Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003520

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63269/2024
LP/13384/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12th November 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
MR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel, instructed by Imran & Co Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”), promulgated on 20 June 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. Those claims were made on 16 August 2022 and therefore the relevant provisions of NABA 2022 applied.

2. In summary, the appellant asserted that he would be at risk on return to Bangladesh for one or both of two reasons: first, that on account of his previous political activities on behalf of the BNP and those undertaken in the United Kingdom, he would be at risk from supporters of the Awami League, despite that party having been ousted from power in August 2024; second, there was an ongoing criminal case against him (based on false accusations) which would entail him being detained on return and placed in detention.

3. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a supporter of the BNP but rejected all other material aspects of the claims.

The FTT’s decision
4. Neither the appellant nor his legal representatives attended the hearing. After the relevant cut-off time in the late afternoon of the day before the hearing, the appellant’s representatives made an adjournment application. This was on the basis that the appellant had attended hospital on 13 June 2025 for a scan on a tumour in his leg and was awaiting surgery. In addition, the representatives confirmed that due to a lack of funding, they had been unable to instruct Counsel to appear at the hearing. The FTT refused the application on the grounds that there was no medical evidence confirming that the appellant was unable to attend the hearing on 19 June 2025 and no evidence indicating that the appellant would in future be able to fund the instruction of Counsel: [5]. The FTT observed that, according to the relevant passage in the Practice Direction, the appellant and/or his representatives should have attended the hearing in order to make the adjournment application in person: [6].

5. On the morning of the hearing itself, a renewed application was made. The FTT understood that the appellant’s representatives will then no longer acting for him. Again, it was recorded that neither the appellant nor the representatives were in attendance to support the renewed application. That application confirmed that the appellant had spoken to his representatives and asserted that he was “currently” in attendance at A&E and therefore could not attend the hearing. The FTT noted that no attendance certificate or related evidence had been provided. The FTT then looked back to the original adjournment application and the assertion that the appellant had attended hospital on 13 June 2025, concluding that there was no reason why the appellant could not have attended the hearing some days later. Finally, the FTT found that there was no evidence to explain how the appellant’s funding position would improve if an adjournment was granted: [7]-[10].

6. Having recorded the respondent’s opposition to the adjournment application, the FTT made its decision just after midday, concluding that “it met the overriding objective to reject the appellant’s renewed application for an adjournment”: [11].

7. The FTT then stated that it would apply the step-by step-approach set out in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC): [17].

8. Issue (a) was whether there was a Convention reason. At [25], it concluded that in light of the changed political circumstances in Bangladesh, it was “not reasonably likely the appellant will face persecution or serious harm…” and that, taking the claim at its highest, there was no Convention reason.

9. Issue (b) was whether the appellant had a subjective fear of persecution. At [26]-[35], the FTT considered the credibility of the appellant’s account, found it to be significantly lacking on the balance of probabilities, and accordingly concluded that the appellant did not “have a well-founded fear of persecution…”

10. Issue (c) concerned whether the appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason. This issue was considered in the alternative to (a) and (b). The FTT concluded that the appellant’s low-level position in the BNP, combined with the absence of credible evidence relating to sur place activities, the political changes in Bangladesh, and consideration of an expert report to which “little weight” was attached, the appellant would not on the lower standard of proof be at risk on return: [36]-[48].

11. Issue (d) related to whether the appellant could obtain sufficient state protection and/or internally relocate. Again, this was put in the alternative to the conclusions on the preceding issues. The FTT concluded that protection and/or internal relocation would be available. In particular, the FTT found it not to be reasonably likely that “any genuine charges which may have been created” by political opponents would be “proceeded with” on return: [50].

12. Accordingly, the protection aspect of the appellant’s appeal was dismissed.

13. Article 8 was then considered at [57]-[74] and this too was rejected. The question of the appellant’s mental health was only addressed at this stage of the FTT’s decision.

The grounds of appeal
14. Seven grounds were put forward. First, in relation to the adjournment application, the FTT had misunderstood evidence, not been appraised of the true position, and had failed to apply the fairness test. Second, the FTT had erred in respect of issue (a) (the Convention reason point). Third, in relation to issue (b), the FTT had erroneously considered the credibility of the appellant’s account as a whole and taken section 8 of the 2004 Act as its starting point. Fourth, the FTT applied the wrong standard of proof to important evidential matters. Fifth, the FTT erred in its assessment of the expert report. Sixth, the FTT had failed to engage with relevant country information, particularly in relation to legal process. Seventh, the FTT failed to engage with the appellant’s mental health issues when considering the protection claim.

15. Accompanying the renewed application for permission was a witness statement from the appellant, dated 25 July 2025. This purports to provide further details about the appellant’s circumstances before and on the day of the hearing before the FTT. An application was made for the witness statement to be admitted on the grounds that it went to the procedural fairness argument raised in the first ground of appeal.

16. Permission was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal, but granted on all grounds when the application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal. The grant of permission did not specifically deal with the question of whether the witness statement should be admitted.

Rule 24
17. The respondent provided a detailed rule 24 response (for some reason it did not see its way through to Mr Karim or me in advance, but we took time to read it before proceeding).

The hearing
18. I informed the parties that I would not make a preliminary decision on whether the appellant’s witness statement should be admitted. Instead, I would hear submissions, reserve my decision on the appeal as a whole, and decide on admissibility as part of my conclusions.

19. Mr Karim relied on all grounds. He submitted that the correct series of events relating to the adjournment application was as follows. The appellant had attended hospital for a scan on 13 June 2025 but that was not the basis for the renewed application made on the day of the hearing. On the morning of the hearing, the appellant asserts that the tumour in his leg was causing such pain that he had to attend the A&E Department of the Royal London Hospital. It was that attendance which prevented him from attending the hearing. Later in the evening of the same day, the appellant had suffered a mental health crisis and had then attended the A&E Department of Homerton Hospital.

20. Mr Karim acknowledged the absence of an attendance certificate or discharge note in respect of the claimed attendance at the Royal London Hospital. However, he submitted that the appellant’s witness statement provided good evidence and that it should be admitted in the circumstances of this case. The appellant had not been provided with any documentation by the hospital and that was a matter outside of his control. I was taken through the online renewed adjournment application, which Mr Karim submitted provided important information that the FTT failed to consider or misunderstood. There FTT had made no express reference to fairness.

21. Mr Karim then focused on the fourth ground of appeal. It was clear, in his submission, that the FTT had erroneously applied the balance of probabilities standard to important aspects of the appellant’s evidence. That was contrary to the guidance in JCK. There were subsequent references to the correct lower standard of proof, but it was submitted that cumulatively the errors rendered the decision unsustainable. The FTT had wrongly assumed that the expert failed to address relevant issues and that the author lacked the expertise to comment on the Bangladeshi judicial process: the author was in fact a practising lawyer in that country. The FTT had made no reference to the country evidence in the CPIN, focusing entirely on passages from the respondent’s executive summary. The appellant’s mental health had only been briefly addressed in the Article 8 section, not in respect of the protection issues.

22. Ms Isherwood relied on the rule 24 response and submitted that there were no material errors of law. She emphasised the absence of any documentary evidence from the Royal London Hospital. In respect of the protection-related grounds, she submitted that the FTT had considered all matters in the round. It had made a number of alternative findings and these were open to it. Ms Isherwood highlighted [50], in which the FTT found that any criminal case against the appellant would not be pursued if he were to return. The FTT had properly approached the expert report.

23. In reply, Mr Karim submitted that what the FTT had said at [50] was at best unclear. It failed to adequately address the appellant’s circumstances if he were arrested under the warrant and held in detention. Further, the FTT’s consideration failed to have any regard to the appellant’s mental health problems if he were to be detained. The expert report had provided appropriate sources. Overall, the demonstrable errors of law were enough for the FTT’s decision to be set aside.

24. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Conclusions and reasons
25. I remind myself of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In the present case, the FTT was faced with a difficult situation and I recognise that the decision under challenge is a conscientious piece of judicial work.

Ground 1
26. For the reasons set out below, I conclude that the FTT erred in law when refusing the renewed application for an adjournment made on the day of the hearing.

27. Before coming to those reasons, I have decided that the appellant’s post-hearing witness statement should, on an exceptional basis, be admitted. Its contents do not raise any new issues, but instead go to support what had been said in the renewed application itself. In addition, the evidence goes to the question of fairness, which, in a protection case, concerns matters of fundamental importance.

28. It is clear that the renewed application was seen by the FTT. Having looked at its contents at the hearing, I am satisfied that it was made by the appellant’s legal representatives. Paragraph 2 of the application states that:

“We have spoken with the appellant this morning, and he informed us that he is currently in A&E due to deteriorating pain in his leg caused by the tumour. We have requested him to obtain an A&E attendance certificate, which will be forwarded as soon as it becomes available. His worsening condition this morning has made it medically impossible for him to travel to the Tribunal.”

29. I am satisfied that the reference to “this morning” related to the morning of the hearing. The cause of the claimed attendance at A&E is supported by the appellant’s witness statement.

30. The FTT was right to note the absence of any hospital documentation provided at the time. I acknowledge that none has been provided thereafter, which is clearly a concern. Having said that, on the appellant’s evidence, no such documentation was provided to. He could be lying about that, and indeed everything else relating to the non-attendance at the hearing. That is the allegation made in the rule 24 response. Alternatively, it may be that he was not provided with a certificate or discharge note, as he claims. It is of significance in my view that the application contained the assertion, made by a solicitor (who owed duties to the FTT as an officer of the court), that the appellant had actually been spoken to at the relevant time and that the claimed attendance at A&E was based on direct instructions. This is not a case in which no explanation for the non-attendance had been put forward. There is also the question of context. There was credible evidence before the FTT concerning attendance at hospital some days previously and additional post-hearing evidence (a discharge note from the Homerton Hospital to which there has been no objection to its admission) confirming attendance at another A&E Department later on the same day. Whilst in no way decisive, it is clear that the appellant has fairly significant health problems.

31. I turn to the issue of representation. It is somewhat unclear as to what the FTT believed the position to be. At [7], it recorded that Imran & Co Solicitors were no longer acting for the appellant, whilst at [10] it is suggested that representation issue related only to attendance at a future hearing. On the face of the adjournment application, I am satisfied that it was made clear that the issue of funding related only to the ability of the solicitors to instruct Counsel to attend the/a hearing, and not to whether the firm continued to act for the appellant.

32. There is some merit in Mr Karim’s submission that there was no apparent reason for why the appellant might have wanted to dishonestly seek an adjournment. There had been no previous adjournments, he had legal representatives (albeit, not at the hearing), and he had consistently prosecuted his case since 2022.

33. With all of the above in mind, I turn now to the question of fairness. It is well-established that fairness is the touchstone for the consideration of whether to adjourn the hearing or not: SH (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2011] EWCA Civ 1284 and Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418 (IAC). Importantly, on appeal, the Upper Tribunal is not concerned with whether the FTT’s refusal to adjourn was reasonably open to it. Instead, it is simply a question of whether the decision to proceed in the appellant’s absence was, in all the circumstances, fair.

34. The FTT did not in fact refer to fairness in terms, only to the overriding objective contained in rule 2 of the First-tier Tribunal’s Procedure Rules. Rule 2 does make reference to the need to the cases to be dealt with “fairly”. The absence of a specific reference to “fairness” does not of itself demonstrate an error of law.

35. I acknowledge that the FTT had put the matter back several hours on the day of the hearing and was not in possession of very much detail. I acknowledge that fairness operates in both directions: the respondent was ready to proceed and her time and resources are important considerations. I acknowledge that the initial adjournment application had been late and appeared to have little or no merit. However, in the particular circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the FTT did not act fairly in refusing to adjourn the hearing and thereby depriving the appellant of an opportunity to put his case (including responding to concerns raised by the respondent and/or the FTT). On its face, the renewed application provided a proper basis for adjourning, and that has been further supported by the appellant’s witness statement. There were no surrounding circumstances which indicated dishonesty or bad faith on the appellant’s part. The absence of legal representation at the hearing was not of itself a reason for proceeding in the appellant’s absence because he would nonetheless be entitled to speak on his own behalf and answer questions (with appropriate arrangements having been made).

36. I record here a degree of sympathy for the FTT. As mentioned earlier, it was faced with a difficult situation in the absence of both the appellant and his legal representatives.

37. There was procedural unfairness in the FTT’s decision to proceed in the appellant’s absence. In my judgment, this is sufficient for the FTT’s decision to be set aside in its entirety, given the fact that the case was focused on a claim for international protection and that there were significant credibility issues in play.

38. For the sake of completeness, however, I will deal relatively briefly with the remaining grounds of appeal.

Ground 2
39. There is a clear error in respect of issue (a).

40. The question to be answered is whether, taking the claim at its highest and applying the balance of probabilities, there was a Convention reason. A [25], the FTT based its conclusion that there was no such reason solely on the “significant political change that has occurred in Bangladesh since the appellant made his asylum claim…” and that it was “not reasonably likely the appellant will face persecution or serious harm from the state due to his claimed membership and/or support of the BNP.” That approach related to an assessment of risk on return and, arguably, the existence of a subjective fear, not to the existence of a Convention reason. Taking the claim at its highest, the appellant’s case was predicated on political opinion and the FTT should have either recognised that or provide adequate reasons for rejecting it.

41. However, the error is not of itself material given the FTT’s alternative findings.

Grounds 3 and 4
42. According to the methodical framework stated by the FTT at [17(b)] and in line with JCK, the next issue to be determined was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant had a subjective fear.

43. The problem with the alternative assessment at [26]-[35] is that it clearly and persistently addresses the question of the credibility of the appellant’s overall claim, going beyond simply whether he genuinely held a subjective fear. The following are examples of this: the delay in claiming asylum; inconsistencies in the account; the genuineness/reliability of the arrest warrants; his ability to leave the country; and whether there were in fact any charges against the appellant. At [35], the FTT concluded that the appellant’s claim “lack[ed] credibility, and he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.”

44. At [16]-[17] of JCK, it is made clear that the subjective fear issue is a “discrete exercise from assessing whether past events occurred.” Certain aspects of credibility can be relevant to whether there is, on balance, a subjective fear, but it cannot be determinative. In the present case, the FTT’s approach indicates that credibility has been regarded as, in effect, determinative of the entirety of claimed events relied on by the appellant. That assessment was made on the balance of probabilities. The FTT had erred in this regard.

45. I appreciate that the FTT went on to address issue (c) in the alternative to issues (a) and (b) and that issue (d) was addressed in the alternative to issue (c). I also acknowledge what the FTT said at [18] and [48] concerning the lower standard of proof. However, in my judgment it is difficult to escape the danger that the FTT’s overall assessment has been infected by the error under issue (b). As regards what the FTT said at [50], I acknowledge that the lower standard of proof was applied, but that does not save the decision as a whole. First, it does not adequately address the circumstances in which (assuming that the warrants were genuine and reliable and the criminal case was ongoing) the appellant is returned to Bangladesh, detained on arrival (as an absconder) and placed into pre-trial detention. There is no reference to how the legal processes might unfold thereafter, and/or what effect detention might have on the appellant’s mental health.

46. I conclude that the error under grounds 3 and 4 is another basis for setting the FTT’s decision aside.

Ground 5
47. I conclude that there are certain shortcomings in the FTT’s treatment of the expert report. I will assume that it was aware that the report had in fact been produced in January 2025 and not January 2024 (this was made clear in the addendum report dated 16 January 2025). The shortcomings are threefold. First, contrary to what is said at [46], the report did in fact address the current political situation Bangladesh, albeit not at great length. Second, the expert did refer to the appellant’s particular circumstances. Third, the author was a practising lawyer and the FTT failed to adequately explain why he lacked expertise to comment on the appellant’s position if he were returned as an absconder with an ongoing criminal case against him. Fourth, the author did provide a number of sources in his report and it is unclear why the judge found otherwise or regarded those sources as being inadequate or inaccurate.

48. I am satisfied that the FTT materially erred in respect of its treatment of the expert report.

Grounds 6 and 7
49. As regards the FTT’s consideration of the country situation in Bangladesh post-August 2024, there is merit in ground 6 that no apparent regard was had to certain passages contained in the executive summary relating to nor enforcement and the legal process in general. This issue was relevant to the appellant’s case that he would be detained on arrival as result of the ongoing case against him.

50. Perhaps more importantly, although not clearly articulated in the grounds, the only references made by the FTT to the CPIN relate to that executive summary. As has been pointed out in a number of cases over the course of time, the executive summary represents the respondent’s own assessment of the country evidence: it does not represent the country evidence itself. There is a real danger that judges who refer only to the executive summary are in effect inadvertently relying on and adopting one party’s interpretation of or a submission on wider objective materials.

51. As regards ground 7, the FTT did refer to the appellant’s mental health, but only when considering Article 8. Whilst the medical evidence was not detailed, it nevertheless demonstrated that the appellant had suffered and continued to suffer from relatively significant problems (including assertion that suicide attempts had been made in the past). These were relevant to the protection claim insofar as any possible detention on arrival was concerned.

52. There are errors here and, on a cumulative basis, they are material.

Disposal
53. I canvassed the issue of disposal with the parties at the hearing. It is quite clear that this appeal must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete re-hearing with no preserved findings.

54. The FTT’s conclusion on Article 8 have not specifically been challenged. However, I deem it appropriate to set it aside in any event in order that the First-tier Tribunal will have a clean sheet when reconsidering this appeal in due course.

Anonymity
55. I maintain the anonymity direction made by the FTT. This is an ongoing protection appeal.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of errors on points of law and that decision is set aside.

I remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.

Directions to the First-tier Tribunal
1. This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (Hatton Cross hearing centre) with no preserved findings;

2. The remitted appeal shall be heard by a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Scullion.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 6 November 2025