Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2025-003512
PA/57793/2023
LP/05444/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

RL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Maddoh, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 21 January 2026

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Upper Tribunal granted permission to the appellant to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
2. By way of background, the appellant re‑entered the United Kingdom in 2020 in breach of a deportation order. The deportation order was signed in December 2016 following the appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to supply cocaine in 2014. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years.

Summary of the Appellant’s Case
3. The appellant fears that he will be killed by a gang if returned to Albania. He states that he borrowed money from a gang and, in repayment of the debt, the gang required him to import drugs. This led to his conviction in 2014 and subsequent deportation. The appellant says that he was in hiding between 2018 and 2020. Although he did not work for the gang during this period, they located him and threatened his life.
4. The appellant also states that he wishes to remain in the United Kingdom because his wife and children are here.

Summary of the Respondent’s Case
5. The respondent averred that the appellant had been convicted of a particularly serious crime and that he constitutes a danger to the community. Accordingly, it was said that he should not benefit from protection under the Refugee Convention.
6. The respondent accepted that the appellant had come to the adverse attention of a gang in Albania, but it was contended that there was no real risk to him in the future. It was further argued that there was a sufficiency of protection available and that internal relocation was a viable alternative. It was also said that there were not very compelling circumstances such that deportation would be contrary to the public interest.

The Grounds
7. The initial application for permission to appeal was not admitted because it was filed late. The original grounds, and the renewed grounds, were threefold and can be summarised as follows.
8. Ground 1 alleged a procedural irregularity. It was argued that the Judge erred in law by refusing to admit key evidence, namely an expert report. The grounds acknowledged that the breach of directions was a serious matter, but it was said that the report constituted helpful evidence and that the Judge should have adopted a more flexible approach, given the powers available under the First-tier Tribunal Procedure Rules.
9. Ground 2 acknowledged that it was likely to be parasitic upon Ground 1, but nevertheless asserted that the Judge reached irrational findings on the appellant’s protection claim.
10. Ground 3 contended that the findings made in relation to Article 8 were irrational. It was argued that the findings concerning the best interests of the children and the impact on the family were more consistent with a conclusion that deportation would be unduly harsh or that very compelling circumstances existed.

Discussion and Findings
11. At the outset of the hearing, I informed the parties that my preliminary view was that the grounds did not disclose a material error of law in the Judge’s determination, and I explained the reasons for that provisional view. I invited both advocates to address me.
12. I have addressed the three grounds in turn, mirroring the structure of the hearing.
13. In respect of Ground 1, Mr Maddoh’s developed submissions can be distilled into four strands. First, it was argued that the Judge was not clear in his reasons for excluding the expert report. I cannot respectfully accept that submission. The reasons are set out at §§29–39 of the determination.
14. Secondly, it was submitted that it could not have been the intention of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (“the PD”) to exclude relevant evidence. I will return to the PD in due course; however, I do not accept this submission. As I expressed to counsel, had it been the intention of the PD to prevent the exclusion of certain classes of evidence, it would have said so. Relevance is plainly a necessary consideration, but it is not the only one. A judge must also consider whether the admission or exclusion of evidence is fair to both parties, and how such fairness is to be achieved.
15. Thirdly, it was argued that if the application of the PD was the sole reason for the exclusion of the evidence, that was problematic. I confess that I had some difficulty following this submission. The PD was not the reason for the exclusion; rather, it provided the procedural framework within which the Judge considered the late evidence.
16. The final strand was that the Judge ought to have imposed an alternative sanction, such as costs, rather than exclusion. As I indicated at the hearing, another judge may well have taken a different approach, either to the exclusion of the expert report or to the sanction imposed. However, that is not the test.
17. In November 2024, the First-tier Tribunal published the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. Procedural rigour is identified as a “guiding principle” of the PD in achieving an issues‑based approach. The importance of issues‑based reasoning and procedural rigour has been emphasised by the Upper Tribunal in TC (PS compliance – “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC) and Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC).
18. The grounds properly acknowledge that there were serious breaches of directions. The most significant breach for the purposes of this appeal concerns the late upload of the bundle containing the expert report. This happened on 27 January 2025. I shall call this the second supplementary bundle (“ASB2”). I describe it as the second supplementary bundle because a supplementary bundle had already been provided on 15 November 2024. Although ASB2 was accompanied by an apology, there was no application for its admission and no explanation for the lateness.
19. Consequently on the day of the hearing, counsel made an application for the admission of ASB2. The PD makes clear that the Tribunal will not overlook breaches of the Procedure Rules or failures to comply with directions. I therefore cannot accept Mr Maddoh’s submission that the Judge was wrong to place weight on the appellant’s previous non‑compliance.
20. In considering whether relief should be granted from sanctions, including the exclusion of evidence not served in accordance with directions, the guidance in SSHD v SS (Congo) and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 387 applies. That authority confirms the familiar three‑stage test set out in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537; [2014] 1 WLR 795, and Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3926.Although the Judge did not expressly refer to Mitchell or Denton, it is clear from a reading of the determination that he applied the substance of that approach.
21. Turning to the Judge’s decision, he properly directed himself to the first stage and to the seriousness of the breach. As already noted, the grounds fairly acknowledge this. The Judge highlighted that the appeal had previously been adjourned on two occasions due to non‑compliance [§32]. He specifically referred to his earlier warning concerning late evidence and its consequences [§34]. The Judge took seriously the failure to put the Tribunal on notice from 8 January 2025, the date of the expert report that it was to be relied upon. The second stage upon reading §29-39 of the determination no explanation had been advanced for the lateness. In terms of the third stage reading §29-39 notably §37 of the determination the Judge evaluated all the circumstances.
22. The question for me is not whether I would have admitted the expert report, but whether the Judge’s decision to exclude it was a decision reasonably open to him on the evidence before him. In my judgment, it was.
23. Turning to Ground 2, which alleges irrational findings in respect of the protection claim, this was advanced as parasitic upon Ground 1. In light of my conclusions on Ground 1, I am satisfied that Ground 2 does not disclose an error of law. I add only two brief observations. First, irrationality is a high threshold. Secondly, the Judge gave reasons for concluding that, notwithstanding the appellant’s previously accepted adverse attention, this did not give rise to a future risk [§50, 51, 53]. This was a finding that was open to him to make.
24. Ground 3 alleges irrationality in the Judge’s Article 8 findings. Despite counsel’s efforts to develop this argument, it amounts to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions. It was argued that, read fairly, the findings should have led to a conclusion that very compelling circumstances existed such that deportation would be disproportionate. There was no suggestion that the Judge failed to direct himself correctly in law [§22–28]. He was plainly aware that this was an elevated threshold, and it is clear that he found the exercise challenging and finely balanced. I do not accept the submission that the Judge erred by seeking specific evidence in a manner inconsistent with his findings. Read as a whole, the determination makes clear why, notwithstanding the strength of certain aspects of the evidence, the Judge concluded that it did not carry sufficient weight to outweigh the public interest in deportation.

Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld and the appeal is dismissed
The anonymity order is continued to protect the identity of the appellant’s children

RA Pickering
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
6 February 2026