Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003510

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/56538/2024
LP/01158/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Yakoob, Solicitor, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs C Bird, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford on 28 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. The Appellant, a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer (“the Judge”) who by way of a decision dated 12 February 2025 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but was later granted by the Upper Tribunal following a renewal application. When granting permission Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins said:
“At Paragraph 23 of the Decision and Reasons the Judge finds that the appellant did not claim asylum on his way to the United Kingdom. Arguably that is not sufficient reason on its own to disbelieve him. ... Arguably there is no evidence to support the Judge’s conclusion that such supporting evidence was ‘easily available’. Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Grounds of Appeal are particularly apt. It is also arguable that the Judge had no basis for concluding that the appellant’s brother had remained in Iraq”.
4. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge also said that whilst he was uncertain about ground 2 in relation to whether or not the Judge had followed country guidance, he did not restrict the grounds and the Appellant had permission to rely upon it if he thought it was necessary.
The Hearing Before Me
5. The Respondent had made a Rule 15(2A) application for the admission of a note of the hearing before the Judge which had been prepared by the Home Office Presenting Officer. Mr Yakoob did not object to its admission and I allowed the note to become part of the proceedings before me.
6. Mr Yakoob took me through the grounds of appeal and in addition referred me to the note of proceedings prepared by the Respondent’s Home Office Presenting Officer. I refer to Mr Yakoob’s clear, helpful and well argued submissions before me in my analysis. Similarly, I am grateful to Mrs Bird who has sought to make robust submissions on behalf of the Respondent.
Discussion and Analysis
7. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
8. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
9. I look to the grounds of appeal and in essence they contend that there was inadequate reasoning by the Judge in his decision. The Judge’s reasoning can be seen at paragraphs 23 to 26 of the decision.
10. Whilst there is an encouragement that First-tier Tribunal Judges’ decisions ought to be succinct and relevant, it is necessary in this case to seek to analyse whether in this particular case the reasoning was adequate.
11. I refer first to paragraph 23 where the Judge said:
“I accept that the breakdown in relations within the PUK led to a split. However, it has not been established that this led to a leak of sensitive information as I have not been pointed to any background evidence that it did. There is no cogent evidence of threats to him, or of the influence of FTR’s family, or of the death of SA, or of his house being burned down, this being easily obtainable through publicly available sources and as the Appellant’s brother remains in Iraq despite male family members being at risk of a blood feud which undermines the suggestion there is one”.
Then at paragraph 24 the Judge said:
“His credibility is further damaged by his failure to claim asylum on route as I do not accept he was under the control of the smugglers at all times or could not have claimed protection while being fingerprinted. It is further damaged by the unlikely scenario of his brother paying for the family’s 8 months journey despite being unemployed and him not knowing where he was going”.
12. Mrs Bird helpfully took me to various parts of the Appellant’s claim including references within the Appellant’s two substantive interviews and screening interviews. She said, in effect the Appellant had referred, in colloquial terms, to “big shots” who would have featured in social media or in the mainstream media yet the Appellant had completely failed to provide such evidence. I understand Mrs Bird’s submissions. The difficulty though is that the Judge’s decision does not provide any or any adequate reasoning in relation to the central and important findings which he made.
13. By way of example, I refer back to paragraph 24 when the Judge said:
“His credibility is further damaged by his failure to claim asylum on route as I do not accept, he was under the control of the smugglers at all times or could not have claimed protection while being fingerprinted”.
There is no adequate reasoning provided by the Judge as to ‘why’ that finding was made. Why or how could the Appellant have got around the smugglers? As I say, Judges are to be commended in the First-tier Tribunal when they give clear findings which with succinct reasoning, but here there was very little by way of reasoning. The reasoning is insufficient.
14. In relation to paragraph 23, I had asked the parties to assist me with what evidence the Judge thought was ‘easily obtainable through publicly available sources’. When, for example, there was reference to the house having been burnt down. Here in the UK a house burning down might lead to there being a police report or a report from other emergency services or even from insurance companies, but it is not clear what the Judge was expecting from the Appellant to be available from Iraq.
15. Whilst I accept that Mrs Bird makes a reasonable point that evidence via social media or from the mainstream media of the “big shots” might have been possible, the culmination of the expectation of reports in respect of the house burning down was to expect too much without further reasoning from the Judge in this protection claim.
16. The case law is clear in respect of the expectation of corroboration and it appears to me that without explanation, here the expectation of supporting evidence from publicly available sources was too high an expectation. I refer to Court of Appeal’s decision in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713. Singh LJ, with whom King and Warby LJJ agreed, set out in some detail the relevant legal principles in relation to corroboration. At paragraph 86 his Lordship said:
“It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal. On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv)”,
and at paragraph 87:
“I accept Mr Jones’s submissions on Ground 3. Although the UT directed itself, at para. 84, that there is no legal duty on the Appellant to corroborate his claim, that was in substance the basis on which it proceeded. Each of the three perceived deficiencies in the evidence adduced on his behalf was to the effect that he could have but had not obtained corroborative evidence to support his claim. In the circumstances of this case, bearing in mind both the relatively low standard of proof and the fact that the Appellant had adduced positive evidence which supported his claim (as the UT recognised), evidence both of what he had himself witnessed and evidence of experts which was consistent with his claim, I have reached the conclusion that the UT required more of him than was necessary. It then fell into error by concluding that the failure to adduce corroborative evidence undermined his credibility with the result that his evidence was found not to be ‘truthful’, at para. 87”.
Conclusion
17. In my judgment the limited reasoning at paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26 which amount to, some 30 lines in the context of a case in which the Judge himself acknowledged that there was detail from the Appellant required much more in the way of reasoning in this protection claim.
18. In the circumstances, I conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge contains a material error of law and has to be set aside.
19. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for further consideration here at the Upper Tribunal or be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. I apply AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I conclude that the appropriate decision in this case is that I remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and is set aside.
The matter is remitted for hearing to the First-tier Tribunal on all issues. Nothing of the current findings shall stand.
The anonymity order is continued because the Appellant has made an international protection claim.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 November 2025