Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-003530
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65049/2024
LP/01033/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

AN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Imamovic, Counsel instructed by Pearce Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr Pavar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The papers I have before me. I have before me a PDF of 194 pages and no Rule 24 response.
Adjournment Application
2. At the hearing there was an application to adjourn this case in order to obtain a copy of the transcript of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. After a lengthy exchange between myself and counsel, I suggested that any notes made at the First-tier Tribunal hearing as to what potential issues were raised before the First-tier Tribunal judge would be sufficient for me to accept that they were raised, given that the counsel who appears before me today is the same counsel who appeared before the First-tier Tribunal and the Home Office had no objections.
3. After taking some advice from the Bar Standards Board, counsel agreed to supply the notes, and we continued with the hearing on the basis that all the issues that were said to have been raised before the First-tier Tribunal judge were in fact raised by counsel. Therefore, there was no requirement to adjourn the case, and we continued to the full hearing. As will be seen from what follows, that particular issue has no real bearing upon the conclusions as to the outcome of the case.
Case Details
4. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Blackwell(“the Judge”), decided at the Birmingham First-tier Tribunal on 14 May 2025. The decision was promulgated on 27 May 2025.
Grounds of Appeal
5. The grounds are in fact a single ground of appeal but subdivided into a number of alternatives, I will treat them as separate grounds:
6. Ground 1a: That the First-tier Tribunal judge failed to consider core evidence and/or failed to provide cogent reasons or applied the wrong standard of proof. In particular, the judge at paragraphs 25 and 26 failed to consider relevant evidence or matters.
7. Ground 1b: failing to make findings and provide cogent reasons. Particularly, it is pleaded that the judge failed to give cogent reasons to depart from the grant of asylum in Cyprus (paragraphs 27 and 30).
8. Ground 1c: Failed to give reasons or provide cogent reasons in that the judge erred in assessing the appellant's sur place political and religious activities or his political and religious beliefs in a number of ways.
Facts of the Case
9. The judge sets out the facts of the case. The main issue is that the appellant is a national of Iran, born in 1990. Asylum was refused by the Home Office in October 2022. The appellant asserted that he would be at risk on return to Iran due to his religious and/or political opinion, and/or that he would be in need of humanitarian protection.
10. The Home Office had conceded in the First-tier Tribunal that there would be no sufficient protection from persecution in Iran and that internal relocation would not be possible if the key material facts of the appellant's claim were accepted. The judge therefore focussed on credibility of the appellant.
11. The judge also noted, however, that even if the appellant were not found credible, it would still be necessary to consider whether he would be at risk of persecution due to perceived characteristics of religion and political opinion.
12. The most significant issue in this case is that the appellant was granted asylum by Cyprus. There is some debate in the judgment as to how that should be treated, and that forms the main issue in this case.
13. The judge identified at paragraph 7 four issues:
a. Whether the appellant should be granted refugee status on the basis of a grant of asylum in Cyprus.
b. Whether the appellant had come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities.
c. Whether the appellant is a genuine Christian convert.
d. Whether the appellant would be at risk on return, his views not being found to be genuine but him being perceived to hold adverse religious or political views by the Iranian regime.
Permission to Appeal
14. In granting permission on 2 September 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins said the following:
"The appellant is a citizen of Iran who claims to have been baptised as a Christian in the United Kingdom. He has also been recognised as a refugee in Cyprus, and whilst he may have left Cyprus because he considered that to be to his economic advantage, it is arguable that it is not a proper reason to disbelieve his claim for protection. I found the ground that the judge ignored, or failed to give reasons for rejecting, expert evidence that the appellant's claim to have been warned by the Iranian authorities about his political activities in Iran to be plainly arguable, and I am concerned that the judge should have shown more regard to the appellant's claim to have made friends with a priest."
Permission was granted on all grounds.
Assessment of the First-tier Tribunal Judgment
15. The judgment of First-tier Tribunal Judge Blackwell is detailed in its assessment of the appellant's credibility. He sets out the framework correctly in relation to the legal tests required for asylum and also sets out the Iranian country guidance cases at paragraph 13. The judge sets out a long and detailed assessment of the appellant's credibility; however, the real issue with this case is how the grant of asylum in Cyprus has been treated.
The Grant of Asylum in Cyprus
16. Unhelpfully, the Home Office did not provide positive confirmation either way, so it was assumed that the appellant had in fact been granted asylum in Cyprus. It is unfortunate that this was not verified, because it could have been done quickly by liaison with the Home Office in Cyprus. The United Kingdom is in a position where he would be returned to Iran rather than Cyprus, where he would in fact have protection.
17. The judge makes adverse credibility findings in relation to the appellant leaving Cyprus and finds that the appellant had not given a genuine reason for leaving Cyprus, namely that he was in fear of the Iranian regime in Cyprus. I cannot assess the veracity of that credibility finding. My problem, however, is that the judge makes that adverse credibility finding and then goes on to find that, as a result, he is not granted asylum in the United Kingdom without really grappling with the initial decision given by the Cypriot government.
18. The judge at paragraph 26 after a lengthily and detailed discussion finds that the appellant is not credible. He then goes on to consider the heading "Asylum in Cyprus". Paragraph 27 states the following:
“I accept that the appellant, on the balance of probabilities, did claim and receive asylum in Cyprus. The Secretary of State did not challenge that before the day of the hearing. There would have been procedural unfairness in allowing such a challenge on the day of the hearing without notice. Moreover, on the balance of probabilities, I find it likely the appellant was granted asylum in Cyprus. That part of his account seems plausible, and an appellant may be credible on one part but not all of his account. Parts of his account also strongly suggest this, such as his statement that he did not claim asylum in France or Germany because they would return him to Cyprus.”
19. At paragraph 28, the judge states:
“I accept that the fact that the appellant was granted asylum in Cyprus is an important factor counting in his favour. With regard to the assessment of his asylum claim, it is a very significant factor: 'recognition elsewhere as a refugee' (Democratic Republic of Congo [2005] UKIAT 00054 at [18]) and of 'considerable weight' (Iran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1457 at [27]).”
20. At paragraph 29, the judge states:
“I have taken that into account when assessing his credibility. Nonetheless, I find him not to be a credible witness for the reasons stated above. I find the reasons stated below weigh so strongly against the appellant that they have resulted in me making findings at odds with the Cyprus asylum decision. Notwithstanding the fact that I have given that decision considerable weight, I note that we do not have the decision before us and so do not have the grounds on which that decision was made.”
Analysis of the Law on Recognition of Foreign Refugee Status
21. As can be seen from the direct quotations of the cases involved below, the law is not quite as clear as is set out by the judge. In fact, in my judgment, MM (Iran) deals with the UNHCR and its status as to whether or not refugee protection should be recognised. In some respects, more relevant is KK( Democratic Republic of Congo), which the judge, in my judgment, oversimplifies. Both judgments effectively say that any grant of refugee status must be the starting point for any assessment made of credibility and of refugee status.
22. At paragraph 27 of MM (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1457, the Court of Appeal said:
“Although it was not raised as a ground of appeal, and indeed does not feature in the appellant’s skeleton argument and supplementary skeleton argument, it is, in my judgment, appropriate to consider the apparent difference between the UNHCR and the respondent in respect of point C(i): whether the Secretary of State and the tribunal must give “considerable weight” to a recognition by the UNHCR of an appellant’s refugee status. I say “apparent” because on reading the parties’ written submissions it seemed to me that in reality there was likely to be very little difference between the position of the UNHCR and that of the respondent, and there was a danger that an abstract semantic discussion might divert attention from what is likely to happen in terms of practical decision-making by the Secretary of State and the tribunal. In response to our questions Ms Gray and Mr Southey confirmed that this was the case. In reality, a decision by the UNHCR as to refugee status will, given the UNHCR’s particular expertise and responsibilities under the Refugee Convention, be given considerable weight by the Secretary of State and the tribunal unless in any particular case the decision taker concludes that there are cogent reasons not to do so on the facts of that individual case. It would be just as unrealistic to contend that a decision by the UNHCR as to refugee status must always be given considerable weight regardless of any indications to the contrary as it would be to contend that it could be given less than considerable weight for no good reason.”
23. At paragraphs 18 to 21 of KK v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2005] UKIAT 00054, the Tribunal said:
“18. The earlier grant of asylum is not binding, but it is the appropriate starting point for the consideration of the claim; the grant is a very significant matter. There should be some certainty and stability in the position of refugees. The Adjudicator must consider whether there are the most clear and substantial grounds for coming to a different conclusion. The Adjudicator must be satisfied that the decision was wrong. The language of Babela is that of the burden of proof: their status is prima facie made out but it can be rebutted; the burden of proof in so doing is on the Secretary of State. We do not think that that is entirely satisfactory as a way of expressing it and it leaves uncertain to what standard the burden has to be discharged and what he has to disprove. The same effect without some of the legal difficulties is established by the language which we have used.
19. But the important point is that it does not prevent the United Kingdom from challenging the basis of the grant in the first place. It does not require only that there be a significant change in circumstances since the grant was made. Clear and substantial grounds may show that the grant should never have been made by the authorities; it may be relevant to show that the authorities in the country in question lacked relevant information or did not apply the Geneva Convention in the same way. Exclusionary provisions may be relevant. The procedures adopted for examination of the claim may also be relevant. Considerations of international comity may be rather different as between EU member states and those with less honest administrations or effective legal systems.
20. Where however the Adjudicator is not satisfied that the foreign grant was wrongly made, if the Claimant is to fail in his claim in the United Kingdom because of a change of circumstances, this is equivalent to the application of a cessation provision and should be considered in a like manner.
21. It is accepted that there is material which the Secretary of State wished to deploy and that it should be heard. It has never been examined at all as a matter of substance and it should be. Accordingly this appeal is allowed and remitted for hearing before another Adjudicator.”
24. During the hearing, it was submitted that the judge had not properly reasoned the departure from the Cypriot decision. This was the main thrust of the argument. In my judgment, the problem with the judge's assessment of credibility is that the starting point in this case should have been that the appellant was a genuine refugee in Cyprus. As a result of his refugee status in Cyprus (given that Cyprus is an EU member state), with cross-reference to KK, mutual trust and recognition should mean that, whilst refugee status in the United Kingdom would not automatically follow, it should be the starting point. Only in a scenario where there was significant and credible evidence to show that refugee status was not properly granted or some significant change in circumstance should a further assessment be made. In this case Iran remains a state unable to provide protection.
25. That is not the approach that has been taken in this case. In this case, both the Home Office and the judge have sought to reassess the whole of the case, but have reassessed the case by using the refugee status from Cyprus only as part of a balancing exercise albeit an important one rather than as the starting point. That, in my judgment, is a fundamental flaw and a material error of law.
26. I agree with Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins when he said that the judge may have erred in that respect, because it seems to me that the judge has, in fact, held against the appellant for perfectly understandable reasons, namely that the appellant it seems Cyprus for economic reasons to come to the United Kingdom. This would be a very easy case if the option were to return the appellant to Cyprus. He has no basis to remain in the United Kingdom, because he had come here effectively as an economic migrant.
27. However, there is no third-country return agreement between the United Kingdom and Cyprus. There is no mechanism post-Brexit for returning somebody who had been granted refugee status in Cyprus other than to their home state, which in this case is Iran.
28. Therefore, in all the circumstances, the judge should have taken the grant of asylum in Cyprus as the starting point and then if challenged by the Home Office examined the other aspects of the matter. The judge also attempts to predict what Cyprus may or may not have considered and how he is in a better position than they were to judge the refugee status. The judge states: “But certainly they will not have had the benefit of certain of the factors which I have relied on in finding the appellant to lack credibility, because they would have post-dated the decision.” That in my judgment misses the point which is that persecution was assessed by Cyprus as credible and refugee status granted.
29. I do not see how there is any other fair approach. As Mr Justice Ouseley pointed out in KK, particularly where this concerns a European Union member state, mutual trust and recognition should be the starting point of any assessment of refugee status.
Conflation of Economic Migration and Protection Claim
30. The fact that the appellant, on the face of the papers, has come to the United Kingdom for economic reasons does not take away from the fact that he was granted refugee status in Cyprus on the basis of persecution in Iran. Therefore, the assessment of credibility should not have focused on the issue of his journey and his post-Cyprus travel, which was clearly designed, at least on the face of the papers, to increase his economic prospects. To confuse that with the grant of asylum by an EU member state on the basis of persecution in one of the most draconian states in the world is, in my judgment, an error of law.
31. I am also unable to reconcile paragraphs 33, 34, and 35 of the judgment. Paragraph 35 correctly states the law: that even low-level political activity, or activity perceived as such, if discovered, gives rise to a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment by the Iranian state. It is worth noting, of course, that the Iranian regime has been described as having a "hair-trigger" approach to persecution.
32. However, the judge has then found, at paragraphs 33 and 34, that the appellant would delete all his social media posts on return because he did not hold the views expressed and would not wish to put himself at risk on return. The judge also finds that the appellant's views are not genuine and are solely undertaken to manufacture an asylum claim and allow him to stay in the United Kingdom as an economic migrant.
33. Paragraph 33 is problematic because it further conflates the issue of his protection claim in the United Kingdom with his economic activity. He has already been granted protection in Cyprus from Iran on the basis of persecution. Whilst his subsequent behaviour has, it seems, demonstrated that he does not wish to stay in Cyprus to seek refuge, coming to the United Kingdom as an economic migrant having been granted refugee status in a fellow EU member state does cause real problems for him and the decision makers as it is not suggested that he is returned to Cyprus.
Religious Conversion
34. In relation to the religious activity, I also agree with Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins that the judge has not properly addressed the issue of the appellant conversion to Christianity. The judge finds, as stated by witnesses, that the appellant was attending church on a regular basis, and the judge accepted his explanation for some absence from church. There is no requirement for a religious convert to attend church every single Sunday or at every festival. The judge even accepts that evidence.
35. There are letters from the Greek Orthodox community in Birmingham, with the priest in charge stating that the appellant has been baptised. The judge places little weight on the letter from the priest in charge, but I am concerned that the judge has again conflated the appellant's difficult behaviour in relation to the economic migration with not believing that he is a converted Christian.
36. I find paragraph 46 to be problematic, where the judge states the following:
"I did not find the appellant's account of his conversion to Christianity plausible. The appellant had been reading the Bible, as he claimed, for several years since his cousin gave him a copy before he fled Iran in mid-2019. I would expect a far deeper and more detailed description of his faith than he gives (for example, the Bible passages referred to at Q49 and Q52 of his interview). If he were regarded by his church as a genuine convert, I consider he would have put in more effort to support his case and would have attended the hearing to speak on his behalf, especially since there were three people who had stated they were available in the recent letter; none attended the hearing."
37. It is not for me to assess whether or not the judge was entitled to make those findings. I do, however, consider that they are tainted by the judge's opinion of the appellant in relation to his credibility on his travels from Cyprus and the failure to treat him as having been found a genuine refugee. The fact remains that there has been no proper assessment of the appellant's Cypriot refugee status. I find this assessment an error of law.
Conclusion
38. The starting point in this case should have been an assumption that the appellant was a genuine refugee, given recognition by an EU member state. It was then for the Home Office to provide evidence or to dispute either that that was the case or to provide alternatives as to why he would not suffer persecution on return to Iran.
39. In my judgment, the judge has conflated the appellant's departure from Cyprus which seems to potentially have been motivated in order to become an economic migrant in the United Kingdom with his original claim, in respect of which he had been recognised as a refugee since 2019. To come to the United Kingdom, where he faces only a risk of being removed to Iran rather than to Cyprus, presents a very different and starker set of facts.
40. I therefore find that the judge, having given a detailed examination of the appellant's case, has, in my judgment, taken the wrong starting point. As a result, that has infected the reasoning in relation to credibility and the remainder of the case.
Decision
41. I therefore find that there is an error of law and that the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing on all matters.

Notice of Decision
1. I therefore find that there is an error of law in relation to the grounds of appeal.
2. No findings of fact are preserved.
3. The case is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for a rehearing.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 April 2026