1984, entered the UK in 1989, and been granted ILR under the EUSS in 2023 [3]. At [4], the FTT set out that he had been convicted of a “number of criminal offences, dating back to 2009,” and that it had been provided with an up-to-date PNC record on the day of the hearing. At [5]-[7], the FTT set out what it considered the “most pertinent offences” for the purposes of the appeal, namely those of which he was convicted in 2014 and 2024 (described above) and a 2011 conviction for false imprisonment and two counts of battery, committed against his mother. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia some years before, and he received a hospital order for these offences, which the FTT recorded lasted for “around two years”.
18. At [9], the FTT recorded that it was accepted that the appellant continued to suffer from paranoid schizophrenia, for which he was on medication, and that it was agreed that he would be treated as a vulnerable witness. At [14]-[16], the FTT set out the domestic legal framework, as described above, and recognised that it was a “complete code” for determining his human rights appeal. At [17]-[20], it gave its reasons for deciding that EEA law did not apply.
19. The FTT’s “Findings of Fact” follow. Paragraphs [21]-[61] considered whether the statutory Exception 1 was met. At [21], the FTT referred to the appellant’s successful 2016 appeal and at [22] it set out that although the respondent continued to accept that the appellant had resided in the UK lawfully for most of his life, it was her position that there were now grounds to depart from the previous FTT’ judge’s findings on the other issues.
20. At [23], the FTT directed itself to the guidelines given in Devaseelan (Second Appeals - ECHR - Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702 as follows: the 2016 determination was its starting point and an “authoritative assessment of the appellant’s status at the time it was made” but
‘The second Adjudicator must, however be careful to recognise that the issue before him is not the issue that was before the first Adjudicator. In particular, time has passed; and the situation at the time of the second Adjudicator’s determination may be shown to be different from that which obtained previously.’
21. At [24], the FTT expressed the view that “clear findings” had been in 2016 “on the appellant’s integration in the UK and the obstacles to the appellant reintegrating in Norway”, and quoted those factual findings at length. At [25], it noted that the 2016 FTT had also made a specific legal finding that Exception 1 was met. At [26], it acknowledged the respondent’s argument that the findings about Exception 1 were obiter because the appeal was decided under EEA law, and gave reasons for rejecting that argument. It also noted that in 2016, the respondent had accepted that the appellant was integrated into the UK. At [27], it concluded that the 2016 findings on integration into the UK and obstacles to reintegration in Norway were its “starting point” (in accordance with Devaseelan).
22. Having identified the 2016 findings as its starting point, the FTT recorded the following exchange with the respondent’s Presenting Officer (“PO”) at [28]:
“At the outset of the hearing, I asked [the PO] what had changed since 2016 to justify a departure from [the FTT Judge’s] findings in 2016. In other words, if the appellant was found to be socially and culturally integrated in the UK in 2016 and that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Norway, how was this less the case some 9 years later? [The PO] asserted that it was the appellant’s continued offending behaviour since then, that showed he was not socially and culturally integrated into the UK.”
23. At [29], the FTT directed itself: “The question for me is whether the appellant’s continued offending, breaks the social and cultural ties found to have been in place in 2016.”
24. The next 20 paragraphs of the decision considered that question. We set out the structure of the reasoning, given the nature of the respondent’s challenge to the determination.
25. Paragraphs [30]-[39] contain a detailed assessment of the appellant’s ongoing offending since 2016, which proceeded in the following steps:
(i) The respondent had warned the applicant in July 2016, May 2019 and September 2020 that “if he committed further offences, the Secretary of State may seek to pursue his deportation.”: [30]
(ii) Despite these warning he had committed further offences. The offences and sentences imposed were detailed: [27]
(iii) “The appellant states that his offending behaviour is tied to his substance abuse.” He had said in his witness statement that his drug habit had begun in 1995. His account of the 2023 offence was set out: [31].
(iv) Long excerpts from the judge’s sentencing remarks in 2024 were set out at [32]-[34].
(v) An up-to-date PNC record showed a further offence of criminal damage; the applicant’s explanation of the offence in his oral evidence was recorded. The applicant admitted that he had begun using drugs again after his release from prison: [35].
(vi) At [36], the FTT summarised the appellant’s evidence about his abstention from drugs while in immigration detention in spite of drugs, he claimed, being readily available.
(vii) The appellant’s risk of reoffending was considered at [37]-[39] with reference to an OASys report, the appellant’s oral evidence, his conduct in prison and the courses completed there, and his conduct in immigration detention.
(viii) At [40], the FTT reiterated that the PO “asserts that all this indicates that the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated into the UK.”
26. The overall assessment can fairly be described as a mixed one. Thus, [38] begins:
“It is clear to me that the appellant has little insight into his offending behaviour and that despite his age, he lacks maturity. He still seeks to diminish or excuse his role in the offences he has committed. […] I have however, no doubt that the appellant is at times motivated to change his lifestyle and address his offending behaviour.”
Similarly, [39] begins
“A similar picture of motivation to change and address behaviour was painted at his 2016 appeal. However, it seems, the appellant has struggled to maintain this motivation when he faces the challenges of life outside of prison.“
27. At [41]-[44], the FTT considered the evidence tending to show that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated as he claimed. It began by setting out what he had said in a February 2024 statement about his arrival in the UK at the age of four years and eight months, his education and work history, his network of friends and relatives in the UK, and his personal cultural interests and sense of identity: [41]. At [42], the FTT noted that none of the appellant’s friends or relatives had attended the hearing, and that although his mother had prepared a statement, she had not attended either. The FTT noted that she had been considered an impressive witness at the 2016 appeal, and set out an excerpt from her statement. At [43], it gave detailed reasons for accepting the appellant’s oral evidence that his mother continued to provide him with financial support and send him food in detention. At [44], the FTT explained that it had decided to place “some weight” on the mother’s statement in spite of the fact that it had not been tested on cross-examination, because it was consistent with her previous evidence, which had been accepted, and was frank about the problems between them.
28. At [45], the FTT found, with reference to the oral evidence and a medical report, that
“[i]t is not possible to know whether, this time, on release from immigration detention, the appellant will stay off drugs. Substance addiction is a complex and debilitating condition. It does appear however, that the appellant has been compliant with his antipsychotic medication.”
29. Finally, the FTT directed itself to the test for social and cultural integration set out in CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and endorsed by the Supreme Court in SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15 at [51]:
“‘a judge should simply ask whether, having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK.”
30. It also took into account the respondent’s guidance, Criminality Article 8 ECHR cases, published on 9 May 2024, which stated that criminal offending will often be an indication of lack of integration but also that “If the foreign national has been resident in the UK from a very early age it is unlikely that offending alone would mean a person is not socially and culturally integrated.”
31. At [48], the FTT set out its conclusion:
“The appellant came to the UK in 1989 aged about 5. He is now 41 years old. Almost his whole life has been spent in the UK. He has had all of his education in the UK. He has close family ties with his mother in the UK. He has had work in the UK in the past. He has a long history of offending leading to various sentences, including imprisonment. Much of his offending is linked to his long-standing drug use, which began in the UK when he was a child, some of which is a result of his coping mechanisms due to his mental ill-health. Taking all of those factors into account, I find the integrative ties formed by the appellant have not been broken by his offending behaviour. I find that despite his new offending since 2016, I am drawn to the same conclusion as [the 2016 FTT judge], that his integrative links are not broken.”
32. The consideration of very significant obstacles to integration is contained at [50]-[60]. After a self-direction to the leading case of Secretary of State v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 ([50]), the FTT reminded itself of the 2016 findings: the appellant did not speak Norwegian, had no relatives in Norway, and had left Norway “at an at an age when he would have been far too young to have formed any lasting relationship or to have any memories of the country”. The “most important factor” had been his paranoid schizophrenia. The previous judge had reviewed the evidence of two psychiatrists who had been involved in the appellant’s care. They had described him as “extremely vulnerable” and expressed the opinion that “without his mother’s involvement he is likely to relapse into mental illness.”
33. At [53]-[54], the FTT gave reasons for placing weight on a new psychiatric report that was before it. At [55], it set out the opinion expressed in that report that return to Norway would have an adverse impact on the appellant’s mental health, and that his engagement in treatment and efforts to remain abstinent from illicit drugs would be put at risk. At [56], it found that this was consistent with the 2016 findings and that “essentially nothing has changed since then.” At [57], it acknowledged that the appellant had recently relapsed into drug use, such that “[i]t is therefore not just removal to Norway that creates a risk of relapse.” Nonetheless, it concluded that:
“The point is that in the UK he has built up relationships with his mental health team with whom he can be frank about his problems and who can assist him when he relapses and he has his mother who continues to support him. It was found that he would not have this in Norway in 2016. There is nothing before me to suggest that anything has changed.”
34. At [58], the FTT found there was insufficient evidence of a risk of suicide in Norway and at [59] it accepted the appellant’s evidence that his mother had recently been to Norway to try to find accommodation for him in the event he was deported but “came back empty-handed.” At [60], it concluded:
“Taking all of those factors into account, I find that the appellant has shown that his ability to integrate into life in Norway is even more bleak than it was in 2016 as a further 9 years have elapsed. The appellant has not returned to Norway since the last appeal. He has now lived in the UK for coming up to 36 years. I find that he has demonstrated that there are very significant obstacles to his integration into Norway.”
The grounds of appeal
35. The respondent is reminded of the guidance set out in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC), promulgated on 19 March 2025, three months before she drafted her grounds of appeal in this case:
“[3]. Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. The grounds of appeal will rarely need to be lengthy. Each ground of appeal should identify succinctly, in clearly numbered paragraphs or (sub paragraphs):
a. The relevant passage(s) in the decision of the FtT.
b. Any relevant primary or secondary legislation only to the extent necessary to do so.
c. Any authority binding upon the judge that is capable of supporting the ground.
d. Brief submissions proving a short explanation to support the ground.”
36. This guidance was not followed here, which meant that we faced some difficulty understanding what the respondent’s grounds were. We sought clarification of the grounds from Mr Parvar at the hearing before us, but he was not the author of the grounds and the assistance he was able to give was limited.
37. The respondent’s grounds were advanced under the single heading of “Ground one: Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on a material matter / Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter - Assessment of Exception 1 (Private Life) Social and cultural integration and very significant obstacles.”
38. The grounds begin with the assertion that “the FTJ has failed to apply relevant legal tests in their consideration and has consequently failed to provide adequate reasons and/or made a material misdirection of law on material matters.” No relevant legal test was identified until [17], but the grounds do begin by identifying a passage in the challenged decision. It is [38], where, it is asserted in the grounds, “significance was afforded […] to courses the appellant states he has completed during his incarceration, the Respondent submits that any course completed as part of a custodial sentence are [sic] not in themselves indicative of rehabilitation.“
39. It is not clear what is being said here. If the submission is that a course taken in prison is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, that is likely to be true in most cases. It is irrelevant as a criticism of this decision, however, as the prison courses were carefully considered in the context of a wide range of other evidence relevant to the appellant’s motivation to change. If the complaint is that “significance was afforded” to these courses at all and that is an error because no weight should ever be placed on courses completed in prison, there is no legal basis for such a submission. The FTT is required to take into account all relevant evidence before it, and the weight it attaches to that evidence is a matter for the Tribunal, subject to a rationality test.
40. In his submissions before us, Mr Parvar presented the complaint as that the FTT placed excessive weight on the courses taken in prison. In other words, it was a rationality challenge, although it had not been pleaded in that way in the grounds.
41. At [12] the respondent acknowledges that “The FTJ has frankly noted the appellant has wholeheartedly failed to address his offending behaviour in the intervening period since the previous Tribunal decision” and at [13] of her grounds, she sets out the appellant’s various convictions and sentences since 2016 in almost identical terms to those used by the FTT at [27] of its decision. At [14], the respondent “submits the appellant is a prolific offender who despite multiple warnings and being afforded every opportunity to lead a lawful life has instead chosen to demonstrate a complete disregard and contempt for the laws of the UK.” As reflected in the word “submits”, this is a submission as to the facts. The error contended for is then that “the FTJ[‘s] findings on social and cultural integration have failed to adequately consider the impact of such prolific and continued offending.”
42. It is unclear what is meant here either. If it is that the impact of the offending on society has not been taken into account, that is not a factor that is relevant to the specific question that Parliament has required the FTT to answer here, which is whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated. If the error is that the FTT failed to “adequately consider” the impact of the offending on the appellant’s social and cultural integration, that is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the FTT identified this at [28] and [29] as precisely the issue that it was required to consider, and then spent the following 15 paragraphs considering it, taking into account a wide range of evidence and making nuanced findings on that evidence. This was followed by a self-direction as to the relevant law and policy (about which no complaint is made in the grounds), and then by a conclusion at [48], in which two further references were made to the appellant’s history of offending.
43. Mr Parvar initially presented this ground as that the FTT had “lost sight of” the offending history and later that it had “glossed over it”, but this is plainly inconsistent with what is said at [12] and [13] of the grounds. It is also unarguable, given the extended and detailed consideration of the offending history outlined above. We conclude that this, too, is a rationality challenge. Essentially, what the respondent is saying is that the history of offending simply cannot have been “adequately considered”, because if it had been, any rational judge would have come to a different conclusion.
44. At [15], the respondent asserts that there is a contradiction between the FTT accepting at [36] that the appellant was abstaining from drugs at the time of the hearing and the finding at [45] that it is “not possible to know whether, this time, on release from immigration detention, the appellant will stay off drugs.” We are entirely unable to identify a contradiction here, let alone see how a contradictory finding (even if there was one) would constitute the error of failing to give adequate reasons. A submission is then made that the conclusion that should have been drawn from the psychiatric evidence was that the appellant was unable to “lead a lawful life.” This is yet another factual submission about the conclusions that should have been drawn from the evidence. No error of law is pleaded here.
45. At [16], the respondent complains that the FTT should have “afforded limited significance” to the statement of the appellant’s mother, given that she had not attended the hearing. She further complains that the FTT should not have taken into account the finding in 2016 that she was an “impressive witness”, given the passage of time and her non-attendance. As the FTT gave careful consideration to how much weight to put on the mother’s evidence in spite of her non-attendance, this, too is either a disagreement or a rationality challenge.
46. The respondent states at [17] that she “seeks to rely” on Binbuga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551 for the principle that social integration includes respect for the principle of the rule of law. This would appear to be the only material misdirection of law pleaded with regard to the social and cultural integration issue. She ignores the context of the Court of Appeal’s restatement of that principle in Binbuga, however, which was that the FTT had erred by finding that the appellant’s membership of a criminal gang was positive evidence of integration. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondent does not identify where in its decision the FTT fell into this error. It is absolutely clear that the criminal offending was, throughout, taken as counting against integration.
47. For these reasons, we consider that the only way in which the respondent’s challenge to the finding that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated can be understood is as a rationality challenge. The respondent does not actually make any arguments in support of the claim that the FTT failed to give adequate reasons. Nor does she identify any misdirection in law.
48. With regard to the finding that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration, it would at first glance appear that the ground pursued is misdirection in law. The respondent acknowledges that the FTT had properly self-directed to Kamara, but she says that she “places reliance on the key findings” of Ackom (Bonsu) [2025] EWCA Civ 537. Two indented paragraphs in quotation marks follow:
“For the purpose of the “very significant obstacles to integration” test in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act, the tribunals should proceed on the basis that life in Germany (and indeed in any other EU state) “is not so different from life in the UK” (paragraphs 46–47).
A person’s inability to speak the language of the country of return (i.e. an EU state) and to find immediate employment cannot, in themselves, suffice to amount to “very significant obstacles to integration” under section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act.”
49. The reference to “key findings” and the formatting create the misleading impression that these sentences can be found in Ackom and were presented therein as guidance as to how Tribunals should proceed in cases involving deportation to European countries. It would appear that this is how the FTT judge who granted permission understood the ground, because she referred to “the direction in Ackom” as one reason that the grounds were arguable.
50. Mr Parvar conceded at the hearing before us, however, that these paragraphs do not appear in Ackom. Paragraphs 46-47 of that decision read:

“46. However, as I have already noted at [19] above, those factors [a lack of ties with the country of destination, no familiarity with that country, no friends or family there to help with integration, and an inability to speak the language] are not unusual in cases of this nature. They are not inevitably determinative. As this Court recognised in AS (Iran) it is possible for migrants with no ties to the country of destination, and no contacts there, and who cannot speak the language on arrival, to integrate and develop a private life there within a reasonable time; much will depend on the country and on the nature and character of the individual concerned. Here one must assume that the judge had in mind everything she knew or had found about the respondent and his character, even though she did not set it out again in this part of her decision. However, the country concerned is Germany, and because life in Germany is not so different from life in the UK, one might have expected something more to have been said about that in this context than simply: “I have taken into account that Germany is a European country”.

“47. Every individual to whom these statutory provisions apply will have a criminal record and will have served a prison sentence of at least 12 months. Whilst of course the judge was entitled to take account of those matters, the problems which those two specific factors might present in obtaining employment in another country, even another European country, cannot in themselves suffice to amount to very serious obstacles to integration, otherwise no person in this category would ever be deported. In the present case, the judge identified that these factors coupled with the respondent’s current inability to speak German would be likely to prevent him from getting a job, but then she went on to accept that he would be entitled to benefits in Germany if he was unable to find employment. It was not found that he would have any serious problem in claiming those benefits. Thus, there was no question of his being destitute.”
51. Mr Parvar also conceded that Ackom did not contain “clear guidance” or a “direction” with regard to all cases involving deportation to European countries, as suggested in the grounds. He reframed the ground as that the FTT should have taken Ackom into account “by analogy.”
52. At [20], the respondent makes the submission that:
“In the current appeal the country of return is Norway, a country recognized as one of the top non-native English-speaking countries in the world and with similar subsidised healthcare and social security provisions as the United Kingdom.”
53. Mr Parvar explained that what was contended here was that the FTT had failed to have regard to these material considerations. He also repeatedly submitted that the reasoning with regard to very significant obstacles to reintegration was “opaque”. By this we take him to have meant that the reasoning was unclear. We note that this is not a complaint raised in the grounds with regard to the very significant obstacles aspect of the decision.
54. By way of summary, the respondent states at [21]
“The Respondent therefore submits the FTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons and or made a material misdirection of law given contradictory findigs [sic] on social and cultural integration and having failed to acknowledge the later integration considerations highlighted by Ackom (Bonsu).”
55. In conclusion, finally, the respondent asserts that the FTT failed to follow the approach set out in HA (Iraq). Which aspect of HA (Iraq) has not been followed and where in the decision it was not followed is not explained.
The hearing
56. At the hearing before us we had a bundle of 419 pages, prepared by the respondent, which included a Rule 24 response from the appellant.
57. We heard submissions first from Mr Parvar, some of which we have referenced above, and then from Ms Revill. We have taken all of their submissions into account in making our decision.
58. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision, which we now give, with our reasons.
Legal framework
59. As set out above, the legal framework governing the FTT’s decision was that set out Section 117C of the 2002, with the concepts of social and cultural integration and obstacles to reintegration being defined in the leading cases of Kamara and SC (Jamaica).
60. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
61. Particularly relevant here is what Lord Justice Popplewell said in AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at [41]:
“I appreciate that under the tribunal system, established by the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 Act, the Upper Tribunal is itself a specialist tribunal, with the function of ensuring that First-tier Tribunals adopt a consistent approach to the determination of questions of principle which arise under the particular statutory scheme in question by giving guidance on those questions of principle: […] However it is no part of such function to seek to restrict the range of reasonable views which may be reached by FTT Judges in the value judgments applied to the many different private and family life circumstances which make almost all cases in this area different from each other. It is emphatically not part of their function to seek conformity by substituting their own views as to what the outcome should be for those of first instance judges hearing the evidence. As Baroness Hale PSC observed in the latter case [MM (Lebanon) & Ors, R( on the applications of) v Secretary of State and another [2017] UKSC 10] at [107]:
"107. It is no doubt desirable that there should be a consistent approach to issues of this kind at tribunal level, but as we have explained there are means to achieve this within the tribunal system. As was said in Mukarkar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] Imm AR 57 , para 40 (per Carnwath LJ):
"It is of the nature of such judgments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law … Nor does it create any precedent, so as to limit the Secretary of State's right to argue for a more restrictive approach on a similar case in the future. However, on the facts of the particular case, the decision of the specialist tribunal should be respected.""
62. Another principle that is relevant here is that a party who applies for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must identify the legal error they say was made the FTT and should not seek to dress up disagreements of fact or weight as errors of law. As recently reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [13] and again in Rai and DAM at [7]:
“Maintaining the distinction between errors of law and disagreements of fact is essential; it reflects the jurisdictional delimitation between the first-instance role of the FTT and the appellate role of the UT, and reflects the institutional competence of the FTT as the primary fact-finding tribunal.”
63. In addition, we bear in mind that:
“The Grounds of Appeal will not ordinarily be permitted to evolve during the course of the appeal. The Upper Tribunal is likely to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly identified and pleaded or where permission has not been granted to raise them.” Rai at [15].
Discussion
64. We find it useful to take the approach taken by Ms Revill in her Rule 24 response and to consider first the respondent’s challenges to the social and cultural integration finding and then to the very significant obstacles to reintegration.
65. As a preliminary matter, we note that there was no challenge raised in the grounds to the FTT’s application of Devaseelan. Mr Parvar submitted that the FTT had erred by failing to follow SSHD v BK (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 1358 and Djebbar v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 804 and treating its decision as dictated by the 2016 findings. As no such challenge was raised in the grounds, it should not have been raised before us, and we hesitate to deal with it. We nonetheless record our view that if such a ground had been raised it would not have been arguable. As is clear from the outline of the FTT’s reasoning in this case that we have given above, the FTT carefully considered whether to depart from the 2016 findings on the basis of the new evidence before it.
66. It is clear that the FTT gave adequate reasons for its decision. It identified the issues in dispute and it determined those issues after a thorough and carefully structured analysis of the 2016 findings and all of the evidence before it. It took into account all of the appellant’s offending since 2016, as acknowledged in the respondent’s grounds. It found that the appellant “at times” had showed motivation to change his behaviour, but also that much of the evidence pointed towards the limitations of that motivation outside the custodial setting. As indicators of his integration, it placed weight on his length of residence, his integration prior to 2016, his relationship with his mother, and his relationship with his mental health team. Before deciding whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated, it properly self-directed to the law as to all of the factors that should be taken into account (“his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors”, as per CI (Nigeria) and to the respondent’s own guidance that criminal offending indicates a lack of integration, but that “[i]f the foreign national has been resident in the UK from a very early age it is unlikely that offending alone would mean a person is not socially and culturally integrated.” It then drew all of these strands together in a concluding paragraph ([48]). The standard of adequacy of reasons, as set out in MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC), is clearly met.
67. The respondent did not apply for permission to appeal on the grounds that the FTT’s decision was irrational. However, as we have set out above, irrationality is the only error of law that can be identified in her challenge to the finding that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated. We remind ourselves of what the Court of Appeal said in Ackom at [11]:
“Bearing in mind that the FtT is a specialist Tribunal and that the judge had the advantage of hearing and seeing the evidence […] an appellate tribunal or court should be slow to interfere with its broad evaluative assessment. As the UT judge recognised, it is important in cases such as this for an appellate tribunal or court to be alive to the danger of substituting their own views for those of the judge. If the finding of “very serious obstacles to integration” was within the range of decisions that were rationally open to the FtT, it cannot be disturbed unless there is some identifiable flaw in the judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, a failure to take into account one or more material factors, or an inadequacy of reasons.”
68. We find that the FTT’s decision was carefully reasoned, took full account of the seriousness and persistence of the appellant’s offending and all other relevant factors, was based on a correct understanding of the relevant caselaw and was clearly within the range of decisions that were rationally open to it.
69. As to the respondent’s challenge to the finding that there were very significant obstacles to reintegration in Norway, we begin by noting that the respondent has resiled from the assertion in the grounds that the FTT misdirected itself in law by failing to apply some general principle applicable to all cases of foreign criminals facing removal to European countries. We accept that the cultural similarities between the UK and the proposed country of return may be materially relevant to the assessment of whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration. So, too, may be the fact that English is widely spoken. We do not accept, however, that these are mandatory factors that the FTT must expressly consider giving weight to give to in all cases. This is because, as Ackom reiterates, what the FTT must do is take into account both the destination country and the “nature and character of the individual concerned” (Ackom at [46]) and identify the particular obstacles that would “prevent or seriously inhibit this [appellant] from integrating” (Id. at [49]) (emphasis added).
70. Both in 2016 and in 2025, the FTT identified the most significant obstacle to reintegration as the appellant’s longstanding and serious schizophrenia. In 2016, the FTT noted the appellant’s inability to speak Norwegian and his lack of relatives but described the appellant’s “serious mental health conditions of paranoid schizophrenia” as the “most significant[…]” factor. It further found that the appellant had ”built up a relationship over the past few years with the particular professionals who are treating him” and that although there would be adequate support for the appellant in Norway, “the past has shown that the appellant needs help to access and to make effective use of those services.” (quoted at [24]) The FTT in this appeal took those findings as its starting point, in accordance with Devaseelan, repeating them at [51] (“the most significant issue was the appellant’s condition of paranoid schizophrenia”; “without his mother’s involvement he is likely to lapse into mental illness”). It took into account the up-to-date psychiatric evidence, which indicated a risk of relapse in Norway due in part to his “separation from his family and network of support.” ([55]). At [57], it noted that there was a risk of relapse in the UK as well, but found that “the point is that in the UK he has built up relationships with his mental health team […] who can assist him when he relapses and he has his mother who continues to support him”. The FTT thus identified the appellant’s serious schizophrenia as the most significant obstacle to his integration in Norway and gave clear reasons, based in the evidence before it, for finding that he would not be able to access the mental health support that was available there. Bearing in mind that FTT judges are not required to refer to every submission made before them, there was no obligation on the FTT in this case explicitly to point out why widespread knowledge of the English language would not have mitigated this particular obstacle.
71. Mr Parvar submitted that the FTT was required to take into account Ackom “by analogy”. Leaving aside that Ackom was not promulgated until after this appeal was heard, we consider that the analogy would not have been helpful to the respondent’s case. As recorded at [48] of that decision, Mr Ackom was “a fit, reasonably intelligent young man in his twenties, who had good educational qualifications and had been employed.” This appellant is extremely vulnerable by reason of a serious mental illness from which he has suffered for several decades.
72. As to the reasoning being “opaque”, we disagree. It is entirely clear: in 2016, the FTT found that the appellant’s serious mental illness would be a very significant obstacle to integration because although care was available in Norway, he would not be able to access it without his existing network of support. The FTT in this appeal considered the up-to-date medical evidence before it, and agreed.
73. For these reasons, we find no error of law in the FTT’s decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 12 June 2025 contained no error of law and is upheld.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 October 2025