Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003535

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00355/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McCARTHY

Between

BMA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Eaton
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan

Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. There is no dispute over the appellant’s identity. He is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. He was born on 17 October 2002. When he claimed asylum, he was 18 years 8 months old. By the time the appeal came before me, he was 23 years 3 months old.
2. On 3 December 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Landes found the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and reasons issued on 17 June 2025 contains legal error. Judge Landes preserved findings and decided to retain the appeal to be remade in the Upper Tribunal. The appeal was transferred to me to remake the decision.
Procedural matters
3. I record the following procedural matters dealt with at and during the hearing.
a. The anonymity direction is maintained for the reasons previously given, as requested by the Appellant and unopposed by the Respondent.
b. This was a hybrid hearing, with Mr Tan attending by video and all others in person. There were no connectivity issues that affected the hearing.
c. The Appellant is treated as a vulnerable adult. I explained he could ask for a break at any point. He attended with a friend as a supporter, who I suggested could interrupt if she noticed the Appellant was having difficulty and might need a break. Mr Eaton confirmed he was not seeking other adjustments to the hearing.
d. There were no communication difficulties between the Appellant and the Kurdish Sorani interpreter.
e. The parties rely on the documents in the composite bundle of 155 pages. No new documentary evidence was provided. Both parties confirmed there was no additional documentary evidence.
f. Mr Eaton provided an 8-page skeleton argument. He confirmed that he had unintentionally omitted the last of the preserved findings ad that he would deal with that matter in submissions.
g. Mr Tan and Mr Eaton relied on three recent Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Iraq:
i. Blood Feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribunal Violence (July 2024),
ii. Actors of Protection (September 2025),
iii. Internal Relocation, Civil Documentation and Returns (October 2023 and October 2025).
I have accessed these documents online as copies were not required to be part of the bundle.
h. After a discussion, Mr Eaton decided not to call the Appellant to give oral evidence, relying on the evidence previously recorded. Mr Tan confirmed the Respondent would not be disadvantaged if he could not ask the Appellant questions.
i. The hearing proceeded for oral submissions only. These were conveyed to the Appellant via the interpreter. Between the submissions, I offered the Appellant a break, which he declined.
The claim
4. The appellant fears violence from his father, his stepmother and her brothers, who he says are peshmergas linked to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
5. The findings preserved by Judge Landes are:
i) That the appellant does not qualify as a member of a PSG;
ii) That the appellant was beaten and mistreated by his family and has a fear of ill treatment from his father, stepmother and her brothers;
iii) The appellant’s claim to have had his arms and legs broken is not credible;
iv) The appellant has an uncle who could initially help to support him on return. It is not credible that the appellant has not maintained any ongoing contact with the uncle;
v) The appellant had an INID and could apply for a replacement via his uncle.
Issues and relevant legal framework
6. Because of the preserved findings, the appellant’s claim is narrowed to whether he qualifies for humanitarian protection.
7. I mention for completeness that Mr Eaton confirmed that the Appellant no longer relies on Article 8 ECHR and therefore I make no findings on what was previously argued.
8. After hearing the submissions, I decided the following issues remain in dispute.
a. The weight to be given to the psychiatric report.
b. Whether the level of harm the Appellant suffered in Iraq reached the serious harm threshold.
c. Whether his stepmother’s brothers have influence within the PUK such that they would be able to trace the appellant if he returned to Iraq or continue to put the Appellant at risk of harm in other ways.
d. Whether domestic violence can be described as a blood feud or honour crime.
e. Whether the Appellant would be able to obtain his INID or a replacement to enable him to move freely.
f. Whether it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to move to another part of the country where he would be able to live without a real risk of serious harm.
9. In summary, the relevant legal framework is as follows.
a. Whether the appellant faces a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin, and he is unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to available himself of the protection of that country (see paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules).
b. Serious harm consists of the death penalty or execution, unlawful killing, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict (see paragraph 339CA).
c. In addition, to qualify, there must not be part of the appellant’s country where he would not face a real risk of serious harm, and it would be reasonable to expect him to move to and stay in that part of the country (see paragraph 339O).
Submissions
Presenting Officer
10. Mr Tan relied on the RFRL and the preserved factual findings. His oral arguments were as follows.
11. This is not a case where the appellant has suffered serious harm. While some mistreatment occurred, it was not to the extent claimed, and the appellant’s account that family members intended to kill him is not credible given the many past opportunities they would have had to do so.
12. There is no evidence that any family member has shown intention, ability, or ongoing motivation to locate or harm the appellant. The appellant previously benefited from the support of his paternal uncle, who sheltered him and funded his departure from Iraq; they remain in contact. His overland journey from Qaladiza across the breadth of the KRI without incident, despite the presence of checkpoints, indicates that his relatives lacked any influence to prevent his movement.
13. The appellant will now return as a 23‑year‑old adult, not an 18‑year‑old, and there has been five years without contact. The family who allegedly caused problems previously rejected him; any suggestion they would seek him out now is speculative. There is no credible evidence that the step‑uncles are Peshmerga, and the appellant could have obtained supporting material from his uncle if this were true.
14. The August 2024 psychiatric report should be given little weight because:
a. The instructions given to the expert are absent,
b. The expert did not have access to the Appellant’s GP records,
c. The expert did not consider the conflict between the Appellant’s registration with a GP and attendance and his account that he feared going to his GP,
d. There is no evidence that the Appellant has engaged with any of the recommendations made by the expert,
e. The expert did not take account of the Appellant’s assertions during his asylum interview that he had no medical issues, and
f. The expert’s conclusions are conditional on the wholesale acceptance of the Appellant’s narrative, which is not the case given the preserved findings.
15. The CPIN material cited on honour crimes and tribal violence is irrelevant because this case does not involve blood feuds, tribal customs, or honour‑based dynamics. The Appellant is an educated male with some employment history and support from his uncle. There is no evidence his family has any profile or influence that would undermine the ability of the competent authorities in the IKR to provide protection. To establish insufficiency of protection, the Appellant would need to prove his relatives are Peshmerga, linked to a party, and able to prevent him seeking protection elsewhere. He has not done so. According to the September 2025 CPIN, this factual matrix fails to identify that he would have insufficient protection available in Iraq.
16. Internal relocation remains a reasonable option. The appellant previously moved within Iraq, including on his journey to the UK. He had support from his uncle, and there is no medical evidence suggesting inadequate healthcare in the IKR. There are no territorial or clan‑based constraints preventing relocation.
17. The preserved findings confirm the Appellant left his documents in Iraq and that he can obtain them through family. His uncle could send them to the UK, meet him on arrival, or facilitate renewal. The Appellant has not attempted to approach the Iraqi Embassy or IKR office to demonstrate it is unviable for him to obtain documentation. In any event, his asylum registration card is a form of identification he could use to obtain replacement Iraqi documents. Documentation therefore raises no real obstacle to return.
Appellant’s representative
18. Mr Eaton relied on his skeleton argument. His oral submissions were as follows.
19. The preserved findings include the FtTJ’s conclusion at [22] that the appellant was not found incredible, and at [26] that his account was largely accepted. The FtTJ accepted the core of the appellant’s evidence of sustained domestic violence inflicted by his father, stepmother and step‑uncles.
20. The psychiatric report further supports this. At para 70, the expert concludes that if domestic violence is accepted, then the PTSD diagnosis must also be accepted as consistent with the Appellant’s account and with the intensity and duration of the abuse. The absence of broken bones does not undermine the diagnosis. Taken together, the evidence demonstrates past persecution/serious harm over a prolonged period.
21. Although there is no documentary proof that the step‑uncles were linked to the Peshmerga, the question is whether such evidence would be reasonably obtainable. The appellant’s account—that he was told and overheard this information—is inherently plausible in a family context. His experience also shows that when he went to his paternal uncle for safety, his father tracked him down and forced him home, demonstrating both (i) the uncle’s inability to provide long‑term protection, and (ii) the family’s continued intention to control him, contradicting the proposition that they had “cast him out”.
22. The level of ill‑treatment therefore meets the threshold for persecution, and refugee status fails only because there is no Convention reason.
23. Domestic violence within families is addressed in CPIN section 4.3, and the appellant’s credible account places him within a family connected to a powerful tribal structure within the KRG. The country material shows that the KRG security forces do not routinely intervene in intra‑family violence. CPIN 11.10.1 highlights the capacity and willingness of tribes/families to locate individuals, especially in cases linked to honour; the father’s prior pursuit of the appellant from his uncle’s home is consistent with this.
24. As set out in the skeleton argument, relocation elsewhere in the KRG would not be reasonable. The appellant is a young man with significant mental health problems, including PTSD, and his family have previously demonstrated motivation and ability to find him when he attempted to move away. Relocation would be unduly harsh, and his psychological vulnerabilities heighten the difficulty.
25. A key flaw in the FtTJ’s reasoning was the failure to give weight to the accepted history of domestic violence, which in turn undermined proper consideration of the psychiatric report. The PTSD diagnosis is rooted in accepted facts and provides further evidence of the severity of past harm and the appellant's ongoing vulnerabilities.
26. At his first asylum interview (Qs 19–21, p.126 PDF), the appellant explained that all his documents remained with the family who perpetrated the abuse. His uncle cannot safely obtain them, as doing so would reveal the appellant’s whereabouts. He therefore cannot access his historic documents.
27. As to obtaining new documents, the ASA (para 28) reflects the persistent difficulties in the Iraqi documentation system. Current CPIN material confirms that a person must nominate a proxy and attend the embassy with relevant documents. The appellant has no documents in the UK and cannot obtain copies from Iraq because they are in the control of the very individuals responsible for past persecution. He cannot safely appoint his uncle as proxy. Under SMO2, he would therefore be returned without documents, with additional risk given both his objective and subjective fear of returning to his home area and the continuing risk from family members.
Findings
Issue 1: What weight should be given to the psychiatric report?
28. I begin by assessing the medical evidence. In September2024, the Appellant was diagnosed by a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist (Dr Nuwan Galappathie) with the following mental disorders.
a. A single episode depressive disorder, moderate, without psychotic symptoms, and
b. Post-traumatic stress disorder.
29. In paragraphs 65 to 68 of the report, the Psychiatrist gives his reason for diagnosing PTSD. In paragraph 69, he says it is a provisional decision because he has not seen the Appellant’s GP records. In paragraph 70, the Psychiatrist says the diagnosis of PTSD is conditional on the Tribunal finding that the trauma the Appellant reports occurred.
30. I have considered Mr Tan’s submissions about the weight to be given to the report. I disagree that the Psychiatrist has not included his instructions as they appear at paragraph 7. Although they are brief, they are adequate as the Psychiatrist proceeds to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Appellant’s mental state. At paragraph 10, the Psychiatrist confirms he has seen the Home Officer bundle.
31. Also at paragraph 10, the Psychiatrist says he does not have the Appellant’s GP records, which is something he refers to elsewhere in the report. These indications tell me that the Psychiatrist is maintaining an appropriate level of caution when assessing the Appellant. In addition, because the Psychiatrist refers to having seen the Home Office bundle, I do not accept that he failed to have regard to what the Appellant said in his asylum interview. I point out that at the end of the Appellant’s substantive asylum interview on 18 September 2023, he describes how his stepmother’s actions made him feel depressed, which was recorded a year before he was seen by the Psychiatrist, and this undermines Mr Tan’s submission that the Appellant had not disclosed anything about his mental health state prior to being referred to and seen by the Psychiatrist.
32. Mr Tan’s submissions imply that the Appellant has not disclosed his GP records because they would undermine the psychiatric report. I do not accept this allegation because I find it is speculative. I do not find the Appellant registration with a GP being inconsistent with his fears about seeing a GP for treatment. I find this pattern fits with his presentation as having a depressive disorder. I accept that the Appellant has not sought treatment through his GP and as a result the GP records are unlikely to have relevant information. I conclude that the absence of the GP records does not undermine the Psychiatrist’s diagnoses. I also find this is adequate explanation why the Appellant has not sought treatment in line with the Psychiatrist’s recommendations.
33. It is evident from the preserved findings that the Appellant’s account of the ill treatment he suffered from his family is not wholly accepted. While it is accepted that he was mistreated by his family and has a fear of ill treatment from his father, stepmother and her brothers, it is not accepted that his arms and legs were broken. I consider whether this undermines the psychiatric diagnosis of PTSD. It does not because the Psychiatrist does not rely on the Appellant’s claim to have had bones broken and as a reason for the diagnosis of PTSD. The Psychiatrist considered the ill treatment inflicted by the Appellant’s family and considered that was sufficient for at least a provisional diagnosis of PTSD.
34. For all these reasons, I accept the Appellant has the mental disorders (depressive disorder and PTSD) diagnosed by the psychiatrist.
35. Before I leave my consideration of the psychiatric report, I assess the Psychiatrist’s opinion about the impact return to Iraq would have on the Appellant’s mental health. I accept the conclusion that return to Iraq would likely trigger a significant deterioration in his mental health because of his strongly held subjective fear of his stepmother and her brothers. However, I do not accept the conclusion that the deterioration would lead to thoughts of self-harm and suicide or to a risk of these actions. The Psychiatrist identifies these as potential developments, based on his understanding about how people with PTSD can react. As the Appellant has never indicated he had thoughts of self-harming or committing suicide when he was in Iraq, and never acted on such thoughts if he did have them, I find the Psychiatrist is describing a risk that falls to be treated as mere possibility rather that as reasonably likely.
Issue 2: Did the Appellant experience serious harm?
36. I turn to the first factual issue I identified earlier regarding serious harm. The Appellant says he comes within the definition of serious harm in paragraph 3.39CA of the immigration rules. He says the ill treatment he received at the hands of his relatives amounts to inhuman or degrading treatment and fears it will resume if he returns to Iraq because his father or stepmother would be able to find him. He fears being killed by his stepmother’s brothers, which would be unlawful.
37. It is accepted that the Appellant suffered emotional and physical violence in his family home. I add that the preserved finding implicitly adopts the claim that the violence was inflicted over several years. Even if that was in doubt, the level of suffering was such that it has caused the Appellant to have a mental health disorder, namely PTSD.
38. Because of this diagnosis, and the evidence from the Pychiatrist that the Appellant’s mental health condition would worsen if he returned to Iraq (see paragraph 90 of the report), I am satisfied the ill treatment experienced by the Appellant amounted to serious harm.
39. I consider whether the Appellant’s past experience of serious harm is a sufficient reason to believe it would recur if he returned to Iraq, having regard to the fact that the starting point is that past experience is a good indication of future real risk. In this case I do not find the past experience is a good indication because despite the preserved findings confirming the Appellant remains in contact with his paternal uncle, there is no indication that the Appellant’s father, stepmother and her brothers have shown any interest in him since he left Iraq. In addition, the Appellant would no longer be a vulnerable young adult and subject to the coercion previously experienced as he has lived away from those relatives for five years and is now an independent adult male who is making his own life.
40. So, although I find the Appellant experienced serious harm in the past from his father, stepmother and her brothers, I do not find it is reasonably likely that ill treatment would recur if he returned to Iraq. I will explain more about this when I look at the last issue and look at the Appellant’s circumstances in the round.
Issue 3: What was the role of the brothers of the Appellant’s stepmother?
41. I turn to the Appellant’s fear of being killed by his stepmother’s brothers. The Appellant said in his witness statement of 30 April 2025 that he did not know what exact positions they held. He believed they were peshmerga because when they visited, they would be wearing a cream-coloured uniform, would arrive driving Toyota Land Cruisers, and because he overheard people mention their roles. In his asylum interview, the Appellant said he had heard them says they were part of the PUK. In his witness statement, the Appellant said his knowledge is limited because he was not included in family discussions, and he relied on what he overheard.
42. I have considered the CPIN Iraq: Actors of Protection (September 2025) as it contains details about the peshmerga. Unfortunately, I cannot find anything in the document that matches the Appellant’s account of the colour of the uniform worn by peshmerga or what vehicles they use. I have looked for such information not to seek corroboration but recognising that if there was corroboration then the Appellant’s account would be strengthened. I do not draw any adverse inference from the absence of such corroboration and return to consider the available evidence, which is the Appellant’s own account.
43. When looking at the matter overall, although I accept that the fact they were wearing uniforms would indicate to the Appellant, even as a child, that they were involved in the military, police or security forces, on his own account he did not know which. His belief they were peshmerga is based on what he overheard said at home, but he admits he was not sure. Although this reflects his overall honesty, the evidence is of limited evidential weight as he is speculating albeit on what he saw and heard.
44. Furthermore, the Appellant has been unable to say what role these men had. I see in his asylum interview he did not know whether his stepmother’s family has a high position in Iraq. I find it is speculative that they were of sufficient influence to be able to use the security apparatus for their own ends, such as to search for the Appellant if he returned to Iraq.
45. While I accept that the Appellant has given the best account he could, based on what he saw and heard, because the evidence is unreliable by his own admission, I find the account that his stepmother’s brothers were peshmerga or that they were of sufficient influence to be able to locate him if he returned to Iraq to be mere possibilities rather than being reasonably likely.
Issue 4: Can the domestic violence be described as a blood feud or honour crime?
46. I begin my examination of this issue by assessing the country information. I have considered the news reports provided by the Appellant, Iraq to stop using old IDa from March 2024 (28/12/2023) and Iraq’s national ID card system launched with 36 million citizens enrolled (30/03/2024) and find them to be consistent with the information in the CPIN. I presume this is why Mr Eaton did not draw particular attention to these reports.
47. Mr Eaton presents the Appellant’s case as being akin to a situation where he has undermined family honour. Mr Eaton drew my attention to paragraphs 3.1.2 and 3.2.11 of CPIN Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribunal violence (July 2024).
48. I do not find these extracts to assist the Appellant’s case. They are taken out of context. In context, it is difficult to describe the Appellant’s circumstances a blood feud. A blood feud usually involves members of one family or tribe threatening to kill or take retaliatory acts of vengeance against another family or tribe. This does not describe the Appellant’s position. Nor do the circumstances fit within the description of honour crimes. The document describes honour crimes involving males where they have engaged in premarital or extramarital relationships, or where they have damaged their family’s honour by violating gender roles through their dress of having same-sex relationships.
49. I accept that the issues reported in the CPIN are limited to the sources extracted by its authors, but I cannot go beyond what it contains. I cannot infer from the limited information that the Appellant’s family would feel dishonoured by him for leaving the family home. Mr Eaton sought to persuade me that the Appellant was forced to return home by his father when he tried to live with his paternal uncle and that this was an indication that the father felt dishonoured. I find that to be mere possibility rather than being reasonably likely as there is nothing in the CPIN evidence to indicate that the father would have felt dishonoured, particularly as the Appellant had sought to stay within the wider paternal family.
50. I refer to Mr Eaton’s submission that the Appellant would have no realistic access to protection against domestic violence in Iraq, or within the IKR/KRG because the laws in place are ineffective. This is supported in paragraphs 4.1.1 and 11.10.1 of the document, although I note that at both junctures, the description relates to women not having protection under the law. The document indicates the patriarchal nature of Iraq and Kurdish societies, and the fact males are treated very differently to females. This means it is difficult to infer that the situation facing women can be read across to men.
Issue 5: Can the Appellant obtain his INID or a replacement?
51. I next turn to the question of whether the Appellant would be able to obtain a replacement INID and consider Mr Eaton’s arguments that draw on the CPIN Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns (October 2023 and October 2025). Of course, I do so with regard to the relevant County Guideline cases, particularly SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) [SMO1] and SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) [SMO2].
52. The preserved findings include that the Appellant had an INID and could apply for a replacement via his paternal uncle. I point out that Mr Eaton has changed the language of those preserved findings in his skeleton argument, by suggesting that the Appellant may, with the assistance of his uncle, be able to obtain a replacement. This is not the preserved finding, which indicates it is something he could, that is would be able to, do. I am bound by the preserved findings and therefore cannot consider the new arguments that the Appellant may have difficulties obtaining a replacement INID.
53. Even if I could depart from the preserved findings, I would not do so. The issue raised by Mr Eaton relates to the practicalities of the Appellant obtaining either his original or a replacement INID. This does not challenge the preserved findings that he remains in contact with his paternal uncle, who would be prepared to help him, including to get the INID or a replacement. As Mr Tan pointed out, the appellant has not approached the Iraqi Embassy or the IKR/KRG Office to show these are not viable routes, and it is speculative that they are not, particularly because the CPIN says that a person in the UK can obtain a power of attorney through the IKR/KRG Office. The Appellant would need to produce some form of ID, but that could be British, and he could use the Home Office issued asylum card. Mr Tan also pointed out that alternatively the Appellant could be met by his uncle on return and then seek redocumentation in Iraq.
Issue 6: Is it reasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate to another part of the IRK/KRG?
54. The final issue stems from paragraph 339O of the Immigration Rules. To determine this issue, I must consider the preserved findings and the findings I have made.
55. Paragraph 339O requires a holistic approach, involving specific reference to the individual’s personal circumstances including past persecution/ serious harm or fear thereof, psychological and health condition, family and social situation, and survival capacities to determine the impact on that individual of settling in the proposed place of relocation and whether the individual “can reasonably be expected to stay” in that place. The test of reasonableness requires and assessment of the particular circumstances of the individual and the impact upon that person of the proposed place of relocation. It does not take into account the standard of rights protection which a person would enjoy in the country where refuge is sought (see SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15).
56. The evidence and findings lead me to the following assessment of the Appellant’s circumstances were he to return to Iraq on the basis that he would relocate to another part of the IKR/ KRG.
a. The Appellant is a 23-year-old man, who experienced serious harm from relatives over several years, which has caused him PTSD.
b. The Appellant has managed his mental health needs in the UK without medical intervention.
c. A deterioration in his mental health is reasonably likely to have an adverse impact on his resilience and his ability to function in society, for example to find and engage in work, but it is unclear to what extent.
d. Although return to the IKR/ KRG is likely to trigger a significant deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health, he is not at a real risk of self-harm or suicide.
e. On his own account, the Appellant worked in Iraq under his father’s control and not by choice. On his own account he completed education to Year 10.
f. The Appellant has not been permitted to work or study in the UK, which means there is no recent evidence of his ability to support himself.
g. As his paternal uncle lives in the same town as his father and stepmother, it is reasonably likely the Appellant’s fear of being located there (as happened previously) would be high and it would not be a place where he could settle.
h. The Appellant would have support from his paternal uncle in Iraq, but the extent of that support is unknown if the Appellant did not live with him, and it is unknown whether the uncle would be able to fund him if he moved to another town or city.
i. The Appellant would have a relevant Iraqi document, such as his INID, enabling him to move freely in the IKR/ KRG.
j. The Appellant’s father, stepmother and her brothers do not have the ability to trace him if he moved to a different town or area of the IKR/ KRG as they do not have resource to track him down.
k. Despite remaining in contact with his paternal uncle, there are no reports that the Appellant’s father, stepmother and her brothers have shown any interest in locating the Appellant after he left Iraq.
57. Drawing all these findings together, I am unable to say that it would be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate. Such a conclusion could only be drawn if I gave weight to mere possibilities, which would be legally wrong. Although the Appellant’s mental health is likely to significantly deteriorate, it is speculative that it would reach a level that undermines his functional skills such as to prevent him working to support himself or to care for himself. Although the extent to which his paternal uncle would be able to support him is unknown if he lived elsewhere in Iraq, it is accepted that the uncle arranged the Appellant’s travel out of Iraq and to the UK, which point to his ability to assist with some level of funding beyond simply providing board and lodging. In addition to these factors, the fact the Appellant has only a subjective fear of his father, stepmother and her brothers and not an objective fear, means that relocation would not require him to live in hiding.
58. In other words, I find that Mr Eaton’s submissions seek to paint the worst-case scenario that might face the Appellant on return in the context of internal relocation. Worst-case scenario is not the legal test I have to apply, which is about whether there it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to move to another area of Iraq, including assessing whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so.
59. I conclude that it would not be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate to a part of Iraq away from his father, stepmother and her brothers as he would not face a real risk of serious harm from them continuing in that area. I find it is reasonable to expect him to relocate because he has failed to establish that it is reasonably likely that he would become destitute or that he would lose his functional skills such that he would be unable to find work or to care for himself.

Notice of Decision
I remake the decision.
The appeal is dismissed.

Judge John McCarthy

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 January 2026