Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-003537

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01479/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

P T M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Sellwood, Counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmore, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) dismissing, by decision promulgated on 9 June 2025, his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his international protection and human rights’ claims. The appellant arrived in the UK and claimed asylum in January 2023 at the age of 16, his case being that he would be killed on return to Iraq due to his former relationship with a girl from a powerful family with connections to the KDP and PUK.
Anonymity order
2. I maintain the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal judge granting permission bearing in mind the appellant has claimed asylum. The public interest in open justice is outweighed by the public interest in the confidentiality of the asylum process being maintained.
Grounds of appeal; discussion; conclusions
3. Ms Gilmore did not oppose the application to amend the grounds of appeal and in the circumstances and bearing in mind her concessions described below, I granted the application.
4. Ms Gilmore conceded that ground 3, the failure to apply country guidance on a Robinson obvious point was made out. I consider that to be an appropriate concession. Although the appellant’s skeleton argument for the hearing before the FTJ did not specifically refer to documentation as an issue, the appellant’s evidence was that all documents including his identity card were taken by the agent. How the appellant would be able safely to return to his home area (or indeed any area of relocation) was therefore an obvious point which needed to be considered. The FTJ should have evaluated the respondent’s assertion that if the appellant had no documents, he could re-document with the help of his father and considered whether that would avoid the risks faced by those without documents. Given the country guidance of SMO, it does not follow that the appellant would be able to avoid the risks at checkpoints before re-documenting, if he had no CSID card and had never applied for an INID card.
5. Even more fundamentally, Ms Gilmore also conceded the point in the original grounds that the FTJ had not given adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account bearing in mind the appellant’s age. Again I consider this to be an appropriate concession. The FTJ accepted that he had to take into account that the appellant was aged 16 when he arrived in the UK and that he was 17 when interviewed by the respondent. However, the FTJ did not explain how he had taken the appellant’s age into account, and it is not obvious from [14]. The FTJ explained that there were a number of discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence and gave examples, but he did not explain why he found those discrepancies significant even making allowance for the appellant’s age at the relevant time. I appreciate the need for restraint and not assuming that the FTJ fell into error just because not every step in his reasoning is fully set out, but there is no reasoning at all relevant to age other than a bare statement that the appellant’s age has been taken into account. The appellant is entitled to know how his age was taken into account and why his explanations were rejected.
6. Given the appropriate concession of inadequate reasoning on credibility taking into account the appellant’s age, there is no need for me to consider the remaining grounds which relate to other aspects of the credibility assessment (failure to give adequate reasons why the appellant’s account was rejected, failure to resolve a disputed issue of fact as to the country from which the appellant had arrived, unlawful requirement of corroboration). This is because the appellant’s age was clearly central to the credibility assessment and the decision must therefore be set aside, with no findings preserved.
7. Both representatives agreed appropriately that given the extent of fact-finding necessary and that the central error of law went to credibility, the appeal must be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for remaking.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
The decision is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal (Hatton Cross) for fresh consideration by another judge, with no findings preserved.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 October 2025